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Map 1. Iraq.
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Map 2. Baghdad.
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Map 3. Mosul, Iraqi Units, 2006-2008.
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Map 5. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Major Camps, 2003–2011.
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Map 6. Ethno-Religious Groups, Iraq.
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Map 7. Detention Facilities, Theater Level, 2003–2011.
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FOREWORD
BY THE 39TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
My predecessor, General (Retired) Ray Odierno, initiated this in-stride study of the
U.S. Army’s experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) to share lessons, sharpen
thinking, and promote debate.
I applaud and congratulate the team of warrior-scholars that authored this two-volume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War. These Soldiers devoted countless hours of
intellectual energy to help us understand the operational lessons of OIF. They reviewed,
analyzed, and synthesized thousands of reports, conducted numerous interviews, and
examined the events of а war that defined а generation of Soldiers.
This study is an interim work by design. It is а waypoint on our institution’s quest
to comprehend the OIF experience. We must continue to evaluate and reevaluate events
and the contexts that frame them. Eventually, our Army will have а comprehensive, official “Green Book” history that describes OIF authoritatively, but it will require years of
research to get there. There is much left to do, but this analysis starts а long-term historical effort.
We have а professional and moral responsibility to learn the relevant lessons of the
recent past. OIF is а sober reminder that technological advantages and standoff weapons
alone cannot render a decision; that the promise of short wars is often elusive; that the
ends, ways, and means must be in balance; that our Army must understand the type of
war we are engaged with in order to adapt as necessary; that decisions in war occur on
the ground in the mud and dirt; and that timeless factors such as human agency, chance,
and an enemy’s conviction, all shape а war’s outcome.
Our Army is strong, and getting stronger. We are on azimuth to build а more lethal
force that deters adversaries and is capable of a rapid transition to win the ground fight as
а member of the joint and coalition forces. Use this work to help you and your team stay
ready to defeat any future adversary. Understand that this is likely not the final word, but
learn its operational lessons and add them to your kit bag of skills.
Army Strong!

xxix

FOREWORD
BY THE 38TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
In July 2013, 18 months after the last of our operating forces departed Iraq, I directed
that the U.S. Army take steps to capture key lessons, insights, and innovations from our
more than 8 years of conflict in that country. As the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, I strongly
believed that having been at war continuously since the attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), it was time to conduct an initial examination of the Army’s experiences in the
post-9/11 wars, to determine their implications for our future operations, strategy, doctrine, force structure, and institutions. The two-volume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq
War by the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group
is the first product of that effort.
The story the OIF Study Group has documented of the Army at the operational level
is one of units and headquarters working in difficult and complex environments, with
leaders at all levels making tough decisions under the pressure of time. As the group’s
research emerged, I noted a number of their findings whose important implications I saw
firsthand as a division, corps, and force commander in Iraq. First and foremost, is the
concept that while our technological means may have become more advanced, we cannot
ignore operational art, the principles of war, and the importance of terrain. These fundamental concepts were every bit as important to our counterinsurgency and stabilization
campaigns in Iraq, as they have been in other, more conventional conflicts. Moreover, it
is clear in retrospect, that those who rejected the idea that there is an operational level of
war in counterinsurgency were wrong. For our operations to succeed and be sustained,
we must have a thorough understanding of the operating environment and the local
political and social consequences of our actions, especially when facing an enemy who
understands the environment better than we do. When operating among a host nation’s
population, we must constantly clarify our intentions in order to avoid creating new enemies. In addition, when conditions on the ground change, we must be willing to reexamine the assumptions that underpin our strategy and plans and change course if necessary,
no matter how painful it may be.
This account of the Iraq War holds some important strategic and institutional lessons
as well. We must seek better ways of operating effectively with our coalition allies, whose
constraints are naturally different from ours. We must also employ better ways of generating and partnering with effective and legitimate host nation forces and of accounting
for the political pressures that constrain those forces. The Iraq War also teaches us that we
should improve the ways in which we develop our strategic leaders. The conduct of war
and the nature of decision-making are becoming more decentralized and, as a result, we
must develop leaders who are capable of thinking strategically and leading joint, interagency, and multinational teams at an earlier stage in their careers.
We also have seen in the wake of the Iraq War that the United States has entered
another historical cycle, like those that followed major American wars in the past, in
which our civilian and military leaders debated the utility of landpower for our national
objectives. A reading of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War indicates that, even at a much higher
end strength than they now have, our ground forces were overtaxed by the commitments
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in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the decision to limit our troop levels in both theaters had
severe operational consequences. A review of these volumes also indicates that our adversaries are unlikely to abandon the way of war they adopted in Iraq, and that landpower
will remain an important element of strategic deterrence in the future.
For me, as a Soldier of 40 years, the history of the Iraq War is the astonishing story
of an Army that reached within itself to learn and adapt in the midst of a war that the
United States was well on its way to losing. It was a formative experience for a generation of Soldiers and leaders. In addition, it was a field of sacrifice for many thousands of
our fellow countrymen. Above all, these volumes are meant to ensure their sacrifices are
never forgotten.

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General (Retired), United States Army
38th Chief of Staff
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PREFACE
In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed
the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The
U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge
counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias,
bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes
how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations
began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
and later United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military
to take responsibility for their nation’s security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated
significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected
complete withdrawal in 2011.
In scope, the study group members consciously modeled this history after the Army’s
“Green Book” histories of World War II. As the Green Books did, and as General Odierno
charged us to do, we focused on the operational level of war. These volumes are narrative
histories that tell the story of U.S. forces in Iraq, mainly from the perspective of the theater command in Baghdad and the operational commands immediately subordinate to it.
They focus on the decisions and intent of the senior three- and four-star commanders in
Baghdad over time.
In writing this history, we strove to evaluate the major decisions those commands
faced, to understand what commanders intended to accomplish, and to comprehend
how the commands interpreted the situation at the time. We also traced many of those
decisions to the tactical level to judge how strategic and operational intent translated
into changes on the battlefield. At the same time, we examined the broad trends and
tactical developments that affected the operational and strategic levels, including missed
opportunities along these lines. Our team also assessed the impact of changes to the institutional army, such as modularization and transformation, on the operational conflict in
Iraq. Finally, we explored the assumptions underpinning the U.S. campaign in Iraq at
various times and assessed their validity.
We wrote this history with two audiences in mind. For current and future Army leaders, we sought to explain the key operational and strategic lessons from the Iraq War that
in our estimation should inform strategy, operations, and the Army as an institution.
In addition, we attempted to write this history in an accessible way so that a civilian
audience can understand the Army’s experience in the war. We believe too few military accounts thus far explain to the American public what the armed forces have gone
through in the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars. If unaddressed, this can lead to a
gulf between the public and its military.
Although this book is an Army history, we included other military services and international forces in the story, sometimes in great detail. In contemporary warfare, the Army
goes to war as part of a joint force and often with coalition partners. It would be impossible to explain what the Army experienced in Iraq without including the story of the U.S.
Marines, the British armed forces, and other coalition ground forces.
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We also attempted, to the best of our knowledge and ability, to include the enemy
perspective, the nature of the operating environment, and the political and social context
for the conflict. We have done this to explain why various groups and peoples fought
against or alongside coalition forces, what they hoped to achieve, and how their leaders
made decisions in response to (or independent of) the coalition’s actions.
This volume of The United States Army in the Iraq War includes a summary of our
major findings concerning the operational and strategic lessons of the war, but readers
will see this throughout the themes of our research. The 2007-2008 surge counteroffensive utterly changed the operational situation in Iraq. In late 2006, Iraq was in the throes
of a civil war, with its government ministries and security forces barely functioning. Its
survival as a unitary state was questionable. By the end of 2008, Iraq’s Sunni insurgency
had been quashed, with vast groups of insurgents having switched sides and joined the
coalition as Sons of Iraq. Similarly, Iranian-backed Shi’a militias had been defeated across
southern and central Iraq, and even the militia stronghold of Sadr City had been cleared.
Introduction of the surge brigades and Marine forces, combined with the additional manpower from the organic Sunni Awakening, and coupled with operational level guidance
to increase the coalition footprint in order to protect the population, had regained the
initiative and returned Iraq to a state of near normalcy.
Improvement in Iraq’s situation brought paradoxical changes at the strategic level
which eventually allowed both Sunni extremist groups and Iranian sponsored militias
to recover and again threaten the Iraqi state. As Iraq’s security situation improved, its
government exerted more influence over its own future. Unfortunately, many of the decisions made by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki during this phase proved to be more beneficial to his own political standing and the standing of supportive Shi’a parties than to the
long-term viability of the Iraqi state. As a result, the Bush administration was unable to
obtain a security agreement to allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq long enough to ensure
the country would not slide off its path toward recovery. Similarly, Iraq’s improved situation provided sufficient justification to the Obama administration―elected on a platform of decreasing American involvement in the Middle East―to carry out that very
platform. The “Washington and Baghdad clocks” to which General David Petraeus had
often alluded had run out. What followed was tragic, but not unexpected. Maliki’s sectarianism and authoritarianism only increased as the U.S. presence decreased, and, following the complete withdrawal of forces in December 2011, his actions hollowed out the
Iraqi security forces and alienated the Sunni community, leading some of its members to
rejoin militant extremists in fighting the central government. Iraq’s civil war, which had
been smoldering since the departure of U.S. forces, reignited. As Iraq’s security forces
collapsed in the face of an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offensive, U.S. forces
returned less than 3 years after they had departed.
For the Army, the 5-year period encompassing the surge counteroffensive to the withdrawal of forces from Iraq represents some of the highest and lowest points in its recent
history. The surge counteroffensive highlighted how leaders and Soldiers at all levels
learned and adapted to a challenging form of warfare. It showed that when the stakes
were the highest and the situation most desperate, the Army was able to incorporate
new equipment, technology, and tactical innovations. As the Sunni Awakening began to
spread, tactical commanders realized its importance and adopted difficult policies that
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resulted in negotiations with men who had American blood on their hands. Operational
and theater-level leaders were similarly able to understand its importance and backed
their subordinates as they capitalized on opportunities. By the close of 2008, those adaptations and decisions achieved results far beyond what had been anticipated. But the
United States was unable to exploit those gains fully. In the end, those same leaders and
Soldiers who had seen free Iraqi elections and the tamping down of the civil war witnessed a Shakespearean-level tragedy as their hard work and sacrifice seemingly came
apart when Iraq nearly collapsed in 2014.
In writing this narrative history, we relied to a great degree on military records from
U.S. operational headquarters and interviews, most of them not previously accessible to
scholars. Mixing oral history interviews with archival documentary research creates, in
our opinion, considerable synergy. Some readers, particularly those within the national
security community, may be surprised with information revealed in this book. Our study
benefited tremendously from U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) support in declassifying and/or redacting over 30,000 pages of material selected by our team. We were also
aided by the products of an earlier effort led by the researchers of General George Casey’s
book, Strategic Reflections, which had yielded over 10,000 pages of declassified or redacted
material. To further ensure we properly safeguarded sensitive national security information, this manuscript underwent security reviews at the Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review and at the U.S. Army War College. We have also benefited from the
fact that much more is known today about the enemy and about the actions of the Iraqi
Government than was known during the early years of the war. From our vantage point
in 2017, however, we recognize that this is a history of a war that is not yet over. With
thousands of U.S. and coalition forces back in Iraq campaigning against an enemy that
is a successor to al-Qaeda in Iraq, we understand that there may be many more accounts
written before the story truly ends. We do not expect that our work will be definitive.
Instead, we hope our contribution helps to open the door to future research by others
whose investigations we fully expect will supersede our own.
The scope of this project and the time available prevented us from covering a number
of major areas of research that we will have to leave for others to examine. We hope that
our work at the operational level will point the way for scholars to research and write the
story of U.S. ground forces at the tactical level. Some histories at that level have begun
to appear, such as Dale Andrade’s Surging South of Baghdad, but many more are needed.
Another omission in this history is the role of U.S. special operations forces in Iraq,
who were involved in virtually every major development during the war, but whose
story we have not been able to adequately tell. The special operations commands are not
yet ready to grant researchers complete access to their operational records to chronicle
the often amazing tales they contain. In particular, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) consistently produced results far above
what would normally be expected of a brigade level command, and little has been written about their exploits. The sections of our history that recount the special operations
role in Iraq represent a small fraction of what the special operators actually did, and we
hope that someday soon that story can be fully told.
We also have not been able to provide a full account of the enemy and Iraqi forces
of various kinds that fought during the war, though we have worked hard to assemble
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as much of that information as we can. Neither the enemy forces nor the Iraqi security
forces have yet told their own story, and, until they do, historians’ understanding of their
perspective is necessarily incomplete.
A few other areas of research were beyond the scope of this history but should be
undertaken by researchers, including the shared logistics that supported both Iraq and
Afghanistan, air power in Iraq, and the maritime component of the Iraq campaign. The
functional areas of information operations and reconstruction efforts deserve their own
treatment as well. Even more importantly, the Defense Department needs to produce a
history of U.S. Central Command in the post-9/11 wars, so that the operational histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars―as well as other smaller operations―can be put
into their regional and strategic context. The fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or the
Islamic State in Iraq was part of a broader campaign against al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Fighting in Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and other locations was connected
through a strategic framework―both ours and our enemies’―with the fighting in Iraq
and Afghanistan. This strategic history should be modeled on the U.S. Army in World
War II series, The Supreme Command, an overarching history of the Allies in the European
theater, without which the operational histories of the European theater cannot be fully
appreciated.
A history set in Iraq will contain many Arabic personal and place names, many of
which have no standard English spelling. In rendering these Arabic names into English,
we have followed standard transliteration in many cases, but in others, we have used the
spelling most common within the U.S. military, whether that spelling followed transliteration rules or not. We also generally chose to refer to Iraqis using English formalities
rather than the more familiar Iraqi style. Therefore, instead of the Iraqi style of referring
to General Babakir Zebari as General Babakir, we refer to him as General Zebari. For simplicity’s sake, and to reflect U.S. military and Iraqi usage, we have also tended to drop
the articles from the spelling of place names in the text. The maps are more formal and
retain the article.
Finally, throughout these volumes, we, the authors, retain full responsibility for all
matters of interpretation as well as for any errors or omissions of fact.
COLONEL FRANK SOBCHAK
COLONEL JOEL RAYBURN
Washington, DC
May 2017
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PART I:
THE SURGE, 2007-2008
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CHAPTER 1
STRATEGY IN CRISIS, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2006
As 2006 drew to a close, U.S. leaders in Washington and Baghdad grappled with the
reality that the transition strategy the U.S.-led coalition had been pursuing for more than
2 years had failed to stabilize Iraq. In the months since the February 2006 bombing of the
Shi’a shrine in Samarra, Iraq had descended into a sectarian civil war, with violence worst
in the Iraqi capital and its surrounding areas. By mid-October, three successive U.S.-Iraqi
operations to tamp down the sectarian attacks in Baghdad had failed, and violence had
only increased. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) campaign plan had envisioned a
reduction of U.S. forces to about 100,000 by the end of 2006. Instead, MNF-I Commander
General George W. Casey, Jr. had been forced to cancel unit redeployments, call forward
in-theater reserves from Kuwait, and authorize extensions of U.S. units in response to the
dire security situation in Baghdad.
For more than 2 years, Casey, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General John P. Abizaid, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld had been
the principal architects of U.S. military strategy in Iraq, but their grip on the campaign
began to slip in the fall of 2006. In December, the ground would shift under their feet as
a variety of high-profile groups offered alternatives to Casey’s strategy. In the space of
less than 2 months, President George W. Bush would dramatically change the strategy
guiding the U.S. campaign in Iraq and would appoint new commanders to implement
the revised approach.
STRATEGY OPTIONS
Moving Forward After Operation TOGETHER FORWARD
About 1 week after Abizaid’s mid-October message to Casey about the need to change
the dynamics in Baghdad (see Volume 1, Chapter 22), Rumsfeld arrived at a similar verdict. The top civilian official in the Pentagon noted the rising violence, abruptly con
cluded that the Baghdad Security Plan had failed, and invited the MNF-I commander to
convince him otherwise.1
Casey expected the ensuing video teleconference on November 1, 2006, to be another
session in which to communicate his appreciation of the situation. Instead, the general
encountered a defense secretary questioning the entire operation. What had been the
value of committing 3,000-4,000 more Americans to Baghdad in support of Operation
TOGETHER FORWARD, Rumsfeld wondered, if violence had only escalated? “Do you
think the Baghdad Security Plan is working?” the secretary pointedly asked.2 “It is keeping the capital from sliding into anarchy,” Casey replied. Sending additional U.S. and
Iraqi units to Baghdad had “a dampening effect on sectarian violence,” he assessed, but
“political action” was needed to shore up security gains.3
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General Fil, Jr., (left) SECDEF Rumsfeld (right).
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Nicole Kojetin (Released).

Major General Joseph Fil, Jr., Commanding General, MND-B,
With SECDEF Rumsfeld.4
Yet making progress on the political front seemed as difficult as it had ever been. This,
perhaps, was Rumsfeld’s point. To Rumsfeld, the late October 2006 incident (see Volume
1, Chapter 22) in which the Sadrists had forced Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to demand
the removal of coalition checkpoints from the outskirts of Sadr City demonstrated that
Moqtada Sadr exercised more influence over Maliki than the coalition did. The secretary
seemed puzzled by Casey’s apparent deference to the Iraqi leader and wanted to explore
what he saw as a mismatch in leverage. Rumsfeld observed that it looked as if Casey
simply bowed to the Prime Minister’s will to satisfy Iraqi interests in a case where the coalition had compelling interests of its own. Casey responded to Rumsfeld’s prodding with
an explanation of his relationship to Maliki. He was in the position of merely providing
military advice, and, as Prime Minister, Maliki could take it or leave it. The general had
argued that lifting the checkpoints would make recovering the missing American Soldier
more difficult and would cast the Iraqi leader as a supporter of Shi’a death squads. Casey
related that Maliki understood the risks but had insisted on suspending the checkpoints
nonetheless, which had settled the matter in Casey’s mind. “I don’t see it that way,”
Rumsfeld pointed out. “You don’t work for the PM [Prime Minister]. You report through
us—Abizaid and SECDEF—then to POTUS [President of the United States]. We decide.
He’s not your political leader.” Casey acknowledged this fact but noted that he could not
ignore Maliki, who was, after all, “my partner.” For clarity’s sake, the general added that
he would never do anything that he felt would disadvantage his Soldiers or jeopardize
the mission.5
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U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad (left) General Casey (center).
Source: DoD photo by Captain Amy Bishop (Released).

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad With General George Casey, Commander,
MNF-I, and Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie.6
Rumsfeld persisted. Casey had to make Maliki understand that, in spite of his position as Prime Minister, he did not have carte blanche in matters that involved coalition
military operations. Yes, Maliki had the authority to make decisions, but he needed to
understand that certain choices came with a price. If the Prime Minister insisted on dismantling the checkpoints along the Army Canal, then Casey should have announced his
intention to counter with an action undesirable enough to prompt Maliki’s reconsideration. The Iraqi leader was taking advantage of the coalition because he saw no downside
to doing so. “I don’t want to use the fifty-thousand-mile screwdriver,” the secretary ventured, “but I think that if Maliki is responding to Sadr’s pressure it’s because no pressure
is being applied from the other side.”7
Applying that pressure, as Rumsfeld saw it, was Casey’s job. When Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Eric S. Edelman objected, questioning whether it was fair to expect Casey to be a military adviser on one hand while demanding he “push” Maliki with the other, Rumsfeld
declared, “I don’t know who else it would be!” Adamant to put an end to what he saw
as a series of “free lunches” enjoyed by Maliki at American expense, Rumsfeld urged
Casey to make the Prime Minister understand that actions taken contrary to expressed
U.S. interests had consequences—with troop levels as the most promising lever.
“Maybe we should reduce the number of our forces in Baghdad? Maybe you should let
him know that you intend to withdraw troops?” suggested Rumsfeld. “Maybe pull a
brigade . . . send it after the Iranians and get after EFPs,” he added, using the acronym
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for explosively formed penetrators.8 Frustrated with Maliki’s sluggishness in reducing
sectarian violence in Baghdad, Rumsfeld’s immediate recommendation was to withdraw
American troops from the capital.
Casey and his advisers considered the secretary’s suggestions unhelpfully aggressive and confrontational. Pushing Maliki too firmly would make him more reliant on
domestic political support and less likely to risk an independent, nonsectarian stand.
Furthermore, Casey’s determination that MNF-I lacked credible leverage only made his
bargaining position worse. “The Iraqis know your hands are tied in Washington,” wrote
one adviser, offering a bleak assessment of U.S. political will. “They want their view of
Iraqi society more than we want our view—and they both know this and know that you
know this.”9 With coalition leverage declining, Maliki’s demands for sovereignty grew
shriller. If Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad responded by taking an even harder line,
then the Iraqis might well call their bluff. “Are we irrelevant because of our desire to
withdraw?” the general wondered.10
After the November 1 video teleconference, Rumsfeld continued to dwell on the prospect of reducing troop levels amid Baghdad’s escalating violence. On the eve of congressional midterm elections in the United States, the SECDEF drafted a memorandum that
listed an assortment of “new courses of action” for Iraq. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing . . . is not working well enough or fast enough,” he wrote, and proceeded to
outline 21 options. Of these, one involved increasing the number of U.S. brigade combat
teams (BCTs) in the theater, and he categorized it as a “less attractive option” alongside
continuing on the “current path.”11 Further limiting the roles and responsibilities of U.S.
forces and reducing their presence through repositioning or drawing down figured much
more prominently in the list.12 There was no question about where Rumsfeld stood when
it came to troop levels. The same could be said for the Republican chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Virginia Senator John W. Warner, who sent a memorandum
to Casey expressing concern that the MNF-I commander might be considering the prospect of increasing troop strength in Iraq.13
The White House Strategy Review
Casey’s tense exchange with Rumsfeld on November 1 and the secretary’s subsequent
input both proved inconsequential. Less than 1 week later, the American people went to
the polls to vote in midterm elections and handed the Democrats control of both houses
of Congress. Bush used the occasion to replace Rumsfeld, who submitted his resignation
a day after the administration’s electoral setback, after almost 6 years at the helm of the
Pentagon.
Since 2005, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley had peppered Casey with
questions related to Iraq operations and strategy. The barrage intensified in summer
2006 as the National Security Council (NSC) staff’s slowly developing assessment of the
conflict gathered momentum. The general, unaware of this quiet review, saw Hadley’s
inquiries as a nuisance that bordered on intrusive. Nonetheless, he accepted them (and,
at times, dismissed them) as part of the administration’s well-intentioned effort to gain
an understanding of the complicated and shifting environment in Iraq.14 Following Hadley’s belated trip to Iraq at the end of October, Casey related to Rumsfeld the national
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security adviser’s comment that the situation in Iraq seemed “really complex!”15 It only
later dawned on the general that Hadley was asking the questions in order to develop
alternative measures at odds with Casey’s strategy.

National Security Adviser Hadley (back, far left).
Source: White House photo by Eric Draper (Released).

President George W. Bush With National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley
and Vice President Richard Cheney.16
With the election over, the NSC staff ramped up its review of the U.S. Government’s
Iraq War strategy, considering a broader array of options, to include the deployment of
additional brigades—alternatives that Rumsfeld had vehemently opposed.17 By late 2006,
most of the options under consideration were not hasty expediencies, but well-developed
proposals. Some were the products of several years of analysis by respected voices both
inside and outside of the Bush administration who had long observed that the U.S. campaign in Iraq was in trouble. Among those outside the government, American Enterprise
Institute scholar Thomas Donnelly had argued as early as November 2003 that the United
States should implement a counterinsurgency approach in Iraq with additional American
troops.18 Brookings Institution scholar Kenneth Pollack had repeatedly argued as early as
2004 that more U.S. troops were needed in Iraq, and he and Georgetown professor Daniel
Byman had warned in August 2006 that the strategy of transitioning responsibility to the
Iraqis and reducing U.S. troop levels would be insufficient to halt Iraq’s civil war, and
that it might, in fact, make the war worse.19 Within the administration, State Department
officials Philip Zelikow and James Jeffrey had argued in June 2006 for sending additional
U.S. troops to restore order in Baghdad.20 These critics of the administration’s strategy
had been consulted by the White House over time, and as Hadley and the NSC staff
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explored options for a different Iraq strategy, their thinking would be informed by these
and other influential scholars and analysts.
On November 8, 2006, the same day as Rumsfeld’s resignation, Hadley submitted
his observations on the situation in Iraq to Bush, based on Hadley’s visit to Baghdad
the week before. With its recommendations for “a robust program of embedding coalition forces” and “giving [Maliki] additional control over Iraqi forces” Hadley’s memorandum reinforced Casey’s idea of speeding up the transfer of security responsibility.21
Hadley mentioned the possibility of more American forces to help reduce violence and
stabilize Baghdad, but he indicated that this idea would be left to the MNF-I commander
to approve. Beyond these points, however, Hadley noted that the U.S. strategy in Iraq
depended heavily on the Maliki government’s success in promoting national reconciliation and reforming the Iraqi security forces, two things the national security adviser
doubted that Maliki had either the ability or the will to do.22
Hadley was questioning the fundamental assumption that underlay MNF-I’s plans,
and this skepticism showed in an interagency review of the administration’s Iraq policy
that Hadley undertook at the President’s request. On November 10, deputy national
security adviser Jack Dyer “J. D.” Crouch launched the review, a step that finally formalized the NSC staff’s 5 months of quiet inquiries in search of alternative approaches. The
review team included several senior White House officials, including Meghan O’Sullivan
and Brett McGurk, who had become frustrated with the MNF-I campaign plan and its
inability to halt the violence in Iraq. Crouch and O’Sullivan were concerned that following through on transitioning security responsibility to the Maliki government without
first extracting meaningful concessions from the Iraqi leader might be counterproductive.
They also believed the United States needed to be more assertive in pushing the Iraqi political factions toward reconciliation. In addition, they consulted U.S.-based defense experts
about the idea of a temporary surge of U.S. troops into central Iraq in order to arrest the
sectarian violence before handing security responsibility over to the Iraqi Government.
Casey had long believed that the United States needed to drawdown its forces in order
to foster reconciliation among the Iraqi parties, after which violence would recede. The
senior White House officials working on Iraq had come to the opposite conclusion: that
U.S. forces needed to remain on the ground in order to tamp down violence and press the
Iraqi factions to reconcile.
Casey Doubles Down on the Joint Campaign Plan
From MNF-I’s standpoint, the elections and Rumsfeld’s resignation brought a sober
realization that the country was growing tired and dissatisfied with the war in Iraq.23 It
lent urgency to the command’s need to reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad and make
progress toward national reconciliation. Casey himself perceived an unsettling change in
the President’s demeanor. On November 10, during the first video teleconference since
the elections, Bush seemed “irritated, distant, and unmistakably cold”—an unpleasant
departure from his usual “upbeat, warm and friendly” tone. Casey conveyed his observation to Khalilzad following the meeting and wondered what this stir in the Washington winds portended.24 He found out soon enough and later recalled that it led “to the
most complex period of my command.”25
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As the NSC staff continued to explore ways for the United States to regain control of
the security situation in Iraq, Casey’s response to the changed dynamics in the aftermath
of the November 7 elections was to recommit to the transition strategy. In mid-November, he formulated a new campaign concept in which MNF-I would continue transferring
security responsibility to the Iraqis as conditions warranted but would now seek to do
so at an accelerated pace. The April 2006 campaign plan that had guided MNF-I’s march
toward the transfer of security responsibilities had already noted that early opportunities
to achieve Provincial Iraqi Control “must be seized and the pace of transition . . . accelerated whenever possible.”26 In fact, MNF-I had dubbed 2006 as the “Year of the Police” in
part to highlight the coalition’s effort to accelerate the Iraqi police service’s development
in order to close the gap between its capability and that of the Iraqi Army.27
The concept of speeding up the transition also fit naturally with the ongoing effort
to link political benchmarks with mutually reinforcing military action to improve the
security environment. As early as July 2006, Rumsfeld had called for a set of benchmarks
that would ostensibly coax the Iraqi Government toward reconciliation and self-reliance.
He had hoped this publicized roadmap would serve as a “new construct for Iraq” and
“permit a reduction of coalition forces.”28 When the latest iteration of the Baghdad Security Plan failed to make a satisfactory dent in the levels of sectarian violence, benchmarks
reemerged as an idea whose time had come.29 Casey saw them as political milestones that
the Iraqis could achieve by January 2007 with coalition help. The benchmarks included
long-standing issues like establishing a date for provincial elections, delineating the
powers of provincial governments, de-Ba’athification, hydrocarbon revenue distribution,
and several other items related to the rule of law, amnesty, and militias.30 Successfully
tackling this ambitious legislative agenda would set the stage for national reconciliation
and the transition of security responsibility during the coming year. Seeking to codify
an Iraqi division of power that addressed the competing interests of Kurdish, Shi’a, and
Sunni populations, the benchmark legislation formed the basis of an integrated political-military plan.31 Yet it depended on Iraqi cooperation, and in the fall of 2006, leaders
of the competing sects and ethnicities found compromise hard to achieve. Maliki even
objected to the term “benchmark” as an affront to his leadership and Iraqi sovereignty.32
The crucial question of how long the coalition would be able to exercise its full authority also loomed. MNF-I operated with fairly permissive guidelines under a United Nations
(UN) security resolution that could be invalidated by the Iraqi Government at any time.
On November 11, 2006, Maliki requested that the coalition’s mandate be extended for
another year in its current form. However, U.S. officials in Baghdad widely viewed this
as the last extension the Prime Minister would grant. Casey fully expected the mandate to expire on December 31, 2007, and, when it did, the coalition would face severe
restrictions on the kinds of operations it could conduct.33 Thus, in the last months of 2006,
MNF-I concluded that it had roughly 1 year to set Iraq on a path toward self-reliance—a
grim prospect given the self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence and the government’s
unwillingness to take meaningful steps toward national reconciliation. This factor also
informed Casey’s thinking as he pursued an accelerated timeline, even as many officials
in Washington were concluding that the time had come to slow down the transition.
The first public debate about Casey’s new concept began on November 15 as Abizaid testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The CENTCOM commander
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dismissed an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops. He advocated instead a “major
change” in U.S. strategy by augmenting the transition teams and reorienting U.S. units
from combat operations to training and advising the Iraqi security forces, the very concept that Casey was preparing to implement in Baghdad. When Arizona Senator John
S. McCain III suggested that the United States should instead surge 20,000 additional
American troops to deal with the security situation directly, Abizaid argued that a surge
would be more than U.S. ground forces could handle. He told McCain:
We can put in 20,000 more Americans tomorrow and achieve a temporary effect. But when you look
at the overall American force pool that’s available out there, the ability to sustain that commitment
is simply not something that we have right now with the size of the Army and the Marine Corps.34

Taking a more direct role with more U.S. forces would also discourage the Iraqis from
taking responsibility for their own security, Abizaid said. The senator countered, “I
regret deeply that you seem to think that the status quo and the rate of progress we’re
making is acceptable. I think most Americans do not.” It was a stark change from their
past exchanges, in which McCain had been deferential to Abizaid’s expertise on Iraq and
the Middle East, and it signaled that those who supported the Iraq War effort were losing
patience with the Casey-Abizaid strategy.35
The following day, November 16, Casey pitched his new campaign concept to Rumsfeld, now a lame duck serving until the Senate confirmed his nominated successor, Robert
M. Gates. The MNF-I commander began with his bottom line: “We are at a position in
the campaign where accelerating and completing the transition of security responsibility to capable Iraqi security forces is both strategically appropriate and feasible.” When
Rumsfeld expressed a mix of surprise and doubt, Casey clarified that the revised plan
would not expand the scope of the ongoing transfer, nor would it entail a change to how
the transfer would occur. “We are simply saying that there is an opportunity to transfer
faster,” Casey explained, arguing that the acceleration itself would provide much-needed
leverage to coax the Shi’a-dominated government down the road to reconciliation with
Sunni Arabs and Kurds. “I thought the administration wants to speed up,” Casey added.36
Rumsfeld now offered a correction to Casey’s interpretation of where the White House
desired to steer the U.S. mission in Iraq. “My impression,” began the secretary, “is that
the president is determined to stay in Iraq for the remainder of his term. . . . He wants
success.” What the President specifically needed from Casey, Rumsfeld ventured, were
options that would not only lead to the accomplishment of the coalition’s objectives but
also allow the President to defend himself from the critics emboldened by the Republicans’ electoral setback. Casey could help the President build political support following
the election by telling him what needed to be done to win, particularly an alternative to
any stark policy shift the congressionally funded Iraq Study Group might propose. The
pace of the transition thus far had been “orderly,” Rumsfeld observed, and he was skeptical that a suggestion to speed it up dramatically would be well received. It was true the
President wanted new options, Rumsfeld said, but “We don’t want to recommend something to the president that is dumb.”37
Casey went on to propose a five-point plan for an accelerated transition that would
ostensibly lead to the implementation of an Iraqi-brokered reconciliation program
ending the violence among competing factions. The coalition would push to complete
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the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government in 2007. Beginning in 2008,
MNF-I would transition to a new mission and establish a new security arrangement with
the Iraqis. On its way to this milestone, the force would gradually reduce its presence and
visibility—both in terms of troop levels and security-related tasks. Increasing the size of
military transition teams would be the primary means of carrying out the acceleration.
While these enhanced teams focused on training the Iraqi security forces and coordinating support for their independent combat operations, other coalition forces would
concentrate on defeating Sunni and Shi’a terrorists and death squads.38 As the coalition
adjusted its posture to speed up the process of transferring control and improving Iraqi
capability, Casey expected Maliki’s government to make progress on reconciliation. Specifically, this entailed taking a harder line against Shi’a militia groups and putting a stop
to their sectarian cleansing in and around Baghdad. However, the general admitted that
it was an open question as to whether the Prime Minister had the political will and courage to do so.39
As alternatives, Casey considered maintaining the status quo, raising troop levels, or
withdrawing on a fixed schedule. He dismissed outright the last option and opined that
additional forces would provide only a “temporary and local solution”—assuming the
Iraqis found such a reversal of coalition force levels acceptable in the first place.40 Not
surprisingly, Rumsfeld panned the choice to deploy reinforcements. “More would not be
helpful,” he declared. It would amount to just “feeding the alligator.”41
The task of describing how to operationalize the accelerated transition plan fell to
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli. The MNC-I commander explained to Rumsfeld
that the new effort, dubbed the transition bridging strategy, would focus on two elements:
training the Iraqi security forces and conducting strike operations, both independently
against high-value extremist targets and in support of Iraqi-led efforts. Reorienting divisions and BCTs onto these two mission sets would allow them to shed manpower-intensive tasks focused on sustained area security, and thus reorganize their formations along
more functional lines. To illustrate the idea, Chiarelli demonstrated how a U.S. brigade
would array its forces in a generic province where an Iraqi Army division was assigned.
A reinforced battalion would devote one company to help Iraqi units secure the border
and to enhance transition teams at the province’s ports of entry. Another company would
supplement the coalition police transition teams posted in Iraqi police district headquarters and stations. In the most significant change, four companies would support the 14
or so military transition teams embedded with the Iraqi Army brigades and battalions
operating in the province. Each transition team of roughly a dozen U.S. troops could be
reinforced by one platoon, doubling or tripling the team’s size.42
In theory, this enhancement provided a number of advantages. It would bolster the
inherent combat power of transition teams and allow them to operate farther afield from
coalition bases. Additional numbers meant that the team could better supervise the Iraqi
unit to which it was assigned down to the company level, an issue that had been debated,
but rejected when the teams were first organized in 2005. Chiarelli later described this
enhanced capacity as “24/7 coverage” that would deter Iraqi military leaders from implementing sectarian agendas.43 The BCT would also maintain a “strike battalion”—Chiarelli compared it to a football team’s free safety—capable of serving as a quick-reaction
force and conducting offensive operations against high-profile targets. Finally, another
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battalion would assume responsibility for fixed-site security for providing enablers to
coalition and Iraqi forces operating in the province.
Two uncertain qualifiers threatened the implementation of the concept at its very
outset. First, it depended on the evenhandedness of the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government and the willingness of the political elite to make substantive progress toward national
reconciliation. Second, it required interagency support. If brigades had to reorganize in
order to accelerate the transition, they would have to shed some of the nonmilitary tasks
they had been performing due to staffing shortfalls in civilian agencies, Chiarelli said.
To illustrate, he mentioned building capacity for the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which, at
the moment, had only one adviser while Iraqi security forces personnel occupied over 80
percent of the coalition’s military hospital beds.44
As he listened to Chiarelli, Rumsfeld pressed the senior military commanders in Iraq
to articulate the nonmilitary support they needed in specific terms, such as assistance in
tackling corruption and sectarianism within the Iraqi police.45 On the whole, although
Rumsfeld was dubious about Casey’s modified strategy, he seemed sold on the transition bridging concept by the end of the session. Granting that the specific numbers for
transition-team enhancement still needed to be determined, he labeled the concept as
“clear and understandable.” The secretary observed that it “seemed inconsistent with
‘clear-hold-build’ or whatever,” and he gave every indication of being comfortable with
that fact.46
The Council of Colonels
Back at the Pentagon, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General
Peter Pace, worked on formulating the Joint Chiefs’ input to the White House strategy
review. Earlier in the fall, retired General John M. “Jack” Keane had suggested that Pace
form a Council of Colonels to conduct an independent assessment of the Global War on
Terrorism and generate options regarding the future course of U.S. military policy in
Iraq, and Pace had accepted the suggestion.47 On November 22, the council presented its
work to the Joint Chiefs, outlining three broad options for the United States in Iraq: “go
big, go long, or go home.”48 Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, who had commanded the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar, Iraq, from 2005 to 2006, championed the “go big” option—formally dubbed the “expanded effort”—in which the United
States would “significantly increase economic, political, and military effort to stimulate
the economy, strengthen governance, secure the population and regain the strategic initiative.” Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, whose 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, had fought against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Karbala in 2004, argued for the “go
long” option of deliberately adjusting the provision of resources and support in Iraq and
adopting a smaller but “sustainable U.S. military presence” that could help the Iraqis
“defeat the insurgency and quell sectarian violence” in a “long-duration effort.” Marine
Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood, who had served on the NSC staff in 2003 and had commanded the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in Babil Province in 2005, made the case for the “go home,” or “strategic disengagement,” option, a
phased withdrawal from the country by the end of 2007 along with a much less ambitious
end state.49
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Over several weeks of deliberations, a majority of the colonels who comprised the
council advocated the “go long” option, and on November 22, they presented to Pace
a paper outlining this course of action. “We are losing in Iraq because we are not winning,” and as a result the United States should reorient its current effort, they advised.50
Iraqi governments at the national, provincial, and local levels lacked both legitimacy
and effectiveness, as did the indigenous security forces that ostensibly supported them.
Caught up in the whirlwind of economic distress, inadequate essential services, lawlessness, destabilizing foreign influences, and sectarian violence, the country was careening
toward civil war. “Our modified strategy,” the group explained, “is focused on reversing these trends as we transfer responsibility for governance and security to Iraqis.”51
The paper went on to outline a strategic design to “accelerate Iraq in the lead” and pave
the way for success by “changing the political and military dynamic on the ground.”52
Given an Iraqi commitment to reconciliation, the U.S. military would “shift its main effort
from a U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort to training and partnering efforts.”53 This would
entail a gradual, though accelerated, transition of security responsibility. As conditions
improved and the Iraqi security forces proved capable of independent operations, U.S.
units would adopt a posture of “regional overwatch” and reach a point of sustainable
presence in 2008.54
Pace provided a copy of the council’s paper to Casey, who participated by videoconference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same day. The MNF-I commander was not
impressed with the colonels’ work. Casey graded their efforts a “C-plus” and dismissed
a subsequent version as not very useful. He charged that the colonels had arrived at their
recommendations by simply assuming away thorny problems, such as achieving unity
of effort among MNF-I, the Embassy, and coalition partners, and obtaining Iraqi Government cooperation on reconciliation and the reduction of sectarian violence.55 From
Casey’s perspective, well-intentioned but uninformed officers in Washington had passed
over the most difficult tasks facing the coalition in Iraq in order to recommend a strategy
that MNF-I was, for the most part, already pursuing. “We’re doing most, if not all, of the
operational things mentioned, and have been for some time,” he wrote in an e-mail to
Pace.56 Casey also believed the chairman’s select colonels had failed to appreciate that the
struggle in Iraq had everything to do with the struggle for political and economic power.
To see the fight as a counterinsurgency spiraling downward into a civil war amounted
to a misdiagnosis, he charged. Sectarian violence had emerged as the greatest threat to
accomplishing the campaign’s objectives, a change that “leads you to the fact that Iraqis
have to solve their own problems—including the division of . . . power, and sectarian
violence,” Casey insisted. “It also leads you to the fact that we have to rely on [the Iraqis]
to make the tough choices and expect them to move at a pace that is probably slower
than we want.”57 By incorrectly interpreting the basis of the conflict and stretching out
the remedy over a long period of time, the Council of Colonels’ strategy failed to put sufficient pressure on the Iraqis to force them to change, Casey believed.
Nevertheless, the reorientation of the current effort proposed by the Council of Colonels generally aligned with Casey’s concept for accelerated transition. The group found
MNF-I’s timeline for transferring security responsibilities ambitious and considered the
concept for assuming “overwatch” to be too vague, but besides these two issues, the only
other major difference revolved around U.S.-Iraqi unit partnership.58 As a mechanism for
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facilitating transition, the council recommended partnering a U.S. BCT with each Iraqi
division to provide oversight and support. “We’re way past that,” Casey objected.59 As
more and more Iraqi units assumed the lead, command and control in a partnered arrangement had become too cumbersome, according to Casey. “We want to cut the umbilical
cord,” he told Pace.60 Partnership had worked at one time, but now that kind of relationship only hampered progress toward Iraqi self-sufficiency, he argued, even though he
and Chiarelli had recommended a similar approach in their session with Rumsfeld a few
days before.
Casey had even stronger objections when the discussion with the Joint Chiefs turned
to the option of a surge of five U.S. brigades, the same idea that McCain had put to
Abizaid 1 week before. Casey acknowledged, as he had earlier in the month, that more
troops would have a “temporary, local impact.” He doubted, however, that, “the tactical gain was worth possibly unhinging” the ongoing process of transition. Recalling the
recent churning of Iraqi politics that stemmed from the coalition’s request to commit
CENTCOM’s MEU reserve to Anbar, the general added that they could not count on
unconditional Iraqi Government concurrence. Nonetheless, Casey admitted that, if given
extra troops, he would have no trouble finding missions for them in Baghdad or in the
rural areas just to the north and south of the capital. Other potential areas where the extra
forces would be of use were Diyala, Anbar, and other border provinces. Pace told Casey
that the Army Staff and Joint Forces Command had validated the possibility of a surge
of 5 BCTs that could bring the force in Iraq up to 20 U.S. brigades from April to October
2007, but Casey reiterated to Pace that existing troop levels were adequate. As he considered the matter from Baghdad, Casey dismissed the chairman’s offer as just another staff
exercise.61
Mixed Messages at Amman
On November 30, 2006, Bush met with Maliki in Amman, Jordan. Seeking Bush’s support for his revised Baghdad Security Plan, the Prime Minister risked a politically damaging rift with the Sadrists to attend.62 Pleased with the plan’s Iraqi origin, the President
assured Maliki of U.S. assistance. The delegations also discussed the recommendations of
the high-level working group on accelerating the transfer of security responsibility.63 This
group, consisting of Casey, Khalilzad, Iraqi national security adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie,
and the Iraqi security ministers, had convened the month before and, over the course of
November, had identified significant Iraqi military capabilities that could be targeted
for acceleration.64 Bush referred approvingly to this group during a post-meeting press
conference and acknowledged the importance of speeding up the training of the Iraqi
security forces. The President expressed his confidence in Maliki as a leader and affirmed
the Prime Minister’s courage and willingness to enforce the law in an evenhanded way.
Appearing to see eye to eye on the immediate road ahead, the two leaders also explored
the development of a long-term strategic partnership.65 “The ultimate solution to stabilizing Iraq and reducing violence is true national reconciliation and capable and loyal
Iraqi forces dedicated to protecting all the Iraqi people,” concluded the two leaders’ joint
statement.66
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Source: White House photo by Paul Morse (Released).

President George W. Bush Reaches Out to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in
Amman, Jordan.67
Significantly, however, Bush mentioned his administration’s ongoing strategy review
and, privately with Maliki, hinted at the prospect of the United States committing tens of
thousands more U.S. Soldiers to Iraq. The price of this assistance—assuming the Iraqis
wanted it—was the Prime Minister’s assurance that he would confront JAM and allow the
Americans to do the same.68 This quid pro quo arrangement must have been confusing to
Maliki. Casey had been trying to extract the same concession from him in recent weeks
but had linked it to a promise to reduce U.S. presence and involvement. All the same,
the Iraqi Prime Minister assured Bush that he would meet this key condition. Casey, for
his part, left Amman unaware that Bush considered committing additional forces to be a
serious option.69 In the meeting with the Iraqis—and in public, for that matter—the President’s words seemed consistent with the thrust of MNF-I’s plan to speed up the pace
of transition. Yet Bush recalled in his memoirs that on the way home from Amman, “I
thought about the options for a new strategy. Accelerating the handover to the Iraqis was
not a viable approach. That sounded a lot like our current strategy, which was failing.”70
Whatever doubts the President had had in Amman, Casey took the conference as a
sign that the President supported his evolving Iraq strategy. In a video teleconference the
day after the meeting in Jordan, the general told Bush that his “acceptance, in principle,
of acceleration was a very good thing” and that Maliki definitely appreciated the gesture.
Sitting alongside Casey in Baghdad, Abizaid agreed, saying that the Prime Minister was
pleased with the meeting and was “feeling stronger with respect to the Sadr issue.”71
Almost immediately though, Bush expressed his doubts. “Does Maliki view with
alarm reports that JAM is killing people or that the Sunni are frightened? What will he
do?” the President asked. Just over a day after putting Maliki on notice about getting
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tough on JAM, Bush was growing impatient. “I’m reading reports that JAM is getting
ready to kill more people,” the President said. “Are we saying to Maliki ‘let us take care
of this [problem]’?” Bush also expressed hesitation about handing power over to Maliki.
What if the Prime Minister decided to use that power for sectarian purposes once it was
irretrievably within his grasp? Bush wondered if there was a way to turn over responsibility to the Iraqis without actually giving them control.72 These were not the ruminations
of a President comfortable with Casey’s strategy.
The Iraq Study Group
Of the strategic reviews occurring outside the walls of the White House, only the
Iraq Study Group’s review really mattered to Casey. Chartered by Congress in March
2006, this bipartisan body of elder statesmen, co-chaired by former Secretary of State
James A. Baker III and former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, had engaged in a series
of discussions with officials and experts both inside and outside of Iraq. Many U.S. officials expected the long-anticipated Baker-Hamilton report to carry some weight once it
appeared, though for his part, the President appeared to worry little about the fallout
from the Iraq Study Group’s findings and sensed that his advisers fretted a bit too much
about it. “Understand that Baker-Hamilton is not setting the orders,” Bush reminded
video teleconference participants. “I am running this show.”73
Casey had met with the group during its visit to Iraq in August. Then, he had responded
to questions about troop levels by assuring them that the coalition had sufficient forces
so long as the Iraqis supplied sufficient numbers of troops and performed adequately.
When the Iraqi security forces lagged, U.S. units would support them as needed.74 In a
separate engagement with the group, Chiarelli also rejected the idea of applying more
U.S. combat power to the problem. One member recalled him saying, “We’re not going
to win this thing militarily. We’re only going to win it when we provide jobs to people,
when we meet their basic needs, when we clean the trash up, when we deliver water,
when we deliver electricity. Until we do that, we’re fighting a losing war.”75 Later, during
a follow-up video teleconference with the group in mid-November, Casey assured the
group that “I have the resources I need to succeed,” crossing out the word “win” in
favor of “succeed” in his talking points. As far as U.S. troops were concerned, the general
promised the group that he would continue to ask for whatever he believed he needed,
but he judged it a mistake to overemphasize American troops’ role in a multifaceted
ethno-sectarian struggle over the division of political and economic power. He outlined
the danger of ramping up coalition forces: “more [U.S. troops] at this point delays Iraqi
movement to self-reliance, gives Iraqi leaders more time to avoid hard decisions, and
blame us for their problems, and complicates the ongoing transition.”76
When it published its findings on December 6, the Baker-Hamilton group proved to
be a receptive audience for Casey’s message. In its final report, mainly penned by future
deputy national security adviser Benjamin J. Rhodes, the Iraq Study Group presented
what it called “a new approach” and a “better way forward.”77 However, its findings
largely corroborated Casey’s viewpoint and endorsed the strategy of drawing down U.S.
troops and shifting the coalition’s primary mission to one of supporting the Iraqi Army.
“The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraq security,” the
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report read.78 That acceleration would be facilitated by the growth of indigenous security
forces and a rise in the number of embedded U.S. trainers. The group’s philosophical
stance echoed the central imperative of Casey’s campaign plan, and as Casey and Abizaid had long done, the group assumed that a reduction in the U.S. role would naturally
prompt the Iraqi factions to reconcile among themselves. “The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis,” the report concluded. “The
United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of
their own destiny.”79 The group also recommended opening negotiations with Iran and
Syria to address the destabilizing influence those countries had on Iraq’s security.80
At Amman a week before the Iraq Study Group report appeared, Maliki and his
advisers had pressed Bush for a similar emphasis on handing them security responsibility in an accelerated fashion. However, other Iraqi leaders responded to the report with
criticism, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani foremost among them. “As a whole, I reject this
report,” he told CNN, describing its recommendations for a U.S. troop withdrawal as
“very dangerous” and a virtual repeat of the 1991 decision to abandon the Iraqi Kurds
and Shi’a as they fought against the Ba’athist regime.81 In the course of events, Talabani’s
fear that the United States would adopt the Iraq Study Group’s drawdown recommendation proved unfounded. Even as the Baker-Hamilton report reached the public, the Bush
administration was already considering options for increasing the U.S. troop presence,
not reducing it.
Exploring the Surge Option
Within the Pentagon, U.S. military officials circulated a five-page minority report
from the Council of Colonels authored by McMaster, which called for the deployment of
additional U.S. brigades.82 McMaster’s paper acknowledged the need for continuing the
development of Iraqi security forces and taking steps toward reconciliation, but he argued
that a revised military scheme of maneuver could help interrupt the cycle of sectarian
violence. With its main effort in Baghdad, MNC-I could ill afford to strip American units
from the capital in order to reinforce efforts to disrupt or defeat Sunni and Shi’a extremists elsewhere. Thus, the United States needed more troops. A brigade posted southeast
of Baghdad, in Wasit Province, would be able to disrupt the flow of explosively formed
penetrators into the country from Iran and serve as a tangible counter to Iran’s increasingly malignant influence. One additional brigade would also exploit ongoing success
against al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar while another could be spread across the belt of towns
and rural terrain north of Baghdad to deny the organization sanctuaries and disrupt its
campaign to terrorize the capital. Finally, McMaster recommended that a fourth BCT be
employed as an offensive force anywhere in Iraq, and that the special operations task
force add Shi’a extremists to its target set.83
McMaster and other members of the Council of Colonels who dissented from the
group’s majority endorsement of a gradual U.S. drawdown in Iraq got a chance to present their ideas for a surge to Pace and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Edmund P. Giambastiani. Pace was somewhat sympathetic to McMaster’s arguments
that the transition strategy was bound to fail because it “underestimated our enemies,
and it overestimated the Iraqi government and security forces’ will and capability.”84
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McMaster’s ideas would not become part of Pace’s and the Joint Chiefs’ ultimate input to
the White House strategy review. Instead, the chairman tasked the group to write a memorandum defending the gradual drawdown that Pace could share with the White House.
McMaster, despite being the most vocal critic of the drawdown option, was selected by
the group to author the memorandum. Forced to defend an idea he disavowed, McMaster wrote that the only benefit of a drawdown was that it would require no further U.S.
troops, but deputy national security adviser Crouch did not include the halfhearted
memo in the papers submitted for the NSC principals.85
Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not adopt McMaster’s proposals, the colonel’s
ideas would soon be closely mirrored by influential work from outside the military,
where a consensus began to emerge among defense analysts in Washington that a surge
of U.S. troops into Iraq would be needed to secure the country. Along with a handful of
other defense analysts, Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
had been invited by Stephen Hadley to Camp David in June 2006 during the early stages
of the White House strategy review. The former West Point history professor believed
the administration had mishandled the occupation of Iraq and took the opportunity to
suggest to the President that more U.S. troops would be necessary to salvage the war
effort.86 In the following months, Kagan fleshed out a concept for stabilizing Baghdad
that emphasized protecting the population rather than transferring security responsibility to the Iraqis. He saw the development of indigenous forces as essential to progress,
but he considered MNF-I’s approach inappropriate, given the violence racking the country. Casey’s strategy of accelerated transition could not succeed rapidly enough, argued
Kagan. Beefing up the number of embedded trainers in the Iraqi security forces would
be counterproductive. Shifting the weight of U.S. manpower from combat operations to
concentrate mainly on an advisory mission would effectively remove trained and ready
forces from the battlefield and likely lead to an escalation in violence far beyond the capabilities of Iraqi units to handle. The effort to develop local security forces had to continue,
but hastening the transition without first reducing violence to manageable levels risked
pursuing a strategy until it plunged off a cliff.87
Kagan also challenged the premise held by Casey and Abizaid that coalition forces
were antibodies whose disruptive presence should be mitigated by reducing their
involvement. This theory could not be reconciled with the available data. Marked shifts
in the levels of violence for a specific area did not correspond with increases or decreases
in the number of coalition troops posted there. By late 2006, the violence consisted largely
of Iraqi-on-Iraqi incidents, and a drop in attacks on U.S. forces amid sharply rising civilian casualties did not equate to enduring stability. According to Kagan, long-term success required political progress and economic development. However, the equation that
yielded this result required rebalancing—and soon.88
Retired General Jack Keane had arrived at a similar conclusion. He determined that
Casey’s Iraq strategy was unraveling under the strain of growing sectarian violence.
From his perch on the Defense Policy Board, the former Army vice chief of staff had been
making the case for a new strategy to defeat the insurgency since August 2006. The new
approach, he believed, needed to start with protecting the population. Doing so required
a consistent forward presence in Iraqi neighborhoods and, thus, more troops. He advised
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Rumsfeld and Pace that the focus on transition was wrong and pressed them to replace
Abizaid and Casey with commanders who would adopt a new approach.89
Keane’s operational expertise and credibility with senior officials prompted Kagan
to invite him to an exercise at the American Enterprise Institute on December 2-3, in
which a mix of civilian analysts and retired military officers explored in detail how to
implement an alternative concept centered on improving population security. Among
the participants were retired Colonel Joel Armstrong, who just a few months before had
been McMaster’s deputy commander in Tel Afar, and retired Major Daniel Dwyer, who
had been McMaster’s chief of plans. The two retired officers brought with them an influential testimonial that a surge of U.S. troops executing a counterinsurgency approach
could achieve results, as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment had done in Tel Afar.90 AEI’s
Iraq Planning Group concluded that extending the combat tours of forces already in Iraq
and accelerating the deployment for units next to deploy could “produce a surge of two
Marine RCTs [regimental combat teams] and five Army BCTs” in March 2007 that could
be sustained for a full year.91 Most of the reinforcements would help secure Baghdad
by establishing a continuous presence among the population through small-unit combat
outposts and foot patrols. The extra Marines would exploit the burgeoning success in
Anbar, where the early signs of a turnaround under Colonel Sean MacFarland and his
1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, could be seen. Kagan originally figured
it would take around 10 additional BCTs. Keane had arrived at his own estimate earlier,
placing the number between 8 and 10.92
Participants in the exercise looked more deliberately into the forces required to deal
with the threat groups plaguing each of Baghdad’s diverse neighborhoods and then balanced this need with what was possible given the Army’s slate of ready and available
units. Keane later learned from the Army staff that five brigades were indeed the maximum that could be committed to any “surge.”93 Rather than full regiments, the Marine
Corps would send two more battalions. This aside, the exercise confirmed to Keane not
only the rationale for dispatching additional troops but also a plan for how they might
be applied.94 As it turned out, the specifics of this blueprint did not directly inform coalition planners in Baghdad.95 However, the AEI process of deriving it equipped Keane and
sympathetic U.S. officials with evidence to argue for a surge of U.S. forces to Iraq.
THE SURGE DECISION
U.S. Leaders Grope for the “New Way Forward”
As the White House continued with its review, the NSC staff began to assemble strategy input from the Pentagon, State Department, CENTCOM, and MNF-I, all of which the
NSC principals would consider in a series of meetings beginning December 8. In formulating his input, Casey had to account for some of the competing ideas that had begun to
emerge from other quarters in Washington, including the idea of a surge of U.S. troops.
In an e-mail sent to Pace and Abizaid on December 6, Casey wrote that if a troop increase
was considered, he favored a temporary surge of three Iraqi brigades to Baghdad and
remained open to the idea of supplementing this force with coalition units already in
Iraq. Alternatively, he could consider moving the 82d Airborne Division’s ready brigade
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to Kuwait from Fort Bragg, NC. Though conceding that the security situation was grim,
Casey was not inclined to ask for more troops that first week of December. In spite of
the Iraqi security forces’ well-known shortcomings, the general gave them the benefit of
the doubt. He made a distinction between “poor to fair” police forces and “fair to good”
army units and believed that, on balance, they all would continue to improve steadily
with coalition support and oversight.96 In Casey’s view, a “fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy” of the kind that the McMaster paper advocated should consist of more
U.S. civilian expertise embedded in provincial reconstruction teams, adequate economic
investment, and meaningful outreach by the Government of Iraq to assuage the population’s grievances.97 It should not mean sending additional American troops.
On the eve of the NSC principals’ meetings, Casey worked to extract political guarantees from Maliki that the Iraqi leader would support the accelerated transition strategy
Casey hoped to execute. For some time, Casey and Khalilzad had been urging Maliki
to realign his base of political support and allow MNF-I greater latitude in attacking
Moqtada Sadr’s military organization. However, Maliki’s conception of the dominant
threat to Iraq differed from the coalition’s. In consultations with Casey, the Prime Minister
insisted that a Ba’athist resurgence presented the gravest danger to stability. Admitting to
a variety of threats, Maliki preferred to approach each in a different way. Terrorists and
former regime elements (that is, the Iraqi Government’s Sunni enemies) were best dealt
with militarily, he asserted, while Shi’a militias were more effectively handled through
the political process.98 The fact that Maliki’s political survival relied on an accommodation with the Sadrists explained his reluctance to confront JAM in Baghdad and allow
the Americans to conduct raids into the militia’s Sadr City sanctuary. MNF-I’s apparent
fixation on JAM also made the Prime Minister suspicious. On December 6, to allay Maliki’s fear that the coalition might ally with the Sunnis in an all-out war against the Shi’a,
Casey summoned the coalition’s special operations task force commander to Baghdad to
brief the Prime Minister on a long-running string of operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq
and Ansar al Sunna. The task force’s relentless pace (five to seven operations per night,
on average), its ability to strike throughout the country, and its focus on Sunni extremists seemed to impress Maliki.99 The task force commander presented the Prime Minister
with a compelling case that the coalition had been pulling no punches in its fight against
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
However, more could be done to undermine the threat posed by Shi’a death squads.
When the task force commander explained that JAM’s campaign of violence and intimidation tended to drive Sunni citizens into the arms of AQI for protection, Maliki concurred. Admitting that militias were not the all-around positive force that many Iraqis
believed, the Prime Minister took the task force commander’s point and turned it on its
head: Sunnis needed to be persuaded to seek protection only from legitimate government
forces.100 Unsurprisingly, the question of the Prime Minister’s willingness to confront
JAM would figure prominently in the White House’s strategy review.
Back in Washington, Rumsfeld—still serving as SECDEF as Robert Gates prepared to
take over—provided his own input to the President on December 8, the same day that
the NSC principals began their deliberations. Outlining a strategy for what he called a
“new phase,” Rumsfeld advised that the United States should “accelerate the transition,
refocus the partnership, and stabilize the region,” recommendations that drew heavily
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from the bridging concept briefed by Casey and Chiarelli. “The U.S. military is prepared
to do its tasks as recommended in the proposal,” Rumsfeld wrote on the cover page. “The
test will be whether or not the non-military tasks—the critically needed political objectives—can be achieved and whether we are able to get the necessary cooperation from
the Government of Iraq.”101
From December 8 to 15, the NSC principals met in an intense series of daily discussions, with Abizaid present and Casey participating remotely from Baghdad. Though not
all of the participants realized it, by the time these sessions began, Bush had committed
to a “new way forward” and intended to announce it in a speech before Christmas. Only
the “way” itself was not fully formed. The President wanted to hear options. On the first
day of discussions, Crouch, addressing the question of Iraqi security force readiness, laid
out two proposals that mainly differed in terms of the level of U.S. military involvement.
Neither satisfied the President, who did not want to hand control over to the Iraqis if they
were not ready, but also did not want to wait 6 months until the effects of retraining and
reform materialized. No one had a problem with transition per se. Bush agreed that the
“new way forward” would be about “giving it to the Iraqis,” but the question was how
fast that transition should take place and under what conditions. He asked Casey what
“yardstick” the Prime Minister would use to determine when his military could actually
shoulder the burden of independent counterinsurgency operations.102
Casey reminded the President about what had been discussed at Amman. The Iraqis
would have control over all 10 of their divisions by spring. Baghdad Province was
expected to pass to provincial Iraqi control in the summer. In the meantime, U.S. forces
would reduce their presence in urban areas and gradually assume an overwatch role. “So
6 more months of the same stuff?” the President asked skeptically. Casey tried to correct
what he viewed as an oversimplification of his approach, but Bush’s frustration was obvious. Although barely more than a week old, the arrangement struck at Amman seemed
stale in the President’s eyes. “Does this argue for more U.S. forces as a bridge?” Bush
asked the general. “If the Iraqis commit to end sectarian violence and ask us for help, then
we should seriously consider adding more forces. But to do this without their commitment or to do it unilaterally? Then that is something we should not do,” Casey replied.103
When it came to Maliki’s commitment to stand up to JAM and mitigate its overtly
sectarian agenda, the President voiced similar doubts, finding it ironic that the Iraqi
Prime Minister seemed to be the principal “roadblock” to a renewed U.S. effort to stabilize the country. “How do we give [Maliki] responsibility without causing a disaster?”
Bush asked. When Casey mentioned that Maliki “lacked political will,” the President
responded, “One option is to find someone else.” In its discussion the following day, the
group revisited the possibility of replacing the Prime Minister. Abizaid observed that
he had “yet to see Maliki show backbone on anything” and thus saw danger in basing
the “new way forward” on the Iraqi leader’s political will. Bush reiterated his desire for
something “dramatic” or “game-changing.” The “new way forward”—whatever form it
took—would have to “put us in a position where we can win.” He again suggested that
it might be “time to choose somebody else,” but Khalilzad and the secretary of state convinced him that positioning Maliki for success was the more prudent course.104
Reportedly, the Prime Minister had boasted to his close advisers in early December that senior U.S. officials needed him more than he needed them. The Americans,
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he reasoned, would avoid actions likely to bring about the fall of his government. Nor
would they press for a wholesale change in leadership. In the meantime, he could work
to consolidate state power.105 Though a bit overconfident, this stance apparently left some
room for give and take. Following their video teleconferences with the President, Casey
and Khalilzad made an evening visit to Maliki on December 10 to argue that no illegal
armed group, Sunni or Shi’a, should be left with a sanctuary anywhere in Iraq, let alone
in the capital. The general began by explaining that coalition and Iraqi staffs were hard
at work putting the Prime Minister’s revised security plan in place. Transition based
on the Amman agreement remained a central element, but a key characteristic of the
impending set of operations was the aggressive targeting of all criminal elements. Maliki
agreed with Casey in principle and used the acknowledged sectarian behavior of the
Iraqi security forces as a lever to press for more specially trained units under his close
control. The Prime Minister hoped to dominate the militias not through kinetic operations against their fighters, but by demonstrating the government’s unmatched ability
to go after Sunni terrorists. Jumping on Maliki’s admission that neither terrorists nor
militias should be permitted sanctuary, Casey inquired about whether the coalition could
carry out raids into Sadr City. The Prime Minister consented to raids led by Iraqi special
operations forces with coalition support, to include armor and air assets as required.106
When the NSC principals resumed their discussions the following day, Casey reported
to the President that Maliki had taken a more positive stance on launching raids into Sadr
City. The President accepted this news, but the question still lingered: would the Prime
Minister “lose his nerve” when it came time to press the fight against the Shi’a militias?
Would he balk when MNF-I ramped up its targeting of Shi’a extremists?107 In its attempt
to persuade Maliki to confront the Shi’a militants, the White House had aimed to place the
Prime Minister at the head of a proposed bloc of Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish “moderates”
(defined by the White House as those who rejected violence and extremism) including
Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and Tariq Hashimi. Hadley
and Crouch suggested in the December 11 deliberations that marginalizing extremists
on both sides of the sectarian divide would theoretically allow the Prime Minister to act
more boldly from a moderate stance.108 The fact that those viewed as moderates in Iraqi
politics had failed thus far to arrive at a basic consensus regarding the future course of
Iraq presented an imposing problem, Hadley pointed out.109 For the President, the pleasantries exchanged at Amman had not satisfied doubts about Maliki’s motives and his
vision for Iraq. Bush wanted the “new way forward” speech to signify a clearly identifiable departure point, and he wanted Maliki unreservedly along for the ride. The Prime
Minister must “stand up” and publicly say that the Iraqi Government will be “going after
all outside the law,” Bush insisted.110
Having upped the ante on what he expected from Maliki, Bush sent Casey and Khalilzad back to the Prime Minister on December 12 for a follow-on discussion in which they
obtained new assurances. Maliki would issue a written order directing the Iraqi security forces to pursue and apprehend all lawbreakers regardless of sect and to eliminate
their safe havens. Again, the Prime Minister asked about acquiring additional Iraqi forces
under his direct control. Casey promised him that he was working on this, as well as
the implementation of the revised Baghdad Security Plan. This visit also affirmed the
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understanding between Casey and Maliki that upcoming operations would be set in the
context of an accelerated transition based on the Amman agreement.111
The President Decides
Despite Casey and Maliki’s discussions, it would soon become clear that the President
of the United States had no intention of proceeding along the lines that Casey and Maliki
believed had been agreed to in Amman. In explaining the violence in Iraq as the result of
a complex communal struggle for power, Casey may have been correct in his diagnosis.
However, Bush had come to disagree with the general’s prescription of drawing down
to win. After months of holding his cards close to his chest, the President would finally
make this explicitly clear.
Bush’s deepening skepticism of Iraqi political initiatives as the solution to Iraq’s chaos
reflected the fact that after almost 2 years of relying on an Iraqi political process as the
key to stability, the President had become convinced that alternative paths to victory in
Iraq were available, in particular the deployment of additional U.S. troops. Soon after
the Amman conference, the White House had asked Casey to address the feasibility of a
surge, to include how more forces might mitigate the risk inherent in an accelerated transition.112 The President engaged Casey on this question in the NSC principals’ discussions
on December 8 and outlined four options for the employment of additional U.S. units in
the deliberations of December 9.113 Repeatedly, Bush queried Casey and Khalilzad about
the utility of sending more troops, asked if Maliki knew that he could request American assistance in the form of more troops, and emphasized that he—the President—was
willing to deploy more troops.114 The United States was running out of time in Iraq, but
a surge could buy some back, Bush said, while also demonstrating American commitment.115 The window was closing on Casey’s strategy of accelerated transition as well. On
December 11, amid the NSC principals’ deliberations, the President met with Keane and a
coterie of defense intellectuals in the White House. Keane pitched AEI’s detailed concept
for how additional brigades might salvage the war effort and enable MNF-I to secure the
population of Baghdad, a task that Bush had already decided to make the centerpiece of
any new strategy.116 Overall, Keane provided the President an external validation of his
instincts in favor of a troop surge and lent the idea the credibility that could come from a
well-regarded former military leader of Keane’s stature.
The following day, December 12, Casey formally provided the President and the other
NSC principals his input to the strategy review, unaware that Keane had met the President the day before to recommend a troop surge. Casey offered a recapitulation of his
plan to accelerate transition in conjunction with the Government of Iraq’s commitment to
reconcile, two initiatives that he believed might serve as the “new way forward” the President was looking for. His rationale remained essentially unchanged from what he had
briefed many times before. Iraqis were engaged in a communal struggle for power, with
sectarian violence presenting the gravest threat to stability in the near term. Reconciliation among the competing factions would serve as the basis for the only lasting solution,
and this long-term process was something that—ultimately—only the Iraqis themselves
could undertake. By reducing its presence and passing security responsibility to Iraqi
authorities, the coalition could satisfy a burgeoning Iraqi desire to exercise sovereignty
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while buying the additional time needed to bolster indigenous military and governance
capacity. In Casey’s estimation, the coalition could successfully arrive at its end state in
2009 or 2010. Casey concluded his presentation by commenting on the potential impact
of surging additional U.S. forces into Iraq. Of the eight bullet points listed, only two were
positive.117
Casey did not yet know it, but the President had already decided against his transition strategy. On December 13, the day after Casey’s proposal, the President visited the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon to discuss the options on the table and sound them
out about his preferred option of surging troops. Some of the groundwork had already
been laid: on December 11, the same day Keane visited the White House, Pace had visited
the White House separately as well and, according to Bush’s memoirs, had assured the
President that though he would hear some concerns from the Joint Chiefs, they were prepared to support him in a surge decision. Pace also reportedly told Hadley that it would
require a surge of 5 brigades, or about 20,000 troops, to make a difference in Iraq.118
Even so, once the Pentagon meeting began, Pace presented the Joint Chiefs’ collective
military advice, which did not recommend a surge option. Before the Council of Colonels
had disbanded in mid-December, Pace had asked the group to summarize a draft of the
military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could provide the President. The chairman
had softened the colonels’ hard-hitting assessment of the war to read “we are not losing,
but we are not yet winning,” but aside from this equivocal rephrasing, the resulting presentation echoed the group’s earlier recommendations to “go long” by gradually reducing forces and shifting the main effort to the support of the Iraqi Army.119 Among the
Joint Chiefs themselves, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker was most vocal
in making the case against a U.S. troop surge, telling the President that a five-brigade
surge would not reduce the violence and would impose too great a strain on the U.S.
ground forces. He also asserted that the impatient U.S. public would not support a surge
or allow enough time for a troop increase, to which the President reportedly replied that
the Joint Chiefs need not concern themselves with domestic political factors that were
the President’s to manage.120 Schoomaker’s concern that the nation’s twin wars and other
military commitments would hollow out and “break” the Army—a concern he shared
publicly in congressional testimony on December 14—was shared by many other Army
and Marine generals who had served as junior officers in the 1970s and concluded that
the Vietnam war had devastated the military. But to the argument that escalating the U.S.
commitment in Iraq would break the U.S. ground forces, Bush observed that suffering
another humiliating defeat as in Vietnam would be more likely to break the force than
a five-brigade troop surge, a point the Joint Chiefs conceded. Some of the service chiefs
expressed concern that committing the U.S. strategic reserve to Iraq might be unwise
in the event that a conflict flared up elsewhere, such as the Korean Peninsula, but the
President replied that he would prefer to win the ongoing war in Iraq rather than hedge
against a hypothetical one.121 “What I want to hear from you is how we’re going to win
. . . not how we’re going to leave,” the President reportedly said.122 After this tense but
open discussion—and against their advice—the President informed the Joint Chiefs of
his decision to execute the troop surge.123
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Vice President Cheney (left), General Pace (second from left), Admiral Mullen (second from right), and
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani (right).
Source: White House photo by Eric Draper (Released).

President George W. Bush With Vice President Richard Cheney, General Peter Pace,
Admiral Mike Mullen, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Edmund P. Giambastiani.124
The Arrival of III Corps
Along with a strategy on the cusp of change, December 2006 brought a shift in one
of Casey’s major subordinate units. On December 14, the day after Bush’s session with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, Chiarelli relinquished command of MNC-I to
General Raymond Odierno in Baghdad. Odierno’s arrival introduced another significant
factor into the question of whether and how to conduct a U.S. troop surge. For more
than a year, his skepticism of the transition strategy had grown. First, as he observed the
Iraq campaign from his post as senior military adviser to Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice, and then as he accompanied retired General Gary Luck on a 2005 assessment trip
that pronounced Iraqi forces unready to assume responsibility for the country’s security.
Before deploying to Iraq, the III Corps commander reluctantly had concluded that the
campaign would fail if it maintained its projected course. In November, he had had a
candid conversation at Fort Hood, TX, with his next-door neighbor, 4th Infantry Division Commander Major General James. D. Thurman, who had arrived home after giving
up command of Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) just days before. Thurman
related to Odierno the failures of Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II and the
destabilizing role played by some of the Iraqi security forces, the same concerns he had
voiced to Abizaid in October. Thurman emphasized how limitations in U.S. combat
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power had hindered him from securing the Iraqi capital. “Just off-ramping is not going
to work,” he contended. It was a path destined for failure.125

General Chiarelli (right) General Odierno (left).
Source: DoD photo by Curt Cashour (Released).

General Peter Chiarelli Transfers Responsibility of Command of MNC-I to
General Raymond Odierno With General George Casey Officiating.126
Thurman’s grim assessment made a deep impression on the future MNC-I commander and validated Odierno’s own instinctive skepticism about the transition strategy. As III Corps had prepared for its Iraq rotation in summer and fall 2006, Casey’s plan
had envisioned the corps inheriting a force of just 13 U.S. BCTs—down from the 15 then
deployed throughout Iraq, and Odierno had expected to oversee a continued reduction.
As Odierno war-gamed how to employ a shrinking force, he detected a clear mismatch
between ends and means. As Thurman had observed, it would be exceedingly difficult to
reverse the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad without sufficient coalition troops
to confront Iranian meddling, rein in corrupt National Police units, halt an “active Shia
plan to control Baghdad,” and deal with an Iraqi Government that viewed everything
through a “sectarian lens.” Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, Odierno also contemplated the
worsening Arab-Kurd tensions along the Green Line, a problem he himself had had to
confront as commander of Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC) in 20032004. Iraq’s Arab-Kurd conflict would persist even as transition proceeded apace, and
there was danger in prolonging the issue as coalition presence and influence dwindled.127
In Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), Major General Benjamin R. “Randy” Mixon’s 25th Infantry Division was having trouble figuring out how to reduce its force from
four BCTs to three without losing the operational flexibility needed to deal with the
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complex northern Iraq conflict. Taken together, these dynamics left Odierno troubled by
the prospect of continuing the transition.128
What the III Corps commander learned from Chiarelli only deepened his concerns.
Shortly after Odierno’s arrival in Baghdad on December 5, Chiarelli shared the results of
MNC-I’s 120-day assessment of the Baghdad Security Plan.129 Despite “successful tactical
efforts,” MNC-I concluded, coalition and Iraqi forces had been “unable or not allowed to
achieve the stated objectives.”130 The “clear-hold-build approach” seemed sound in concept, but the Iraqis were not up to the task. Anchored to largely ineffective checkpoints,
unsupported by key ministries, and infiltrated in many cases by JAM, Iraqi units suffered
in terms of both quality and numbers. They proved unable to hold and protect cleared
areas, and the reinforcements promised by the ministries had yet to arrive in Baghdad.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Maliki had shielded the Shi’a militias from harm by withholding his approval for certain military operations and denying security forces access
into sanctuaries like Sadr City. Perhaps most disturbing to Chiarelli, the Prime Minister’s
government seemed bent on a course leading to Shi’a dominance in Baghdad, a factor
that was driving moderate Sunnis into a “marriage of convenience” with al-Qaeda in
Iraq.131 “The self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence will continue as long as the [Gov
ernment of Iraq] and certain citizens of Iraq do not see it as a terminal problem for their
nation, exercise restraint, and take the appropriate actions to facilitate reconciliation,”
Chiarelli’s assessment somberly concluded.132
Though faced with this bleak prognosis for stability in Baghdad, Odierno jumped
into a whirlwind of activity in the days leading up to MNC-I’s December 14 transfer of
authority from V Corps to III Corps. From Casey, the incoming commander received
a charge to “change the dynamics in Baghdad” and “break the cycle of sectarian violence.”133 This meant, in effect, adopting an offensive mindset almost immediately, while
executing the transition bridging strategy that Chiarelli had been developing. The corps
also was falling in on the process of sketching out the revised Baghdad Security Plan with
its emphasis on U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and the creation of a unique command-and-control structure. On the evening of December 6, Odierno had wrapped up his first full day
in Iraq by joining Casey for a meeting with Maliki’s top security advisers in which the
MNF-I commander introduced his idea for a “New Year’s Offensive” that would demonstrate the Iraqi Government’s commitment to imposing law and order. In Casey’s mind,
the offensive could involve as many as five Iraqi Army divisions operating in the capital
and would build much-needed momentum in preparation for the anticipated transfer of
responsibilities.134 Odierno was cheered by his interaction with the heads of Iraq’s two
key security ministries, but he remained concerned about a rushed transition and saw
little prospect for securing Baghdad without significantly more American troops.135 These
views would put him squarely at odds with Casey as the weeks passed.
Confusion Over the Surge Implementation
Although the President had decided in favor of a troop surge on December 13 and all
the discussions Bush had held with the NSC principals—Joint Chiefs of Staff and outside
surge advocates such as Keane—had revolved around the figure of 5 brigades and at
least 20,000 troops, he had yet to direct explicitly that the surge would consist of all 5 of
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the available brigades. As a result, when it came to the exact size of the surge the President had ordered, an astonishing lack of clarity persisted through Christmas, with Bush,
Gates, Casey, and Casey’s subordinates all making long-term plans based on different
strategies. In the absence of explicit Presidential guidance to deploy all five brigades,
many senior military leaders continued to work toward preserving the basic framework
of the existing transition strategy by making the troop increase as small as possible.
Casey was foremost among them. In the second week of December, he and Khalilzad
published their own progress review of the April 2006 joint campaign plan acknowledging that much had changed for the worse since the spring, but envisioning no major
changes to the existing strategy and discounting the benefits of a troop surge. The coalition had failed to achieve its objectives “within the planned timeline” and an increasingly
complex threat, the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad, and the Iraqi Government’s
more conspicuous expressions of sovereignty only seemed to promise a harder, slower
road ahead.136 The central tenet of the campaign—that “enduring strategic success will
only be achieved by Iraqis”—remained “universally accepted.” Casey and Khalizad’s
review held out a shred of hope that potential surge operations, coupled with political progress, could reduce violence and bring stability in the coming year, but assessed
the chances of that as “low-medium,” particularly because coalition forces “enmeshed”
in an ethno-sectarian struggle might actually be “acting as a catalyst” for violence.137
Worse still, Casey and Khalilzad’s report predicted that the coalition would see many of
its powers stripped away or heavily restricted when the United Nations (UN) Security
Council resolution expired at the end of 2007, implying that there was little time left for
ambitious initiatives like a surge.138
MNF-I’s lack of enthusiasm for the President’s troop surge, coupled with the fact
that Bush had yet to specify that all five brigades would be sent to Iraq, ushered in a
period of maddening confusion for subordinate units. In his first days as MNC-I commander, Odierno was keen to obtain reinforcements for the Baghdad fight and to exploit
the opportunities presented by the Anbar Awakening. First, Odierno wanted to extend
the deployment of the 2,200-man 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Casey had
requested the MEU, CENTCOM’s theater reserve, to reinforce MNF-I’s offensive efforts
in Ramadi, and the unit had arrived in November.139 Recognizing that Ramadi would
not be secure before the expeditionary unit was scheduled to leave, in mid-December,
Odierno raised the question of extending the unit.140 Doing so would not only strengthen
coalition efforts in Anbar, but would also allow Odierno to commit any incoming Army
units to Baghdad.141 Odierno also discussed expanding the size of the Marine contingent in Anbar with I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander Lieutenant General
James N. Mattis, who noted that there was a possibility that the rotations of two Marine
rifle battalions scheduled to leave Anbar in March 2007 could be extended.142 Given this
opening, Odierno pressed the issue. Prolonging the deployments of these two battalions
by 60 to 90 days while the units slated to replace them flowed in on schedule would see
Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) through a critical spring and summer.143 It would
also offset the inevitable loss of the 15th MEU, which could not remain in Iraq beyond
April.
Casey did not view the situation with the same sense of urgency that Odierno did. He
doubted that additional forces in Anbar would be decisive in defeating AQI and looked
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to Marine Major General Richard C. Zilmer, commander of MNF-W, to back him up.
Zilmer did the opposite, siding with Odierno and recommending the addition of one
reinforced BCT for employment in Ramadi and Hadithah. While not persuaded, Casey
partially relented and on December 17 agreed to extend the 15th MEU.144
This debate over additional manpower in Anbar took place as Casey and his subordinate commanders, prompted by the intense policy debate in Washington, DC, considered the larger question of what Bush’s new surge strategy would entail. For his part,
Odierno judged that the United States would require several more brigades to address
the security situation in Baghdad.145 In his first week in command, Odierno presented a
number of surge alternatives to Casey: a “small surge” of three additional brigades in
place by early March 2007; a “large surge” of five brigades on the ground by late April;
and a “local surge” that would see the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division’s ready
brigade (the division’s 2d Brigade Combat Team) to Baghdad and the extension of one
Marine regimental combat team in Anbar. To these three, Odierno added a fourth option:
combining the extension of the MEU with the commitment of the 2d Brigade Combat
Team, 82d Airborne Division, and the call-up of a heavy BCT already postured in a “prepare to deploy” status.146 Possible locations for the surge units—in addition to Baghdad
and Anbar—included Diyala, southern Salahadin, the Lake Tharthar region just northwest of the capital, the southern belts, and along the Iranian border in Wasit Province.147
Casey responded by expressing disappointment that the corps commander had
seemed to “put the cart before the horse.” It was premature to make a decision on the size
of a surge at this point, the MNF-I commander said.148 The broad span of employment
options also left Casey with the impression that MNC-I was attempting to disguise a lack
of in-depth analysis. For example, Casey thought it foolish to position a brigade in Wasit,
where the unit would likely have no impact on the fight in Baghdad. Finally, dubious
about the need for more American troops in the first place, he directed that future plans
on the flow of additional forces should include built-in decision points for staunching
that flow. There would be no open spigot if the MNF-I commander could avoid it.149
The exchange put Odierno in an uncomfortable position. The MNC-I commander
believed that virtually all the surge discussions among U.S. leaders in Washington,
including the President and the Joint Chiefs, had revolved around a five-brigade surge
(with which Odierno strongly agreed), but that Casey intended to shape the implementation of the decision and prevent the full five available brigades from coming to MNC-I.
Instructed by the MNF-I commander to continue planning and executing the transition
bridging strategy, Odierno sought to buy time until the matter of the surge could be clarified. Under his guidance, MNC-I created a plan under which the implementation of the
transition bridging strategy would be drawn out for several months. Rather than start the
transition right away, coalition and Iraqi forces would generate momentum with offensive operations through the spring of 2007, leaving the augmenting of advisory teams
and the reduction of the coalition presence aside until the conditions were in place for the
Iraqi military to become the country’s dominant security force.150 Even this drawn-out
timeline was based on far-fetched assumptions that the Iraqi factions would make quick
progress on reconciliation and economic development alongside security operations. For
Odierno, drawing up the unrealistic plan was a necessary expedient as he waited for an
expected change in strategic guidance from Washington.
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Meanwhile, Casey continued to operate as though the implementation of the surge
would be subject to his control and Maliki’s concurrence. On December 20, a week after
the President’s decision, Casey told Maliki that Bush had promised his full support—
including more American troops if the Iraqis wanted them.151 Major General Joseph F. Fil,
Jr., whose 1st Cavalry Division had arrived in November to assume control of MND-B
from Thurman’s 4th Infantry Division, already had asked Casey and Odierno for two
additional BCTs for immediate operations in Baghdad. Despite discussions on increasing the size of U.S. forces in Iraq by two or three brigades, Casey proposed to Maliki an
increase of just one. This modest rise was necessary, Casey told the Iraqi leader, in order
to have enough coalition battalions to partner with each Iraqi brigade operating in the
city. Even so, the MNF-I commander placed more emphasis on the movement of three
additional Iraqi Army brigades to the capital than on additional U.S. troops. Making a
virtue of the bureaucratic and logistical missteps that had led to prolonged delays in
the deployment of these units, Casey described their anticipated arrival on a staggered
timeline as a way of maintaining momentum. The periodic infusion of additional Iraqi
and American combat power over the course of January and into February would make
it easier to sustain progress, the general said. A second U.S. brigade would move into
Kuwait as the theater reserve and would be available after mid-February—but only if the
situation called for it. Though reluctant about deploying more foreign troops into Baghdad, Maliki approved this scheme.152
On the same day that Casey persuaded the Iraqi Prime Minister to accept a small and
temporary spike in U.S. force levels, he sought to convince the new U.S. SECDEF not to
push for too large an increase. Gates, having replaced Rumsfeld 2 days earlier, landed
in Baghdad on December 20 with a team of advisers that included then-Colonel Mark
A. Milley. A veteran of four Presidential administrations, Gates had previously visited
Baghdad as a member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group but had resigned from
the group once he had been nominated for the SECDEF position. Joining Pace and Abizaid for consultations with Casey and his generals, Gates discussed the possibility of a
more robust surge than the two-brigade option that Casey advocated, however, he left
Iraq satisfied that the situation—though tenuous—was on the right track. In spite of the
violence, it appeared to Gates that Casey’s strategy of preparing the Iraqis to assume
the lead for security appeared to have turned a corner. Only a “modest increase of up to
two brigades” would be necessary as a bridge to allow the Iraqis to take full control of
the capital by summer.153 The SECDEF sensed a “whiff of disagreement” between Casey
and Odierno, but the latter, while notably pessimistic, did not openly challenge his boss’
assessment that no more than two brigades were needed.154 Thus, Gates mistakenly came
away with the impression of a consensus on the way ahead among the U.S. commanders in Baghdad. He returned to Washington and presented his recommendation to the
President, essentially “parroting” (as Gates himself later ruefully described it) the MNF-I
commander’s advice.155 In a separate matter before his departure, Gates offered Casey the
Army chief of staff job, and the general, who had served some 30 months in Iraq by that
point, accepted.156 The move was not a surprise; as U.S. leaders in Washington had settled
on a new strategy, they had also implicitly agreed that new MNF-I and CENTCOM commanders would be appointed to implement it, and within days speculation would begin
on whom those new commanders might be.
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Back in Washington, Gates set the Joint Staff to work on plans for a surge of two Army
brigade combat teams and two Marine battalions.157 As the end of the year approached,
Casey’s intention to hold the line in defense of his strategy, in spite of all the chatter about
a surge of considerable size, appeared to be working. Since the beginning of December,
Casey had seized on the Iraqi desire to recast the Baghdad Security Plan as an opportunity to further his strategy of accelerated transition. Among the initiatives devised by the
Iraqis were standing up a new operations command to coordinate army and police activities in the capital and establishing joint security stations in each administrative district.
Casey found this newfound Iraqi energy—along with a tentative willingness on the part
of the Prime Minister to target Shi’a militants—encouraging. The MNF-I commander had
yielded ground by conceding to MND-B’s request for additional brigades and by allowing the division to resurrect unit partnership, but as Casey had related to an uneasy
Maliki, though he indeed had requested the temporary deployment of two more BCTs,
the circumstances under which he actually would commit the second brigade to Baghdad
were quite constrained.158
Casey’s subordinate commanders in Baghdad saw things differently. At MND-B, Fil
had already factored the second surge brigade—initially thought to be a heavy BCT from
Fort Stewart, GA—into his scheme of maneuver. In fact, the launching of new operations
in Baghdad depended on the brigade’s timely arrival. Fil planned to use the new brigade’s battalions to reinforce the three BCTs already operating in the capital in order to
“assist with partnership.” With its subordinate battalions parceled out among MND-B’s
other units, the newly arrived brigade headquarters would oversee Baghdad’s enhanced
transition teams as the capital passed to Iraqi control and the division’s main effort shifted
to the belts.159
Odierno concurred with Fil’s plan. Troubled by an approach that tied coalition
success to Iraqi combat performance, the MNC-I commander worried privately about
whether “we have underestimated the number of coalition forces needed and overestimated the capability and motivation of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).” Additional American brigades could serve as a “mitigating factor,” he judged.160 The general believed it
was infeasible to launch a combined U.S.-Iraqi offensive while simultaneously parceling
out platoon-sized contingents to enhance transition teams. The manpower requirements
associated with each concept were in “direct competition,” Odierno wrote in his personal notebook on December 28. “We cannot do both at once with the current force structure.”161 In his view, the requirement for significantly more U.S. troops was clear, but this
judgment was putting him at sharp odds with Casey. Odierno would later recall that the
2½ months he spent as the corps commander under Casey would be the most difficult
period of his 39-year career.162
Back in Washington, the U.S. military apparatus had begun work over the Christmas
holidays to implement a two-brigade, two-battalion troop surge—much smaller than the
five-brigade surge Bush had discussed with the NSC and the Joint Chiefs. The “2+2”
option was aligned with the recommendations of Abizaid and Casey but seemed dangerously wrongheaded to Keane, who had just 2 weeks before advised the President that the
task in Iraq required at least five additional brigades. Over the previous weeks, Keane
had also been in discreet contact with Odierno and knew that the III Corps commander
had concluded that a surge of that size would be required to make a serious change
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in the security situation in Baghdad.163 Roused by the Pentagon’s baffling insistence on
committing fewer troops than he believed the commander in chief had authorized, the
retired general again reached out to his contacts in the administration and made the case
for sending five brigades to reinforce the U.S. forces in Iraq.164 He gained support from
Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, commander of the Combined Arms Center, who
had been brought into the conversation at various points as both a counterinsurgency
expert and a potential replacement for Casey. In separate discussions with Keane, Gates,
Pace, and White House staffer Meghan O’Sullivan, Petraeus opined that the security situation, as he understood it, called for all the additional BCTs the Army could spare. If it
came down to a choice between five and two, then the answer was obvious.165 Like Keane,
Petraeus cautioned that these forces should be approved and committed as a single contingent, not as individual units dispatched based on discrete requests from the theater.166
On December 28, Bush finally clarified that he intended to conduct a full five-brigade
surge and asked for a video teleconference with Maliki within the week to inform the
Iraqi Prime Minister that the surge was coming.167 Pace conveyed the news to Odierno
the following day.168 Concerned that Maliki’s government might undercut the surge of
additional American troops by openly condemning it, Bush intended to obtain the Iraqi
leader’s tacit support for the modified U.S. strategy, as well as his pledge to continue
the fight to secure Baghdad until the job was finished. Bush also wanted Maliki’s assurance that the Baghdad Security Plan would target all lawbreakers, regardless of sect or
political affiliation, and that Maliki would give the coalition a freer hand in operations
against Shi’a militias.169 The President communicated these conditions to Maliki by video
teleconference on January 4, and the Prime Minister largely complied in a stirring speech
2 days later.170
The President planned to announce the new round of troop deployments publicly in
early January, having already postponed plans for a pre-Christmas speech to allow Gates
an opportunity to visit Iraq.171 The deployment of the 15th MEU would be extended, as
would those of the two Marine battalions. The 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne
Division, would arrive in Iraq on January 15, 2007. A heavy BCT would follow, moving
into Kuwait in mid-February. Three more brigades would make their way across the
Atlantic at a rate of one per month, beginning in March.172
***
Home for a short leave following Christmas, Casey learned of Bush’s guidance about
a five-brigade surge from Pace on December 29. He also learned from a reporter that he
would be replaced months earlier than he had anticipated and that White House officials had already informed The New York Times. While disappointed that the President
had rejected his best military advice, the MNF-I commander was also flabbergasted that
administration officials were denigrating his strategy in the press and blaming him for
Iraq’s descent into violence.173 “The White House is throwing you under the bus,” one
contact reportedly informed him.174
On January 2, Casey spoke with The New York Times, giving what amounted to a critique of the surge decision and a defense of the transition strategy he had formulated 2
years before. Casey said:
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The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq’s security, it lengthens
the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing
with the militias . . . [and] they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq’s problems, which are at base
their problems.175

Responding to criticism that he had declined to ask for more troops when they were
needed, the MNF-I commander said, “I have worked very hard to ask for what I need,
for what I thought I needed to accomplish the mission. . . . It’s always been my view that
a heavy and sustained American military presence was not going to solve the problems
in Iraq over the long term.”176
Casey repeated that argument to Pace and Abizaid 2 days later, charging that the
impending troop surge would be counterproductive to the long-term campaign. He questioned whether the Iraqis would consent to a U.S. troop increase of the size the President
had ordered and saw U.S. military presence in general as “grating on the population, particularly in large urban areas.” “We should acknowledge up front that more [coalition]
troops won’t solve what . . . is inherently a political problem,” he insisted.177 However,
the time for protest had passed. On the same day Casey sent his e-mail, January 4, 2007,
the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, began its journey to Baghdad. The
surge was underway.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVE OF THE SURGE, DECEMBER 2006-FEBRUARY 2007
The final days of 2006 were an uncertain time for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. President George W. Bush had made the decision to deploy five surge brigades, but almost
2 months remained until a new commander, General David Petraeus, would arrive to
implement a new U.S. strategy. In the meantime, General George Casey, Jr., remained
in command in Baghdad, overseeing operations under new strategic guidance from the
President that Casey had advised Bush not to issue. The 2 months between the surge decision and the arrival of Petraeus would see a widening rift between Casey and his operational commander, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, as Odierno began sending his
troops forward into Baghdad’s neighborhoods and instructing U.S. units to retake lead
responsibility for security operations from their Iraqi counterparts. Odierno’s approach
amounted to a reversal of the course Casey had set for MNF- I more than a year earlier.
One issue on which Casey and Odierno agreed was that the coalition and Iraqi security forces immediately should renew operations to secure Baghdad. As a new Baghdad
security plan got underway in early 2007, the warring parties in central Iraq—the coalition, the Iraqi security forces, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a
militant groups—braced themselves for the coming U.S. counteroffensive. In the intensified fighting that resulted as the plan was implemented, the long-deferred war between
the coalition and the Iranian regime’s militant proxies would reignite.
In the first weeks of 2007, coalition leaders also would shift their attention to the belts
that surrounded Baghdad, guided by a new realization that only by controlling the capital’s hinterlands could the coalition and its Iraqi partners secure the city itself. Finally,
far beyond Baghdad, renewed fighting in northern Iraq would show that even with the
coming five-brigade troop surge, there would be important areas of Iraq beyond the coalition’s means to pacify, at least in the short term.
THE HANGING OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
The end of 2006 brought with it the end of Saddam Hussein, who had been in U.S.
custody since his December 2003 capture. A consummate manipulator, he had cast himself as something of a grandfather to his bemused American guards, dispensing personal
advice to those who saw him on a daily basis. In a similar vein, he politely needled the
senior officer who visited him every other week at the coalition detention center on Camp
Victory, Iraq, where he was held. “You Americans are naïve,” he told Major General John
D. Gardner, commander of coalition detention operations. “You will be unable to keep
the Shi’a, the Sunni, and the Kurds together because you are too kind.”1
Convicted of “crimes against humanity” for the killing of 148 people in the mainly
Shi’a town of Dujail, and sentenced to death by hanging in November 2006, the former
dictator learned of the denial of his final appeal on December 26. The Iraqi Government
was eager to move forward with the execution but had to satisfy a number of administrative requirements before the United States would transfer custody. The extent of these
outstanding legal issues led coalition leaders to assume that the execution was at least 1
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to 2 weeks away. When Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s representatives notified the U.S.
Embassy late on the evening of December 29 that the Iraqi Government intended to hang
Saddam the following morning, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Casey both
were out of the country. Scrambling to try to delay the execution, the Embassy arranged
a call between Khalilzad and the Prime Minister and even elevated the matter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The ambassador and U.S. military officials pressed for a
postponement, arguing that the rush was unseemly—particularly given that December
30 was Eid al-Adha, an important religious holiday for both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.
However, Maliki insisted on moving forward, asserting the execution was a matter of
Iraqi sovereignty.2
Around 3:00 a.m. on December 30, U.S. officials yielded to the Iraqi request and flew
Saddam by helicopter from Camp Victory to the Iraqi-run Camp Justice in the Kadhimiyah District of Baghdad. The U.S. military transported Iraqi national security adviser
Mowaffaq Rubaie and other Iraqi officials from the Green Zone to the execution site by
helicopter as well.3 Saddam met his fate before sunrise amid a raucous crowd of Ministry
of Justice officials and Shi’a militiamen chanting, “Moqtada, Moqtada, Moqtada,” a scene
captured on cell phone video by Rubaie himself.4
For 3 years, the coalition had kept Saddam alive and healthy during his confinement—accommodating his lawyers’ demands for access, force-feeding him during his
two hunger strikes, and choreographing his safe passage back and forth to the trial—
only to accede in the end to the Iraqi Government’s haphazard handling and provocative
timing of the execution. Maliki’s office had brushed aside U.S. concerns over executing
Saddam on the day of Eid, stating that it would hang the former dictator well before sunrise. However, citing this technicality as a mitigating factor was merely a smokescreen.
The Maliki government fully intended to send a message with the execution. Later that
day, Iraqi state television broadcast Rubaie’s cell phone video of the former dictator’s last
moments, and an aide to the Prime Minister labeled Saddam’s death as “an Eid gift to the
Iraqi people.”5 The message was not lost on Sunni Arabs. In a meeting with Khalilzad in
Riyadh, for example, an outraged King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia accused the U.S. Government of complicity in the controversially timed execution.6 A defiant Maliki answered
regional critics 1 week later, “We look strangely at the statements made by some governments who pretend to mourn the dictator for being executed on a sacred day,” he
intoned, “although these governments know very well that Saddam had desecrated all
the sacred things [for] 35 years [while] these governments stood silent.”7
At coalition headquarters, the incident deepened Odierno’s suspicions of the Iraqi
Government. The coalition had hoped the execution could be an opportunity for Iraqis to
move forward in unity, but news that the government had allowed the event to devolve
into a sectarian spectacle dashed these hopes. A disappointed Odierno next found
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) embroiled in a dispute over the disposition of the
former dictator’s remains. The corps transported the Salahadin governor and Saddam’s
kinsmen to Baghdad for consultations with the Prime Minister’s representatives and later
flew the body to Tikrit for burial after the issue was decided. Unimpressed with how the
central government had handled these negotiations, Odierno was dismayed by the realization that Maliki’s aides seemed to be harnessing the powerful emotions associated with
the hanging to stoke the sectarian flames. “Rubaie, I believe, has deep ties with Sadr” and
“a clear bent toward . . . the protection of Shia extremism,” the MNC-I commander wrote
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after he learned of the national security adviser’s involvement, adding that Rubaie “basically turned the execution over to the Sadrists.”8 The distasteful experience left Odierno
and other senior U.S. leaders questioning whether the Iraqi Government’s partisan stance
would derail the impending campaign to secure Baghdad.
THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN
The Maliki Government’s New Plan
Saddam’s execution took place against a backdrop of intense preparations by Iraqi
and U.S. leaders for a renewed Baghdad security plan. Throughout December, as U.S.
leaders in Washington hammered out the specifics of a large-scale surge of American
troops, Casey and his Iraqi counterparts formulated plans for a surge of Iraqi troops into
the capital and additional measures to try to tamp down the sectarian violence there.
Casting the operation as a campaign to enforce the law against any militant groups that
violated it, Maliki and his officials named the new plan Operation FARDH AL-QANOON,
Arabic for “Enforcing the Law.” With coalition assistance, the Iraqis developed a unique
command-and-control framework for FARDH AL-QANOON that became a mainstay of
future operations in the capital.
Representatives from the ministries of defense and interior as well as Maliki’s office
of the commander in chief would establish a single command—the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC)—to oversee all Iraqi security forces in the capital. Two subordinate
commands would divide the city into nine administrative districts: the Rusafa Area
Command would oversee the five districts east of the Tigris River, including Sadr City;
while the western half’s four districts would fall under the jurisdiction of the Karkh Area
Command. Police stations in each district would serve as hubs where Iraqi Army units,
National Police, and coalition forces would coordinate operations with local police to
secure surrounding neighborhoods. Iraqi generals from the army and National Police
would lead the Karkh and Rusafa subcommands, respectively, each with a deputy from
the other service—an Iraqi-crafted measure instituted to build trust within the security
forces and facilitate “joint” operations.9 The Iraqis’ insistence on integrating elements
from the ministries of defense and interior into the same headquarters at multiple echelons throughout the capital seemed overly complicated to U.S. officers, but understandable given the pervasiveness of destructive sectarianism. Increasing the linkages among
the army, police, and coalition forces meant, in Casey’s words, “everyone . . . would be
watching each other.”10
For simplicity’s sake, Casey pushed for a combined U.S.-Iraqi command led by Major
General Joseph F. Fil, the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) commander, and
Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan, the commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command
(IGFC). Using an existing headquarters building and an experienced staff for the BOC
made sense to Casey, who had witnessed MNF-I’s own growing pains and also wanted
to begin operations quickly.11 Maliki, however, had other ideas. For weeks, the Prime
Minister had pressed the coalition to grant him a responsive military force that reported
directly to him. To meld the new command with the IGFC would tie it bureaucratically
to the Ministry of Defense rather than directly to the Prime Minister. Creating it as a
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combined headquarters, meanwhile, would fuse American and Iraqi leaders and staffs
together, an idea that Maliki rejected because it seemed to enable the Americans to dodge
responsibility for security while providing them with a veto over Iraqi operations. The
BOC should be answerable ultimately to the Iraqi Prime Minister alone, Maliki argued.
The Prime Minister also had no intention of locating the BOC in the middle of Camp
Victory, far from the Green Zone but only a 5-minute walk from MNC-I’s headquarters.
Preserving his freedom of action mattered more than the strictly military considerations.
Instead, the BOC would move into a wing of Adnan Palace near the Green Zone with an
ad hoc staff of Iraqi officers from the ministries of defense and interior.12 Although the coalition would provide a large advisory team, the BOC would be an Iraqi-run organization.
It also did not serve Maliki’s political interests to place the IGFC commander, Ghaidan,
in charge. Maliki’s office instead floated the name of General Mohan al-Freiji as the future
Baghdad commander, but MNF-I drew the line at this nomination. At Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey
judged Freiji “a bad piece of work.” Odierno also balked at the proposal, characterizing
Freiji as an officer with “extreme Shi’a views,” who would be incapable of leading “fair
and balanced operations.”13 As a result, the Prime Minister moved on to Lieutenant General Abud Qanbar, a Shi’a officer virtually unknown to the coalition, but a Maliki kinsman who recently had directed the praetorian-like Office of the Commander in Chief. In
naming him, Maliki passed over three Iraqi generals Casey had recommended.14

Staff General Abud Qanbar (left). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant David Hodge (Released).

BOC Staff General Abud Qanbar, During a Groundbreaking Ceremony in Baghdad.15
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The coalition headquarters scrambled to assess Baghdad’s new commander. Odierno
dispatched MNC-I’s chief Arabist and political adviser, Colonel Robert Newman, to head
the BOC advisory team and report his impressions. Qanbar’s postings since 2003 had
given him little exposure to the coalition, and he did not yet trust its leaders, tending
toward “rudeness” and “a profound lack of respect” in interactions with American and
British generals, Newman observed. The American colonel was struck by what he interpreted as the Iraqi commander’s baseless self-confidence and dearth of military experience. “[Lieutenant General] Abud believes that he can do anything he wants to do because
of his support from the Prime Minister’s [PM’s] office,” Newman reported. “And there
is a good chance that most of what he will do will be motivated by sectarian interests.”16
Casey’s operations director, Major General David A. Fastabend, met Qanbar soon after
his appointment and came away with a similar impression: “Strong hints of Shi’a bias. . .
. An officer of average Iraqi competence in the tactical/lower-operational realm. No sign
of a grasp of operational/strategic/political complexities. This is not Colin Powell.”17
However, there was little Casey could do. The security ministers backed Maliki’s
choice, and the MNF-I commander judged he lacked the influence to contest it. Controversy aside, the BOC was the price the coalition had to pay for a level of Iraqi Government support absent in the Baghdad operations of 2006.
The New Year’s Offensive
It would take more than a new commander and headquarters to enforce the law in
Baghdad. Early in the process, the Iraqis determined that the revised plan would require
a total of 19 brigades from the Iraqi Army and National Police; five more than were actually available.18 To help correct this shortfall, three additional army brigades were slated
to deploy to the capital no later than the end of February.19 However, the Iraqi plan left
many matters unresolved. First, it focused on military details to the exclusion of political
and economic issues.20 Besides a vague reference to raids and patrols, the concept lacked
both a scheme of maneuver for units to follow and a prioritization of key terrain in the
city. “This is a plan about checkpoints,” summarized Fil, the MND-B commander. “There
is no mention of the actual offensive.”21 The Iraqi plan went into exhaustive detail about
the staffing of static positions, including the Baghdad Barrier, a series of checkpoints
ringing the perimeter of the city and an Iraqi fixation that coalition leaders saw as a virtual sinkhole for platoons that could be better employed elsewhere. “We have our doubts
on the efficacy of the Baghdad Barrier,” commented Fastabend, “but if we unilaterally
bring it down it will be the ‘Big Excuse’ . . . on why things are not going well.”22
Beyond the matter of the Iraqis’ static approach, MND-B recognized that the Iraqi
plans did not adequately address the problem of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other Shi’a
militants—the same shortcoming that had helped to doom the Baghdad security plans of
summer and fall 2006. For the past several months or more, JAM elements had been carrying out a systematic campaign of violence and intimidation designed to bring the capital under exclusively Shi’a control. Sunnis had responded by forming “neighborhood
watches” to defend their communities and, increasingly, to launch their own extrajudicial killing raids against Shi’a. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) exploited this growing sectarian
rift and co-opted many of these Sunni groups.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Bleichwehl (Released).

Major General Joseph Fil, Commanding General of MND-B in the Rusafa Market. 23
MND-B had limited troops at its disposal to address these problems. At the time,
three U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) operated in the city. The departure of the 172d
Stryker BCT from Baghdad without replacement forced MNC-I to relocate Colonel Stephen J. Townsend’s 3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, from Mosul to the capital
city in December to become MND-B’s mobile strike force. Besides these U.S. units, Fil
had operational control of seven Iraqi Army brigades and eight National Police brigades
in Baghdad. Fil and his division had assumed responsibility for conducting patrols with
Iraqi units throughout the city and for holding five “focus areas”—mixed neighborhoods
that had witnessed heavy sectarian violence. All these lay in the western half of Baghdad,
except for the Sunni enclave of Adhamiyah.24 MND-B also controlled three U.S. BCTs
operating outside the city in the so-called belts—one to the north and two to the south.
To arrest the sectarian violence in Baghdad, Fil and the 1st Cavalry Division argued
for collapsing the Baghdad Barrier to free up the Iraqi units that manned it—nearly a brigade of Iraqi combat power—and use them to help clear areas inside the city. They also
proposed reinforcing the Army Canal checkpoints on the edge of Sadr City—the same
checkpoints Chiarelli unsuccessfully had urged Casey not to remove in late October, just
2 months earlier. The 1st Cavalry Division wished to maintain the checkpoints that limited access to the focus areas, while minimizing other checkpoints to encourage more
patrolling and an offensive spirit in Iraqi units.25 With renewed offensive operations and
an extended curfew, MND-B hoped to “surge combat power on focus areas to protect the
population.”26
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Map 8. Before the Surge, Disposition of U.S. Forces Baghdad, January 2007.
Political pressure accelerated the launch of the new security plan, as Maliki was eager
to show progress and Bush was intent on demonstrating the specifics of his “new way
forward.” On December 22, with Casey and Odierno in attendance, Fil told Iraq’s security
ministers that a long-term operation would begin within days and last into the summer.
During the last week of December, Colonel J. B. Burton’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, would clear Ghazaliyah, a tough Sunni neighborhood astride a sectarian fault line
in west Baghdad. Most MND-B units in the city would spend the first 2 weeks of the new
year increasing their presence inside previously cleared areas while conducting raids and
patrols to disrupt Sunni and Shi’a militants elsewhere. Meanwhile, Townsend’s Stryker
brigade would undertake a series of clearing operations across the capital as the division’s strike force.27
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As a strike force, Townsend’s brigade would not have a single sector of its own, but
instead would lead the effort to remove enemy forces from specific neighborhoods in
other BCTs’ battle space and to eliminate any support zones or sanctuaries. The unit’s
additional maneuver battalion and its comparatively large contingent of infantrymen,
combined with the Stryker vehicle’s mobility, made it well suited for a rapid series of
discrete clearing missions. In these operations, coalition and Iraqi troops would move
with care through hot-spot neighborhoods, building by building, following up on intelligence or tips from locals to try to find militant operatives, safe houses, weapons, or
other aspects of enemy organizations.28 Clearing operations had been a major part of the
coalition’s approach in Iraq’s urban areas throughout the war, and they often resulted in
large-scale captures of enemy operatives and weapons or sparked violent engagements
with enemy fighters.
After the New Year, Fil intended for the 3d Stryker Brigade to clear Sha’ab/Ur to the
north of Sadr City and prepare the area for the mid-January arrival of the 2d Brigade,
82d Airborne Division, the first of the surge brigades. Townsend’s troops would then
conduct similar operations over the next several weeks in the troublesome Kadhimiyah,
Rashid, and Mansour districts. As the strike force shifted to each follow-on assignment,
the American BCT owning the recently cleared battle space would maintain a physical presence there in direct support of Iraqi Army or National Police units. As Sunni
and Shi’a militants sought to reassert their influence in these still-contested areas, Iraqi
and U.S. formations would remain to protect the population, an element absent from
the TOGETHER FORWARD operations in 2006. With a sustained reduction in violence,
security forces would turn the cleared areas into “gated communities,” as the soldiers
liked to call them, surrounded by concrete barriers and with access points controlled by
the security forces. As supporting U.S. units reduced their footprint in these areas, the
Iraqi Army and National Police would be responsible for ensuring the enemy was not
able to reestablish a foothold—though the issue of Iraqi security forces reform would
have to be addressed.29 The traditional counterinsurgency imperative of police primacy
informed MND-B’s plans. As security improved, control would gradually pass from coalition forces to the Iraqi Army or National Police and finally to local police.30
The concept was an advance beyond the flawed approach of Operation TOGETHER
FORWARD, but its reliance on the idea of police primacy proved problematic. Putting
the Iraqi police on the front lines of the civil war in early 2007 amounted to sponsoring
one warring party in a civil war against the other, except in those rare places and units in
which the police were thoroughly apolitical and professional. The guiding principle for
population security and control within a civil war should have been to prevent all groups
from using violence against one another, including the group in control of the government and its security forces. By placing a premium on police primacy while security still
hung in the balance, MNF-I had misapplied counterinsurgency doctrine and endangered
the operation itself.
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Fil’s plan also fleshed out the Iraqi concept for joint security stations where American troops, local police, and Iraqi Army and National Police units operating in the same
general area would co-locate their headquarters to monitor and synchronize operations.
Coalition commanders hoped this move, and its injection of American forces inside Iraqi
headquarters, would limit sectarian behavior by Iraqi security force (ISF) members.
Starting from a baseline of 9 or 10 “district” joint security stations, MND-B instructed its
subordinate BCTs to set up “satellite” stations in the surrounding neighborhoods where
company-sized U.S. and Iraqi units would coordinate combined operations, manage routine patrols, process detainees, and engage the local population. Spurred by MNF-I’s
insistence that the plan complement its transition goals, the division initially proposed
that platoons rotate through the company’s sector, patrolling in 12-hour shifts before
returning to a forward operating base rather than residing in joint security stations. In the
view of Casey and MNF-I, the joint security stations were a mechanism for transition as
the coalition postured itself for a phased withdrawal from the city.31
To ramp up the U.S. and Iraqi security presence on the streets of the capital, MND-B
revived the concept of partnership that Casey had eschewed the previous month. The
Baghdad Security Plan aligned Iraqi unit sectors and district boundaries, facilitating the
pairing of U.S. and Iraqi units that shared battle space. Each of the dozen or so Iraqi Army
and National Police brigades posted across the capital’s nine security districts would partner with a coalition force battalion. Unlike the 12-man military transition teams advising
Iraqi field-grade leaders and their staffs, the newly partnered U.S. units were directed “to
increase the capabilities of Iraqi security forces through combined operations and coaching, teaching, and mentoring at all levels.”32 Notably, as additional Iraqi brigades arrived
in the capital, more U.S. battalions would be needed to pair with them.
As Fil and his officers saw it, it would take several months of operating within the
city before the coalition could transition Baghdad’s security to Iraqi control and shift
coalition attention to the AQI-dominated areas surrounding Baghdad. Once the threat
was sufficiently reduced, local police would take the lead for providing security, allowing the coalition to take the fight into the enemy support zones surrounding the capital
while shifting to an “overwatch” posture inside the city itself.33 Given the forces available, including the two surge BCTs the division hoped to receive from outside the theater, launching a coordinated assault into Baghdad’s belts would have to wait until a
semblance of stability was restored to the city’s core, Fil and his staff judged.34
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Source: DoD photo by United States Forces Iraq (Released).

American and Iraqi Soldiers Wait as U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters Approach Their Landing Zone Near Mahmudiyah.35
Likewise, a major incursion into Sadr City would not be forthcoming. Washington’s
interest in the possibility of “taking care of JAM” had prompted a deeper look by Casey
in early December. Clearing the densely populated Shi’a slum could be done with the
Iraqi and American forces already in and around Baghdad, he concluded. However, if
MND-B concentrated its forces on Sadr City, it would leave the west side of Baghdad
uncovered, resulting in a high degree of risk.36 The prospect that engaging JAM in its Sadr
City sanctuary could trigger a countrywide backlash gave the MNF-I commander pause
as well. “We would expect a tough fight for a week or two,” Casey related in an e-mail to
Pace and Abizaid, “but we would prevail if the government held tough.”37 Whether the
Maliki government would hold remained in question. Maliki had authorized targeted
strikes into Sadr City, but he had no appetite for an open confrontation against JAM on
its own turf. This suited MND-B just fine. Focused on sectarian fault lines throughout
the capital, the division judged that a costly clearing operation into the long-time militia stronghold would likely not end Shi’a death squad activity and argued in favor of a
delay. At all levels, U.S. military leaders agreed that it was better in the near term to isolate the stronghold, disrupt JAM through frequent raids against its leadership, and work
to weaken the militia’s position vis-à-vis the local Iraqi security forces.38
To reinforce FARDH AL-QANOON, Odierno ordered MNC-I’s units to keep the
enemy off-balance with a flurry of simultaneous offensive activity.39 MND-B had no shortage of hot spots, and Fil quickly began using Townsend’s Stryker brigade to address them.
The full complement of Townsend’s BCT arrived from Mosul in mid-December, ending
a 3-week gap during which MND-B operated without a Stryker brigade headquarters
or dedicated mobile strike force. The BCT commander’s first exposure to Baghdad had
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come the previous month on a patrol with the unit his brigade was replacing. Townsend
had been struck by the absence of American troops in the neighborhoods. “In 5 hours,
we saw one other coalition patrol,” he recalled.40 Under the auspices of FARDH AL-QANOON, BCTs across Baghdad would now initiate operations to reintroduce U.S. military
presence throughout the city.

Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Lance Wail (Released).

Colonel Stephen Townsend, Commander of the 3d Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry
Division, With Major General Abdul Ameer al-Lami, Commander of the
Iraqi 6th Division.41
Battalion-sized strike operations were the raison d’être of Townsend’s unit in Baghdad. With his reconnaissance squadron already attached to another BCT, the commander
aligned his three remaining maneuver battalions geographically so that they coincided
roughly with the sectors of “ground-owning” U.S. brigades, thereby improving responsiveness. Townsend’s first large operation occurred in Salman Pak, the mixed-sect
town on the southeastern outskirts of the capital where JAM and Sunni militants long
had struggled for control and where hundreds of bodies of murdered Baghdadis had
washed up from the Tigris in 2005-2006. The second, in New Baghdad, involved three
of Townsend’s battalions and sought to disrupt Shi’a militant operations while creating
the false impression that U.S. forces were gearing up for a major push into Sadr City.42
During the first week of January, the BCT shifted its combat power to the opposite side
of the capital in order to clear the Kadhimiyah District’s densely populated Hurriyah
neighborhood. Meanwhile, following clearing operations in Ghazaliyah and Ameriyah,
Burton’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, sought to disrupt the Shi’a militants’ hold
on northern Kadhimiyah and prevent their ongoing forays into Sunni areas just to the
53

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

south. Two of Townsend’s battalions supported this fight. From there, half of the Strykers
launched clearing operations in Dora. Remaining in Hurriyah, 1st Stryker Battalion, 23d
Infantry Regiment, held the neighborhood, along with an Iraqi Army unit, and waited
until reinforcements from the first surge BCT arrived to relieve it.43
The Battle of Haifa Street
As FARDH AL-QANOON got underway with these operations in early January
2007, the most difficult fighting emerged around Haifa Street, a busy byway paralleling
the west bank of the Tigris River in the Karkh District. Just 2½ miles north of the U.S.
Embassy, the neighborhood had become an AQI stronghold and a sectarian battlefield. It
lay in the area assigned to Colonel Bryan Roberts’s 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, but
had received scant coalition attention for much of 2006—due to the limited forces available and the fact that Dora, in the same BCT sector, was far more violent.
Roberts considered Karkh an economy of force mission. One of his squadrons had
responsibility for the area in and around the international zone, with roughly one troop
running patrols and monitoring Iraqi checkpoints at any given time.44 Haifa Street itself
ran through a locale inhabited largely by Sunnis, but many Shi’a lived in a neighborhood
a few blocks to the west. This sectarian fault-line had become more pronounced in 2006
as Shi’a militants and AQI battled to expand their control.45 The well-to-do professional
class that had once resided in Haifa Street’s high-rise apartment buildings had fled as the
violence grew intolerable, and those who remained were under the sway of Sunni terrorist groups promising protection in the face of militia intimidation. Just blocks away, in the
Shi’a-majority area, a makeshift sign hung on the side of a children’s hospital (roughly
translated) proclaiming: “Congratulations, President Moqtada al-Sadr, for executing
Saddam.”46 As U.S. troops geared up for operations in places like Kadhimiyah, Mansour,
and Rashid, Odierno eyed the sectarian tinderbox of Haifa Street as a “big problem.”47

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

High Rise Apartment Buildings on Haifa Street, the Location of Intense Battles in
Early January 2007.48
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Matters came to a head during the first week of January 2007. On January 6, a sharp
clash in the Haifa Street neighborhood between Sunni gunmen manning a fake checkpoint and Iraqi forces left 30 Sunni fighters dead. Sunni militants retaliated by executing
a near-equal number of Shi’a civilians and dumping their bodies in an alleyway, after
which emboldened Sunni fighters patrolled the streets practically unchallenged over the
next 2 days.49 When troops of the 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, arrived from
nearby Hurriyah to reassert government control, they found themselves overmatched
almost immediately. At the request of the commander of an ambushed Iraqi convoy,
the 1st Stryker Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, dispatched two companies to help.50
By daylight on January 9, more than 1,000 Iraqi and American troops were engaged in
a pitched battle with Sunni insurgents, with the sound of the fighting heard in the U.S.
Embassy and MNF-I headquarters a little more than 2 miles away. The enemy appeared
well organized and highly trained, maneuvering from position to position, and delivering
coordinated mortar fire in support. Defenders occupied several apartment towers some
20 to 30 stories high, making deliberate building-to-building, floor-to-floor, and roomto-room clearing operations infeasible. According to the U.S. commander on the scene,
the complexity of the terrain far exceeded the capabilities of available Iraqi-American
manpower. When insurgents opted to stay and fight it out rather than melt away after
an initial exchange as they typically did, coalition forces employed firepower to bridge
the gap. Close air support from rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft targeted snipers. Marking
the battle’s climax, precision rocket fire from Fallujah some 40 miles away destroyed a
heavily defended building with virtually no collateral damage. As darkness fell on January 9, the combined American-Iraqi force consolidated its positions. Over the course of
the 11-hour fight, it had suffered six casualties—four American and two Iraqi wounded.
About 50 enemy fighters were killed and at least 15 captured, with a handful of Syrians
and Egyptians among them.51 By comparison, the same battalion had netted 16 detainees
while reporting no enemy killed the previous week during 5 days of clearing operations
in Hurriyah.52
Over the next week, the Stryker battalion reduced its forces and left security on Haifa
Street in Iraqi hands. The American withdrawal set the stage for the unit’s return later
in the month. Without U.S. troops present, Haifa Street soon became a scene of sectarian
conflict again. JAM, the Badr Corps, and other Shi’a militias renewed their campaign
of intimidation in nearby areas and exploited their infiltration of Iraqi forces to target
Sunnis. Meanwhile, Sunni extremists also returned to Haifa Street. When their harassing
sniper fire paralyzed Iraqi Army units, the Strykers returned to restore stability. On January 24, the battalion attacked with a large force of Iraqis, as well as a troop belonging to
2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The units undertook more thorough clearing operations
than on the previous occasion and over a number of days instituted population-control
measures by cordoning off key areas and limiting access to pedestrian traffic. A troop
from 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, established a combat outpost alongside troops
from the 6th Iraqi Army Division.53 However, this small presence could not contain the
expansion of the Shi’a militias, which imposed a “mafia-like” grip on the neighborhood
that persisted for several more months.54
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The fighting around Haifa Street showcased the shortcomings of the Iraqi security
forces in Baghdad relative to the threat. Some of the Iraqi Army troops involved in the
early stages of the confrontation appeared to have abandoned their posts. Even the unit
sent to Haifa Street to restore order fell victim to an ambush, ran out of ammunition, and
was unable to resupply itself.55 Coalition officials characterized the first day’s battle as
a success, describing Iraqi forces as maneuvering “aggressively” and enduring “fierce
firefights,” but in actuality, the Iraqi troops were still no match for the Sunni extremists
confronting them.56 The same units also seemed reluctant to contest the rise of Shi’a militia influence once American forces withdrew from the area.57 At the same time, the raiding approach of the U.S. units around Haifa Street resembled the failures of Operation
TOGETHER FORWARD: U.S. units arrived on the scene reacting to a local security crisis,
neutralized the threat, and then pulled out—only to be ordered back when the same
problem soon reemerged.
MNC-I, AQI, AND THE BAGHDAD BELTS
During Odierno’s fall 2006 preparations to assume command of MNC-I, he noted the
lack of corps-level operations in Iraq throughout the previous year. From his perspective, as U.S. units had transitioned battle space and consolidated onto large bases, the
U.S. commands had effectively stopped maneuvering and executing at the operational
level. Rather than synchronize the multinational divisions toward a common operational
goal, MNC-I had tended to structure its campaign as multiple division-sized fights in
which subordinate units worked for local economic development, good governance, and
trained Iraqi security forces. During summer and fall 2006, this approach had meant that
the coalition campaign to secure Baghdad had fallen solely on MND-B and its three U.S.
brigades in the city, with the other divisions conducting operations largely disconnected
from MND-B’s task in the capital.
As the operations of January 2007 got underway, Odierno sought to restore the coalition’s operational perspective. From Odierno’s vantage point, the coalition’s war in
Iraq was more properly viewed as countrywide, rather than as a set of discrete province-based campaigns. As MNC-I’s main effort, MND-B would establish joint security
stations throughout the city, partner with Iraqi units, and adopt a posture that enabled
them to maintain a 24/7 presence in their sectors.58 As Odierno saw it, reversing the cycle
of sectarian violence required more than protecting the people of Baghdad and attacking
the Sunni and Shi’a militants operating within the city. Any attempt to secure the capital
required a concurrent effort to stop violent actors and weapons before they made their
way into Baghdad, such as the car bombs that often originated in the belts surrounding the
city on their way to targeting Shi’a neighborhoods. Under Odierno’s instructions, MNC-I
tasked MND-N and MNF-W to support MND-B by interdicting these “accelerants” to
violence.59 By focusing all three U.S. divisions on Baghdad, the corps could create a new,
shared responsibility for Baghdad’s security and give better shape to the priorities of the
outlying divisions. This was particularly true for Major General Benjamin R. Mixon and
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Multi-National Division-North (MND-N). MNC-I’s emphasis on controlling the northern
belt running from the Lake Tharthar region into Diyala Province proved more helpful
as a guide for managing risk than MNF-I’s 2006 framework based on “strategic cities”—
four of which lay dispersed across MND-N’s vast battle space.60 Odierno’s plan made
clear to Mixon that the sectarian battleground between Baghdad and Baqubah should
be MND-N’s top concern.61 However, the same principle did not really extend to the
non-U.S. divisions. More distant from Baghdad, Multi-National Division-Central South
(MND-CS) and Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) would remain focused on
other security problems as the U.S. divisions concentrated on the capital.
Odierno’s emphasis on Baghdad’s hinterland was new for the coalition, but not for
the Iraqis. For quite some time, Iraqis had recognized the areas just beyond Baghdad
as crucial to controlling the city, a fact that Defense Minister Ali Allawi had pointed
out to Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in spring 2004. Saddam, too, had viewed
controlling the belts as essential and had developed plans to position Republican Guard
divisions in defensive zones around the capital.62 The Iraqi Shi’a leaders saw the problem
similarly, with Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) officials identifying the belts as key terrain in conversations with CJTF-7 officers in 2004. Similarly,
in late 2006, Maliki reportedly told his advisers that, after the government successfully
excluded the coalition from greater Baghdad, Iraqi forces should move quickly to clear
and control an area spanning from Diyala to the southern and western areas of the capital.63 Within the coalition commands, in 2005 MNC-I commander Lieutenant General
John Vines’s concern about insurgent support zones in the belts had led him to disagree
strongly with Casey’s plan to move a division’s worth of U.S. combat power from the
Baghdad region to the Syrian border zones. To some degree, Casey and MNF-I appreciated the importance of the belts around Baghdad as a support zone for AQI before
October 2006, but their focus on transition to Iraqi control, as well as a shortage of U.S.
forces, had precluded significant coalition operations in the belts. When Iraqi leaders
had insisted on establishing the ring of Baghdad Barrier checkpoints around the city in
an attempt to control the routes from the outlying areas into the capital, MNF-I quickly
judged it a pointless drain of Iraqi combat power. They missed the key point underlying Iraqi fixation with the ring of checkpoints: securing the city required controlling the
outlying rural areas to the north and south. “The role of the support zones in controlling
Baghdad is a perceived historical fact to them,” Fastabend observed.64 In their desire to
sideline the misguided tactic of staffing stationary checkpoints, coalition leaders before
December 2006 had overlooked the significance of this key terrain.
The Taji Documents
One of the most important discoveries of the war validated Odierno’s and the Iraqis’
instincts about the importance of the Baghdad belts. On December 19, 2006, U.S. Soldiers
from 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, conducting a routine patrol in the Taji market
north of the capital, captured a map and other documents that revealed AQI’s strategy to
control Baghdad. As the U.S. patrol investigated a suspicious vehicle, the men occupying
it fled. One wore a suicide vest that detonated when the Americans opened fire. Another
claimed to be a hostage. Left in the vehicle was a laptop computer, 450 gigabytes of data,
and a hand-drawn map of Baghdad and its environs.65
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The map and the accompanying Taji documents, as they became known at MNF-I,
brought clarity to the coalition’s understanding of AQI’s battlefield geometry, which was
more structured than coalition officials had realized. AQI leaders treated Baghdad as a
separate zone, distinguishing between the “metro area” and the surrounding belts, but
there was a connection between the two. Securing the key terrain of Rusafa, which AQI
leaders seemed to consider a high priority, required the systematic sectarian cleansing
of the belts, which would cut off Shi’a lines of communications into east Baghdad and
increase the flow of displaced persons to locales known to have poor infrastructure. AQI
leaders assumed these developments would tax the already dysfunctional Iraqi Government beyond its capacity and trigger a collapse. “The most important battle, which is
happening now,” an AQI leader had written in late 2006, “is the Battle of the Baghdad
Belt.”66
The Taji documents showed that AQI leaders believed it was time to intensify this
fight. Within Baghdad, they considered the notorious Rusafa car bomb network their
principal instrument of violence. Led by an AQI commander called Abu Nur, this network was responsible for the large-scale car bombs that plagued east Baghdad in late
2006 and early 2007. Its sustained success encouraged AQI leaders to accelerate a sectarian conflict with Baghdad’s Shi’a they felt confident they could win.67 From within
the Shi’a-majority Rusafa District, Abu Nur’s car bombers could easily target the adjacent Sadr City and were also close to a base of support in Adhamiyah, the only Sunni
enclave east of the Tigris River. Rumors circulated that some of Abu Nur’s operatives
were former Shi’a whose Shi’a identities enabled them to move freely in east Baghdad’s
Shi’a-majority districts, all of which had transitioned to Iraqi police control. Abu Nur’s
immediate objective was to displace the Shi’a population of central Baghdad into districts
like Sadr City and Kadhimiyah, corralling them into besieged pockets for more efficient
extermination. At the same time, AQI leaders sought to expand Sunni strongholds in the
Ghazaliyah and Ameriyah neighborhoods of west Baghdad, a step toward making the
entire northwest quadrant of the capital an “extension of Anbar.”68

The Handwritten Map Depicting AQI’s Strategy for Dominating the Baghdad Belts.69
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According to the Taji documents, AQI had divided its campaign in the belts into three
areas: east, south, and north. The northern belt included Taji, where the documents had
been found, and stretched to the lower Diyala Province. Meanwhile, the eastern belt
stretched from Salman Pak up through the largely Shi’a Mada’in Qada to the southern
reaches of Diyala Province. AQI’s emir in the eastern belt, an obscure operative known
as Asim, had responsibility for cutting the Kut-Baghdad road and securing a land bridge
from the outskirts of the capital up the contested Diyala River Valley to Buhriz and Baqubah. These tasks had been reinforced by AQI in mid-2006.70 The southern belt stretched
west of the Tigris River from Arab Jabour to the border of Anbar Province near Zaidon,
an area where a low-grade sectarian civil war pulsed through the key population centers
that dotted the heavily irrigated farmland. Arab Jabour remained a Sunni stronghold,
as did Yusufiyah at the far end of this portion of the belts. In between, though, JAM and
other Shi’a militias were increasing their footholds in the traditionally Sunni towns of
Mahmudiyah and Iskandariyah. The stakes were high. Control of Yusufiyah, for example, was vital to AQI, because without it, Baghdad’s southern points of entry would be
practically inaccessible.71
From the coalition’s perspective, security in the southern and eastern sections of the
belts suffered from a general dearth of friendly forces. At the beginning of 2007, two U.S.
BCTs under MND-B had responsibility for the area. With the culturally significant cities
of Karbala and Najaf in its sector, Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry
Division, short one of its maneuver battalions, could project relatively little combat power
into the belts adjacent to the capital.72 The battlegrounds of Arab Jabour and Salman
Pak saw little coalition presence, save for forays aimed at disrupting enemy activity. The
latest had occurred in December when a battalion from Townsend’s 3d Stryker Brigade,
2d Infantry Division, hit high-value targets in Salman Pak.73 In terms of available troops,
2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, was not much better off in the so-called Triangle
of Death just southwest of Baghdad, but did have the advantage of a smaller area of
operations. Its commander, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, decided early in his tour to
maintain a forward presence among the population through a network of patrol bases,
an approach that by early 2007 seemed to be clamping down on AQI’s freedom of movement.74 For example, Abu Dunyah, emir of the southern belt, reported in late 2006 coming
under “pressure from the enemy,” a development causing infighting among his subordinate leaders.75
According to the Taji documents, AQI placed its greatest hope in the operations of
Abu Ghazwan, the emir of the northern belt. Imprisoned at Camp Bucca and released
from coalition custody in 2005, Ghazwan oversaw the area arcing eastward from Abu
Ghraib to the outskirts of Baqubah. He financed himself by extorting money from contractors working for the coalition. He also co-opted local Sunni officials, engaged Sunni
tribes in order to cultivate popular support, and steadily pressured Shi’a civilians to relocate at a measured and almost unnoticeable pace of two to three families per day.77
AQI’s vision of a purely Sunni northern belt underscored the area’s operational significance. Critical lines of communications ran through this slice of rural terrain. The
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Captain Good (right). Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley (Released).

Captain Jason Good During a Patrol in Al Jabor.76
north-south corridor from Tarmiyah/Taji through Saab al-Bour ran just west of the Tigris
into Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah District. On the other side of the river, near-parallel roads
from Baqubah passed through Hussainiyah and Khan Bani Sa’ad before reaching the
fringes of Adhamiyah and New Baghdad, respectively. Large numbers of vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) made their way from the Sunni city of Taji into
the capital, along with funding for Abu Nur’s network. Ghazwan thus managed an indispensable logistical hub for AQI.78 For its part, JAM enjoyed a safe haven in Hussainiyah,
an explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) hot spot that bedeviled the coalition. The Shi’a
militia’s presence there became problematic for AQI as local JAM intimidation increased
and Sunni extremist links to Baqubah grew in importance.79 As in the south, fighters on
both sides of the sectarian divide struggled for control of key crossroads. One distinction
of the northern belt, however, was its role as a linchpin in the Sunni terrorist organization’s operational infrastructure. The area connected the foreign fighters flowing into
Iraq from Syria with the targets they eventually struck in Baghdad. Making their way
south along the Tigris River by way of a pre-positioned facilitation network, many foreign fighters paused in Tarmiyah or Taji before making the final leg of their journey to
join Abu Nur in the city. Ghazwan’s grip on most of the area also enabled AQI to more
easily exploit the seam at the convergence of three U.S. division sectors southeast of Lake
Tharthar—another safe haven due to the absence of coalition forces.80
It was in this area near Taji that Sunni insurgents likely associated with Ghazwan
set up deliberate ambush positions, attacking coalition helicopters traversing the busy
air routes between Taji and Camp Victory or Balad and Camp Victory, shooting down
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several helicopters in the early months of 2007. In one engagement on February 2, 2007,
insurgents hit the AH-64 Apache helicopter flown by Army Chief Warrant Officer Keith
Yoakum, a pilot in the 1st Cavalry Division’s aviation brigade. After flying his aircraft
safely clear of the ambush zone, Yoakum returned into enemy fire to mount a counterattack against the insurgent antiaircraft positions. He was able to strike several enemy
positions with rockets before his severely damaged helicopter crashed, killing him and
his copilot instantly. For his bravery, Yoakum was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
Odierno Changes MNC-I’s Operational Concept
MNC-I leaders considered the captured AQI plans from Taji a “serendipitous goldmine.” The documents confirmed that the terrorist organization continued to adhere to
Abu Musab al- Zarqawi’s strategy of inciting sectarian conflict as a way to overthrow the
Iraqi Government and eventually annihilate the Shi’a population. For Odierno, the Taji
documents confirmed the importance of the Baghdad belts and the risks of maintaining a
too-limited coalition presence in those areas. Odierno would use the refined understanding of the enemy that the documents yielded to help guide the emplacement of the surge
brigades as they arrived. Surprisingly, it had become clear that AQI relied on a conventional battlefield architecture. Even terrorist organizations and guerrillas required open
lines of communications to conduct resupply, maintain freedom of movement, and shift
forces from one geographic area to another. They maintained support zones and rear
areas and maneuvered from those places to attack zones. They had command-and-control nodes to orchestrate these movements.
Equipped with this knowledge, Odierno was determined to marshal his available
forces to strike the different components of the enemy system simultaneously where he
could.81 With assistance from his staff, the MNC-I commander sketched out three different kinds of areas that U.S. and Iraqi units needed to deny the enemy in order to secure
Baghdad. First came the operating zones where the militants attacking Baghdad carried
out their attacks, such as Rusafa or Dora. Odierno would seek to deny AQI and its allies
access to these and to deny them freedom of movement along the avenues of approach
into Baghdad.
Odierno made the next priority the support zones around and beyond the city, the
areas such as Adhamiyah, Taji, and the Triangle of Death where AQI and other groups
gathered their combat power among local Sunni populations and staged their attacks
into the operating zones. In these areas, Odierno intended to employ U.S. and Iraqi units
to attack enemy command-and-control hubs, safe houses, and operatives. Finally came
the sanctuaries beyond Baghdad usually in quiet, remote areas such as Lake Tharthar,
untouched by the coalition or the ISF, where AQI could locate its rear logistics bases,
training camps, car bomb factories, and even lodging for its fighters and their camp followers without challenge. In these areas, Odierno intended to disrupt the insurgents,
forcing them to abandon their bases and making them more vulnerable to coalition raids
while on the move. As the surge units arrived, Odierno and his planning team determined

62

THE EVE OF THE SURGE, DECEMBER 2006-FEBRUARY 2007

Sāmarrā’

X

3

82

Tigr

DIYĀL Á
is R

Balad

Khāliş

ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN

Ba‘qūbah

X

3

1

a R

At Tājī
X

yā l

1

Di

1

III

Madīnat
al Ḩabbānīyah

BAGHDAD

5
USMC

2

X

Al Fallūjah

X

X

3

1

2

2

2
X

2

OPRES

13 U.S. Bns
assigned to
Sec Districts

1

X

2

10

Salmān Pāk

BAGHDĀD
Eu
ph
ra

AL ANBĀR

te

Al Maḩmūdīyah

X

s

R

4

25

Tig

ris

R

WĀSIŢ
Al Iskandarīyah
U.S. Unit
Inner Cordon

KARBALĀ’
Baghdad Belts

0

BĀBIL

30 Miles

0
30 Kilometers

Karbalā’
Al Ḩillah

Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

Map 10. Disposition of U.S. Forces in Central Iraq, Early 2007.

63

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

where to place them to put simultaneous pressure on all three categories of enemy zones.
Of the five surge brigades that Odierno expected to receive, two would flow into Baghdad itself. Exactly where the rest would deploy following their arrival in Kuwait had
not been decided, but it was clear to Odierno that a considerable portion of their combat
power would need to go into the belts rather than the city.82 MNC-I’s “main security
effort” would be “Baghdad and the Baghdad belts, where identified support zones and
avenues of approach are used by extremists to accelerate sectarian violence.”83 Over time,
MNC-I intended to extend its operating zone, support zone, and sanctuary framework to
the fight against Shi’a militants as well.
If the emphasis outside of Baghdad was on disrupting enemy support zones and sanctuaries and interdicting accelerants to violence, then inside the city it was on population
control applied in mixed-sect areas in a balanced way. Along with control measures like
joint security stations and concrete barriers, Odierno envisioned precision strike operations against extremist operatives and leaders. Units would provide security first, standing ready to follow up with economic development and reconstruction efforts.84
Odierno’s operational concept signaled a change in the trajectory of the coalition presence and a delay in the coalition’s assumption of a mostly supporting role. “There will be
no rush to move from [secured] areas to new areas,” he decreed. Likewise, “there will be
no rush to transition control of security to the ISF, unless the ISF are ready and capable
of success.”85 Odierno was determined not to repeat the error of Operation TOGETHER
FORWARD II by handing over cleared areas to the Iraqis only to see them slip back
into violence. Just as plainly, he did not believe, as Casey had, that “transition” could be
used in the near term as leverage over Iraqi factions competing in a violent, high-stakes
struggle.
Odierno’s difference of opinion with Casey came partly from the MNC-I commander’s distrust of the Iraqi Government leadership. Prime Minister Maliki had indicated his
support for security operations against lawbreakers on either side of the sectarian divide,
but in Odierno’s judgment, “It becomes more clear everyday (sic) that [Iraqi leaders]
just want us out of the way,” as the MNC-I commander noted to himself in his journal.
“They see us as an impediment to progress.”86 Odierno’s fundamental view of the conflict crystallized during his second month in command. Like Casey, he viewed the war in
Iraq as not simply a counterinsurgency, but as a complex communal struggle for power
and resources. There were several distinct categories of threat throughout the country,
Odierno judged, and each of these “different fights” in “different areas” would require
“different approaches.” The ubiquitous term “AIF” or “anti-Iraqi forces” was not sufficient to describe threats as diverse as sectarian violence, Sunni and Shi’a militias, AQI’s
terrorist activities, Kurdish expansionism, Shi’a infighting, malign Iranian influence, and
an evolving Sunni insurgency consisting of armed groups open to reconciliation given
the right conditions.87 Putting his own stamp on it, the MNC-I commander visualized the
overall problem as a “gap” between Iraqi citizens and the government whose job it was
to provide their basic needs. The general’s definition of near-term success would be stability, which, if sustained over time, could lead to the “ultimate goal of self-reliance” on
the part of the Iraqi Government.88 Given that the Iraqi Government itself, in Odierno’s
view, was a threat to stability because of its systemic and often sectarian-based corruption, as well as its lack of capacity and experience, self-reliance was far down the road.
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In the meantime the coalition’s primary task, as Odierno saw it, was to assist the Iraqi
Government in its efforts to “fill the gap,” including, whenever necessary, by direct coalition action.89 It was an approach to addressing the problems in Iraq that would differ
markedly from that of MNF-I under Casey.
THE SHI’A MILITANTS ON THE EVE OF THE SURGE
AQI and its Sunni militant allies were not the only group aiming for control of the
belts around Baghdad. JAM and other Shi’a militant groups, including the Badr Corps
and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, had begun to expand their operations in an effort to seize Sunni
towns north and south of Baghdad and control the lines of communications running into
the capital. The JAM expansion in fall 2006 to Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, served as
one of the more dramatic examples. Over the course of 90 days, JAM wrested control of
the town through a campaign of targeted killings and the seizure of public services. By
October, using Mahmudiyah as a springboard, JAM had begun to conduct similar operations in the nearby town of Yusufiyah.90 MNC-I’s operations to establish control of the
belts would have to take the Shi’a militants into account.
During the previous summer, MNF-I had sensed the growing threat that Shi’a militias
posed to coalition objectives, though Casey had resisted categorizations that portrayed
them as a greater danger than AQI. Militant factions led by one-time Sadr loyalists made
the landscape of the Shi’a threat even more complex. Isma’il Hafiz al-Lami, known as
Abu Dura, had broken with Sadr in 2004 but still orchestrated death squad and kidnapping operations out of Sadr City, a role that led Western reporters to dub him “the Shia
Zarqawi” in 2006.91 Another former JAM leader who defied Sadr, Abu Gharawi, ran a
major EFP network out of Amarah.92 Some Badr Corps operatives were involved in the
shadowy war against the coalition as well. Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani rose to prominence
as an intelligence officer and front commander in the Badr Corps before supposedly falling out with the Hakims before the war. In July 2003, he received $40 million from the
Iranians to organize a logistics network that would funnel weapons to Shi’a militants.93
The elusive Sheibani drew upon his prewar experience in clandestine operations, as well
as his deep pool of contacts in the Badr Corps to build a potent EFP network. He went on
to finance and supply other key networks and remained a key node in the Quds Force’s
controlled distribution of advanced weaponry.94
These and other Shi’a militant networks with shared associations, shifting loyalties,
and divergent political aims made for a complex battlefield. Iranian regime support was
the common denominator. The major Shi’a militant networks all owed their potency—
and even existence—to the Iranian regime’s Quds Force and its powerful commander,
Qassem Soleimani. The lethal materiel supplied through these networks entered Iraq
through ports of entry along the eastern border. Key cities across the southern provinces
served as waypoints for the smuggled goods as they traveled hundreds of miles over
roads and “ratlines” and passed through multiple tribal areas. Amarah was a major crossroads, from which EFPs were funneled south to Basrah or north through Kut—another
critical hub—and Numaniyah, Suwayrah, and eventually Baghdad. Alternatively, facilitators shipped EFPs west from Amarah to Diwaniyah and Najaf and then north through
Hillah and Karbala before reaching the outskirts of the capital.95 A separate “ratline,”
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with the help of Kurdish contacts, began at the border town of Khanaqin and ran south
through Diyala Province. Besides providing weapons, training, and periodic sanctuary,
Soleimani’s Quds Force paid the fighters belonging to JAM Special Groups; supplied
their leaders with cars; and offered bonuses for recorded footage of successful rocket,
mortar, and IED attacks on coalition forces.96 In the short term, the Quds Force funneled
EFPs to JAM-affiliated or Special Group surrogates using Badr Corps connections. It did
so with a view toward the long haul, maintaining financial ties to SCIRI and other players
with solid political legitimacy.97 In short, the Iranian regime was content to fund, train,
and supply all parties willing to attack the U.S.-led coalition.
Seeking multiple points to apply leverage in Iraq, the Quds Force also formed a new
Shi’a militant group, Kata’ib Hizballah, in early 2007. Its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis,
had the distinction of being a member of the Iraqi Parliament from the SCIRI-Badr bloc,
a former Badr Corps commander, and a deputy of Qassem Soleimani. He also had been
sentenced to death in absentia by a Kuwaiti court for his role in the 1983 bombings of the
American and French embassies in Kuwait City. More so than even Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq
(AAH), Kata’ib Hizballah was designed as a small, disciplined, specially equipped organization of a few hundred highly trained fighters. It remained under the tight control of
the Quds Force and would grow in political prominence over time to become one of the
most important militant groups in Iraq.98
The Quds Force and its Iraqi surrogates were the primary instruments employed by
the Iranian regime to wage a proxy war against the United States at minimal cost. Since
2003, the Islamic republic had pursued a regional strategy that sought to promote instability, maximize American casualties, and steadily increase its control over Iraq’s Shi’a
heartland while maintaining plausible deniability.99 The politically influential Soleimani
reported directly to Iran’s supreme leader and oversaw a carefully organized and sustained cross-border operation. His subordinate Ramazan Corps managed the effort in
Iraq, with three subcommands responsible for the northern, central, and southern sectors, respectively. Two to three regional offices operated out of each sector.100 Hundreds
of agents were involved, not least Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Ghomi,
who served as an undercover Quds Force officer. The consulate in Basrah functioned as
a similar hub of covert activity for Soleimani.101
The level of this network’s activity against the coalition in Iraq appeared to have
changed over time. In the early months of the war, the Iranian regime seemed to have
been careful not to confront the United States, even through proxies, most likely out of
fear that the United States might choose to invade Iran next. By 2005 and 2006, the Iranian calculus had apparently changed. As U.S. troops became bogged down in Iraq, the
chances of an American invasion of Iran diminished, and it seems likely that Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei and his regime decided to ramp up their anti-U.S. proxy war in
Iraq, confident they could so with relative impunity. It is also likely they considered the
U.S. outreach to Iraqi Sunni groups in 2005-2006 to be a danger to the Iranian regime’s
Shi’a and Kurdish client parties. The expanded Iranian role both against U.S. forces and
in support of Shi’a sectarian cleansing in central Iraq were probably intended, in part,
to counter the American strategy of giving Iraqi Sunnis a greater share of state power.
Whatever the motives, by the end of 2006 the Iranian regime’s new level of destabilizing
activity in Iraq was a threat the coalition could not ignore.
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U.S. Special Operations Efforts to Counter Iranian Influence
As the special operations arm of MNC-I, the Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) had seen convincing indicators of nefarious Iranian involvement as early as 2005. However, Casey had been skeptical at the
time, concluding that a major shift in MNF-I’s campaign was not justified because, in his
judgment, the CJSOTF had found no “smoking gun” implicating Iran’s Government.102
MNF-I’s intelligence staff had established a cell to focus on Iran in spring 2006, but it
had atrophied. In summer 2006, Chiarelli had assembled undeniable evidence that the
Iranian regime was responsible for the EFPs causing mounting American casualties and
had pressed Casey and MNF-I to take action against the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant
groups. In late 2006, after months of tracking the increasing strength of the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant groups, coalition leaders finally reorganized their forces to counter
the growing threat. With EFP attacks on the rise and the quality of ordnance improving, Casey concluded that the Iranian regime had ramped up its campaign in Iraq. On
November 7, 2006, he asked his intelligence officers if Iranian support to Shi’a extremists
was having a strategic effect and had solicited ideas on how to disrupt Iranian activity.
Given the dearth of intelligence on Quds Force agents and infrastructure in Iraq, the coalition had few actionable targets to strike right away. Casey hoped to spin up the effort
quickly in the event Iran responded to Western pressure on its nuclear program by retaliating against MNF-I.103
Outside U.S. headquarters in Iraq, others took a fresh look at malign Iranian influence as well. Before joining Odierno’s headquarters as a senior operations adviser in late
2006, Colonel James Hickey led a project at the Institute for Defense Analyses that had
documented in detail the presence and activities in Iraq of the Quds Force and its proxies,
including the EFP smuggling networks in the south. At about the same time, the White
House gave the go-ahead for the Joint Staff and CENTCOM to develop a plan to counter
Iran’s destabilizing activities. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld also had
proposed a more aggressive stance, such as broadening the target set of the special operations task force based in Iraq. A subordinate element of the task force had been boring
into Sunni terrorist and insurgent groups with devastating effect. As evidence of Iranian involvement in Iraq mounted, Casey considered applying some of that manhunting
capability toward the attrition of their extremist counterparts on the Shi’a side, to include
Quds Force agents operating in Iraqi territory. Discoveries inside Iraq of ordnance with
2006 Iranian factory markings reinforced Casey’s thoughts on this score, as they convinced the MNF-I commander that the Iranians had become more brazen in their lethal
support of Shi’a extremists.104
Undertaking the new mission of countering Iranian influence introduced tension
between the Green Berets of the CJSOTF and the special operations task force in the
country. While the high-end operators had concentrated chiefly on AQI, the U.S. Army
Special Forces groups rotating in and out of Iraq during their tours as the CJSOTF had
mapped out the Shi’a extremist threat. Special Forces detachments had gone after Shi’a
death squads, primarily in partnership with Iraqi special operations forces, but without
the far greater quantities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that the
high-end operators controlled. The CJSOTF’s broad mission set, which included training
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indigenous commandos, partnering with Iraqi conventional forces, and providing human
intelligence, also meant that it had wider responsibilities than simply killing or capturing
militants.105 Casey wanted MNF-I’s campaign against Iranian agents and their surrogates
in Iraq to assume a greater level of intensity and focus comparable to other SOF elements’ war on AQI—without forsaking the institutional knowledge painstakingly gained
through the CJSOTF’s years of engagement with tribes and other local networks.
Casey directed the CJSOTF and the special operations task force to cooperate in creating a new subordinate command focused on Shi’a militants that clearly would be separated from the AQI mission set. Since the special operations task force initially would
have to rely on the CJSOTF for many targets, as well as the troops to attack them, a cooperative command-and-control relationship was established between the two special operations commands, despite the great disparity in rank between the three-star commander
of the special operations task force and CJSOTF commander Colonel Kevin McDonnell. A
fusion cell in McDonnell’s headquarters at Balad air base in November 2006 was the first
embodiment of this focused effort to counter Iranian influence. It would grow in capability in the coming months as both Casey and the commander of the special operations task
force sent intelligence specialists to work alongside the CJSOTF.106 McDonnell thought
the new attention on Shi’a extremists also would yield additional unmanned aerial vehicle support for the CJSOTF.107 However, the special operations task force commander
would be the obvious billpayer in this transaction, and he was reluctant to share if it
meant reducing his task force’s operational tempo against AQI. To better posture itself
for countering Iranian influence, the CJSOTF planned to shift four additional U.S. Special
Forces detachments to the Shi’a south to join the seven already posted across the southern provinces. Another Special Forces company headquarters also would relocate to the
south, bringing the total there to two. The repositioned teams would establish a CJSOTF
presence during early 2007 in cities that had long gone without coverage, including the
hot spots of Diwaniyah and Amarah.108
The original command-and-control arrangement supporting the new Shi’a militantfocused task force did not produce the operational effectiveness that Casey had hoped.
Limitations in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets hampered the new
task force’s operations, as did differences in approach.109 Reliant primarily on human
intelligence, McDonnell’s CJSOTF tended to conduct operations more deliberately than
the special operations task force, which, by contrast, adhered to a rapid, self-sustaining cycle of raids that generated intelligence leading to attacks on subsequent targets.110
As part of a broader coalition mission to “deny Iranian oppositional influence,” MNF-I
had instructed the CJSOTF to make direct action against major EFP networks its main
effort. McDonnell countered that his main effort should be information operations complemented by well-planned assaults. Working “by, with, and through” indigenous
forces and Shi’a tribes was crucial as well, McDonnell argued, and he advocated building popular support so that Iraqis themselves would call for constraining the Iranian
regime’s destabilizing influence.111 The special operations task force was impatient with
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McDonnell’s holistic approach and saw the special operations role in the mission to be
primarily “man-hunting.”112 Partnership, tribal engagement, and information operations
lay outside its realm of highly refined expertise.
To resolve the competing views about the importance of the Shi’a extremist threat
and to address the inherent inefficiencies of the cooperative command-and-control relationship between the CJSOTF and his own command, the special operations task force
commander proposed that all special operations forces in Iraq be unified under one
command. This change might have mitigated McDonnell’s shortfalls in helicopters, surveillance assets, and detention facilities, but it also would have amounted to a hostile
takeover of the CJSOTF by another special operations element with a completely different vision, and as a result, McDonnell fought the proposal. Outgunned in a bureaucratic
fight with a three-star officer, McDonnell turned to Odierno for support and convinced
the MNC-I commander that the corps still required control of the CJSOTF to partner with
elite units of the Iraqi security forces and to maintain situational awareness through a
countrywide network of contacts.113 By persuading the MNC-I commander to intervene
on the CJSOTF’s behalf, McDonnell managed to block the idea of a unified special operations command and maintain his CJSOTF’s independence. He also may have ended his
own career. Despite his visionary role in confronting the serious but neglected threat
posed by the Quds Force and its proxies, the special forces colonel ultimately was passed
over for promotion, becoming one of only three wartime CJSOTF-AP commanders—out
of 11—not promoted to general officer rank. Despite these disputes over SOF organization and focus, by the end of 2006 the coalition was postured for the first time to apply its
potent special operations capabilities to the Shi’a militant networks operating in Iraq. The
result in the months to come would be the largest confrontation between the coalition
and the Shi’a militants since the battles of August 2004.
The Realignment of the Shi’a Parties and Fracturing of the Sadr Movement
As the coalition was deciding to fight a special operations war against the Shi’a militant groups and, by extension, their Quds Force sponsors, the alignment of the Iraqi Shi’a
parties that had given the Sadrist militants political top cover against coalition operations for almost 2 years was changing. In fall 2006, Moqtada al-Sadr and his party continued to pursue the same basic goals they had since 2004: continuing de-Ba’athification,
expanding the political and cultural influence of the Sadrist movement, and forcing a
withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.114 As the Sadrists and their militant followers
largely had been unconstrained by the Baghdad security operations of summer and fall
2006, it had seemed to MNF-I that Sadr’s political stock was rising and that the Shi’a cleric
had the power to mobilize broad swathes of the Iraqi population against the coalition if
he so chose.115 The fact that Maliki, who owed his election as Prime Minister to the votes
of Sadrist Parliamentarians, had intervened repeatedly to block MNF-I from conducting
operations against Sadrist militants in Sadr City reinforced this idea.
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Yet, when the Sadrist Parliamentary
bloc walked out from Parliament on
November 30 in protest against Maliki’s
meeting with Bush at Amman, it became
clear that the Sadrists had overreached.
Suspending their participation in the
central government, politicians affiliated
with Sadr had approached other Members
of Parliament with a proposal for an alliance that would demand coalition withdrawal, while JAM units had flexed their
muscles to intimidate provincial councils
Source: Photo published by Muslim Press.
and Iraqi security forces across the Shi’a
116
south. These moves were a direct threat
to the 6-month-old government of Maliki,
Moqtada Sadr.117
and in response, Maliki and his Da’wa
Party allies began to change their political calculus. A few days after the Sadrist walkout
from Parliament, Maliki’s party struck a new agreement with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, cementing a governing coalition that
might be powerful enough to hobble the Sadrists’ political and military position.118 At the
same time, Maliki and his Da’wa advisers began seeking ways to fracture Sadr’s political
front and forge alliances with Sadrist leaders disenchanted with Sadr’s leadership. The
prime target for Maliki’s political outreach was the militant organization AAH, headed
by Sadr’s longtime lieutenant Qais al-Khazali, who since late 2004 had grown into a de
facto challenger to Sadr’s leadership within the Sadr movement.119
Khazali had disagreed with the political overtures that JAM made toward the Iraqi
Government after the 2004 Najaf showdown, and along with fellow Sadrist militant
Akram al-Kabi he had led a breakaway faction of JAM that allied itself with Iran’s Quds
Force. For 2 years, Khazali had remained loosely within Sadr’s movement, but he had
grown more independent over time.120 As MNF-I puzzled over the array of Shi’a extremists it confronted, analysts differentiated between JAM groups that remained firmly under
Sadr’s control and “Special Groups” or “secret cells” led by the likes of Khazali.121 What
allowed AAH to operate separately from JAM was the support of Iran’s Quds Force. While
uncooperative JAM members could be isolated if they failed to “toe the line,” Khazali’s
network maintained its own supply channels and received funding and special training
from Iran. JAM had received such support since 2004 or earlier. In 2006, Iran’s Quds
Force reorganized its effort in Iraq and sought to develop a military organization there
similar to the Lebanese Hizballah when Sadr began to appear too powerful for the Iranian regime to control. Still, mainstream JAM continued to derive much support from its
vibrant Iranian connections, and Mustafa al-Yaquoubi, Sadr’s most trusted adviser, continued to make trips to Iran and Lebanon.122 As Iranian officials became more concerned
about Sadr’s future pliability, they sought to strengthen his potential competitors. With
combat-experienced leaders, access to the same Sadrist popular base as JAM, and fighters
more malleable to Iran’s agenda, Khazali’s faction fit the bill. By late 2006, Quds Force
commander Qassem Soleimani had dispatched senior Lebanese Hizballah operative Ali
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Musa Daqduq to serve as an adviser to AAH
and to act as a liaison between Khazali and
the Quds Force.123
In MNF-I’s view, AAH, with its connections to the Quds Force and its significant
role in the sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from
Baghdad, was the most dangerous of the special groups and a prime target for the newly
empowered coalition special operations task
force. In Maliki’s eyes, however, Khazali
was an important potential political ally
who could be used to reduce Sadr’s political
power and to co-opt some of the grassroots
Sadr movement into the Da’wa Party base,
thereby securing Da’wa’s long-term leadership of both the Shi’a political bloc and the
Source: Photo by Meghdad Madadi, Tasnim
News Agency.
entire government.124
Maliki and MNF-I now approached the
Qais al-Khazali.125
Iraqi Shi’a militant problem in nearly opposite ways: MNF-I tended to refer to loyal
followers of Sadr as “mainstream JAM” who could be dealt with on a political level,
while the special groups were “rogue JAM,” irreconcilable extremists who would have
to be destroyed through military operations. Maliki, meanwhile, considered Sadr and
his loyalists to be political extremists who needed to be constrained, if not destroyed, for
the sake of stability, and considered the special groups the more reasonable faction that
could be reconciled to the government by political means.
Maliki’s newfound hostility to Sadr, in time, would make it easier for the coalition to
employ its new anti-JAM task force. However, these sharply different approaches toward
the Sadr movement and the special groups created more than a year of tension between
Maliki and MNF-I that would give way to an Iraqi Shi’a civil war in 2007 and 2008.
The Raid on SCIRI’s Baghdad Compound
Within weeks, the anti-Shi’a militant task force began to have a significant impact.
The first high-profile operation came in December 2006, and it swept up ostensible U.S.
allies along with Shi’a militant targets. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the United
States had worked to build a political alliance with SCIRI and its long-time military wing,
the Badr Corps, partly to counter the Sadr movement and partly to sever the two Shi’a
parties from the Iranian regime, which had created them during the Iran-Iraq War. The
Badr Corps had maintained its close connections to Soleimani’s Quds Force after the
fall of Saddam’s regime and had deliberately integrated into the nascent Iraqi security
forces, thus acquiring an institutional foothold that JAM lacked.126 Because of this development, many of the confrontations between Shi’a extremists and Iraqi Army units were
manifestations of an ongoing intra-Shi’a civil war. Stewing for decades, antipathy and
distrust between Sadr’s forebears and the Hakim family, the exiled founders of SCIRI
and the Badr Corps, only exacerbated the tension. In this struggle, the United States had
71

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

unabashedly taken sides with the Hakims and
their allies. Recalling the affiliations of Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) commanders
in key southern cities, one Special Forces officer
deadpanned, “We were basically partnering with
the Badr Corps.”127
A large organization, the Badr Corps enrolled
many who found it hard to distance themselves
from the lucrative business of arms smuggling.
Nonetheless, the coalition had given Badr the benefit of the doubt. It was true that some operatives
facilitated the flow of EFPs into Iraq, but MNC-I
analysts rationalized that they did so against the
wishes of Badr Corps commander Hadi al-Amiri
Source: Wikimedia Commons, the free
and SCIRI chairman Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, both
media repository by sayyed
of whom U.S. analysts believed desired a stronshahab-o-din vajedi.
ger relationship with the United States in the
near term.128 In any case, in terms of the number Qassem Soleimani, Commander
of casualties it inflicted on coalition soldiers, the
of the Quds Force of the Islamic
Badr Corps was not comparable to JAM.129 Still,
Revolutionary Guard Corps of
both Badr and its SCIRI affiliates had had a major
Iran.130
hand in the bloody sectarian cleansing of 2005 and
2006, but the coalition had penalized neither.
Coalition assumptions about SCIRI and Badr were shaken on December 21, 2006,
when coalition commandos raided a SCIRI compound on the Karada Peninsula in central
Baghdad in pursuit of Iranian military official Mohsen Chizari, head of the Quds Force
operations department. Eluding capture earlier in the day, he had absconded to a safe
house in a section of the compound belonging to Amiri himself. The special operations
task force trailed him there and detained 10 people at the house, including Chizari and
three more with connections to the Iranian Embassy. The other six were affiliated with
Badr.131
Besides living space, the safe house contained a military operations center with maps
outlining the Sunni and Shi’a areas of Baghdad and graphics identifying points in the
capital apparently where key events had occurred—a visual depiction of the sectarian
struggle for Baghdad and its belts that to some degree mirrored the AQI map captured
in Taji just 2 days before. When he briefed Maliki on the raid, Casey suggested that the
graphics marked the locations of recent (or planned) assassinations and kidnappings.
The commandos also recovered computers, videotapes, notebooks, Badr order of battle
information, and receipts that logged weapons shipments from Iran. It would take the
coalition 14 days to process the volume of material seized.132 The evidence confirmed the
strong links that remained between Quds Force and Badr—not to mention the mutual
interests both organizations had in solidifying Shi’a dominance in Iraq. When he had met
with U.S. Vice Presidential adviser John Hannah in October, Amiri had denied that his
organization was involved in any sectarian activities or that Iranian intelligence agents
had infiltrated Badr.133 Now, 2 months later, MNF-I had captured a high-ranking Quds
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Force representative in Amiri’s house mulling over Baghdad’s sectarian fault lines alongside Amiri’s men—some of whom were EFP facilitators.
When U.S. commandos stormed into their compound, it no doubt came as a surprise
to Amiri and SCIRI leader Hakim, but it was no less surprising to the White House.
Hakim had visited the White House at Bush’s invitation earlier in the month, a significant milestone in the Iraqi political party’s nascent strategic dialogue with the United
States. When told by Abizaid on January 8 that MNF-I “found Iranians in bed with the
Iraqis,” Bush seemed dumbfounded. “Is SCIRI involved with Iran?” he asked. “Deeply
involved,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice replied. “So they are involved with terrorists?” Bush asked, clearly dismayed. “So I had this guy into the Oval Office who kills
our troops?” “No,” Rice responded, explaining that SCIRI’s military wing did not kill
Americans directly, but trained those who might.134
Back in Baghdad, the Iranians protested the detentions stridently enough to worry the
Maliki administration about potential repercussions. Though not happy with the Quds
Force’s calculated efforts to destabilize the country, the Prime Minister refrained from
taking a hard line, and President Jalal Talabani’s pronouncement after the raid that two
of the Iranian operatives had come to Iraq at his invitation weakened the coalition’s case
for holding them. It mattered little that they had crossed the border illegally, under false
names. U.S. leaders were not inclined to press publicly for the prolonged detention of
Hassan Chizari and his cohorts. The coalition released all four prisoners with ties to the
Iranian Embassy by December 25, in time for the visit of Iran’s deputy foreign minister. Though bowing to this expected pressure, Casey found satisfaction in the signal the
raid sent to Iran and the irrefutable evidence it provided to Maliki regarding Iranian
intentions.135
The Erbil Five
Three weeks after the December raid on SCIRI’s compound, the coalition’s anti-Shi’a
militant task force crashed another meeting between Iranian agents and their U.S.-allied
Iraqi hosts, this time in Kurdistan. The January 11, 2007, raid originally had targeted Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Ja’afari, suspected of guiding Quds Force activities in Iraq,
and Hamid Taghavi, the Ramazan Corps operations chief, but somehow the two evaded
capture. Ja’afari, incidentally, would take command of Iran’s entire Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps just 8 months after the raid.136 Illustrating the Quds Force’s pervasive
hands-on involvement, Ja’afari’s comrade, Mansour Taghavi, would be wounded later
in 2007 during a gunfight with Iraqi security forces in Diwaniyah and would be killed in
December 2014 while advising Iraqi Army units and AAH militiamen as they cleared the
Sunni town of Jurf al-Sakhr.
Nonetheless, in January 2007, the special operations task force missed its primary
target. U.S. special operators landed by helicopter at Talabani’s guesthouse and Erbil
airport and hauled away five mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers.
Known as the Erbil Five, they would remain in coalition custody for more than 2 years.
In response to this second successful raid against its operations in Iraq, the Iranian regime
shut down its Iraqi consulates for a time and instructed Iranian companies doing business in Iraq to remove their computers or to delete all files, lest American commandos
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capture the information they contained. The Quds Force also scaled down its operations
inside the country, recalling many Quds Force officers back to Iran.137
The Attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center
Nine days after the raid in Erbil, Soleimani’s Iraqi proxies struck back in an apparent
attempt to capture American hostages who could be traded for the Erbil Five. Late in the
day on January 20, Khazali’s AAH militants launched a sophisticated raid against U.S.
troops in the government center in the city of Karbala. The small, two-block compound
in the middle of a busy neighborhood contained a number of buildings, including the
provincial police headquarters and a barracks for the 30 U.S. Soldiers pulling week-long
rotational duty there.138 Toting M4 carbines and wearing American-style combat fatigues,
about a dozen AAH fighters arrived at the front gate in a convoy of five-to-seven black
sport utility vehicles, and an Iraqi guard waved them through. The vehicles converged
on the multi-storied police headquarters, where U.S. advisers, military police, and Soldiers from the 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in ground-floor offices were wrapping
up their daily activities. Outside the headquarters, several AAH attackers moved briskly
to the entrance, where they shot and wounded two American guards before bursting
into the building and unleashing a hail of grenades and small-arms fire. The operatives
surprised and overwhelmed the small U.S. contingent, killing one and wounding three
others inside, while seizing four more. Within 30 minutes, the raid was over, and as
darkness fell, the militants made their escape with their prisoners, blowing up two High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the process.
Alert Iraqi policemen from nearby Babil Province picked up the trail that evening
after the attackers careened through a checkpoint on their flight east toward Hillah.139
During the pursuit, the attackers either panicked or realized the fruitlessness of evading Iraqi and coalition troops with prisoners in tow. When police found the abandoned
vehicles soon after, they found discarded digital camouflage uniforms and the abducted
American Soldiers, all of them shot in the chest and head execution style. Two remained
handcuffed in the rear of one vehicle while another lay dead on the ground. The fourth—
barely alive when the Iraqis recovered him—died of his wounds within the hour.140

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley (Released).

Soldiers from 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, During Patrols in Search of
Insurgents in Adwania.141
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The brazen raid provoked a vigorous response from the coalition but also sent a chill
up and down the chain of command. MND-B had dispatched Apache helicopters to the
scene, but they arrived too late to break up the attack and prevent the abduction. The
division also mobilized its quick reaction force, sending two companies of Strykers south
to help track down the perpetrators once the Iraqi police recovered the remains of the
missing Soldiers.142
Although it ended quickly, the AAH raid prompted some reflection by U.S. commanders. For a division about to ramp up its forward presence in Baghdad through the
construction of dozens of joint security stations and combat outposts, the episode in Karbala provided a sober reminder of the risks involved.143 Occurring as it did in one of
the outlying provinces, the attack also suggested to some coalition officers that MND-B
might be overstretched. In the emerging debate over possibly reassigning Baghdad’s
southern belts to another division headquarters, the assault on the Karbala provincial
joint control center underscored the arguments of those who favored reducing MND-B’s
span of control.144
The attack bore the marks of an inside job, carried out with the complicity of the Karbala police. The intruders had detailed information about the compound’s security measures, including where and when the unsuspecting Americans likely could be taken. As
the gunfire erupted, the Iraqi garrison was absent or inactive, and those officers walking
the upstairs halls of the headquarters building or working at their desks showed no interest in organizing a defense. U.S. military policemen racing room to room in search of their
comrades swept past Iraqis engaged in hushed conversations. To American troops on
rotational duty at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), the incident seemed
to cap a period of veiled threats and a nagging feeling of insecurity and distrust of their
supposed Iraqi partners.145 The peculiarities of the day made sense in retrospect: the scarcity of local residents that normally did business in the compound, the early closing of
the barbershop and market, and the arrival of a delegation of 15 to 20 “policemen” from
Baghdad who had met with local Iraqi commanders ostensibly to plan security for the
Ashura celebration. Some had taken pictures of restricted areas. A few had lingered into
the evening. A report later concluded they were an advanced team for the attackers.146
Within 3 days, six suspects were in custody, and the coalition quickly determined that
the perpetrators were AAH members.147 Not only did the shadowy group’s suspected
past operations—including the assassination of Lieutenant General Amer Hashimi in
October 2006 and the Ministry of Higher Education kidnappings in November—resemble the Karbala attack, but a cell phone belonging to Laith Khazali, the younger brother
of AAH’s leader, had been active in the local area.148 The perpetrators made amateurish
mistakes during the raid, from grievously wounding their intended captives to leaving
behind multiple undetonated explosive devices, suggesting that experienced Quds Force
cadre had not participated directly. However, MNF-I saw strong indicators of a Quds
Force hand in training AAH and preparing its fighters for the difficult mission.149 Coalition officers later would discover the existence in Iran of a mock facility, apparently modeled on the Karbala provincial headquarters compound that the Quds Force had likely
used to train AAH operatives for the operation.150
MNC-I initially explored the theory that the raid stemmed from the Sadrists’ desire
“to save face” amid mounting pressure and to reassert JAM’s dominance in Karbala.
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However, given the attack’s timing and the tenuous relationship between Khazali and
Sadr, the command judged the operation was far more likely an attempt to acquire hostages to trade for the Erbil Five.151 It was also an escalation in the Iraq-based shadow war
between the United States and the Iranian regime.
The Sadrists and the Baghdad Security Plan
The same day that Khazali’s operatives were killing U.S. Soldiers at the Karbala PJCC,
MNF-I was negotiating with Prime Minister Maliki over the coalition’s aggressive new
posture against Shi’a militia leaders under the auspices of the Baghdad Security Plan. The
day before, January 19, MNF-I had detained the well-known Sadrist cleric and notorious
JAM operative Abdul Hadi al-Daraji at his compound just south of Sadr City. Those affiliated with Sadr labeled the detention as a disastrous and foreboding blow.152
MNF-I had carried out the Daraji raid with the understanding that, as part of his political battle with the Sadrists, Maliki had loosened restrictions on the coalition’s targeting
of Shi’a militants in Baghdad. On January 20, the day after the raid, Casey reported to
Bush that he noted a marked difference in the Prime Minister’s stance. Throughout the
fall, Maliki had been “quite agitated” whenever MNF-I conducted operations near Sadr
City and often had intervened to secure the release of Sadr allies. Over the intervening
months, Casey reported, the situation had eased, allowing MNF-I to target Shi’a militia
leaders “without a peep” from the Prime Minister. “We have no present restrictions on
Sadr City operations,” he declared, adding that this change had diminished senior JAM
leaders’ boldness and reduced Shi’a death squad activity by 35 percent over the previous
5 weeks.153 It was perhaps a premature assessment considering that MNF-I already had
decided to defer operations against Sadr City and other Shi’a militant strongholds in the
capital.
It also was premature where Maliki was concerned. The Prime Minister expressed surprise and irritation over Daraji’s detention, thinking the Sadrist cleric had been granted
immunity from arrest by the Iraqi interim government in 2004. Despite Maliki’s competition with Sadr, his administration was not yet on the same page as the coalition, and his
representatives immediately sought to use Daraji’s capture by dangling the prospect of
the cleric’s release in exchange for the Sadrists’ return to Maliki’s cabinet. Hoping to cut
its losses and wrest some guarantees of protection from the New Year’s Offensive, Sadr’s
party announced its intention to return to the government on January 21. Casey protested, however, pointing out that Daraji had links to sectarian violence that more than
justified his prolonged detention. The issue escalated into the political realm quickly,
and Bush himself directed the MNF-I commander to keep the JAM leader in custody.
Mentioning the prisoner to Casey by name, the President viewed his arrest as a test of
Maliki’s commitment to evenhandedness. In spite of the political discomfort of having to
forego his potential deal with the Sadrists, the Prime Minister yielded to the coalition in
this case.154 The exchange showed that just days after the U.S. Government had extracted
commitments from Maliki to take action against the Sadrist militants, it would be a challenge to keep the Prime Minister on board.
The Daraji arrest and other coalition operations in January 2007 appeared to put the
Sadrists off-balance. Sensing that their top cover had evaporated in the aftermath of the
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surge announcement, many Shi’a militia commanders hunkered down and adopted
a “wait-and-see” approach.155 Many of those who believed they had made a name for
themselves feared capture and fled Baghdad.156 Confirming this trend, reports reached
MNF-I in late January that the Iranian Embassy had issued some 200 special passports
to Shi’a militia members. Sadr himself secretly departed for Iran around this time.157 The
flight of the Sadrist leaders within days of the surge announcement illustrated that the
psychological effects of the surge would be as important as its physical effects, both in
cowing the coalition’s enemies and in emboldening its partners. The same effect applied
to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who reportedly fled to Iran at the end of January.158
Hoping to lower JAM’s profile as it braced for more frequent and intense coalition
and Iraqi attacks, Sadr called for his militia to stand down following the kickoff of the
revised Baghdad Security Plan. Mainstream JAM units generally obeyed. Many leaders
that spurned Sadr’s instructions did so not for strategic or ideological reasons but to
sustain their lucrative criminal enterprises. Groups of loyal fighters formed. The Najafbased “Golden JAM” and Baghdad’s “Noble JAM,” as they called themselves, attempted
to persuade rogue elements to comply with Sadr’s wishes or purged them altogether,
showing that the Shi’a militants were fighting one another even as they postured to fight
the coalition.159
The Battle Against the Soldiers of Heaven
Far from Baghdad, another confrontation took place on the eve of the surge that highlighted the complexity of the Shi’a militant problem. Iraqi and coalition troops found
themselves in a strange battle against a Shi’a militia with no ties to the Sadr movement or
any other Shi’a extremist faction known to the coalition. Early on the morning of January
28, 2007, 10 miles north of Najaf, Iraqi security forces became embroiled in an unexpected
gunfight. The first coalition unit on the scene—a U.S. Special Forces detachment from
Najaf—arrived to find dozens of police and troops from the 1st Brigade, 8th Iraqi Army
Division, locked in combat with a dug-in, battalion-sized foe reportedly equipped with
heavy machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. As the fighting intensified,
the enemy’s identity and how the battle began remained a mystery to the Americans.
Under fire themselves, the Green Berets called for close-air support as reinforcements
consisting of Iraqi special operations forces and U.S. advisers from nearby Hillah made
their way to the sound of the guns. Multiple strafing and bombing runs from F-16 Falcon
jets and A-10 Thunderbolts failed to suppress the enemy position. Rocket fire brought
down one AH-64 Apache helicopter that had arrived to help, killing the two pilots when
it fell from the sky into no-man’s-land between the opposing sides. A U.S. Army transition team returning to the coalition base in Diwaniyah after training with its Iraqi battalion attempted to secure the crash site, but gunfire kept the American Soldiers pinned
down. The precarious situation stabilized only when two U.S. Stryker companies arrived
at dusk, along with another Iraqi Army company.160 Taking control of the operation that
evening, the Strykers bombarded the enemy position through the night and launched an
assault shortly after dawn as the militants began to surrender en masse. The battle ended
in a lopsided victory for U.S. and Iraqi troops, with reports of up to 400 militants killed
and another 400 people detained.161
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The coalition soon discovered that the mysterious armed group was a cult-like organization called the Soldiers of Heaven, which had established a commune of sorts on a
compound outside Najaf. There, the group’s militant members lived with their families,
many of whom were detained by the Iraqi troops that overran the compound as the battle
ended. Holding a peculiar view of Shi’a Islam, the Soldiers of Heaven believed that the
Twelfth or Hidden Imam—who had reputedly disappeared in the 9th century—was on
the verge of returning. Their leader, Dhia Abdul Zahra Kadhim, killed in the January 28
fighting, seems to have convinced his followers that he was a reincarnation of the Imam
Ali.
No definitive explanation of the origin of the January 28, 2007, battle has ever come
to light. Despite its extreme beliefs, the group had displayed no previous violent activity.
In the days after the fighting, controversy swirled as details emerged about the group’s
intentions and the Iraqi Government’s motivations surrounding the incident. According
to Iraqi Government spokesmen, the Soldiers of Heaven had hoped to hasten the day of
the Hidden Imam’s return by carrying out a bloody assassination campaign targeting
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other Shi’a leaders in Najaf and occupying the Imam Ali
Mosque. While some accounts reported that Iraqi security forces had stumbled into an
ambush, others indicated that the troops instigated the conflict but soon found they had
kicked over a hornet’s nest.162 Official explanations further clouded the matter. Asad Abu
Ghalal, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) governor of Najaf, tarred the Soldiers
of Heaven as Sunni extremists who had foreign fighters among their ranks. A day later,
Major General Qais Hamza al-Mamouri, Babil Province’s chief of police, attempted a
clarification, describing the group’s leader as a Sunni militant masquerading as a co-religionist of his exclusively Shi’a followers. The confusion lingered, with some Iraqi officials
speculating about ties to al-Qaeda, while others alleged Iranian connections.163 One analyst argued that the fighting was a political vendetta against a tribe that locally opposed
the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq and Maliki’s Da’wa Party.164 Related to this was
another assertion that Maliki had intended to teach the Sadrists a lesson by confronting a
weaker fringe group, thus signaling his readiness to crack down on defiant Shi’a militias,
but the operation had met greater resistance than anticipated and had required coalition
intervention.
U.S. troops had hastened to answer Iraqi calls for assistance, committing ground,
air, and special operations forces with scarcely a thought toward the battle’s origins or
underlying purpose. Having passed control of security in Najaf province to Iraqi civil
authorities in mid-December 2006, MND-B commander Fil naturally highlighted the coalition’s military reaction and how it had shored up an unraveling situation. Units had
learned about exercising command and control “on the move,” Fil observed, as well as
valuable lessons on leveraging the operational reach of Stryker formations and marshaling resources for rapid response.165 Portrayed as a model of how to support contingencies
in provinces under Iraqi control, the operation had lacked a logic that connected it to the
coalition’s broader campaign. Though it was a large battle by Iraq War standards, the
government had kept its plans secret until security forces required help. Then, the Americans stepped in and rescued them without knowing who the enemy was, decisively
intervening in what may have been an intra-Shi’a political or religious rivalry disguised
as a battle against extremists.166
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Though on Iraq’s political and social fringe, the Soldiers of Heaven had maintained
offices across the southern provinces. Just as they did not suddenly emerge on the eve of
the January 28 battle, neither did they disappear in its wake. Nearly a month later, a joint
U.S. and Iraqi force captured over 180 Soldiers of Heaven in a raid in western Qadisiyah Province.167 Other operations against them would arise in 2008 as well. The sudden
appearance of this little-known cultish group showed coalition leaders that stabilizing
southern Iraq would likely take more energy and troops than they had expected.
The Zamili Arrest
Barely a week after the battle in Najaf and 3 weeks after the arrest of Daraji, another
arrest of a high-profile Sadrist leader suggested there would be some bite to the coalition’s bark against the Shi’a militant groups. On February 9, U.S. Special Forces advisers
and Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Ministry of Health compound in downtown Baghdad and arrested Hakim Zamili, the Sadrist politician who served as a Deputy Minister
of Health. Since 2005, Zamili—a militia commander who purportedly maintained a personal security detail of over 100 men—had masterminded a campaign of terror against
Sunni citizens. Under his instructions, government ambulances doubled as troop and
weapons carriers for Shi’a death squads, and hospitals became killing grounds for sick or
injured Sunni patients. Zamili also was implicated in the November 2006 kidnapping and
murder of Ammar Saffar, the other Deputy Minister of Health and Maliki’s Dawa Party
colleague. Saffar had been compiling a list of the ministry’s JAM-sponsored atrocities
with the intention of revealing the crimes publicly before gunmen abducted him from
his home and eventually murdered him. Seeing Zamili as a mounting liability, Maliki
decided to cut ties with the odious health official and authorized MNF-I to detain him so
long as it occurred outside of Sadr City. The operation to seize Zamili involved the Iraqi
commandos disguising themselves as wounded personnel requiring medical assistance.
In this way, they penetrated the outer ring of Zamili’s militiamen guarding the compound and captured their quarry without firing a shot.168

Source: Photo by Public Relations Department, Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia.

Hakim Zamili, Iraqi Deputy Minister of Health.169
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Removing this prominent symbol of corruption and sectarianism from the government sent a powerful signal that the impending surge would involve action against not
just Shi’a militant leaders on Baghdad’s streets, but potentially against well-connected
Shi’a militant politicians. For Casey, evidence pointing to the deep connections between
disreputable Iranian actors and their Iraqi partners also suggested something about the
difficulties ahead. In one of his last engagements before he departed Iraq in February,
the MNF-I commander visited Vice President Adel Abd al-Mehdi and warned him that
SCIRI’s associations with sectarian thugs threatened the future of his country. Casey had
a similar message for Hadi al-Amiri after the Badr Corps chief attended the general’s
farewell reception: It was time to choose Iraq over Iran and the militias. To Talabani, the
MNF-I commander pointedly asked how it was possible for the Iraqi President to thank
the United States for the blood and treasure it had expended while maintaining a cordial
relationship with Soleimani, whose responsibility for the deaths of American Soldiers
now was beyond doubt.170 By February 2007, the question Casey had put to his staff 4
months before had been answered. The strategic effect of Iranian influence indeed was
substantial, if not decisive, with the Quds Force-managed proxy war against MNF-I serving as the clearest indicator.
THE NORTHERN IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SURGE
With the coalition’s focus drawn to Baghdad throughout 2006, the fight in northern
Iraq, like that in Basrah and the south, had remained an economy of force operation.
Casey’s decision to move the Strykers of Colonel Townsend’s 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry
Division, south from Mosul confirmed the growing centripetal force of the deteriorating
state of security in the capital. The Stryker brigade’s departure from Mosul in late November left only one U.S. combined-arms battalion from 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in
a dense, urban area of nearly 2 million people―replicating the situation before the city’s
collapse in 2004.171 Mosul itself was a divided city in physical, demographic, and military
terms. The Tigris River bisected it, and Sunni Arab and Kurdish enclaves dominated the
western and eastern halves, respectively. Mosul similarly was split between the jurisdictions of two Iraqi Army brigades, with a predominantly Sunni Arab unit operating in the
west and a former peshmerga unit in the east. The city lay along a fault line where Kurdish expansionism abutted long-time Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkoman interests. Resettling the Mosul area following the collapse of Saddam’s regime, the Kurds had secured a
strong political position with the help of the Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections and had
dominated Ninawa’s provincial government ever since. Exacerbating the sense of Sunni
disenfranchisement, aggressive peshmerga units routinely crossed the Green Line that
marked the western boundary of the Kurdistan Regional Government to establish checkpoints to control the movement of the local population and stake out broader Kurdish
territorial claims.172
This Arab-Kurd struggle—and a related struggle between Kurds and Sunni Turkomans—provided an opening for AQI and other Sunni insurgents as they moved to
solidify their hold on critical terrain. While Baghdad was the prize AQI sought to win,
Iraqi Sunni leaders judged that the terrorist group needed Mosul to survive.173 The city
was a crossroads connecting northern Iraq with Syria through the Sinjar-Tel Afar corridor—the same corridor in which Casey had placed the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to
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disrupt foreign-fighter flow in the summer of 2005. Mosul proved relatively hospitable to
al-Qaeda in Iraq not only because of its Sunni Arab population’s resentment of Kurdish
encroachment, but also because it boasted a sizable number of former army officers and
Ba’athist officials who opposed the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad.174 Groups
like Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s New Ba’ath Party that sought to expel the coalition and infiltrate Iraq’s nascent security apparatus found a relative safe haven in and around Mosul
and in the Za’ab Triangle to the south.175 On the day of Saddam’s execution, Douri’s
militant loyalists in these areas publicly announced the formation of the “Naqshbandi
Army,” which would function as the militant arm of Douri’s wing of the Ba’ath Party.
Their heartland was an operationally significant rural area where the only major road
between Anbar Province and the upper Tigris River Valley emerged from the southern
reaches of the Jazeera Desert to intersect with the Hamrin Ridge running northwest from
central Diyala. This combination of factors made it difficult to dislodge AQI, the Naqshbandis, and other militants from Mosul and its environs.
MND-N’s Complex Problem Set
Mosul was just one of a host of problems that Mixon’s 25th Infantry Division headquarters was responsible for managing. As MND-N commander, Mixon supported the
main effort in Baghdad principally by attempting to interdict accelerants of violence emanating from Baqubah and the capital’s northern belt.176 This approach translated into the
standard tasks of neutralizing VBIED networks and death squads and denying them safe
havens. MND-N’s area of responsibility extended from the outskirts of Baghdad north to
Turkey and along an east-west axis from the Iranian to the Syrian border, an expansive
area whose widely scattered population centers precluded a concentration of ground
forces and rapid mutual support between Mixon’s units.

General Mixon (right), Governor Duraid Kashmoula (left).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Major Roderick Cunningham (Released).

Major General Benjamin Mixon, Commander MND-N, With Ninawa Provincial
Governor Duraid Kashmoula.177
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In early 2007, Mixon dispersed his four BCTs across the four provinces of Diyala,
Salahadin, Kirkuk, and Ninawa, which together formed an area the size of Indiana. Each
province held unique problems that added to the dizzying complexity of MND-N’s mission. In the far north, the division’s complications included the presence of the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), an organization that had conducted a 2-decade insurgency against
the Turkish Government from bases deep in the mountains of northern Iraqi Kurdistan. The PKK’s terrorist attacks inside Turkey sometimes provoked a response from the
Turks in the form of limited cross-border operations.178 Iraq’s northern oil fields around
Kirkuk and the refinery at Bayji also came within Mixon’s purview, saddling him with
the unenviable job of assisting the Iraqi Government with improving its oil infrastructure
and disrupting smuggling networks that partially bankrolled the insurgency. Given the
influx of foreign fighters, the arduous task of border interdiction on the Syrian frontier
stretched MND-N’s forces even further. Adding to this list of tasks, MNC-I directed the
division to neutralize AQI in key cities along the northern Tigris River Valley and to disrupt insurgent activity in the Za’ab Triangle.179 In the vast territory under Mixon’s charge,
few areas were unimportant.
MND-N may not have benefited directly from the surge of the first few U.S. brigade combat teams to central Iraq, but the arrival of these forces in Baghdad halted the
bone-scraping diversion of coalition combat power from the division’s area of operations. Mixon managed the risks posed by a vast, undermanned and trouble-strewn sector
in part by leveraging his combat aviation brigade and a recently formed IED-hunting
aerial surveillance unit called Task Force ODIN. With these, he organized airmobile platoon and company-sized strike packages targeting insurgent leaders across his area of
operations.180 Given Diyala’s connection to the northern belt and the fight in Baghdad,
Mixon designated the province and its capital of Baqubah as MND-N’s priority effort,
and when additional forces began to arrive during spring 2007, Mixon would deploy
them there.181 The BCT stationed in Ninawa thus found itself in the doubly uninviting
position of serving as the economy of force element within a division that was itself the
corps economy of force.
“Hold Mosul”
Colonel Stephen M. Twitty, the commander of the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division,
understood that MNC-I’s primary focus in early 2007 was on reducing the violence in
Baghdad, a fact that Odierno made clear in a visit to Mosul. “I know you need more
forces,” he told Twitty. “But I can’t give them to you. . . . Just hold Mosul for us, and
don’t let it fall. That is your mission.”182 With that guidance, the BCT commander chose
to keep his strongest battalion posted at Forward Operating Base Marez on the edge of
the city and used these troops to staff combat outposts within the city alongside two
Iraqi Army brigades. With his remaining forces, Twitty covered the Syrian border and
Tel Afar to the west, and Qayyarah to the south. Twitty’s thinly stretched units in Mosul
faced the same problems that had emerged during Operation TOGETHER FORWARD
in Baghdad. Clearing operations in a specific area temporarily lowered levels of violence,
but attacks rose again after the limited surge of U.S. and Iraqi troops moved on to other
zones. Twitty could hold Mosul, but the ebb and flow of security developments was such
that he could not consolidate his gains with the available forces. The reassignment of
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three local Iraqi Army battalions to Baghdad as part of the Baghdad Security Plan only
lessened his chances of doing so.183

Colonel Twitty (right) with Major General Wathiq al- Hamdani (left).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Major Roderick Cunningham (Released).

Colonel Stephen Twitty, Commander, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry
Division, With Ninawa Provincial Director of Police
Major General Wathiq al-Hamdani.184
The U.S. commanders in the north judged that the intensifying pressure on the enemy
in Baghdad could have a related and undesirable impact elsewhere, as had been the case
when the Sunni insurgency responded to the coalition’s November 2004 attack in Fallujah
with devastating coordinated attacks in Mosul.185 Local politics did not help. Aggressive
peshmerga behavior along with brazen exhibitions of Kurdish nationalism resembled the
violent and intimidating activities carried out by some Shi’a-dominated military units in
and around Baghdad. Heavily Kurdish outfits lacked legitimacy in the eyes of Mosul’s
Sunni Arab citizens—often for good reason, and the practice of employing them in Sunni
Arab areas constituted a risk to be managed carefully.186
Nevertheless, while Casey and Chiarelli’s transition bridging strategy had been jettisoned as a corps-wide approach to accelerated transition, Mixon still believed that conditions in MND-N warranted using augmented transition teams to develop the Iraqi
security forces in areas where the coalition lacked sufficient combat power to partner
with Iraqi units. The continuing improvement of the 2d and 3d Iraqi Army Divisions in
Ninawa made the downside of this contentious allocation of manpower more palatable.
Both divisions had passed from coalition control to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command
by December 2006, just as Twitty’s brigade had arrived.187 In Ninawa, Mixon decided to
attach a maneuver squad to the 12-man military transition teams paired with each Iraqi
Army battalion and, similarly, one maneuver company covered the brigade of Iraqi border
troops posted along the Syrian frontier.188 For Twitty, this translated into having an entire
squadron devoted to training and advising security forces throughout the province.189
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A crucial part of holding Mosul in early 2007 involved managing the tense relations
between local army units and the city’s police force. The police in Ninawa’s provincial
capital were almost exclusively Sunni Arab, making their cooperation with the Kurdish-majority brigade of the 2d Iraqi Army Division difficult. Instances of violence between
Iraqi soldiers and police occurred frequently enough for them to be a major concern to
Twitty and other U.S. commanders.190 “That was my biggest worry,” Twitty recalled. “If
I lost the police and the army, I only had one [U.S.] battalion in Mosul.”191 The dearth of
troops meant the coalition was in a precarious situation in a province that would prove
to be the most important insurgent stronghold in Iraq. Mosul and the north would pose a
thorny problem whether the impending surge operations pacified Baghdad or not.
***
On the eve of the surge counteroffensive in January 2007, U.S. commanders had managed in a matter of weeks to reinitiate a campaign to secure Baghdad. However, the
events occurring during the 2 months between Bush’s December 2006 decision to deploy
the surge troops and the eventual arrival of Petraeus in February deepened senior U.S.
leaders’ distrust of Prime Minister Maliki and his government. This left them questioning whether an Iraqi Government riven by sectarianism had the will and ability both to
attack AQI and rein in Baghdad’s Shi’a militant groups.
Yet even before the surge troops began to arrive, the dynamics of the conflict in central Iraq started to change as the warring parties anticipated the additional American
troops. Clear signs emerged of what was to come in the remainder of 2007. The coalition’s fight against AQI would shift from the streets of Baghdad to the rural areas and
suburbs surrounding the city, where AQI had long enjoyed support zones on the edge
of the capital. War between the coalition and the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies,
relatively quiet since the Sadrist uprising of August 2004, again intensified. War between
the Maliki government and the militant arm of the Sadr movement appeared imminent
as well, leading to a new alignment of Iraq’s Shi’a political parties. Tension grew between
MNF-I and the Maliki government over how best to address the Shi’a militant threat,
with the two sides appearing to adopt diametrically opposing strategies. There was tension within the coalition command as well, as Odierno began to anticipate the surge and
to reverse the transition campaign plan his commander, Casey, had created. Finally, as
the coalition commanders gathered U.S. and Iraqi combat power for another Baghdad
security plan, the northern Iraq security problem and the Arab-Kurd conflict continued
to fester, with neither the coalition nor the Iraqi Government possessing the means to
resolve either issue. These were the challenges Petraeus would inherit when he took command of MNF-I in early February 2007.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007
In a televised address to the nation on January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush
announced his decision to change the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Speaking from the Oval Office,
Bush outlined a plan “to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian
violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad.” The President explained the plan
in unusual detail, to include the new Iraqi command-and-control structure in the capital
and the intent behind joint security stations (JSSs). In the past, Iraqi and U.S. force levels
proved insufficient to hold “cleared” neighborhoods, he said. This was a primary reason
for recent failures, along with unwarranted restrictions on coalition operations against
terrorists and insurgents. Explaining how these shortcomings would be addressed, Bush
cited Nuri al-Maliki’s supportive public comments and revealed his own decision to
commit roughly 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. Besides the 5 brigade combat
teams (BCTs) slated to deploy in and around Baghdad, the President mentioned the
imminent arrival of another 4,000 Marines in Anbar. While security was the “most urgent
priority for success,” the plan contained elements covering political, economic, and diplomatic concerns. During his address, the President referred to a “new approach” or a
“change” in strategy over a half-dozen times.
A new commander would implement the revised strategy. General David H. Petraeus would take command of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) from General George
Casey, Jr., in early February, ending Casey’s nearly 3-year tenure in Baghdad. Within
days of his arrival in Iraq, Petraeus would reverse the course of the MNF-I campaign
plan, sending American troops off their bases and back into Baghdad’s neighborhoods to
conduct operations against both al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Shi’a militant groups. The days
of the transition strategy were over.1
PETRAEUS TAKES COMMAND
“Hard is Not Hopeless”
The White House consulted with then-Lieutenant General Petraeus during its fall
2006 Iraq strategy review, and his name had been floated as a potential replacement for
Casey in December by Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, former Vice Chief
General Jack Keane, and Casey himself.2 Schoomaker had recommended Petraeus to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld as a potential successor to Casey as early
as fall 2005, when Petraeus had given up command of Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to oversee the Army schools at Fort Leavenworth, KS, with
the charter to revise the service’s counterinsurgency doctrine in light of the Iraq campaign.3 Schoomaker also had informed Petraeus at that time that he was the most likely
candidate to succeed Casey at MNF-I, a consideration that lent more urgency to Petraeus’s work. Other senior officers, including Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, had been
mentioned as potential new MNF-I commanders, but by the time the President visited
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in mid-December to issue his guidance to deploy the surge
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brigades, Petraeus had become the leading candidate. In early January, the President
nominated Petraeus for the post. The general enjoyed broad support in Congress and
popularity in the media; and the administration looked for him to assume command in
Iraq as soon as possible.
Petraeus’s two previous tours in Iraq had helped to frame his basic sense of what
the coalition’s future course should be, and his recent assignment overseeing the development of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual 3-24, provided a
doctrinal foundation on which to proceed. The key principle of the new manual—that
of population security—was noticeable in Petraeus’s January 23 confirmation hearing
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Petraeus’s remarks amounted to
a point-by-point repudiation of the transition strategy. “The mission of Multinational
Force Iraq will be modified, making security of the population, particularly in Baghdad,
and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the military effort,” he told the committee, adding that to secure Baghdad’s neighborhoods, “a persistent presence in these
neighborhoods will be essential.” This change away from a focus on transitioning to Iraqi
control was necessary, he explained, because “The escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state.” Like many
of the committee members, Petraeus said he believed the long-term solution to Iraq’s
problems required more than security, but it was “exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi government to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while survival is the
primary concern of so many in Iraq’s capital.”4 This fact made a renewed emphasis on
“military action to improve security” necessary.
The surge forces would require significant time to flow to Iraq and gain enough understanding of the situation to operate effectively, Petraeus cautioned, taking care to preempt calls to limit explicitly the duration of the surge or to assess its progress too early.
“None of this will be rapid,” Petraeus said, adding that MNF-I would face “a determined,
adaptable, barbaric, enemy . . . [that] will try to wait us out.” Perhaps mindful of criticism
that Casey had stuck too long with a failing transition strategy, Petraeus assured the senators that “should I determine that the new strategy cannot succeed, I will provide such
an assessment.” He finished his presentation by cautioning against defeatism, offering,
“The way ahead will be very hard . . . But hard is not hopeless.”5
The President’s decision to change commanders in Baghdad prompted a change of
commanders at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as well. Like Casey, General John
Abizaid recommended against the U.S. troop surge and was skeptical that the addition of
five brigades would have a lasting impact on Iraq’s security situation. However, Abizaid
and other U.S. leaders recognized that a significantly changing strategy would require
different commanders in both Baghdad and Tampa, FL. Abizaid had already served at
CENTCOM for 3½ years, an unusually long tenure, and was scheduled to retire in April,
so moving up his transition was relatively easy. To replace Abizaid and serve as Petraeus’s immediate superior, SECDEF Robert M. Gates and JCS Chairman General Peter
Pace recommended that Bush select Admiral William J. “Fox” Fallon, then serving as the
commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
CENTCOM would be Fallon’s fourth post as a four-star admiral, making him the most
senior four-star commander in the U.S. military. Petraeus would be the most junior. At 62
years old, Fallon had more than 4 decades of experience in the U.S. Navy and also carried
the endorsement of now-retired General Keane, who had worked closely with Fallon
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in the Pentagon when the two men were vice chiefs of their respective services. Keane
believed Fallon’s experience as a military diplomat in the Pacific region had equipped
him to fill the role of a CENTCOM commander who could engage Middle Eastern leaders across the region to try to mitigate outside intervention in the Iraq conflict.6 He also
believed Fallon would be content to let Petraeus set the U.S. course inside Iraq without
interference from CENTCOM, but this was a belief that Fallon soon would dispel.
The Departure of General Casey
Casey tried to put his best foot forward as he entered the home stretch of his prolonged Iraq tour. However, the transition period was far from smooth. Since the summer
of 2006, the MNF-I commander had struggled to explain the crux of his approach to the
Bush administration—how the United States had to drawdown its forces, transition tasks
to the Iraqi security forces (ISF), and get out of Baghdad’s neighborhoods in order to
win. He had persisted in this line of argument through the exhaustive external strategy
review. Surprised and puzzled on occasion as the White House adjusted its Iraq policy,
the general believed, in retrospect, that Bush had settled on the surge largely to buy time
and build domestic support rather than to achieve success on the ground.7
As the administration put its final touches on the “new way forward,” Casey found
himself again addressing what he considered misperceptions of the approach he had
championed for years. In support of the President’s January 10 speech, for example, the
White House sought to highlight how the revised strategy differed from the preceding
one. A list of “key operational shifts” noted that MNF-I’s previous security focus had
been on transition, while the way ahead would be chiefly characterized by protecting the
population.8 During a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Gates, Pace, and
Stephen J. Hadley, the MNF-I commander protested what he viewed as an incomplete
and simplistic depiction of his approach. Casey insisted the coalition had been conducting a counterinsurgency campaign throughout his tenure, adding that he understood the
central focus of counterinsurgency as securing the people. He resented the insinuation
that MNF-I had neglected it during his watch.9 The statesman-like Gates cautioned his
colleagues against the inclination to set Casey and Abizaid on one side and the “White
House, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the new people” on the other. “We
need to make it seem as if we are all on the same side,” Gates advised.10 This would
become increasingly difficult as the MNF- I change of command loomed.
Despite the clear decision in Washington to change course, those at MNF-I watching
the President’s speech believed they still detected support for the transition bridging
strategy. The White House had emphasized protecting the population and identified this
as a deviation from the MNF-I campaign plan.11 However, Bush also mentioned embedding more American advisers and described the training of Iraqi forces as “the essential
U.S. security mission in Iraq.” The President also announced a doubling of the number
of provincial reconstruction teams, a step meant to help “speed the transition to Iraqi
self-reliance.”12 The supporting information briefings by the National Security Council
(NSC) staff labeled the way ahead as Iraqi-led.13 Extending these points, Casey claimed
at a press conference a few days later that the new plan would “[allow] us to sustain the
agreement in Amman . . . to accelerate development of the ISF and the passage of security
responsibility.” He also described the flow of additional forces as flexible with the ability
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to “evaluate progress as we went,” even though nearly all senior U.S. policymakers by
that point had decided that all five surge brigades would deploy.14
Back in Baghdad, the process of transition from Casey to Petraeus began uneasily and
remained so throughout. Knowing that in his Senate confirmation hearing he would be
asked for his opinion on the size of the surge, Petraeus thought it prudent to consult General Raymond Odierno, the operational commander on the ground. Over the phone from
Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander told Petraeus he needed all five
brigades, a judgment that matched Petraeus’s own.15 Casey, however, considered the
incoming commander’s probing as improper meddling and barred Petraeus from communicating directly with MNF-I’s subordinate units until after the change of command.16
In the brief, one-on-one time the two commanders shared during this rushed transition, Casey observed to his successor, “What we’re seeing here is a major shift in strategy
from [the Iraqis] doing it to us doing it.”17 Fully aware that Petraeus favored a reversal of
his initiative encouraging more Iraqi-led operations, Casey worried about how American
troops would adapt to what would effectively be a change of mission. “Whatever you do,
whatever you decide, just be clear about it,” Casey urged, “because it’s a major change.”18
It was indeed, Petraeus agreed, and he was determined to be very clear about it.19
The New Commander’s Intent
Petraeus took command of MNF-I on February 10 in a ceremony presided over by
Abizaid. His introductory letter to the troops issued on that day emphasized security
as the foremost task, one that the coalition would achieve in partnership with the Iraqis.
Petraeus noted it would require living and fighting alongside those partners. Though
the incoming commander echoed the central tenet of his predecessor (“In the end, Iraqis
will decide the outcome of this struggle”), not a word was mentioned of transition.20 The
immediate concern was to “gain the time” the Iraqis needed to “save their country.”21

General Petraeus (second from left), General Casey (right).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Laura M. Bigenho (Released).

General David Petraeus Takes Command of MNF-I From General George Casey.22
98

THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007

Meeting with his subordinate leaders at Al Faw Palace immediately following the
change of command ceremony, Petraeus stated that the high level of violence in Iraq
had invalidated the current strategy and that a “modification of priorities” was required.
Transition remained important, he said, but security had to be recognized as a “prerequisite for the way ahead.”23 Commanders should look for opportunities to put Iraqi security
forces in the lead, Petraeus said, “But if we don’t get a grip on the violence, then it doesn’t
matter who is in charge.”24
As for improving security, Petraeus stressed that how commanders employed the
additional surge forces would matter more than sheer numbers. Operationally speaking, the five additional BCTs would be dispatched to help secure Baghdad and interdict
accelerants to violence in the surrounding belts, and thus reduce overall violence in the
capital. Petraeus considered violence against the population to be the “key metric,” and
said that tamping it down would be a months-long venture requiring an offensive mindset throughout the process. At the tactical level, adopting a forward presence would be
critical, and Petraeus endorsed the construction of JSSs and combat outposts—an effort
he would seek to accelerate considerably over time.25 The first of these had achieved initial operating capability in Ghazaliyah, and there would ultimately be another 76 stood
up in Baghdad alone during the surge.26 However, the new commander branded the
JSS concept with his own guidance. Casey originally envisioned JSSs as a mechanism to
help Baghdad’s police assume control of the city as coalition forces withdrew over time.
Each station would serve as a base of operations in a given neighborhood and coordinate patrols. However, Petraeus saw JSSs and combat outposts as a means to ramp up
coalition presence on the streets of the capital, and he made clear that he expected each
U.S. battalion to locate its command post within the battalion’s area of operations, not on
distant forward operating bases. The only way to secure the people was to live among
them, Petraeus said.27
In making clear that coalition commanders had responsibility for bringing violence
under control in their areas of operations, Petraeus was not dismissing the importance of
cultivating relationships with the Iraqis. He urged leaders to “embrace Iraqi units” and
encouraged the rekindling of partnerships with local security forces, a change that would
involve BCT commanders more deeply in the daily affairs of Iraqi units with which they
shared battle space.28 Petraeus considered transition teams an important part of this
equation, but he intended to attach them formally to the BCTs partnered with the Iraqi
formations they advised, thereby making BCT commanders responsible for the development of the security forces in their sectors. Over time, he aimed to work with the Army to
deploy the transition teams simultaneously with the BCTs in whose areas of operations
they would operate.29
Unity of effort extended to relations between the coalition and the Government of
Iraq as well. Here, Petraeus, like Casey, signaled his preference to work with the Prime
Minister rather than lobby Washington to seek an alternative. “Maliki is our guy,” he told
his subordinate commanders.30 Petraeus saw his job—along with Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad—as facilitating reconciliation and helping the Prime Minister’s government
improve its capacity. Believing reconciliation to be “key in the long run,” the general
hoped to draw Maliki to the center by driving a wedge between him and the Sadrists and
thus make the government’s tribal outreach to Sunnis more credible.31
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As he sat in the palace luncheon, Odierno jotted down the guidance he heard. The
new MNF-I commander, he noted, was not interested in plans for the consolidation of
headquarters or schemes related to the so-called BRAC-for-Iraq in which the coalition
closed down facilities.32 After months of disagreements between MNF-I and MNC-I on
the way ahead, it appeared the new MNF-I commander and his principal subordinate
were at last on the same page.
The Race against Time
As he set about his work in his first weeks in command, Petraeus described MNFI’s mission as “an enormous race against time,” and the general intended to do what
he could to buy more of it.33 Petraeus saw the two most concerning security threats as
Sunni car-bomb cells and Shi’a death squads. It would be a tough slog against both, and
he wanted audiences in Baghdad and Washington to know this. With just one of the
five surge BCTs operating in Baghdad and a second on the ground preparing for action,
Petraeus emphasized that the coalition counteroffensive would take months to develop.
Looking ahead to the arrival of more brigades in March, April, and May, he explained to
Gates, “It’s much too early to tell how long we’ll need to maintain the additional forces.”34
He had an idea, though. The MNF-I commander reassured Odierno of his intent to sustain the surge at 20 BCTs through December 2007.35
In the meantime, units in Baghdad continued what they had begun with Operation
FARDH AL-QANOON: clearing neighborhoods and establishing a permanent presence
in JSSs. This approach, Petraeus believed, “is helping convince Iraqi citizens that we will
stick it out with them rather than moving to the next hot-spot.”36 Yet it would take more
than forward presence to protect the population in the capital. “We will not be able to
reduce substantially the VBIEDs [vehicle borne improvised explosive devices] until we
get the final brigades on the ground and can go after the bomb factories that we believe
are located in the ‘belts’ around Baghdad,” Petraeus warned.37
Well before Petraeus assumed command of MNF-I, he had understood the pressing
need to reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad. After falling slightly from December to
mid-January, the number of observed incidents of ethno-sectarian violence in the capital
leveled off at 150 for over 2 weeks before spiking again to 183 the first week of February. Unsurprisingly, most of the violence had occurred along Sunni-Shi’a fault lines in
western Baghdad and across the river in the Sunni enclave of Adhamiyah.38 Apart from
the statistics, the general’s impressions after a firsthand look at the bleak conditions in
Ghazaliyah and Dora were much worse than he had anticipated. AQI’s need for support
zones from which to launch attacks inside the city had led to the group’s takeover of
Sunni areas. The Shi’a militias’ campaign of sectarian cleansing further terrorized these
besieged Sunni pockets, while pervasive violent crime, like kidnapping, made conditions
for families unlivable.
As he traveled around the city in his first days in command, Petraeus was struck
at how far conditions had deteriorated since his departure from MNSTC-I 17 months
before, though he noted a few bright spots. To Petraeus, Prime Minister Maliki seemed
committed to improving security along evenhanded, nonsectarian lines, though he was
clearly under heavy Shi’a political pressure. Indeed, Maliki recently had announced to
the Iraqi security forces that impending operations in Baghdad would “target anyone and
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everyone who violates the law” and that “no one can hide behind any political party.”39
After weeks of coordinating with the Iraqis, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MNDB) had begun to position some of its units in JSSs across the capital. In preparation for
the kickoff of the revised security plan, the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) was
establishing itself, albeit slowly. The combination of targeted raids and clearing operations seemed to take their toll on extremist groups, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).
Sectarian murders in February decreased by 50 percent from January’s total, and population displacement in Baghdad appeared to have stopped. However, Petraeus hastened
to put these encouraging signs into their broader, less encouraging context. While some
categories of violence had improved slightly from January, late January had been a horrific period of bloodshed, with the Ministry of Interior announcing that more than 1,000
Iraqis had been killed in a single week. February had witnessed the highest number of
VBIED attacks in the past year with 77—up slightly from January’s 72.40 There had been
44 VBIEDs in Baghdad alone in February, the most in the capital in any month of the war.
The commander expected to see similar levels in the coming weeks as Sunni extremists
responded to the new American approach.41
“Get Off the FOBs:” Forward Presence Shakes Up East Baghdad
The first surge brigade, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, was also among the first to
implement Petraeus’s and Odierno’s guidance to move directly into its battle space and
operate alongside Iraqi partner units among Baghdad’s population. The brigade’s arrival
in late January had brought the number of U.S. BCTs in the Baghdad security districts
to five and marked the start of the surge. Though headquartered in Camp Taji 20 miles
to the north, the brigade assumed responsibility for coalition operations in the capital’s
northeastern security districts of Adhamiyah and Sadr City. With aggressive Sunni and
Shi’a elements vying for control, the area seethed with sectarian violence. In the densely
populated slums of Sadr City, Sha’ab, and Ur, Shi’a militiamen found safe havens from
which to launch raids against Sunni enclaves throughout the city. Adhamiyah, an upscale
residential area for military officers and government professionals during the Saddam
era, was one such Sunni zone. Nestled along the eastern bank of the Tigris, this neighborhood had served as a support base for al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) Rusafa network, which
included the most active and deadly car-bomb ring in the country.42 In January 2007,
amid these two formidable antagonists stood an overmatched U.S. battalion that quartered only one company in the sector. The remainder of the battalion’s combat power
operated from Camp Taji.43
The first surge BCT’s deployment to northeast Baghdad effectively increased the
number of battalions in the sector from one to three. The first priority for 2d Brigade,
82d Airborne Division, as it formally assumed control of its new section on February 12,
was to establish a forward presence with two-thirds of the BCT’s combat power. “Get off
the FOBs [forward operating bases],” Colonel Billy Don Farris, the brigade commander,
told his subordinate leaders.44 Following several days of targeted raids and cordon
and knock/search operations, two battalions from Farris’s incoming BCT established
combat outposts in their newly assigned sectors in Sha’ab and Ur. The already present
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, consolidated its position around Old Adhamiyah.45 The new
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combat outposts allowed the brigade’s three battalions to reduce movement back and
forth from the Taji base to their respective sectors, and facilitate interaction with the local
population.46

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).

Colonel Billy Don Farris, Commander of 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Meets With
Civic Leaders of Sadr City’s First Joint Security Station.47
In the coming weeks, Farris’s brigade tightened its grip on an area that had seen
sparse coalition presence. While combat outposts enabled constant forward presence for
U.S. units, JSSs served as command and control nodes for both coalition and Iraqi forces.
Farris anticipated that each of his battalions would establish one JSS in existing police stations or government buildings to coordinate local security operations, advise the Iraqis,
and encourage their security forces to be an active presence in the community.48 However, this was problematic, given the lack of Iraqi troops. When Odierno visited Farris
on February 24, the BCT commander reported significant shortages in the ranks of the
National Police battalion in Sha’ab and Ur—an issue compounded by the Iraqi high command’s reluctance to send its army units there.

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Joann Makinano (Released).

U.S. Army Soldiers Search a House in Zaghiniyat During the
Early Days of the Surge.49
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Initially, Farris was content to isolate Sadr City, given the limited number of maneuver units under his control. He faced practical restrictions when it came to dispatching
conventional forces into the dense, inhospitable urban area where JAM dominated. The
base of the Iraqi National Police brigade responsible for this security district sat on the
northeastern corner of the Shi’a slum, making it difficult for American transition teams to
provide oversight. A new JSS planned for the southwestern edge of Sadr City would alleviate this particular problem but introduced another.50 Committing to a JSS provocatively
close to the Sadrist militia’s main stronghold would strain the BCT commander’s combat
power and, in his view, jeopardized clearing operations in Sha’ab and Ur as well as Old
Adhamiyah. “These were two very tough nuts to crack,” he explained.51
Odierno surprised Farris by asking him if he could use another battalion. As Farris
mulled this over, the general told him that he and his brigade were doing exactly what
Odierno wanted them to do: “Getting into the neighborhoods and integrating the ISF.”52
Petraeus reiterated this guidance in his own visit to Farris’s sector 2 days later, telling
Farris’s Soldiers, “We need to live in the neighborhoods we operate [in]; [we] must break
the FOB mentality; [and we] cannot allow ourselves to ‘commute’ to the fight.”53

Source: U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).

Iraqi Police and Paratroopers From 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Patrol
Adhamiyah in February.54
Soldiers of 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, established their JSS on the outskirts
of Sadr City during the first week of March 2007. U.S. troops cleared the surrounding
area using a “soft knock” approach, and Petraeus reported that the population seemed to
appreciate it. The National Police battalion proved helpful, its presence apparently setting the people at ease, but the area remained volatile. The Sadr City mayor, after seeking
an accommodation with the coalition as it stepped cautiously into the Shi’a militant safe
haven, survived an assassination attempt by Shi’a militants on March 15. The following
week, the capture of Qais Khazali and other Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) leaders in faraway Basrah stirred fears of another Sadr City uprising. To avoid provoking a large-scale
confrontation, Odierno required any raids against high-value targets based in the Sadr
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City district come to him for approval. For the time being, the strategic importance of
maintaining calm in Sadr City outweighed whatever tactical inroads might be made.55
Just south of Farris’s area of operations, Colonel Jeffrey Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d
Infantry Division engaged in a similar fight to root out Shi’a extremists while protecting
the populace from car-bomb attacks. Before the surge, Bannister’s sector had included
all of east Baghdad. The BCT had four battalions under its control, but one of these units
operated outside the security districts in the sprawling rural Mada’in area. In the neighborhoods for which the brigade was responsible, AQI’s Rusafa car-bomb ring had carried out devastating attacks against mostly Shi’a civilians for more than a year. Several
market areas in Bannister’s sector had been struck by deadly car and truck bombs in late
2006 and early 2007, some of them repeatedly. AQI had bombed the Sadriyah market in
December, killing 50 Iraqis, and then struck the market again on February 3 in a massive
truck bombing that was one of the war’s worst, killing or wounding almost 500 Iraqis.
What was likely the same gang followed up on March 5 with a bombing of Baghdad’s
famed open-air book market on Mutanabi Street, named for Iraq’s most famous poet,
which killed 26 Iraqis and left the market in ruins.

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Jason T. Bailey, U.S. Air Force (Released).

A U.S. Patrol Passes the Ruined Facade of Baghdad’s Mutanabi Book Market,
Destroyed by an AQI Car Bomb in March 2007.56
The arrival of Farris’s brigade enabled Bannister and his brigade to compress their
battle space and focus on securing the frequently bombed districts of New Baghdad,
Rusafa, and Karada. As Farris’s BCT assumed responsibility for Adhamiyah and Sadr
City, Bannister positioned one of his battalions in each of the three remaining security
districts for which he now had responsibility.57 From the two FOBs in his sector—Loyalty
and Rustamiyah—his units began to “flood the zone,” pushing two-thirds of their combat
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power forward into a net of combat outposts and converting selected Iraqi police stations
into JSSs. Bannister benefited from a small surge of Iraqi security forces as well. The idea
to bring Iraqi Army units to Baghdad from less volatile regions of the country had had
an unfortunately long gestation, but in January two Iraqi brigades finally arrived. One
of them went to Karada, where, according to Bannister, the timely appearance of the
additional Iraqi troops helped offset the loss of National Police units pulled offline for
much-needed retraining.

SECDEF Gates (center) with Colonel Bannister (right). Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).

SECDEF Robert Gates Tours a Joint Security Station With
Colonel Jeffrey Bannister.58
Bannister’s BCT eventually reached a total of 6 battalions, enabling it to establish
12 combat outposts and 9 security stations from which his troops and local Iraqi forces
would attempt to put an end to the AQI attacks ravaging Rusafa.59
The Surge in West Baghdad
In west Baghdad, Colonel J. B. Burton was gratified to hear Petraeus’s guidance for
coalition forces to increase their presence on the streets of the capital. The commander
of 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, had seen the need for that same approach when his
headquarters assumed responsibility for the security districts of Kadhimiyah, Mansour,
and west Rashid in November 2006. Here, AQI operatives infiltrating Baghdad from
the “ratlines” running east from Anbar through Abu Ghraib collided with JAM, AAH,
and other Shi’a militants. From support zones in eastern Kadhimiyah, Shi’a militiamen
pushed into Sunni neighborhoods in a deliberate effort to expand Shi’a militant control.
Like others, Burton understood the problem facing him as more complicated than simple
counterinsurgency. His BCT was a third party to an ongoing sectarian war.
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Colonel Burton (left) with Major General Abdul Al-Ameer (right).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Benny Corbett (Released).

Colonel J. B. Burton, Commander, 2d BCT, 1st Infantry Division, With
Major General Abdul Al-Ameer, Commander of the 6th Iraqi Army Division.60
The solution, Burton believed, was to insert his forces into the maelstrom. “When
I took over, I made it the first order of business to deploy off the FOBs and establish
what we called ‘combat outposts’ along sectarian fault lines,” he later said.61 Combat
Outpost Casino, established in the Sunni enclave of Ghazaliyah, was the first of what
would become a set of 14 combat outposts and JSSs in Burton’s sector.62 Before the surge
announcement, Burton’s BCT had been relieved of its responsibility for Abu Ghraib on
the outskirts of Baghdad. When 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived in January,
one of its battalions was attached to Burton, bringing his total to four. He assigned the
incoming paratroopers to the Shi’a militia strongholds in Harbiya and Hurriyah and welcomed them there in the aftermath of a clearing operation conducted by the division
strike force.63

Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Tierney Nowland (Released).

U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers Search for Weapons Caches Near Janabi in March.64
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In Petraeus’s view, the U.S. battalions in Mansour and Rashid faced the toughest
security challenges in Baghdad. For months, these areas had been the scene of the most
intense death squad activity, sectarian ISF abuses, and AQI infiltration. The second surge
BCT to arrive, Colonel Ricky Gibbs’s 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, alleviated some
of the pressure in those areas when it hit the ground in mid-February. Its arrival allowed
Burton’s BCT to concentrate on the northwest quadrant of the capital. In March, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, combined with Colonel Stephen J. Townsend’s Stryker BCT
to launch a month-long clearing operation in Mansour. In 35 days of grueling actions,
Townsend’s units progressively moved through the district, neighborhood by neighborhood, with battalions assigned to Burton establishing cordons in support or patrolling
on the flanks. In one of these major clearing operations, U.S. and Iraqi troops discovered
components for more than 3,000 IEDs and took 160 suspected insurgents into custody.
Forty of these were sent to long-term detention facilities, a number Townsend judged
remarkably high for such a short period.65 Nonetheless, the persistent violence in sectors
such as Ameriyah following the departure of the Strykers again showed that clearing
operations alone were not enough to solve the problem.66
The Rashid District seemed just as troublesome, especially the eastern half of the district centering on the al-Qaeda bastion of Dora. Colonel Bryan Roberts and 2d Brigade,
1st Cavalry Division, had attempted to clear Dora, but the once-flourishing market there
remained a battleground when Gibbs and 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, assumed
responsibility for the area on March 15. As Gibbs moved into the sprawling district that
nearly stretched the length of southern Baghdad from Camp Victory to the Tigris River,
Roberts shifted his forces to the center of the capital, turning his brigade’s attention to the
international zone and the still-smoldering Haifa Street. Roberts took an attached Stryker
battalion with him, but he left two infantry battalions to add to Gibbs’s cavalry squadron
and another infantry battalion—bringing the total number of such units to four where it
had been three. Gibbs’s BCT also inherited a partnership with elements of three National
Police brigades, though they were of dubious utility since National Police units tended to
be infiltrated by Shi’a militiamen.67

Colonel Gibbs (left) with Ambassador Crocker (front right).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Robert Timmons (Released).

Colonel Ricky D. Gibbs, Commander, 4th Infantry BCT, 1st Infantry Division,
With Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker in April.68
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Moving into Rashid in mid-March, Gibbs encountered a dichotomous threat like
other BCT commanders in the capital. The western half of the district was largely Shi’a,
with JAM and the Special Groups posing the greatest danger. In the mostly Sunni neighborhoods east of Route Jackson, AQI ruled, intimidating the local population and using
the area as a launching point for violence elsewhere. Instructed on arrival to deploy his
subordinate units forward in sector, Gibbs conducted a preliminary operation to establish company-sized combat outposts in hot spots throughout the district.69 Over the next
month, 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division built 11 outposts and JSSs—stocking cranes,
trucks, and concrete barriers location by location and taking about a week to fortify each
position. The move of U.S. units from FOB Falcon back into the Iraqi neighborhoods did
not go uncontested. As the new U.S. and Iraqi outposts went into place, they came under
frequent attack by Sunni fighters who recognized the danger they posed, such as the
March 24 suicide truck bombing against a police station in Dora that killed more than
20 Iraqis, most of them policemen. Militants conducted 711 lethal attacks against Gibbs’s
troops in March, a monthly figure that would rise to 928 later in the spring.70 With its forward presence set, the BCT began a long fight in Dora against what would prove to be a
fortified AQI headquarters.71

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley (Released).

Soldiers From 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, Fire at Insurgents in Dora.72
The Division Fight in Baghdad
At the turn of the New Year, Major General Joseph Fil and the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) had had only three U.S. BCTs and a brigade-sized strike force to
cover all of Baghdad, but the arrival of both American and Iraqi surge forces in February
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and March significantly changed the troop density and character of MND-B’s operations
in the capital. By the end of March, with the arrival of Farris and Gibbs, MND-B had a full
five BCTs that owned battle space in the city. More importantly, the territory assigned to
each brigade was significantly smaller than it had been in 2005 and 2006, allowing brigade commanders to concentrate more U.S. troops in smaller areas of operations. East of
the Tigris, Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, saw its area of operations shrink
by nearly half while gaining two battalions. Burton’s command across the river benefited
from the same doubly favorable transaction, employing two more battalions in a sector
half the size of what it had been in early January. Finally, Roberts retained control of three
battalions, but these massed in Karkh as he shed responsibility for east Rashid. In the
coming months, the concentration of American troops in the capital would only grow,
and this concentration would factor directly into MND-B’s fight against Sunni and Shi’a
militants.73
The new U.S. troop density also allowed MND-B to partner U.S. forces in Baghdad
with Iraqi units at lower echelons as the Iraqi troop density also increased. Senior U.S.
commanders had clamored since the previous fall for additional Iraqi battalions to be
dispatched to Baghdad. By the first week of March, all had arrived, and by the end of the
month, troop strength totaled 61,000 Iraqi security forces in Baghdad, along with 32,000
coalition troops.74 Another 20,000 Iraqis and 13,000 Americans operated in the belts.75
In the months ahead, the number of U.S. battalions patrolling the streets of the capital
would nearly double from what it had been in late 2006, peaking at 25. Among other
things, the additional combat power enabled the rapid creation of more JSSs. After just a
month in command, Petraeus noted that 25 already had been established.76
This influx of forces gave MND-B far greater means to implement the Baghdad Security Plan than Fil’s predecessor, Major General J. D. Thurman, had had for Operations
TOGETHER FORWARD I and II. In a broad sense, MND-B’s focus remained the same as
it had been in late 2006: conduct operations in keeping with the “clear, hold, and build”
framework of Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II, with an emphasis on neighborhoods located along sectarian fault lines. Yet the marked shift from transition to population security entailed a process whereby areas, once cleared, would be controlled and
retained with much more extensive coalition involvement and oversight. This meant instituting more rigorous population control measures—the kind that a persistent forward
presence allowed. In one case, a battalion commander in Dora maintained two platoons
in Iraqi neighborhoods and began an “ongoing census” that fostered relationships with
the locals and helped put a name and a face to friendly and enemy parties.77 Similarly, in
northwest Baghdad, Burton found that the dozen or so JSSs his units created gave Iraqi
locals “a constant touch point of security and information inside their neighborhoods.”78
At the same time, MND-B launched “safe neighborhood” and “safe market” initiatives under which BCTs would erect barriers around vulnerable public areas to frustrate
the AQI car and truck bombings that had ravaged Baghdad’s markets and open spaces
for months. As various kinds of concrete “T-walls” went up throughout Baghdad by the
thousands, U.S. troops nicknamed them according to size. The shortest barriers, 3 feet
high, were “Jersey barriers.” Intermediate-height barriers were either “Virginia barriers” or the slightly taller “Texas barriers.” The tallest, over 10 feet high, were “Alaska
barriers.” In an operation aptly named VIRGINIA CREEPER, Burton’s troops lined the
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route running west out of his sector toward Abu Ghraib with concrete barriers in order
to hamper AQI’s freedom of movement on this important road.79 Meanwhile, east of the
Tigris River, Farris and 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, built a so-called Great Wall of
Adhamiyah to limit unwanted access to the Sunni enclave and adopted a similar tactic to
help isolate Sadr City. In all, Farris’s units would lay more than 30 miles of concrete barriers during their 15-month deployment.80 Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division,
hardened nine markets across east Baghdad by enclosing them with concrete T-walls
and leaving only a few controlled entrances, converting scenes of former VBIED attacks
into pedestrian zones.81 This barrier sought to deny access to militants on both sides of
the sectarian divide, including JAM and other Shi’a militants, and it seemed to have a
rapid effect. In one notable case, with the support of local Sunni leaders, Burton’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, erected concrete walls around northern Ghazaliyah to stymie
JAM death squads, after which the neighborhood’s murder rate dropped by 50 percent
the following week.82 As these preventive measures appeared around Baghdad, MND-B
continued its raids to kill or capture the most dangerous militants, launching the division
strike force—3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division—on a 2-week clearing operation in
March focused specifically on two of Baghdad’s major VBIED networks.83
For MND-B, more U.S. units in Baghdad also meant more headquarters elements
with which to engage Iraqi officials and to partner with ISF units. Fil met regularly with
the mayor of Baghdad while his deputy division commanders, Brigadier General John
Campbell and Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, engaged with district and neighborhood advisory councils.84 When General Abud Qanbar and his new Baghdad Operations
Command began functioning on March 1, Fil assigned Campbell, MND-B’s deputy commanding general for operations, to partner directly with Qanbar, interacting with the
Iraqi general and his staff almost daily and encouraging unity of effort between U.S.
and Iraqi forces throughout the capital region. MNC-I and Odierno contributed as well,
assigning the British deputy corps commander, Major General Gerald Berragan, the task
of coaching Qanbar’s staff at its Adnan Palace headquarters.85 These and other related
measures mitigated the risk of placing an inexperienced headquarters over Iraqi operations in the capital. Partnerships and transition teams at multiple echelons, including
Colonel Robert Newman’s newly formed advisory team posted in the BOC itself, were a
necessary reinforcement for the Iraqi command as it took control of the 6th and 9th Iraqi
Army Divisions and the 1st and 2d National Police Divisions.86
Another Division Headquarters: The Creation of MND-Center
To help enable MND-B to secure Baghdad, it was crucial for MNC-I to ensure that the
division did not have to focus on matters beyond the city. As some of the arriving surge
units began focusing on the belts around Baghdad, Odierno wanted an additional division headquarters to manage those outlying operations. The division’s proposed scheme
of maneuver involved taking the fight to the belts sequentially—after securing the capital
and withdrawing coalition forces to its periphery. However, Odierno intended for operations in these areas to occur simultaneously and strongly believed that separate entities
needed to direct them.87
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Map 11. MND Areas of Operation, June 2007.
By mid-March, Odierno decided that the third surge BCT arriving later that month
would deploy into the portion of the belts south and east of the city, near Salman Pak.
The fourth, when it arrived, would cover battle space in the northern belt, near Tarmiyah—at the nexus of Abu Ghazwan’s fiefdom and astride AQI’s line of communications
from Mosul to Baghdad and, laterally, from Baqubah to Anbar. The fifth BCT, when it
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appeared, likely would go into the southern belts, but Odierno would finalize that decision at a future date.88
According to Army doctrine, commanders positioned units two levels below them
in the operational chain. Odierno believed the tactical situation demanded a break with
doctrine. Given his limited forces—even with the surge—and the numerous points that
required U.S. military presence, Odierno arrayed battalions three levels below him. The
break with doctrine displeased some of his division and brigade commanders, but Odierno
believed the tactical situation demanded it. While he disliked breaking up organic brigades—as did his brigade commanders—parceling out battalions allowed him to commit
a BCT headquarters and one or two of its battalions to the belts while sending the balance
into the capital itself, where more manpower but not additional brigade headquarters
were still needed. While only 2 of the 5 surge BCTs deployed to the security districts
inside the city, more of their maneuver and artillery battalions—12 of 25—took up
positions there.89
For MND-B, the relief of responsibility for the southern belts meant a loss of responsibilities and resources that Fil and his division preferred to keep for themselves. They
were convinced the best use of the additional U.S. forces was to employ them in securing Baghdad itself, leaving the belts for later, and therefore were skeptical about Odierno’s approach and the creation of Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C). MND-B’s
repeated requests for battalions from the later surge BCTs created tension between the
corps and division staffs and pestered Odierno to the point of annoyance at least once.90
MND-B also saw the shifting of battle space as disruptive because it threw unit and
municipal boundaries out of alignment, complicating leader engagements with Iraqi civil
authorities.91 This, however, was a small price to pay in Odierno’s view: the belts would
require their own separate battle, he determined, led by a division dedicated to that task.
THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN EARLY 2007
As the American commander who oversaw the staffing, equipping, and training of
Iraqi military and police formations, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey regarded the
surge of U.S. troops with doubt. In the December 2006 deliberations about the surge,
Dempsey had advised Casey against asking for more U.S. troops. “If the ultimate goal . . .
is to settle the situation to enable better dialogue toward reconciliation,” he offered, “then
the introduction of additional coalition forces is the wrong answer. [Iraqis] will not reconcile simply because we are separating them.”92 A U.S. troop surge, Dempsey thought,
would also give the Iraqis the impression that the U.S. military was inclined to sweep in
and take control of every crisis, thus inadvertently holding back the development of their
own security forces. The MNSTC-I commander saw more promise in the transition bridging strategy of reinforcing the coalition’s advisory effort and the assistance it provided to
Iraqi units.93 Briefing the newly arrived Petraeus on February 17, Dempsey repeated his
chief concern that, by putting security responsibility back on the coalition’s shoulders,
the surge threatened to cause a “loss [of] momentum” for the ongoing transition to the
Iraqis. He proposed instead that the surge troops might be used to implement fully the
bridging strategy.94 However, this was an idea Petraeus already had told his subordinate
commanders—including Dempsey—a week before that he did not intend to follow.

112

THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007

The Iraqi security forces had grown significantly
in the interval since Petraeus had given up command of MNSTC-I in 2005. By early 2007, 10 Iraqi
Army divisions operated across the country in sectors established largely along provincial lines. In the
far north, the 2d Division—with its mix of Kurdish
and Sunni Arab brigades—controlled a sector that
included Mosul and half the Kurdish region while,
to the west, the Kurdish-majority 3d Division covered most of Ninawa Province. To the south of these
two divisions, the brigade sectors of the 4th Division
aligned with Salahadin, Kirkuk, and the Kurdish
province of Sulaymaniyah. The 5th Division had
responsibility for Diyala Province, while the 6th
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant
and the 9th Divisions, the latter the Iraqi Army’s
Curt Cashour (Released).
only mechanized formation, operated in and around
Baghdad. In Anbar, the 1st Division sector centered
Lieutenant General Martin
on Fallujah, while the 7th Division spanned much of
Dempsey, Commanding
the Western Euphrates River Valley and extended
General, MNSTC-I.95
south across desert terrain to the Jordanian and Saudi
borders. Two divisions split the southern provinces,
with the 8th Division responsible for Najaf, Karbala, Babil, Qadisiyah, and Wasit and the
10th Division covering Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Basrah.
When first organized, each division had fallen under the operational control of the
coalition, but in 2006, MNF-I had begun to pass responsibility for the day-to-day command and control of certain units to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). By the
time Petraeus took command, the IGFC controlled five divisions operating in the northern and southern portions of the country. The remaining five, based in Anbar, Baghdad,
and Diyala, were slated for transition in the coming weeks and months.96 At the tactical
level, 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions had been fielded. Of these, 93 had the lead for
counterinsurgency operations in their areas of responsibility, according to MNF-I.97 It was
a problematic metric that seemed to assess the Iraqi security forces more optimistically
than justified. In a late February review conducted at the request of the newly arrived
Petraeus, Keane found that virtually all Iraqi units, including those formally in control
of territory, still required substantial coalition assistance.98 The result across Iraq was a
collection of Iraqi headquarters that supposedly exercised operational control while their
units largely depended on the coalition.
The standing up of the BOC was a promising initiative, and Petraeus reported favorably in March that Qanbar was “leading from the front.” While the Iraqi commander was
“technically in charge,” his headquarters had very limited capacity.99 Similarly, as clearing operations in Baghdad continued, BCT commanders paid deference to Qanbar’s subordinates in Karkh and Rusafa, but they could plainly see that Iraqi units still required a
great deal of coaching and material support.100 Colonel Farris, for example, railed against
the Iraqis’ cultural inclination to reduce military operations to the practice of staffing
checkpoints. He insisted his partnered unit conduct more patrols, pointing out that, even
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with a “ridiculous amount” of checkpoints in his sector of northeast Baghdad, “we didn’t
catch one single noteworthy bad guy” at any of them.101 However, there were bright
spots: Roberts partnered with an Iraqi general in Karkh whom he considered “as good as
any brigade commander I have ever served with in the United States.”102 Petraeus, in his
weekly reports to Gates, noted otherwise unremarkable feats, like staffing fixed positions
or establishing outer cordons, as examples of Iraqi competence.103 Yet, even such ordinary
capabilities were absent in many Iraqi units.
Sectarianism and Corruption in the Iraqi Security Forces
In addition to the ISF’s uneven capabilities, sectarianism pervaded the force. The
transition bridging strategy, with its augmented advisory teams, had been developed by
Casey and Chiarelli in part to discourage sectarian behavior in the Iraqi security forces.
Though he opted for a different prescription, Petraeus recognized the problem as well
and, referencing a list of the 20 worst sectarian actors that he carried in his pocket, often
expressed concern to Maliki about its widespread impact.104 Maliki’s own office of the
commander in chief was part of the problem, adding an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy
to Iraqi military operations and subjecting the Iraqi commands to strong sectarian bias.105
Among Iraqi tactical units, the sectarian behavior that Thurman and his 4th Infantry
Division had observed in Baghdad in fall 2006 was undiminished by spring 2007. In his
late February assessment, Keane observed that many Iraqis had come to view the security forces as predators, not protectors.106 In one high-profile case aired by al-Jazeera,
a Sunni woman claimed to have been raped by militia-linked Shi’a police in Baghdad.
When Prime Minister Maliki subsequently cleared the policemen of any charges, outraged Sunnis protested, incensed at the tone-deaf nature of the official response.107
National Police units in and around Baghdad also remained notorious for their sectarian behavior. MNSTC-I had instituted a “re-bluing” program in the fall of 2006 following
the implication of the 8th Brigade, 2d National Police Division, in the kidnapping and
execution of Sunni civilians in west Baghdad. The coalition had arrested its officers and
pulled the unit off the streets for dedicated vetting and training. In the aftermath of the
scandal, the other 8 National Police brigades rotated through a similar, month-long process of re-bluing, so that by March 2007, 5 of the 9 National Police brigade commanders
had been replaced, and approximately 2,700 national policemen had been removed from
the rolls.108
In early April, Petraeus reported that the effort to mold the National Police into
an effective and nonsectarian institution was progressing, but its tarnished reputation
would be hard to refurbish.109 At the tactical level, the opinion of the National Police was
even less sanguine. The population of east Baghdad still viewed the National Police as
an extension of JAM, recalled 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division’s Bannister.110 It was not
a case of mere perception. Soldiers assigned to Townsend’s Stryker brigade discovered
that they were especially subject to attack in close proximity to National Police checkpoints.111 In Rashid, Gibbs found the National Police to be nothing but trouble, recalling later how formations of Shi’a national policemen would storm into the mixed-sect
neighborhood of Saidiyah, randomly kill civilians, and force families from their homes.112
When a Sunni mosque guarded by the National Police in west Rashid blew up, MNF-I
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concluded that JAM infiltrators had compromised the unit there.113 When Prime Minister
Maliki’s initiative to grow the Iraqi security forces included a proviso to establish another
National Police brigade to provide security for the Samarra mosque, coalition leaders
were understandably wary, especially after Maliki’s office produced a roster of recruits
for the brigade that was almost 100 percent Shi’a.114
Corruption was a related problem. The well-known practice of padding unit rolls
with “ghost soldiers” allowed unit commanders to pocket the government salaries of
troops who existed only on paper.115 Systemic corruption stemmed from more than greed,
however. Factions competing in a civil war and posturing for an eventual American
withdrawal had plenty of incentive to husband resources for themselves, which helped
explain missing equipment as well as the general lack of accountability in the security
forces.116 The Iraqi Facilities Protection Service (FPS) typified the problem. This loose affiliation of security details guarded government buildings and officials. Dispersed across
27 ministries and 8 directorates, its 150,000 armed men had a reputation for violence
and indiscipline. Attempting to impose order and accountability over the FPS, the Prime
Minister had authorized its consolidation under the Ministry of Interior in December
2006, but by late spring 2007, Dempsey reported virtually no progress on this initiative.
Unenthusiastic about shedding FPS salaries from their budgets and thus losing leverage
over their security guards, the ministries resisted the measure.117
General Dempsey and the Gaps in Iraqi Security Forces Development
The ISF suffered not only from state-sanctioned and state-engineered sectarianism
and corruption, but from a lack of institutional capacity as well. Their numerical strength
in early 2007 stood at 136,000 soldiers, 135,000 police, 24,400 National Police, and 28,400
border troops, for a total force of 323,800 that many outside commentators judged was
not nearly enough to meet Iraq’s security needs.118 An army expansion initiative developed by the Prime Minister sought to alleviate this shortfall by fielding two additional
division headquarters, six more brigades in central and southern Iraq, and another Special Forces battalion. Implementing this initiative throughout 2007, along with a separate
measure to raise the assigned strength of combat battalions, would grow the Iraqi Army
by 54,000 men, alongside a more modest increase of roughly 6,000 in Iraq’s local and
National Police.
Nevertheless, Dempsey concluded in a written “In-Stride Assessment” on the eve of
his departure from MNSTC-I that the Iraqi security forces were unprepared to assume
full security responsibility, and that the plan for their growth had been far from adequate. The first months of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON had invalidated some of the
coalition’s key assumptions about the composition and size of units the Iraqis needed,
Dempsey judged. The coalition had designed the Iraqi Army with the expectation that it
would operate from fixed geographical points in an environment in which the counterinsurgency campaign already had been won. Consequently, when Iraqi units deployed
away from their home stations, as several did to support the Baghdad Security Plan, they
lacked the logistics and communications capabilities to operate on their own.119
The coalition filled this technical gap for the most part, but compensating for a lack
of tactical depth proved more difficult. Loath to leave their home bases and battle space
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unsecure, Iraqi commanders opted to leave, on average, a quarter of their combat power
behind when ordered to deploy their units elsewhere for a time.120 This tendency compounded an already serious personnel shortage. In late 2006, the coalition had decided
with the Ministry of Defense to man Iraqi battalions at 110 percent of their authorized
strength to compensate for the army-wide practice in which a quarter of a unit’s rank and
file were away on home leave at any one time. But in the spring of 2007, even this corrective measure appeared insufficient, prompting Petraeus to direct Dempsey to adjust
the manning goal to 120 percent, the equivalent of 20,000 extra soldiers, so that the Iraqi
divisions could field 80 to 90 percent of their authorized strength even without those on
leave.121
The additional troops were needed to address another flawed assumption as well.
Rather than steadily decreasing over time as coalition planners had predicted, levels
of violence had continued to climb. Sunni and Shi’a extremists had shown unexpected
resilience and adaptability, and in sustained campaigns against them, the Iraqi security
forces had labored under constant troop shortages. According to Dempsey, Iraqi combat
units had no “tactical staying power or sufficient capability to surge forces locally”—a
critical vulnerability, given the tendency of enemy groups to shift fighters quickly from
sector to sector.122 Furthermore, Iraqi units did not necessarily improve as the months
and years passed and as leaders and soldiers accumulated experience. Instead, tactical
skills often deteriorated under the combined strains of prolonged combat and unit attrition. This loss of proficiency meant periodic training of Iraqi units was essential, but
the Iraqi Army’s generous leave policy, potential out-of-sector deployments, demands
of routine maintenance, and continuing requirement to secure bases and facilities made
it unlikely the Iraqis would develop a sustainable rotation scheme that allowed for collective training and reconstitution. Dempsey concluded that adding more division and
brigade headquarters, uniformly raising the number of battalions per brigade from three
to four, and bolstering each battalion with more soldiers would go far toward remedying
this shortfall.123
Turning to issues of quality, Dempsey found that “the Iraqi Security Forces are, for
the most part, well-trained, and where military training teams have been present, increasingly well-led,” demonstrating both “resolve and capability in battle.”124 Petraeus made
a similar report to Gates around this time, noting the Iraqis had been “steadily engaged,”
suffering an increasing number of combat deaths as Operation FARDH AL-QANOON
progressed.125 Nonetheless, the MNSTC-I commander judged the capabilities of the Iraqi
security forces quite harshly relative to the threat they faced. Posing questions as to
whether the Iraqis were properly armed, adequately protected, or sufficiently mobile,
Dempsey answered “no” on all three counts. They lacked the armor-protected vehicles
and weaponry to dominate small-unit engagements and were particularly vulnerable to
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Maneuvering outside their assigned sectors
consistently exceeded their capabilities.126 “If you pointed them in the right direction, [the
ISF] could seize a town, cordon a village, or attack a target,” Dempsey recalled later, “but
they had nothing—I mean literally nothing—to support that” in the areas of communications, intelligence, logistics, and transportation.127 He proposed a number of solutions
to address these gaps in 2008, including the creation of a corps headquarters for northern
Iraq, an engineer regiment for route clearance, an artillery regiment to provide standoff
fire support for infantry units that had only 60-mm mortars assigned to them, and the
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continued enhancement of a logistics architecture that would match the ongoing growth
of tactical forces.128
As for funding, Dempsey requested that the U.S. Government commit to a budget
of $5.5 billion in support of Iraqi security forces development, more than doubling his
initial request made less than 1 year before in September 2006.129 He had worked hard to
convince the security ministries to adopt U.S. foreign military sales as the key element of
their acquisition process, and believed the more regulated approach had begun to pay off
for the Iraqis. “We were able to merge our budgets to advance the issues . . . in a way that
we simply could not have [done] if they continued spending money in brown paper bags
and flying to Malaysia to buy patrol boats,” Dempsey later recalled.130 In January, Maliki
had agreed to Dempsey’s recommendation to grant the Ministers of Defense and Interior
greater authority to approve foreign military sales contracts, raising the amount the two
cabinet ministers could spend independently from $5 million to $50 million.131 Months
later, though, maddening problems hampered the handling of foreign military sales on
the American side, where the Washington apparatus treated contracts with Iraq on a
routine basis and not with the wartime urgency Dempsey and all other senior U.S. commanders in Baghdad believed they deserved.132 The U.S. Government had to “squeeze
all bureaucratic slack out of the FMS [foreign military sales] process,” he argued as his
MNSTC-I tour ended. “Time remains the most critical resource,” he observed, echoing
Petraeus’s theme of a “race against time.”133
After 3 years in which U.S. leaders such as Casey, Rumsfeld, and Abizaid had argued
for pulling U.S. troops back from security operations in order to spur the Iraqis to step
forward and defend their own country against a complex insurgency and the Shi’a militants, Dempsey’s “In-Stride Assessment” showed how deeply flawed that idea had been.
The MNSTC-I commander’s report documented in great detail the areas in which the
Iraqi security forces simply lacked the capacity to take over security responsibility from
the coalition, no matter how intensely coalition leaders wished otherwise. As Dempsey
made clear, the Iraqis were far from ready for the changeover that Casey and the transition strategy had envisioned for 2007.
ECONOMIES OF FORCE, SOUTH AND NORTH
Trouble in Diwaniya
As the surge brigades began to arrive in the Baghdad region to carry out Petraeus’s
and Odierno’s new guidance for security in the capital and its hinterland, security problems elsewhere in the country continued to simmer, but without sufficient coalition and
Iraqi forces to resolve them. Some 80 miles south of the capital, one such problem began
to boil over. Across the Shi’a south, the anticipated transition to provincial Iraqi control
set the stage for a political battle in which Sadrist foot soldiers and Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) operatives squared off. Restrained somewhat in the
holy city of Najaf, JAM members felt freer to challenge the Badr-infused ranks of the Iraqi
security forces in Diwaniya, a Shi’a city of 400,000 and the capital of Qadisiyah Province.
Located halfway between Baghdad and Basrah, it sat along the coalition’s primary line
of communications running south to Kuwait and astride the east-west road connecting
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Najaf with the provinces bordering Iran. The governorship of Qadisiyah belonged to
SCIRI, and the officer corps of the 8th Iraqi Army Division included a number of former
Badr Corps members. However, the Sadrists enjoyed the loyalty of about 1,000 local
police, a factor that gave JAM fighters far greater freedom of action in the city than Iraqi
or coalition forces could claim.134
Diwaniya was therefore a safe destination for many of the Shi’a militia leaders and
fighters who decided to flee Baghdad in January 2007 when the new Baghdad Security
Plan began to clamp down on JAM and other groups in the capital. By early March, the
number of Shi’a militiamen operating in the city had increased from about 600 to over
1,000, and the growing strength of JAM and the Special Groups in Diwaniya became more
than the local coalition contingent and the Iraqi Army units posted in Qadisiyah Province
could handle.135 The Polish-led Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) was
not staffed or equipped for a forceful campaign against the local Shi’a militias and had
long been prevented by national guidance from taking too aggressive an approach in any
case, meaning that militia control of Diwaniya spread relatively unhindered in early 2007.
The locally based 8th Iraqi Army Division lacked the capability to conduct an aggressive,
anti-militia campaign as well, though its commander, Major General Othman Ali Farhood al-Ghanimi, did as much as he could with his meager troop levels and resources. A
Shi’a officer who had served in Saddam Hussein’s army as well as a sheikh of the local
Ghanam tribe, Othman had been one of Casey’s top three Iraqi picks for the Baghdad
command and was respected by U.S. leaders for his apolitical stance toward the dominant Shi’a political parties. Proud of the professional reputation he had earned, Othman
labeled Badr, JAM, and Iran all as potential enemies of the Iraqi state.136 As the influence
of these three grew across southern Iraq in early 2007, there was only so much that one
division commander could do.

General Odierno (center), Major General Pawel Lamla (right) and Major General Othman al-Ghanimi
(left). Source: DoD photo by Specialist Jessica Kent (Released).

General Raymond Odierno, With Polish Major General Pawel Lamla,
MND-CS Commander, and Major General Othman al-Ghanimi, Commander
of the 8th Iraqi Army Division.137
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When Petraeus ventured into downtown Diwaniya on patrol with Othman and
MND-CS Commander Major General Pawel Lamla in late February, the city had appeared
“vibrant, with heavy traffic in the city center.”138 However, this surface impression of
a bustling urban area masked growing tensions and violence. The security situation
in Diwaniya deteriorated rapidly in early 2007 as the Sadrist militants expanded their
presence there and increased weapons smuggling, intimidation tactics, and murderous
activities. IED attacks and indirect fire against local coalition and Iraqi troops mounted
as well, especially against the MND-CS headquarters at Camp Echo on the outskirts of
the city. MND-CS routine business such as conducting security patrols and supervising
checkpoints would not be enough to retain control of this key terrain along the coalition’s
primary supply route. Petraeus, Othman, and Lamla all agreed on the need for a combined operation against JAM in the city.139
While Petraeus sought Maliki’s endorsement for coalition plans to confront JAM in
Diwaniya, MNC-I and the 8th Iraqi Army Division began planning for an operation to
be launched following the Muslim holiday of Arba’een. Throughout March, the militia
groups expanded their hold on the city, securing support zones and staging areas from
which the militiamen maintained a continuous presence in Diwaniya’s northern districts.
JAM fighters staffed checkpoints in defiance—or with the compliance—of local police
and sallied forth to attack Camp Echo with indirect fire. After one such attack wounded
eight Polish soldiers, coalition analysts determined that militia groups were bombarding
the base from more than a dozen firing points spanning the entire width of the city.140
The discovery indicated that the ISF in the area were no longer effective. As he reviewed
plans for Operation BLACK EAGLE, the impending coalition-Iraqi operation to secure
the city, Odierno realized that the Iraqi police in Diwaniya were in a state of collapse and
had ceased coordination with the Iraqi Army. To the MNC-I commander’s frustration,
however, the overly optimistic police transition reports from MND-CS did not reflect this
reality or the fact that most of the police were intimidated or under militia influence. This
led Odierno to direct that all police transition team reports from Wasit and Qadisiyah
Provinces should come directly to him for review.141

Source: DoD photo courtesy of Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (Released).

Military Transition Team Members and Iraqi Soldiers During
Operation BLACK EAGLE.142
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Following a week of small-scale strikes by U.S. and Iraqi special operations forces,
BLACK EAGLE launched on the evening of April 5. The Iraqi and Polish division commanders hoped that the situation could be remedied with the capture of six local JAM
leaders, but as the action unfolded, it became clear the operation would require more than
that.143 Despite the intense battle for Baghdad going on at the time, MNC-I allocated additional forces, intelligence specialists, and aviation assets to the Polish-led headquarters to
support raids to kill or capture influential militiamen in Diwaniya.144 More importantly,
Odierno dispatched his operational reserve to the city, sending a battalion-sized Stryker
task force from Townsend’s brigade in Baghdad that helped the 8th Iraqi Division and
MND-CS surprise the local militia enemy. With the Strykers on hand, more than 3,000
coalition and Iraqi troops conducted a series of cordon and search operations that overcame organized resistance and resulted in the capture of 107 JAM fighters over 2 weeks.
The population, for its part, appeared to accept the unfamiliar and relatively large-scale
presence of U.S. Soldiers in the city. Following this rapid insertion of combat power, Iraqi
and coalition troops established two JSSs on the opposite ends of the troublesome northern districts, while the Sadrist militants fell back on rhetoric and propaganda to seek local
tribal support.145 Indirect-fire attacks on Camp Echo—a long-time magnet for rocket and
mortar fire—dropped to a historic low.146 The pause in attacks provided MND-CS and its
local Iraqi partners what would be a few weeks’ respite from militia pressure as the two
sides gathered their strength for the next battle.
A Shift in Focus for Operation SINBAD
South of Diwaniya, Basrah also proved precarious for the coalition. The ongoing Operation SINBAD, begun by Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) Commander
Major General Richard Shirreff in October 2006, had originated as a plan to subdue JAM
and other Shi’a militant groups and restore Basrah to government control, rescuing the
British expedition in Iraq from a downward spiral toward humiliation in the process.
However, when Shirreff handed command of MND-SE to Major General Jonathan Shaw
in January 2007, the new British commander concluded that SINBAD was a case of too
little, too late. Though Shirreff slated the operation to continue for several months, Shaw
quickly shifted MND-SE from Shirreff’s counterinsurgency approach to a scaled-back
course inclined toward a political solution.147
In doing so, Shaw was following clear guidance he had received on the eve of
his departure from Great Britain. In London, the pressure was on to decrease British forces in Iraq in order to increase them in Afghanistan, and it mattered little that
the United States had decided that same month to take a divergent path by surging
five additional BCTs to the theater. “What the Americans do isn’t our concern,” Air
Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Great Britain’s Chief of Defence Staff, had told Shaw.
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Source: DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby (Released).

SECDEF Robert Gates With British Major General Jonathan Shaw,
Commander of MND-SE, and General Casey.148
“You’re to continue to carry on and get out of Iraq.”149 This explicit guidance provided
Shaw with a sharp bottom line. Given his command’s limited resources and Britain’s
waning political will, Shaw deemed SINBAD’s goals too ambitious, and the approach he
inherited from Shirreff a mismatch of ends and means. Beyond the policy and resource
constraints, Shaw believed SINBAD’s formula of district-by-district clearing operations
followed by police training and focused reconstruction projects was the wrong way to stabilize Basrah. To Shaw, Basrah’s turbulent local politics resembled “Palermo, not Beirut,”
meaning that an accommodation among mafia-like groups stood a better chance of stabilizing the city than large-scale clearing operations combined with police development. As
Shaw saw it, most of the violence in Basrah took place simply because the British troops
were there, so reducing MND-SE’s local involvement and force levels would remove the
major cause of instability in the city. Instead of using SINBAD to subjugate Basrah’s militias and bring them under government control, the general chose to use the operation to
facilitate the British drawdown and the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis, the
same approach Casey had taken in Baghdad the previous summer.150
Shaw’s change of approach in Basrah promised to widen the gap between MND-SE
and its American-led higher headquarters that was about to launch a large-scale counteroffensive. The divergence became clear when Shaw explained his rationale to Petraeus
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4 days after the latter arrived in Baghdad in February 2007. Stripping out anti-coalition
attacks, the struggle in Basrah boiled down to “power, politics, and gangsterism,” Shaw
told the new MNF-I commander.151 The dearth of attacks against local infrastructure suggested to Shaw that intra-Shi’a violence was “self-limiting.” Unlike the nihilistic Sunni
extremists wreaking havoc in northern and central Iraq, no party vying for power in the
Shi’a south was interested in destroying the sources of Basrah’s wealth.152 According to
the MND-SE commander, withdrawing coalition forces in Basrah would not only dramatically reduce violence in the city by removing a major source of Iraqi rage, but it also
would compel Iraqi leaders to address the intra-Shi’a problem—presumably in a way
that the coalition would find in its interests.153 “The best realistic goal,” Shaw argued,
would be “a stable linkage” among elements of the Iraqi state, the tribes, and the militias
competing for power and resources in the southern provinces. A “pragmatic stability”
could only be reached through an accommodation among the key competitors, and any
deal had to account for malign Iranian influence and the disruptive activities of death
squads.154 The coalition could not impose a solution in Iraq, Shaw told Petraeus. Rather,
one had to emerge out of the natural forces existing in Iraqi society. Outsiders could not
“fight the soil,” Shaw contended, and because he considered JAM to be one of those natural forces in Basrah, he believed that trying to defeat the militia in the city was futile.
“An outright victory for one side is likely to prove a goad to revenge within a culture of
‘blood feuds’,” the British commander argued. “An accommodation that gives honor to
all reconcilable sides is likely to prove more enduring.”155
As Petraeus politely noted, Shaw’s approach was out of sync with the new U.S. strategy and troop surge. It quickly emerged that the British general’s concepts were fully in
sync with senior British civilian and military leaders in London. On February 21, 2007, 1
day after the 10th Iraqi Army Division passed from coalition control to the control of the
Iraqi Ground Forces Command, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a gradual
drawdown from 7,100 to 5,500 of his country’s troops in Iraq.156 A steady handover of
British bases during SINBAD’s final weeks followed. By May, British troops had transferred control of three bases to the Iraqis and were operating out of just Basrah Palace
and the large air base on the outskirts of the city. A few incidents in the course of the
operation had cast greater doubt on the local Iraqi forces to which MND-SE was transferring responsibility. In the worst episode, on March 5, Iraqi special operations forces,
U.S. advisors, and British troops had raided the Interior Ministry’s intelligence bureau in
Basrah—which reported to Engineer Ahmed157 at the Interior Ministry in Baghdad—and
had found 30 prisoners being held there in brutal conditions.158 Despite these indicators
of the ISF’s unreliability, Shaw anticipated a shift to Iraqi control of the province as early
as November 2007.
Elsewhere, MND-SE transitioned Maysan to Iraqi control in April despite the province’s churning intra-sectarian strife and the fact that British troops had no freedom of
movement into the provincial capital of Amarah. According to Shaw, this made “readying Maysan for [provincial Iraqi control] . . . hard and very much in the hands of the
Iraqis.”159 The British resolve to withdraw gradually, coupled with their view that the
“political soil” was impervious to any sort of meaningful retilling, lent a sense of inevitability to MND-SE’s slow yielding of control over the Shi’a south.160 “The accommodation that JAM and Badr . . . made [in Maysan] seemed to look reasonably steady,” Shaw
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recalled later, judging that “it was as good as it was ever going to get.”161 When he recommended transferring the province to Iraqi control, his American military superiors in
Baghdad reluctantly agreed to take the risk.
By the time Operation SINBAD ended in May, British and Iraqi forces had killed
over 340 militia fighters. The damage inflicted on the Basrah militias was substantial but
had come at a cost of 46 British troops killed and 350 wounded, a level of casualties that
the British Government and public were unwilling to bear on a sustained basis. While
the Iraqi security forces had grown in capability and confidence since the October 2006
beginning of SINBAD, they still lacked the wherewithal to conduct a determined campaign against JAM, as the coming months would show.162
Making Much With Little in Mosul
On the opposite end of the country from Basrah, Petraeus viewed the evolving security situation in the north with measured optimism as he took command. As early as
March, he expressed the hope of reaching a “sustainable level of violence” in Mosul by
summer, despite worrisome incidents like the well-orchestrated insurgent assault on the
Badush prison on March 6, which freed about 70 inmates and exposed long-standing
corruption in the Iraqi-run facility.163 As the weeks passed, Iraqi-led operations seemed to
be working well enough to keep a lid on the security situation while the coalition’s main
effort focused on Baghdad. Enabled by tips from local civilians, Iraqi troops captured
sizable enemy caches in mid-March, and, in the face of a large, coordinated AQI attack
in Mosul in May, Iraqi units maintained their cohesion and fought back as a determined
force, something they had failed to do in late 2004.164 In contrast to the grim assessments
of other government agencies at the time—which predicted Mosul’s imminent collapse—
Petraeus tended to cast the security scene there in hopeful terms, partly due to the crucial
role played by the coalition’s special operations task force in the city.165 The task force
provided depth to an otherwise thin coalition presence in the north, honing its ability
to work with conventional units to amplify the effects of both.166 The special operations
forces (SOF) contingent formed a “fusion cell” of operations and intelligence analysts
with the BCT, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) elements, and
interagency partners in Mosul to counter the Sunni extremist networks seeking to reestablish a stronger foothold there. Therefore, the SOF contingent was able to keep AQI
leaders in northern Iraq off-balance even while Baghdad demanded the preponderance
of MNF-I’s attention and resources. Reflecting on the close relationship among the task
force, conventional units, and other U.S. governmental agencies in Mosul, one BCT commander who had deployed throughout Iraq reported that he never observed a better
partnership anywhere else.167 Despite relegating Mosul to an economy of force effort in
2007, Petraeus thought the provincial capital’s security arrangement of “competent Iraqi
security forces in the lead, a relatively small U.S. unit in partnership, and a strong special
ops capability,” might be a model for the future.168 In the course of events, however, Petraeus would not hold this judgment for long.
AQI’s response to combined operations in and around Mosul provided some insight
into the terrorist organization’s strategy as it sought to reestablish control over this vital
area. VBIED attacks in early 2007 increasingly targeted the ISF, indicating a focused
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attempt to intimidate the army and police and disrupt their activities.169 Petraeus saw this
as a sign that Ninawa’s insurgents considered the ISF’s growing effectiveness and sense
of control a serious threat.170 Such a pattern may have been related to the enemy’s assessment of security force quality, but more likely it suggested that after the departure of
Townsend’s Stryker brigade for Baghdad in December 2006, the small remainder of U.S.
troops in Mosul no longer impinged on AQI’s freedom of maneuver to the extent their
ISF counterparts did. Sunni extremist targeting of the ISF in the north continued into the
spring with multiple VBIED strikes in Mosul and Kirkuk.171
High-profile attacks against civilians to stoke ethno-sectarian conflict remained a key
part of AQI’s strategy in the north as well. Most notably, on March 27, two massive truck
bombs struck a market in Tel Afar in one of the largest attacks of the entire war. The
bombs collapsed the surrounding buildings, killing 152 Iraqis and wounding almost 350
more, the vast majority of them from Tel Afar’s significant Shi’a minority community.
Within hours, enraged Shi’a Tel Afari police retaliated by murdering as many as 70 Sunni
men and boys elsewhere in the city, with the executions only ceasing once Iraqi Army
troops arrived on the scene and arrested the policemen. The incident was a test of the
central government’s responsiveness and impartiality toward affairs in the distant Sunni-majority province, with MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy trying (but largely failing) to
impress on the Maliki government the danger the situation posed to the government’s
already tenuous legitimacy there. In the end, the Shi’a policemen arrested for the killings
of Tel Afari Sunnis were never punished. Meanwhile, the Tel Afar episode illustrated
AQI’s penchant for stoking ethno-sectarian tension, as well as its desperate need to maintain control over the foreign-fighter pipeline from Syria.172 Disconcertingly for coalition
leaders, the group demonstrated its operational reach with coordinated attacks on two
bridges, an Iraqi-run prison, and several police stations in Ninawa’s provincial capital
on a single day in May.173 AQI’s resilience in Mosul and the far north meant those areas
would eventually have to become the coalition’s main effort, if and when Baghdad and
central Iraq could be pacified.

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Samantha Stryker (Released).

Residents of Tel Afar Dig Through Rubble in the Aftermath of the
March 27 AQI VBIED Attack.174
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TOWARD A NEW JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN
The Joint Strategic Assessment Team
While MNF-I aimed to regain the initiative through multiple, simultaneous thrusts
into long-held al-Qaeda in Iraq sanctuaries, Petraeus and newly arrived U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker judged that long-term stability in Iraq would require far more than
security operations. Together they intended to develop a comprehensive campaign plan
to address the diverse array of problems that beset Iraq, from governance and economic
development to rule of law and detention. They also hoped to create conditions to foster
reconciliation between the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government and a Sunni population
that had been deeply skeptical of the new government since its inception. While Petraeus
judged that the surge operations would visibly improve Iraq’s security as the months
passed, there were few indicators of progress in Iraqi politics, the area that the U.S. Congress and many critics of the strategy had come to regard as the principal benchmark by
which to assess the U.S.-led campaign.

SECDEF Gates (right) with Ambassador Crocker (left).
Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).

SECDEF Robert Gates Meets With Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad.175
As a new commander implementing a new strategy, Petraeus enjoyed some reprieve
from these external stressors. However, pressure was building. In mid-March, Petraeus
and Crocker recruited a team of more than a dozen civilian and military experts to review
the strategic situation in Iraq and revamp the coalition campaign plan.176 To lead the team,
Petraeus assigned Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, then on a fellowship in
London, while Crocker summoned senior diplomat David D. Pearce from embassy duty
in Rome. The two had extensive experience with Iraq and the Middle East. McMaster
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had led the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar in 2005-2006, earning high praise
from Bush for the counterinsurgency operations his unit waged there. More recently, he
had served on the Council of Colonels organized by Chairman of the JCS General Peter
Pace in late 2006 and had accompanied Keane during the latter’s assessment trip to Iraq
in February. Pearce was a career foreign service officer who had held sensitive posts in
Damascus and the Gulf region, in addition to heading the State Department’s Iraq desk
from 2000 to 2003.
Comprised of distinguished senior officers, diplomats, and scholars, the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) represented an unusually comprehensive interagency and
multinational effort and was a sharp contrast to normal Army campaign planning efforts.
Besides Pearce and McMaster, the team was comprised of regional experts and intellectuals, including Robert S. Ford, an Arabist then serving as ambassador to Algeria, and
Molly Phee, a fluent Arabic speaker and Foreign Service officer who had served as the
Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) governor of Maysan in 2003-2004.177 Regis W.
Matlak, a long-time veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, joined the team, as did
Colonel Rick L. Waddell, a Rhodes Scholar and Army reservist with extensive business
experience in the oil and gas industry who previously had investigated corruption at the
Bayji oil refinery in 2005.178 Dr. Chris Schnaubelt, a former Air Force colonel who had
joined the State Department, served as the U.S. Embassy’s lead strategic planner on the
team. Former Australian army officer and counterinsurgency specialist David J. Kilcullen served on the team as well, along with civilian scholar Stephen D. Biddle, an Army
War College professor and senior fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations who had
been among the security experts invited to the White House in December 2006 to discuss
Iraq War strategy with Bush.179 Several British standouts participated, including Toby
Dodge, author of two books on Iraq, and Andrew Rathmell, a veteran of the CPA and the
chief of an advisory team in Iraq’s embattled Ministry of Interior. Emma Sky, Odierno’s
political adviser, also contributed to the team, as did the British MNF-I planner Colonel
James Richardson. The group also included two U.S. Army foreign area officers specializing in the Middle East: Colonel Philip J. “P. J.” Dermer, who had served with the CPA
and recruited most of the new Iraqi general officer corps; and Colonel Martin Stanton,
renowned within the Army for his ill-fated Kuwait City holiday in August 1990. After
calling in reports on the Iraqi invasion from his hotel room, then-Major Stanton became a
prisoner of war and later an involuntary human shield at Bayji oil refinery.180
The JSAT completed its work on April 20, following a 4-week whirlwind of unit visits
and senior leader briefings that informed rounds of debate and discussion. The team’s
final recommendations to the MNF-I commander and U.S. ambassador highlighted the
implications of the communal struggle for power in Iraq. Though primarily sectarian
in nature, the conflict in Iraq was exacerbated by terrorist activities and external actors,
making engagement with reconcilable groups and renewed diplomatic initiatives critical to success. Iraq’s communities needed to be pushed toward political accommodation
through both bottom-up and top-down efforts, the JSAT recommended, and the coalition
should shift to a new strategy that emphasized protecting the population and sought to
establish security conditions that would allow for the growth of inclusive governance. It
recognized that a transition to Iraqi forces would need to take place, but, by emphasizing population security, it acknowledged the intertwined nature of security and political
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problems. Population security would lay the groundwork for a political accommodation
between Iraq’s warring factions that, in turn, would remove support for both AQI and
the Shi’a militias.
In addition to a lack of political will among Iraq’s warring parties, the JSAT held
that a “chronic lack of state capacity” hampered efforts to improve stability. It was thus
not enough to press the Iraqis to step up and assume responsibility.181 Transition to
Iraqi responsibility had to be conditions-based, and one of those conditions entailed the
removal of “malign actors” from Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government and security forces—a task that required more muscular MNF-I and embassy involvement in the near
term. Pointing out that many factions in Iraq were already jockeying for position in a
conflict sure to escalate following the coalition’s withdrawal, the team hammered home
the need to sustain the surge for as long as politically possible.182 The team’s assessment
struck Petraeus as “accurate, forthright, and a bit disheartening.”183
The JSAT paved the way for a new, comprehensive joint campaign plan that sought
to achieve “sustainable security” by spring 2008.184 Describing the plan to Gates, Petraeus
posited that two “big ideas” differentiated it from previous coalition efforts: the emphasis on securing the population, and a focus on a political “line of operation.”185 To resolve
the conflict, the JSAT concluded the coalition’s military objectives should at all times
be supportive of and subordinate to political objectives, and the political objectives, in
turn, should focus on actions that would enable—or compel—the warring parties to seek
their goals through the political process instead of violence.186 Moreover, Petraeus and
Crocker did not assume that Iraqis would reconcile of their own volition over time, and
they intended to use the coalition’s military operations and political advantage both to
bring Sunnis to the negotiating table and to force the Shi’a parties in power to end their
sectarian abuses.
The JSAT’s leaders believed their most important finding was that Iraq was clearly
in the midst of a sectarian civil war and that the Iraqi Government itself had become an
accelerant of the conflict. The transition strategy had failed, they judged, because the
coalition had worked too uncritically and unconditionally with the government even as
the new Iraqi state became captured by sectarian parties who used the machinery of the
state to pursue narrow sectarian agendas. The only answer, they argued, was to hold the
government leaders accountable for the destabilizing behavior of government-affiliated
sectarian killers, and to force the political centrists to purge the extremists—using U.S.
military power to compel them if necessary. Too often, McMaster and Pearce concluded,
coalition leaders had taken for granted that their job was to empower their government
partners, without considering whether those partners might be making the conflict worse
with de facto coalition help. The coalition would need to start by forcing the removal
of the worst sectarian actors within the Iraqi security forces, especially in the Interior
Ministry.187
Beyond security, the JSAT’s final report laid out detailed analyses and recommended
ways forward in more than a dozen areas. To take advantage of the Sunni tribal awakening that had swept Anbar and parts of the Baghdad hinterland, MNF-I should create
a strategic engagement cell to coordinate initiatives to split reconcilable militant groups
from irreconcilable ones and persuade as many insurgents as possible to switch sides.
To reduce the popular discontent with the Iraqi Government that was fueling militant
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groups on all sides, the coalition should take specific steps to spur economic growth
and to get the machinery of the Iraqi state working again, not just in Baghdad but in the
provinces as well. There were specific steps the coalition should take to defuse the ArabKurd conflict, the JSAT judged, or else the coalition would risk mission failure by the
outbreak of a new civil war along the Green Line in the north. This and other aspects of
the Iraqi civil war would require the United States to undertake a major diplomatic effort
to persuade or coerce Iraq’s regional neighbors to cease their destabilizing interventions
in the Iraqi conflict—especially Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The coalition would need to take
urgent measures to reform its detention operations and its support for rule of law in Iraq,
both of which were near the point of collapse.188
In addition to its new ideas, the JSAT was an unusual, ad hoc innovation in joint and
interagency assessment and planning, an area for which almost no U.S. doctrine existed.
With little precedent to guide them, the JSAT’s leaders had managed to integrate input
from across the multinational coalition and the U.S. and UK (United Kingdom) interagencies, producing recommendations that reflected deep expertise no single agency
could have mustered by itself. Unlike the MNF-I red teams of the previous 2 years, which
had themselves been nondoctrinal innovations, the JSAT had been empowered by senior
coalition military and civilian leaders in Baghdad to change the coalition approach to the
war. Petraeus, Odierno, and Crocker would use the same JSAT-type model repeatedly to
tackle complex problems during their tenures in Iraq and beyond.
Political Violence
The JSAT observed that violence in Iraq was a political phenomenon, a symptom of
the war for power and survival among the major Iraqi factions. In the day-to-day bombings and death squad killings, the political motive was sometimes hard to see. Several
events during Petraeus’s first few weeks in command were examples of political violence
that brought the struggle among the Iraqi parties into clear focus. On February 26, as
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi was giving a speech at the Ministry of Public
Works, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the building in what appeared to be an
assassination attempt, wounding both the Vice President and the Minister and killing
four directors general who had gathered for the occasion.189 On March 16, assassins shot
to death the head of the Adhamiyah district council, a senior Sunni politician, just as
they had assassinated his predecessor 3 months earlier. On March 23, less than a month
after the attempted assassination of Mahdi, another assassin came close to killing Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zobaie in his Baghdad home, setting off a suicide bomb
that seriously wounded Zobaie and killed nine others.190 The Zobaie bombing came just
5 days after Iraqi and coalition troops raided the Green Zone home of Dhafer al-Ani, one
of the leaders of the Sunni Parliamentary bloc, and confiscated 65 AK-47s and four cars
that bore traces of TNT.191
The Ani raid added evidence to the frequent assertion by Shi’a leaders that Sunni
politicians were engaged directly in terrorist activities. On April 12 came even stronger
evidence. On that day, a suicide bomber entered the Iraqi Parliament building and blew
himself up in the building’s cafeteria as Members of Parliament were breaking for lunch.
The explosion wounded 22 Iraqis and killed a senior Parliamentarian from the Iraqi

128

THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007

National Dialogue party headed by Saleh Mutlaq. Iraqi officials believed the bomber had
entered the compound in the entourage of a Sunni Parliamentarian. Over time, Iraqi politicians came to suspect the Speaker of Parliament, Mahmud Mashhadani, with the assistance of Khalaf Ulayan, a Sunni Member of Parliament from Anbar who moonlighted
as an insurgent commander in Jaish al-Islami; and Nasser Janabi, another Member of
Parliament who secretly commanded the wing of Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri’s Naqshbandi
Army based south of Baghdad, orchestrated the bombing.192 Reacting to the brazen April
12 attack, Maliki government spokesman Ali Dabbagh told reporters, “There are some
groups that work in politics during the day and do things other than politics at night.”193
The Sunni Parliamentarians were not the only senior militants inside the government, however. On February 23, just 2 months after U.S. forces had detained IRGC commander Mohsen Chizari in a SCIRI-Badr compound in Baghdad, U.S. special operators
detained SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s son Ammar after intercepting his convoy
crossing from Iran into Iraq. The American troops had discovered a massive collection of
weapons and large quantities of money among the vehicles and had concluded that the
younger Hakim was up to no good. To minimize the political fallout sure to result from
the detention of the SCIRI patriarch’s son, Petraeus ordered Ammar al-Hakim’s immediate release.194 In this case, Petraeus saw greater strategic benefit in looking the other way,
and Bush agreed. The President told the MNF-I commander the following week to keep
SCIRI “in the tent” and to treat Hakim and his party as potential allies, despite their ties
to the Iranian regime.195
In a few cases, the Iranian regime was involved directly in politically motivated militant events. On March 20 in Basrah, coalition commandos captured AAH leader Qais
Khazali and his brother Laith, who had masterminded the January 20, 2007, attack
against U.S. Soldiers in Karbala. Along with the Khazali brothers, the coalition troops
had captured an unidentified man who pretended initially to be mute but turned out to
be senior Lebanese Hizballah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq, the man whom the IRGC
Quds Force had assigned to advise AAH in militant operations a few months before. The
capture of the Khazalis shocked Prime Minister Maliki, who had hoped AAH could be
used as a political counterbalance to Moqtada Sadr and who required explicit evidence of
Qais al-Khazali’s guilt from Petraeus before he agreed to allow MNF-I to hold Khazali in
detention. The capture also robbed Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani of one of
his most effective Iraqi proxy leaders, and the Iranian regime immediately looked for an
opportunity to secure Khazali’s release. Three days after the capture of the AAH leaders,
the IRGC Navy took 15 British sailors hostage in the Persian Gulf, falsely claiming they
had strayed into Iranian waters, most likely intending to trade them for the release of
the Khazalis and the detained IRGC officials known as the Erbil Five.196 The February 4
kidnapping of a senior Iranian Embassy official also may have been related to the hostage
negotiation. After the unknown gunmen who had abducted the Iranian official released
him on April 3, the IRGC released the British sailors the following day.197 The high profile
political posturing of Petraeus’s first few weeks in command showed that Iraqi politics
remained a turbulent business, with outside powers often closely involved, as the JSAT
had found.
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“Not in Sync with Us:” Admiral Fallon and the Surge Strategy
Viewing the broader challenge as one of buying time for the Iraqi Government to
develop capacity and make progress toward reconciliation, Petraeus hoped to prolong the
surge well into 2008. In this aim, he met unexpected pushback from the newly appointed
CENTCOM commander. Despite being selected for command as part of Bush’s “new way
forward,” Fallon was deeply skeptical of the U.S. troop surge the President had ordered,
and was unsure that Iraq could be stabilized at all. During his January 30, 2007, confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate, Fallon had admitted plainly enough that “what
we’ve been doing is not working,” and that the coalition required a different approach to
meet its objectives in Iraq.198 He had declined to endorse the ideas that Petraeus already
had put forward in public. When testifying before the same committee a week earlier,
Petraeus had stated his intention to shift the primary mission of U.S. forces from transition to population security, but in his own hearing, Fallon characterized Petraeus’s idea
as a mere “proposal.”199

Admiral Fallon (center) and General Mixon (right).
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Serena Hayden (Released).

Colonel David W. Sutherland, Commander 3d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Briefs Admiral William Fallon, CENTCOM Commander, and Major General Benjamin Mixon,
Commander of MND-N.200
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Fallon even had seemed to indicate the surge itself was still in question. Though Bush
already had clarified that he intended to send all five available brigades to Iraq, the admiral told senators that he did not yet know how many more troops were needed. “Frankly,
I aim to find out and have my own opinions,” he avowed.201 In Fallon’s view, the President’s statements about the surge were just expressions of policy. It would take a concerted effort to transform the policy into a coherent strategy, and the admiral intended
to have a direct role in formulating it. “I’m going to . . . work with General Petraeus and
our commanders to figure out how to make an effective strategy,” Fallon informed the
senate committee.202 He seemed unaware that Odierno already had begun implementing a new strategy in line with what Petraeus recommended and what the President
had envisioned when he approved the surge. There was a similar divergence where the
duration of the surge was concerned. Whereas Petraeus and Odierno intended to sustain
the troop surge as far into 2008 as possible, Fallon spoke to the senators of being able “to
wrap this up and get our troops back,” and he cast the campaign in terms of weeks and
months, not years as Petraeus did.203
Further indicators of future friction emerged the weekend after Fallon took the helm
at CENTCOM on March 16, when he held a 2-day commander’s conference with representatives from CENTCOM’s subordinate commands, including MNF-I. During the
proceedings, the admiral reviewed the array of challenges across CENTCOM’s area of
responsibility and told his new subordinates he believed MNF-I should pursue a much
more modest set of objectives, implying that the surge forces either would have no impact
or might even make matters worse over time.204 Fallon’s views echoed the accelerated
transition strategy that Casey and Abizaid had advocated and that the President had discarded 3 months before—only with more troops, while they lasted. In contrast, Petraeus
and Odierno already were gearing up for a surge of U.S.-led offensive operations once all
five additional brigades arrived in Iraq in the early summer.205 When Fallon visited Iraq
later that month, Odierno recorded in his journal that the new CENTCOM chief “believes
[the] surge will go through October at the latest,” and added that Fallon “clearly has a
timeline in his mind that is not in sync with us.”206
Throughout Casey’s tenure at MNF-I, he and CENTCOM Commander Abizaid had
maintained close alignment in their strategic views, but they were frequently at odds
with whomever happened to be MNC-I commander at the time. Now, at the outset of the
surge, the tables had turned: under Petraeus and Odierno, MNF-I and MNC-I would act
in concert, but at odds with Fallon’s CENTCOM. The disconnect between the new CENTCOM commander and his key subordinate commanders in Iraq stemmed partly from the
fact that Bush had long since come to consider the MNF-I commander in Baghdad as the
main leader of the Iraq campaign, bypassing the CENTCOM commander in Tampa in
order to maintain a direct line first to Casey and now to Petraeus. In selecting new commanders in December 2006, Bush had directly tapped Petraeus as MNF-I commander,
but he had not been involved in the selection for the CENTCOM post and simply had
accepted the Pentagon’s recommendation for what he considered merely a supporting
command role. As a result, Fallon had taken command at CENTCOM erroneously presuming to operate under a Presidential charter to oversee the Iraq campaign.207 These
misconceptions would cause tension between the different echelons of command in the
months to come.
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***
By early April 2007, 2 months after he had arrived in Baghdad, Petraeus commanded
a force that was postured very differently than it had been in January. Within days of
his arrival, Petraeus had given MNF-I a new mission based on population security and
had begun work with U.S. Ambassador Crocker on a new campaign plan that would
involve much more direct coalition intervention in Iraqi affairs than had been the case
in 2006. The coalition also had begun to employ its much-needed surge reinforcements
to regain the initiative in Baghdad after a year of worsening sectarian civil war. In the
MND-B area of operations, five U.S. brigades held territory where previously there had
been only three. Five additional Iraqi Army brigades had arrived as well, bringing the
total of U.S. and Iraqi forces inside the city to 93,000—far more than had been on hand for
the TOGETHER FORWARD operations of summer and fall 2006. Petraeus and Odierno
also had narrowed MND-B’s focus, reassigning its vast territory south of Baghdad to
the new Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) that would prosecute a simultaneous
campaign in southern belts with more than 30,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops. The additional
troops inside and outside the capital city enabled the coalition to intensify its operations
on both the east and west sides of Baghdad, and to expand its footprint dramatically in
the city after 2 years of steadily shrinking it. By mid-April, Petraeus and Odierno had
overseen the creation of more than 20 new U.S.-Iraqi outposts in Baghdad’s neighborhoods, a presence that would eventually increase to 77 outposts by the end of the surge.
The two U.S. generals had accomplished this significant shift without the support of the
new CENTCOM commander, Fallon.
The new approach was not without its serious costs. As U.S. troops fanned out into
Baghdad’s districts once more, they came head to head with both Sunni and Shi’a militants in the city, and U.S. casualties rose as a result. In February and March, MNF-I suffered 162 U.S. Soldiers killed and another 1,140 wounded, with a worse toll to come in the
spring and summer. “We are getting into the fights with both Sunni and Shi’a extremists
we knew were coming,” Petraeus explained to Gates in early April.208 MNF-I suffered 35
troops killed in action during the first week of April alone, a number 60 percent higher
than the average weekly death toll since December, and Petraeus expected this grim trend
to continue as U.S. troops moved farther into enemy-dominated territory.209
AQI responded to the new coalition operations with counterattacks of its own, defiantly carrying out some of the war’s largest car-bomb attacks against Shi’a civilians both
in Baghdad and in the far north and south of the country. Meanwhile, after lying relatively low in January, JAM and other Shi’a militants had responded to the arrival of
additional U.S. troops by bombarding the Green Zone periodically, in one case killing
two Americans at the U.S. Embassy billeting office a few yards outside Petraeus and
Crocker’s office windows.210
As more U.S. and Iraqi troops moved into Shi’a-militia-dominated neighborhoods,
a portion of Baghdad’s Shi’a militants had displaced to Diwaniyah, Basrah, and other
southern cities and had begun to threaten coalition partners in those territories. While
never strong, MND-CS’s slipping grip on Diwaniyah and MND-SE’s similarly weak hold
on Basrah and Amarah in early 2007 were the latest manifestations of a problem that had
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dogged the U.S.-led occupation since 2003. Operating with coalition partners had been
meant to bolster the strategic legitimacy of the U.S.-led campaign, but at the operational
level, those same partners often had neither the capability nor the will to achieve the
objectives of the U.S.-crafted campaign plan. The deteriorating conditions in the southern
cities indicated that MNF-I and MNC-I would eventually have to conduct more extensive
operations there after bringing Baghdad under control.
In these areas away from the capital, the coalition could not yet count on Iraqi forces
to fill the gap, as Dempsey made clear in his final assessment of the ISF as he prepared
to leave command of MNSTC-I; the ISF simply had too many capability gaps to make
a transition bridging strategy feasible. Nor could the coalition yet look to Iraqi politics
to mitigate security problems in Baghdad or anywhere else. The battles on Iraq’s streets
were symptoms of the political struggle among Iraq’s major parties, not the other way
around, reinforcing Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that war was a continuation of politics
by other means. The impetus for political reconciliation would have to come from beyond
the Green Zone, as the events of spring and summer 2007 were about to demonstrate.
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CHAPTER 4
THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM
During the spring of 2007, the surge of U.S. forces, General David Petraeus’s change in
strategic guidance, and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno’s shift in operational posture combined to alter the balance of security in the Baghdad region and halt the advance
of sectarian forces that had been underway for more than a year. During the same months,
coalition commanders compounded these modifications by enabling—or in some cases
coercing—the Sunni population of central Iraq to switch sides and take a stand against
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni extremist groups. From Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) down to the lowest tactical level, coalition commanders worked in concert to expand the Awakening that had begun in Anbar and used it to amplify the effect
of the surge. A wave of local cease-fires was about to sweep across western and central
Iraq, bringing tens of thousands of Sunni insurgents into a new alliance with the coalition
troops they had fought for almost 4 years.
THE EXPANSION OF THE ANBAR AWAKENING
As he prepared to take command of MNF-I, Petraeus had noted with interest the
significant changes taking place in Ramadi, where a city once dominated by AQI and
its allies had become a stronghold of a new, anti-AQI Sunni movement. During his first
weeks, Petraeus encouraged his subordinate commanders to watch for opportunities
beyond Ramadi to strike local cease-fires with Sunni fighters to turn one-time enemies
into allies—or at least into neutrals. If local Sunnis indicated their willingness to come to
an agreement with coalition units, then Petraeus believed coalition commanders should
take advantage of the opening. At MNF-I, some of the coalition’s senior leaders already
had been on the lookout for such overtures. As MNF-I’s British deputy commander since
September 2006, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb had begun exploring the possibility of reaching accommodations with select Sunni insurgent leaders along the lines of
the Awakening. The former Special Air Service commander believed in negotiation with
even staunch enemies. To fellow coalition commanders who might be skeptical about
dealing with insurgents responsible for the deaths of American Soldiers, Lamb argued
that it would be foolish to bar influential resistance leaders from wading into the political
process because they had “blood on their hands.”1 To press his point, the British general
often remarked that he himself shared the same condemnable quality, having fought terrorists in Northern Ireland with whom he later negotiated.
Creating a small cell of analysts and military officers on loan from the special operations task force and intelligence agencies, Lamb mapped out the widening rifts in the
Sunni insurgency and looked for opportunities to pry loose “reconcilable” factions willing to make a separate peace with the Iraqi Government from the “irreconcilables” not
inclined to do so.2 In keeping with his unorthodox character, the British general occasionally arranged for captured insurgent leaders to be transported individually to his living
quarters in the Green Zone to have a discussion over tea and assess whether their release
might lead to cease-fires with the groups they led.3 In December 2006, Lamb arranged
for the first “strategic release,” setting free the detained Ansar al Sunna cleric Abu Wail
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without conditions in the hope that his return to the insurgent group would lead to a rift
with AQI.4

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Dawn M. Price (Released).

Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, Deputy Commander, MNF-I.5
Petraeus encouraged Lamb to continue his efforts and confirmed the coalition’s basic
approach to reconciliation as “target[ing] the ‘irreconcilables’ of either sect to reduce
their capability and influence, while simultaneously reaching out to those who are reconcilable.”6 Lamb’s outreach extended to enemy fighters still at large. Treading lightly to
avoid antagonizing Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his advisers, Petraeus and Lamb
would keep an eye out for Sunni resistance leaders who recognized the potential for reconciliation at a time when the insurgency seemed increasingly divided. The main effort
of MNF-I’s Sunni outreach in 2006 had been the U.S. Embassy and Major General Rick
Lynch’s high-level talks with exiled insurgent (or pro-insurgent) Sunni figures in Jordan
and Syria. But under Petraeus, MNF-I’s main Sunni outreach effort would shift to a more
bottom-up process in which the senior coalition commanders authorized brigade and
battalion commanders to follow the openings that presented themselves in their local
areas. As those opportunities emerged, the coalition commands in Baghdad would support them with funding or political top cover, and would run interference with the Maliki
government as the need arose.
The course of the Awakening in eastern Anbar changed the way Multi-National
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) approached its operations as well. When Odierno had assumed command of MNC-I in late 2006, he had seen reconciliation primarily as a top-down process
by the Iraqi Government to gain Sunni allegiance through key legislation and improved
essential services.7 However, as reports of armed Sunni groups seeking agreements with
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U.S. units floated up the chain of command, he recognized the Awakening of the tribes in
Anbar as significant and explored with Petraeus and Lamb the prospect of reproducing
that phenomenon elsewhere.8 Though MNC-I’s collective mindset remained skeptical,
and though it would take Odierno a few months to interpret this new development and
“decide whether we thought it was real or not,” he would soon seize the chance for tactical military leaders to broker local cease-fires and work with former insurgents to defeat
AQI.9
Visiting Anbar during his first week in command, Petraeus learned of the unexpected
progress made in the provincial capital of Ramadi. Days from turning the area over to his
successor, Colonel Sean B. MacFarland related how dramatically the security situation
had changed since the arrival of his 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in June 2006. Daily
attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces in Ramadi had plummeted. With local tribes dispatching their young men to serve as policemen and hunt down AQI operatives, MacFarland
reported that his brigade had “an embarrassment of riches” compared to the meager local
Iraqi cooperation it had found when it arrived 6 months earlier. “We have more friendly
forces than we almost know what to do with,” MacFarland related.10 He described the
Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) tactical approach: quickly establish combat outposts in
the city, deliberately expand a forward presence, and cement it with an aggressive information operations campaign.11 Petraeus approved. Most notably, though, MacFarland’s
brigade had isolated Ramadi and cut AQI’s lines of communications by reaching an
accommodation with Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and other local leaders whose tribes
comprised the Awakening.12
However, this new agreement between MacFarland and the Awakening sheikhs led
to a disagreement between MacFarland and his superiors at the two-star Marine headquarters on Camp Fallujah. While Major General Richard C. Zilmer of Multi-National
Force-West (MNF-W) had tolerated MacFarland’s engagement effort in Ramadi, he had
been dubious about its long-term effects and mindful of its potential to undermine what
the Marine command saw as the more strategically promising track of discussions with
the well-connected expatriate sheikhs in Jordan.13
Zilmer’s successor began his tour intent on emphasizing one approach at the expense
of the other. Major General Walter E. Gaskin’s II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)
assumed responsibility for MNF-W on February 9—1 day before Petraeus took the reins
at MNF-I. In attendance at MacFarland’s meeting with Petraeus, the new Marine commander questioned the relative utility of the BCT’s tribal engagement in Ramadi, labeling
Sattar a “road thief” and the sheikhs behind the Awakening “small fish.”14 MNF-W’s
ongoing dialogue with the sheikhs in Jordan had poisoned the well. Alarmed by Sattar’s rapid rise to power, many leaders of the more established tribes had denigrated
the upstart sheikh as a murderous smuggler to their Marine interlocutors.15 MacFarland
acknowledged Sattar’s shady background but suggested to Gaskin that the improved
security situation in his sector spoke for itself. When the BCT commander recommended
that Petraeus meet with Sattar, Gaskin objected, arguing that such a gesture would lavish
the sheikh with undeserved credibility and thus undermine more significant engagements.16 Nevertheless, persuaded that MacFarland’s effort held great promise, Petraeus
threw his weight behind it and told Gaskin to put a priority on supporting the Awakening.17 “This is counterinsurgency,” he pressed. “This is how these endeavors end.”18
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Major General Gaskin (right) and General Pace (left).
Source: DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant D. Myles Cullen (Released).

U.S. Marine Corps Major General Walter Gaskin, Commander MNF-W, and General
Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tour Ramadi.19
Gaskin had inherited a dynamic situation. As a supporting effort to Operation FARDH
AL-QANOON, he understood his task to be interdicting accelerants to Baghdad’s sectarian violence, but he oversaw a province that his superiors considered ripe for exploitation.20 At the time of Gaskin’s arrival in February 2007, the Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) area of operations included three brigade-sized sectors. Flanking the Army BCT
in greater Ramadi were two newly arrived Marine regimental combat teams (RCTs). To
the west, Colonel H. Stacy Clardy’s RCT 2 had responsibility for the Euphrates River
Valley west of the provincial capital to the Syrian border, including the cities of Hit, Haditha, Rawah, and Al Qa’im. Reinforced by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),
its sector extended south of the river over a wide expanse of sparsely populated desert
area traversed by a highway and the coalition’s main supply route from Jordan. Notably,
municipal government had rebounded in al Qa’im as MNF-W’s local accommodation
with the Albu-Mahal tribe held steady, and Haditha and other population centers had
seen drops in violence as well when operations in November caused AQI to disperse. The
Marines went on to bulldoze berms around the cities and erect internal barriers to better
control access to neighborhoods. Between Ramadi and Baghdad, RCT-6 under Colonel
Richard L. Simcock operated in and around Fallujah. Thirty miles from Iraq’s capital, Fallujah had offered the most promise in Zilmer’s eyes in early 2006, but the situation there
seemed tenuous in comparison with Ramadi as Gaskin assumed command 1 year later.21
Major tribes in the area, like the Jumaili and Zobai, still tended to favor AQI. Extremists
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held sway in the villages surrounding the city and the long-time sanctuary north toward
Lake Tharthar remained.22
For the MNF-W commander, the surge meant the extension of the 15th MEU and
the imminent arrival of two more formations: 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which he dispatched to Ramadi in March, and 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, which fell under the command of RCT-2 out west.23 The surge of U.S. BCTs to Baghdad also reduced the chances
that MNC-I would peel away Army units from MNF-W in order to tamp down violence
in the capital—a concern not far from the minds of Marine commanders.24
Most importantly, following Petraeus’s guidance in Ramadi, MNF-W redoubled its
support of the Awakening, with Gaskin’s deputy, Brigadier General John R. Allen, visiting Sattar at Petraeus’s urging. Sattar impressed his guest by assembling more than 100
notables from the surrounding tribes the day of the meeting.25 The Marine headquarters broadened this promising channel even as it continued talks with the exiled sheikhs
biding their time in Jordan. Gaskin sustained tribal engagement along with efforts to
build capacity in the Iraqi security forces. He soon discovered there was a direct correlation between the two.26
Finishing the Job in Ramadi
On February 18, Colonel John W. Charlton and 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, took
over the Ramadi sector from MacFarland’s brigade. Though the situation in the city had
improved markedly, Charlton saw the fight as far from over. West of the city, tribes
loyal to the Awakening dominated, while to the east in Sufiyah cooperation between the
coalition and the Albu Soda tribe had disrupted AQI command and control and logistics
nodes.27 Meanwhile, the participation of Albu-Fahad sheikhs in a January reconstruction conference signaled the powerful tribe’s new receptivity to the Awakening and thus
indicated that the belts surrounding the provincial capital would grow more inhospitable to Sunni militant groups.28 In Ramadi itself, MacFarland’s new combat outposts and
security stations manned jointly with the newly formed police force had tamped down
violence around the embattled government center.29
Yet AQI and its allies had not conceded the struggle. In the northern half of Ramadi,
1st Battalion, 6th Marines, stood poised to advance into the Qatana District in the city’s
center while Army battalions converged on its southeastern quadrant. MacFarland’s brigade had secured a foothold downtown, but the enemy contested it daily with mortar,
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and small-arms fire.30 AQI placed particular emphasis on attacking local police outposts with suicide car bombs—so much so that Odierno
expressed concern for Iraqi morale following a string of such attacks, including a February 14 explosion that killed the western Ramadi police chief.31 Multiple AQI cells clung
to safe havens in the central and eastern portions of the city, where they had arrayed
improvised explosive device (IED)-laced defenses, manned temporary checkpoints, and
enjoyed at least the passive support of the local population. Despite improvements in
the overall security situation, six Americans were killed in action during February and
another 31 wounded. Fifty-nine IEDs had exploded that month in Ramadi, revealing two
major hot spots around the al-Qudar Mosque in the Marine battalion’s sector and in the
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Mula’ab District on the city’s eastern edge.32 U.S. and Iraqi forces had not established a
sustained forward presence in either area.

Colonel Charlton (left) and General Petraeus (right).
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Colonel John Charlton With General David Petraeus.33
To maintain MacFarland’s hard-won momentum, Charlton launched a series of clearing operations that began the day his brigade assumed control of Ramadi.34 The first
focused on Mula’ab, a bad part of town MacFarland had intended to clear late in 2006
before diverting the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, east to rescue the Albu-Soda
tribe in its close-run struggle with AQI in Sufiyah and Julaybah.35 In February 2007,
Charlton returned to MacFarland’s original plan and dispatched the same combat-experienced battalion into eastern Ramadi after physically isolating the district overnight
with the well-choreographed placement of concrete barriers. Two of Charlton’s other
battalions, accompanied by 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, helped to block fleeing
enemy fighters as the U.S. formation cleared Mula’ab. In the first week, the combined
force established a fully functional combat outpost, discovered an IED factory, and killed
35 militants.36 Another clearing operation followed in the sector assigned to 1st Battalion,
6th Marines, repeating the approach of isolating the area and sweeping through it block
by block while establishing mutually supporting outposts. The second sweep resulted in
about 15 additional insurgents captured, and it enabled more than 200 Iraqi policemen to
return to cleared neighborhoods that had been an Ansar al Sunna safe haven.37
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Map 12. Ramadi, February-March 2007.
By mid-March, Petraeus assessed that the coalition had about 70 percent of the provincial capital under control, but entire neighborhoods still were without a credible U.S.
presence.38 On March 17, Charlton launched a third clearing operation, this one in the
south-central district of Iskan, where the largest concentration of AQI fighters had sought
to regroup.39 To reinforce the operation, Charlton swapped his smaller but more mobile
cavalry squadron for MNF-W’s 1,000-man 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, thereby gaining
another 500 infantrymen. Charlton committed two infantry battalions—one Army and
one Marine—to the final clearing operation.40 The fighting remained intense, with the
Marines calling for a long-range rocket strike to support their offensive.41
Charlton’s 6-week endeavor to clear Ramadi ended on March 31, a day on which there
were no attacks in the provincial capital. The BCT commander remembered that day
as “eerily quiet” without the usual cacophony of air strikes, artillery, tank rounds, and
machine-gun fire.42 The Ramadi operations of February 18-March 30 resulted in 36 enemy
killed, 8 wounded, and 114 captured. During this period, there had been 515 insurgent
attacks in Ramadi, including 82 IED strikes. American troops had suffered 9 killed and
40 wounded.43 In the aftermath of this tactical victory, U.S. and Iraqi forces consolidated
their presence in about 40 positions in the city and began the laborious task of reconstruction. It would take several months and $13 million just to remove rubble from Ramadi’s
war-ravaged streets.44
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With violence in the city under control, Charlton set about solidifying his gains. Military operations in Ramadi’s tribal belts in April and May coincided with engagement
efforts aimed at expanding the Awakening.45 A breakthrough came when Sattar and
Charlton traveled together to the Julaybah area east of the Sufiyah District and met with
sheikhs from Albu-Fahad. Though powerful, the tribe had mixed loyalties, and its leader,
Khamis Abdul Karim, fled to Jordan in late 2005 following the murder of his brother at the
hands of AQI supporters.46 Once cool to the prospect of aligning with Sattar’s movement,
tribal elders now treated the Abu Risha sheikh like a “rock star,” recalled Charlton, who
attributed the warm reception to a growing sense that the tide had turned decisively.47
When the Albu Fahad joined Sattar, the Awakening’s influence spread east into the Habbaniyah area, constricting AQI’s freedom of movement along the Ramadi-Fallujah corridor. By early May, MNF-I reported that these developments and Charlton’s operations
in the belts around Ramadi were forcing AQI’s remnants to displace east to Fallujah and
Baghdad or north into the remote Lake Tharthar region.48
Watching the events in Ramadi, Petraeus quickly latched onto the significance of
the connection between local tribal outreach and improved security. He sought to use
mounting tribal opposition to AQI by involving the Iraqi Government in a constructive
way.49 He cajoled Maliki into visiting Anbar in early March and hoped the gesture would
generate trust among restive Sunnis. Nonetheless, he confided to Gates that considerable
challenges remained, pointing out that Sattar took little care to mute his hatred not just
of AQI but also of the Iraqi Islamic Party, whose Sunni members dominated the province’s elected government. With marked understatement, Petraeus noted, “Reconciliation work, even intra-sect, is obviously difficult.”50
The momentum generated by the Awakening in Ramadi reverberated across the
province. U.S. casualties in Anbar plummeted by 80 percent during the second week
of March.51 Occasional setbacks took place, such as a massive truck bomb that killed
13 policemen in late April.52 By May, MNF-W witnessed days with fewer than 10 total
attacks in all of Anbar Province. During the second half of 2006, attacks in greater Ramadi
had averaged 18 per day, with periodic spikes to as many as 40, but from June 2007 to the
end of Charlton’s tour in March 2008, the daily attack average in Ramadi fell to less than
one per day—with some “attacks” nothing more than the discovery of an IED.53 Petraeus
described the overall progress as “stunning,” and noted that the security situation in
Anbar was “simply unthinkable 6 months ago.”54
The growth of the police was another indicator of progress. Volunteers came forward
in droves after the clearing of Ramadi, gradually adding auxiliaries to the 2,000 policemen Charlton had available and allowing him to hold the city’s neighborhoods with few
manpower constraints.55 The Ramadi police force eventually would grow to 9,000 by the
end of the surge.56 The undermanned Iraqi Army brigades operating in Charlton’s area of
operations also received a boost from the Awakening after the BCT persuaded Sattar to
provide local men as army recruits. The sheikh agreed to provide soldiers on the condition that the Sunni men who joined would be posted in Anbar for a minimum of 2 years,
thus ruling out deployment to Shi’a provinces where militias might target them, a proviso
that coalition leaders readily approved. Five hundred men enlisted at the next recruiting
drive for the 7th Iraqi Army Division, exceeding the number of slots the Marines had
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designated for basic training. Streaming into Sattar’s compound to sign up, truckloads of
40 to 50 men rumbled past the gate where the sheikh stood cheering them on.57
If security improvements and the continued growth of local security forces firmed up
the gains of the Awakening militarily, so too did modest political progress. An enhanced
provincial reconstruction team led by a State Department diplomat joined 1st Brigade,
3d Infantry Division, in April, soon after Ramadi had been cleared. Viewing the embedded provincial reconstruction team as a “governance transition team” best employed
in partnership with the mayor’s office, Charlton built a small compound for it adjacent
to the government center.58 The city council held its first meeting on April 14, and the
provincial council returned on May 6, convening after an unproductive year in Baghdad. In a concession to Sattar, the council included for the first time representatives
from the Awakening.59 By July, Petraeus could report that Ramadi was “well into the
reconstruction phase,” characterizing “the number and breadth of activities” as “very
impressive. . . a true example of what right looks like.”60 That same month, during a conference that brought several of Anbar’s influential sheikhs, the governor, and the director of police together for the first time, the Sunni leaders “pledged support for Iraq and
opposition to al-Qaeda.”61
A meeting engagement in the desert that same week demonstrated how far AQI’s fortunes had fallen since the previous fall when its supporters had marched in armed procession through the streets of Ramadi celebrating the declaration of the Islamic State of
Iraq. Acting on a tip, a patrol from Charlton’s battalion operating south of the provincial
capital made contact with 40 to 50 AQI fighters hiding in a hay-filled flatbed truck. The
group had taken months to infiltrate from outside the province, south around Lake Habbaniyah, to an assembly area on the outskirts of Ramadi. The fighters—many wearing
suicide vests—engaged the U.S. patrol in the tall grass around a placed dubbed “Donkey
Island.” Calling in helicopter support, the Americans killed over 30 fighters and recovered a large assortment of weapons at the site, including sniper rifles, grenades, mortar
rounds, IED components, and dynamite.62 The mission of this relatively large AQI force
had been to infiltrate into the city and assassinate the leaders of the Awakening, indicating that the terrorist group was now directing much of its resources and men to try to
stop their new tribal enemies.
The Awakening in the Western Euphrates River Valley
By summer 2007, the situation looked equally grim for AQI in the population centers
to the northwest. Security operations in late 2006 had disrupted the extremist group in the
cities between Al Qa’im and Ramadi, but the struggle for the Western Euphrates River
Valley remained in question as the New Year began. AQI had cowed and weakened the
Jughayfi tribe around highly contested Haditha. To the south in Hit, the Albu-Nimr tribe,
unfazed by AQI, tilted strongly toward the coalition but it seemed the coalition had done
little to exploit this stance.63
Commanding a mechanized infantry battalion attached to RCT-2, Army Lieutenant
Colonel Doug Crissman arrived in Hit during February 2007 and surveyed the situation with increasing unease. Home to over 100,000 Iraqis, the district had approximately
650 policemen present for duty, most of them outside the city limits in the Albu-Nimr

153

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

tribe’s traditional strongholds across the river. In Hit itself, Crissman’s predecessor had
established a single police station under the charge of a charismatic but corrupt Iraqi
colonel who showed no reservations about standing up to AQI.64 All the same, according
to Crissman, operations in the city consisted of “going out and hoping you [didn’t] get
blown up each day, going around, waiting for something to explode, [and] then going
after the guys you think might have done it.”65 Finding this pattern unsustainable, the
commander, with substantial Iraqi input, compiled a list of some 70 targets and orchestrated a clearing operation led by the police and backed by U.S. transition teams, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) advisers, and conventional patrols.
As the combined force swept through Hit in pursuit of insurgents, it established two new
police stations and set up checkpoints manned by Iraqis under close American supervision. The battalion facilitated similar operations in towns just to the south.66
The expansion of U.S. operations and the tightening of police control in and around
Hit coincided with Sheikh Sattar’s outreach to the senior Albu Nimr sheikhs. Eager to
replicate the gains observed in Ramadi and to strengthen its position vis-à-vis AQI, the
tribe joined the Awakening and began boosting the personnel ranks of local security
forces with hundreds of recruits.67 Violence in Hit dropped sharply, enough so that
during a visit to the city in early March, a surprised Petraeus reported to Gates that he
had not expected to find himself “walking through the market in Hit in a soft cap eating
ice cream this soon.”68 In September 2006, the weekly attack average in Hit and Haditha had reached 67 and 58 attacks, respectively. Six months later, these averages had
dropped to eight and three.69 The dramatic change in security conditions came along with
changing popular attitudes. Later in March, MNF-I reported that an intense rejection of
AQI’s extremist ideology had emerged as the predominant theme among the population
of western Anbar.70
The insurgents still vied for control of the population through a persistent murder
and intimidation campaign, but they were now losing ground, as well as allies, because
of it. On April 27, a suicide car bomber attacked the residence of the Hit police chief, killing 3 policemen and 10 civilians but leaving the chief himself unscathed.71 Such efforts
failed to stem the spread of local resistance against AQI. By the end of April, the tribal
sheikhs of Haditha joined the Awakening and began reporting clan members who continued to support AQI. Sunni resistance fighters of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades based
in Hit also switched sides and aligned themselves with Sattar’s movement around this
time.72 By May, cooperation among U.S. and Iraqi forces and local tribes created enough
pressure on AQI that the terrorist group’s local leaders began to explore the prospects
of amnesty.73 Sunni insurgents maintained a presence throughout villages between Al
Qa’im and Rawah, but the struggle for popular allegiance in the Western Euphrates River
Valley undoubtedly had shifted against them and in favor of the Awakening.
For tactical commanders like Crissman, this turn of events translated into accelerated
recruiting for the Iraqi security forces as the tribes mustered their young men for service
in the army, police, or government-sanctioned emergency response units. It also meant
making peace with shady characters who had once populated coalition target lists, as
well as organizing deliberate, by name detainee releases to demonstrate goodwill and
win over local leaders. The effects of such unorthodox actions were not always quantifiable, but Crissman believed one particular metric illustrated the shift: in Hit between
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February and September 2007, when his battalion relocated to Rutbah, he lost none of his
Soldiers in action.74
The Turning of the Fallujah Tribes
The wave of tribal uprisings against AQI that spread across Ramadi and western
Anbar in spring 2007 was slower to reach Fallujah, the restive city that twice had been
the scene of large-scale fighting in 2004. Fallujah’s significantly different tribal and social
character proved the main reason for the delay. In Ramadi, the tribes had been able to
combine and serve as the foundation for improved security, but those in and around Fallujah were in greater disarray and suspect of the idea of allying with the coalition against
Sunni insurgents. The city lay at the convergence of four major tribal areas of influence.
Three of these tribes—Mohemdi, Jumayli, and Zobaie—remained sympathetic to AQI in
early 2007, while the fourth, the Albu Issa, had split on the issue. With their sheikhs out of
the country, all four tribes had lacked senior tribal leadership for some time, making them
susceptible to intimidation and internal and external squabbling.75 A further tribal fault
line cut through these tribes’ territories, with the Zobaie tribe falling under the Shammar
confederation, while the Albu Issa, Mohemdi, and Jumayli belonged to the rival Dulaim
confederation.76
The Zobaie tribe’s area of influence in particular had been fertile ground for insurgent
groups since 2003. Dr. Harith al-Dhari, Sunni cleric and chairman of the Association of
Muslim Scholars, was a Zobaie tribal leader who also served as a spiritual head of the
Sunni insurgency. Dhari’s insurgent roots ran deep. His grandfather purportedly had
triggered the 1920 revolution in Iraq with the assassination of a British colonel near Fallujah. From his refuge in Jordan, Dhari—a longtime senior member of the Iraqi branch
of the Muslim Brotherhood—provided religious endorsement and financial support for
insurgent groups such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, a Muslim Brotherhood-associated group in which Dhari’s own son was a commander.77 The Zobaie tribe’s strong
Salafist culture also proved amenable to the extremist ideology of AQI when it arrived
on the scene.78
Fallujah’s involvement in regional politics was different from Ramadi’s as well. The
tribes around Ramadi loathed the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and included the removal of
IIP Governor Mamoun al-Alwani as a demand in the original draft of the September
2006 proclamation announcing the Awakening.79 In contrast, the Albu Issa tribe maintained close ties with senior IIP leaders such as Rafi al-Issawi, an Albu Issa member and
medical doctor who had treated insurgents in a Fallujah hospital during the November
2004 battle before entering politics. Becoming Maliki’s first Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Issawi would rise to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in 2008. The Zobaie tribe
had its high-level connections as well, not only to vehement critics of the Iraqi Government like Harith al-Dhari, but also Salam al-Zobaie, a member of the IIP-led Sunni Parliamentary bloc who had become Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister in May 2006.
Conditions in Fallujah in early 2007 were not ideal for the kind of changes taking
place in nearby Ramadi. Two developments in 2006 had worsened Fallujah’s security situation. First, between 30,000 and 50,000 internally displaced Sunnis fleeing the sectarian
violence in Baghdad had settled in Fallujah, a heavy burden for the city of 400,000.80 Next,
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insurgent fighters driven from Ramadi by MacFarland’s brigade and the Awakening had
migrated to the rural villages surrounding Fallujah, areas that had been a sanctuary for
AQI and its allies since they had fled the coalition attack of November 2004.81 There the
insurgents had authority, staffing checkpoints and enforcing curfews in places that saw
only intermittent coalition presence. Wedged between the Euphrates River and the Fallujah-Abu Ghraib highway, Zaidon to the southeast stood out as a safe haven that offered
access to Baghdad’s crucial southern belt, while Karmah to the north served as an AQI
logistical hub and transit point. During a mid-February 2007 raid, U.S. and Iraqi troops
discovered an elaborate IED factory in Karmah with multiple car bombs in various stages
of production, most likely intended for use in Baghdad or its suburbs. Beyond the town
of Saqlawiyah to the northwest, AQI enjoyed relative respite in the seam separating the
coalition units in Fallujah from those in Ramadi.82 In these areas within striking distance
of Fallujah, AQI and other insurgents gathered their strength and prepared for a confrontation with the coalition and the Iraqi security forces.
The ISF in Fallujah proved unreliable. In keeping with the MNF-I campaign plan, coalition troops had focused on transition mission rather than operating against the insurgents. The Marine regimental combat team in Fallujah shifted responsibility for the city’s
security to the 1st Iraqi Army Division and afterward maintained only 300 Marines within
the city’s boundaries.83 As a result, the security picture was mixed. While recruitment
and training woes hampered the Iraqi 1st Division’s effectiveness in keeping the city
secure, the Fallujah police chief, Colonel Faisal Ismail Hussein, operated against AQI in
tandem with the Awakening’s militia arm, the Thawar al-Anbar. The two groups had fair
results, hauling in 282 suspected AQI fighters in February 2007 alone.84 Faisal, a former
Republican Guard commando and one-time insurgent, formed the “special missions
group,” which proved especially effective in the hunt for high-value targets, capturing
former Ba’athist and prolific AQI financier Brigadier General Ali Dawud Sulayman Nayil
al-Khalifawi in March. Khalifawi, prominent in coordinating the insurgency in Fallujah
since 2004, continued to support the violence through his ties to the influential Sheikh
Abdullah Janabi, whom he visited frequently in Syria.85 Faisal Hussein also struck ceasefires with Jaysh Muhammad, Jaysh al-Islami, and 1920 Revolutionary Brigades operatives in the city, which likely benefited local police but not U.S. troops.86
As for governance, Marine commanders were optimistic for Fallujah’s city council,
one of the few functioning in Anbar. However, the situation in the city in early 2007 was
more fragile than they realized.87 One week after Colonel Richard Simcock and RCT-6
assumed responsibility for Fallujah in late January 2007, the city council secretary was
assassinated—the same fate his predecessor had met 6 months earlier.88 The targeted
killing led the council to adjourn for 1 month and, under the uninspired leadership of a
corrupt mayor, the municipal government nearly collapsed.89
Tribal outreach in Fallujah had yielded far less than in Ramadi by early 2007. In an
attempt to build a “tribal wall” around Fallujah and make the eastern tip of Anbar inhospitable for AQI, deputy MNF-W Commander Major General John R. Allen traveled to
Amman, Jordan, every 2 weeks to talk with prominent sheikhs in exile. He managed to
extract a few promises to support police recruitment, but he initially failed to persuade
many to return and rally their tribes. Sheikh Mishan al-Jumayli, for example, rejected a
direct appeal from Allen in the spring, even though Jumayli had driven all night from
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Damascus to meet with the Marine general in Amman. Even after assurances that the
coalition would fortify his compound and train his personal security detail, the sheikh
decided to wait, as did most others like him.90
The sheikhs of the Albu Issa proved the exception, and they provided an opening
that eventually changed Fallujah dramatically. Courted by Allen’s predecessor, Sheikh
Aifan Sadoun al-Issawi had a checkered history with the Americans. Mistakenly shot by
U.S. troops in 2003, the sheikh later was imprisoned at Abu Ghraib for 9 months. However, as an early outspoken Anbari voice against AQI, he had taken part in the initial
CJSOTF efforts to mobilize tribal auxiliaries in 2004-2005, and had been forced to flee
with his family to Amman after a failed AQI assassination attempt against him. Following an appeal by Sheikh Sattar, however, he returned and sought to extend the Awakening to Fallujah, a step that put him at odds not just with AQI, but with some members of
his own tribe.91 In early February, the embattled Sheikh Aifan found himself defending
his compound outside Fallujah with the help of Marines as he worked to organize an
emergency response unit there, a complete turn from his earlier hostility to U.S. troops.92
Later that month, Iraqi police and Sheikh Aifan’s armed Albu Issa fighters, supported
by Marine artillery, fought a 2-day battle against 300 Sunni insurgents that resulted in at
least 40 insurgents killed. A few weeks later, AQI struck back by launching chlorine-laden
suicide car bombs against the Ameriyah Fallujah police station and nearby residence of
Sheikh Aifan, just one of many attacks in 2007 in which AQI attempted to use chlorine
gas as a chemical weapon.93 It was also just one of three assassination attempts against
Sheikh Aifan that year, all of which he survived, only to be killed by a suicide bomber
while serving in the Iraqi Parliament in January 2013.94 The war against AQI was costly
for the Albu Issa, with the tribe losing scores of fighters. In one incident, AQI killed at
least 40 Albu Issa tribesmen, dumping them in a mass grave.95
Sheikh Aifan’s turn against AQI coincided with and benefited from intensified coalition security operations in the Fallujah area in the spring of 2007. With three Marine battalions and two battalion-sized Army units, Simcock had more U.S. forces at his disposal
than any of his predecessors in eastern Anbar.96 Violence inside Fallujah’s city limits was
a problem, but at an average rate of less than two attacks per day during April, it was not
out of control. Thus, the RCT commander focused first on the rural areas south of Fallujah, conducting an operation to secure the route connecting the Ameriyah Fallujah police
station to its logistical base near the city.97 The RCT then shifted its main effort to Zaidon
and proceeded counterclockwise around Fallujah’s belts, moving north to Karmah and
on to Saqlawiyah, where Simcock had the least developed tribal relationships.98 Adequate U.S. troop levels, along with three Iraqi Army brigades and the establishment of
two emergency response police units, enabled the RCT commander to maintain a permanent presence in these outlying areas, even as he turned to clearing Fallujah, where
enemy sniper attacks and suicide car bombs were increasing.99 In late March, for example, insurgents carried out a complex chlorine-augmented IED attack against Fallujah’s
government center using two suicide truck bombs and two suicide vest bombers, as well
as mortar and small-arms fire. Iraqi police disrupted the attack before it caused major
damage, but the incident indicated AQI still had a potent presence in the city.100
As the Albu Issa tribe was fighting AQI near Ameriyah Fallujah, large portions of the
Zobaie tribe joined the battle against AQI as well. As in the Albu Issa area, fighting in the
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Zobaie tribal area of Zaidon took the form of an intra-tribal war with the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades fighters loyal to the Dhari house turning against members of al-Faris, a clan
closely affiliated with AQI. While the struggle was in part due to Zobaie anger over AQI’s
indiscriminate targeting of civilians as well as cultural differences like forced marriage,
the rival clans’ main objective was a grab for power. Observing this Sunni-on-Sunni violence in early March, MNF-W interpreted it simply as insurgents targeting each other.101
The conflict began in earnest when squabbling over an inter-clan marriage gone badly
and the unrelated murder of a sheikh’s son-in-law aggravated an already tense situation. Pressure mounted as related economic factors brought into question which family
would control the potentially lucrative transportation corridor running from Fallujah to
the outskirts of Baghdad.102 The internal Zobaie rivalry bled over into Baghdad, with the
unsuccessful March 23, 2007, assassination attempt against Deputy Prime Minister Salam
Zobaie reportedly carried out by a fellow Zobaie tribe member allied with AQI.103
The dispute between the two sides of the Zobaie tribe tipped into open war on March
27, when AQI carried out a suicide attack against the home of Thahir al-Dhari, the most
senior sheikh of the Zobaie tribe and the half-brother of Harith al-Dhari. The attack killed
Sheikh Thahir’s son, a leader of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades.104 Angry tribesmen
swelled the Revolutionary Brigades’ ranks and began fighting AQI in Zaidon. What followed was effectively a switching of sides not only by the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades,
but by several other Sunni insurgent groups as well. By mid-May, elements of the 1920
Revolutionary Brigades were negotiating with MNF-W about how best to achieve the
common objective of expelling AQI from Anbar.105 Harith al-Dhari broke publicly with
AQI, declaring that it had “gone too far” and that the central leadership in distant Pakistan did not “represent Iraqis.”106
Joining the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades in its public rupture with AQI was Jaish
al-Islami, one of the largest Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq. Just days after the attack on
Thahir al-Dhari, Jaish al-Islami announced its decision to “disunite” from AQI.107 The
group’s spokesman, Ibrahim al-Shammari, told al-Jazeera News that the informal alliance
between the two groups had frayed after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June
2006 because of AQI’s targeting of Jaish al-Islami operatives and its commitment to an
expansive Islamic state. Indicators of this rift had come in February 2007, when former
Iraqi Parliamentarian Mishan al-Jabouri, who fled the country in late 2005 after his indictment for funneling government money to the insurgency, denounced AQI over the airwaves of the Syrian-based television station he owned. The network typically churned
out propaganda for insurgent groups like Jaish al-Islami, but Jabouri used it on this occasion to lambast AQI’s campaign of suicide bombings against Shi’a neighborhoods and
its cutthroat tactics to intimidate and control rival sheikhs and emirs. The terrorists had
done little to make Sunnis in Iraq more secure, Jabouri charged.108
In early May, Jaish al-Islami, Jaysh Mujahideen, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, and
a portion of Ansar al Sunna declared themselves members of a new Jihad and Reform
Front united against AQI, a major blow to AQI’s support base in Anbar.109 The turn against
AQI in the Fallujah area did not necessarily translate into active partnerships with coalition forces, however. Harith al-Dhari, for example, remained staunchly opposed to the
occupation from his perch in Jordan. Nonetheless, local realignments often meant fewer
enemies for American troops at the tactical level. Engagement with former insurgents
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could develop cease-fires into something more, as the Awakening and the fielding of
emergency response units had proved. Along these lines, Jaish al-Islami’s break from
AQI in spring 2007 would pave the way for the eventual expansion of the Awakening
beyond Anbar to Abu Ghraib and the southern belts of Baghdad. Within Anbar, tribal
rejection of extremist groups like AQI grew quickly in the late spring, taking firmer root
in Ameriyah Fallujah and Zaidon and branching out toward Jumayli territory around
Karmah to the north.110
As Fallujah’s hinterland turned increasingly hostile to AQI, RCT-6 and the Fallujah
police launched operations in early June to clear the remaining insurgents from the city
itself and put an end to large-scale AQI attacks. With the support of a Marine battalion, police units and their coalition advisory teams erected concrete barriers and vehicle
checkpoints before sequentially moving through each of the city’s 10 precincts, standing
up neighborhood watch groups and gathering biometric data in support of ISF recruiting
as they went.111 The cornering of terrorist cells in the city led to some sharp engagements.
One U.S.-Iraqi patrol that discovered a car-bomb factory came under attack by AQI operatives wearing suicide vests. After killing seven enemy fighters, the patrol dismantled two
trucks carrying thousands of pounds in homemade explosives.112 Later in June, another
combined patrol in the city discovered an insurgent cache containing over 25,000 gallons
of nitric acid, enough to produce a large number of IEDs.113 These deliberate clearing
operations by coalition and Iraqi units pushed AQI’s remnants out of the city and toward
remote areas where they attempted to regroup. With Zaidon and Ameriyah Fallujah no
longer hospitable to them, many insurgents headed toward the sparsely populated area
north of Karmah, near Lake Tharthar. There they would seek to reestablish themselves,
setting up a further round of fighting against coalition and Iraqi troops that would come
in the summer.114
Cementing Security Gains in Anbar
The rapid improvement of the situation in Anbar created an unexpected decision
point for Petraeus and Odierno. Petraeus had been reluctant to shift forces out of Anbar
while the situation around Fallujah remained precarious, but the MNF-I commander
could not ignore the option, given the province’s breathtaking turnaround. With major
fighting underway in Diyala and Baghdad, he reported to Gates in late May that Odierno
was drafting plans to transfer one Army battalion from Anbar to the southern belts.115
That adjustment eventually would occur in midsummer when 3d Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), left eastern Anbar and returned to its parent organization, Colonel Michael Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, south of Baghdad. Separately,
Odierno entertained the possibility of moving Charlton’s BCT to Baghdad, but decided
against this significant reallocation of combat units as long as AQI retained enough latent
striking power to pose a threat in Anbar.116
By early July, Petraeus considered the military fight largely won in Ramadi and Fallujah, judging both cities to be in the “consolidation phase,” and with fighting in the
urban areas dropping off, the coalition commands moved into a period of cementing
the security gains in the province.117 For MNF-W, the first aspect of this phase was pursuit operations using the additional troops that had come to Anbar as part of the surge.
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Between the 13th MEU and 2 more rifle battalions, an additional 4,000 troops arrived in
the province by summer 2007, enough manpower to “put us over top” in the words of
Allen, MNF-W’s deputy commander.118 Across the province, north and east of Fallujah,
south of Haditha, and north and east of Rutbah, the MEF dispatched troops to disrupt
long-time AQI safe havens without having to leave the Euphrates River Valley population centers vulnerable. The aim of this widespread pressure was to drive AQI fighters
into deserted wadis where unmanned aerial vehicles could find them and indirect fire
or airstrikes could target them with little risk of collateral damage, a process that would
continue for months.119
Back in Anbar’s populated areas, MNF-W continued to enroll tribesmen in the security forces and draw formerly hostile or neutral Anbaris into new alliances with U.S.
troops. In Allen’s judgment, the coalition and the tribal Awakening had been mutually
reinforcing. The Awakening had been the idea of the Ramadi tribal leaders, but it “could
not have gotten off the ground if it hadn’t been supported by coalition forces,” he later
told historians.120 Tribal leaders who were skeptical about Anbar’s provincial government had resisted MNF-W’s entreaties to reconcile, Allen explained, noting that “As long
as AQI was a nightmare in their lives every day if they appeared to be aligned with
the government . . . then [tribal sheikhs] were on the fence.”121 To encourage reconciliation, MNF-W’s strategy had been to empower the sheikhs, connect them to the local
government, support them with indigenous security forces, and then provide “security
top cover through constant conventional and special operations.”122 By early summer,
this multi-pronged approach had paid off, as the tribes had come down on the coalition
side of “the fence” and had raised eight emergency response units that changed the security balance in Anbar.123 The rapid formation of these armed tribal levies had taken AQI
by surprise, Allen observed, and the Marine general compared their appearance to the
sudden “uncloaking of Klingon warships” in Star Trek.124
The resulting numbers were vast. By midsummer 2007, the combined strength of the
police and emergency response units in Anbar Province exceeded 20,000. MNF-W aimed
to solidify these gains through steps such as the establishment of a large police academy
at Habbaniyah that eliminated the logistical and security burden of transporting local
recruits to places like Mosul and Jordan.125 The addition of so many trained policemen in
the province enabled the coalition and ISF to hold population centers far more effectively
than in previous years, Allen judged. Clearing operations in the past had resembled a
boat plying the water, he described, with insurgents returning to an area as the ship’s
wake settled. However, the growth in police forces had changed this trend. “If you come
rolling back into . . . town as al-Qaeda now,” Allen observed in late June 2007, “chances
are you’re going to find yourself in somebody’s basement shackled to a pipe until we get
around to your case.”126
As the Awakening grew and security in Anbar improved, MNF-W persisted in its
effort to bridge the gap between the tribes and the much-despised provincial government, with mixed results. As they had attempted to do in 2006, MNF-W tried to connect Governor Mamoun and the provincial council in Ramadi with Anbar’s outlying
municipalities and press provincial officials to be more responsive to local communities’
needs. Mamoun labored under a deficit of goodwill due to the provincial government’s
long-standing ineffectiveness. To help placate indignant municipal leaders, MNF-W
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requested an infusion of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) money
from MNC-I to enhance the governor’s ability to deliver local reconstruction projects, and
Odierno responded by approving an additional $50 million.127 MNF-W also frequently
ferried the governor to Baghdad to establish connections with the ministries and favorably facilitate the flow of Iraqi Government money and projects to the province.128 However, Mamoun and his provincial officials had not played a significant role in Anbar’s
turnaround between September 2006 and summer 2007. The key Iraqi players instead
had been the Anbari sheikhs—particularly local tribal leaders whom the coalition initially had not considered important. In Ramadi, western Anbar, and Fallujah, the turning
of the tribes had come because of local dynamics and coalition outreach to local leaders
rather than through negotiations with senior Anbari sheikhs in Jordan. The expatriate
sheikhs had not led events, but as conditions in eastern Anbar changed, they followed
them, joining their more junior tribal leaders who, in some cases, had already expelled
AQI from their tribal territories. In early July, as Marine commanders had long wished
him to do, Jumayli finally made his way back to Iraq after one of his sons was killed by
an IED northwest of Fallujah. The presence of Mishal and others like him provided his
tribesmen with the psychological lift for which the Marines had hoped, but not until the
security situation had already turned.129
In mid-June, the Marines began holding meetings with senior sheikhs who had
returned to Anbar after an absence of several years to join forces with Sattar and the
Awakening.130 On June 25, an AQI suicide bomber attacked a number of these sheikhs
and Awakening leaders who traveled to the Mansour Hotel in Baghdad for meetings
with central government officials. The bomber killed 10 Iraqis, including former Anbar
Governor Faisal al-Gaood and Tariq al-Assafi, Sattar’s security adviser and a leader of
the Awakening in his own right.131 Though not present, Sattar himself had expected to
attend and would have been present in the targeted party had he done so.132 Reflecting on
the near miss, Allen summarized the fragility of the progress in Anbar: “You’re only one
bomb blast away from the entire calculus changing.”133
THE AWAKENING IN THE BAGHDAD BELTS
Pacifying the “Triangle of Death”
The Awakening and its associated war within the Sunni tribes did not stop at Anbar’s
borders. As though channeled by the Euphrates River and the highway system running
toward the capital, the tribal movement seeped in early 2007 from MNF-W’s area of operations into the sector south of Baghdad dubbed the “Triangle of Death” due to its chronic
violence and insurgent influence. AQI and its allies valued this area for its proximity to
Baghdad and the access it offered Sunni fighters intent on launching attacks into the capital. The Triangle was an ideal insurgent sanctuary, with many areas difficult for coalition
troops to reach. Thousands of small farms dotted a landscape that was crisscrossed by
irrigation ditches and 20-foot wide canals, which restricted the movement of U.S. patrols
to IED-strewn levee roads. This was the area in which Sunni militants in June 2006 had
captured two Soldiers from 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, killing the captive
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Americans at an abandoned Russian-built power plant in Yusufiyah that had become an
insurgent headquarters for the area.134
The western edge of the Triangle of Death was Zobaie tribal land that extended into
the areas of Anbar where the Dhari family turned against AQI in spring 2007. Just east of
the Zobaie, though, the territories of the Janabi and Karghuli tribes remained particularly
hostile to coalition troops and had served as insurgent support bases for several years.
In demographic terms, the Triangle was roughly 70 percent Sunni, but with a large Shi’a
minority clustered in population centers along Highway 8, the north-south road that fed
into southwest Baghdad’s troubled Rashid District.135 These communities were torn by a
sectarian struggle for control of the southern belts playing out in Mahmudiyah and Lutufiyah, with Shi’a militias successfully shifting the demographics in those traditionally
Sunni towns before expanding toward Yusufiyah 8 miles to the west.
Since September 2006, this area had been the responsibility of Colonel Michael M. Kershaw’s 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, assigned to Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) at the time. Kershaw and his troops found themselves facing a violent
sector in which the 48th BCT of the Georgia National Guard and the 2d Brigade, 101st
Airborne Division, had suffered heavy casualties in the previous year and a half. The
brigade’s main effort was in the Mahmudiyah area, which in the Saddam Hussein era
had been home to the Republican Guard’s Medina Division and the location of a major
weapons facility—two factors that explained why the area had the ordnance and human
capital to sustain a large-scale insurgency.136

Colonel Kershaw (right) and Colonel Rapp (left).
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Colonel Michael Kershaw and Colonel William Rapp With Awakening Members in
the Triangle of Death Area.137
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To tackle this troublesome insurgent sanctuary, Kershaw had adopted two approaches
that were out of step with the MNF-I campaign plan of 2006. First, he had partnered
his units with the large 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, embedding his field artillery battalion directly in the brigade rather than simply relying on transition teams. He
had worked closely with the Iraqi brigade commander, Brigadier General Ali Freiji, to
develop a combined plan for the Triangle of Death. Freiji, a well-regarded nationalist
Shi’a officer whom Minister of Defense Abdel Qader described to coalition officers as
“the best officer in the Iraqi Army,” had a mix of Sunni and Shi’a officers and unusually
did not shrink from carrying out operations against Sunni or Shi’a militants alike.138 Freiji
had five battalions of Iraqi troops at his disposal, but few police with whom to partner
because the insurgent-dominated area had resisted the establishment of police outposts.
Next, Kershaw had circumvented guidance from MNF-I and MNC-I to close patrol
bases in his sector, choosing instead to deploy his companies forward into the area of
operations, away from the brigade’s base at Camp Striker on the Victory Base complex.139 “Push units as far forward as possible,” the brigade commander advocated in late
November 2006, “operate decentralized; gain and maintain contact with the people.”140
By the end of November, 11 of Kershaw’s 14 companies were living on forward outposts
within the brigade’s sector.141 Establishing the outposts was not easy, and the BCT faced
its toughest combat during its initial months as it implemented Kershaw’s approach.
In its first 90 days in the Triangle of Death, the BCT lost 25 vehicles to roadside bombs,
a trend that Kershaw intended to arrest by continuing to place his units forward in the
sector and thereby reducing the distance the troops had to travel to operate. The forward
presence would also allow for more frequent engagement with the population.142 The
BCT also conducted frequent air assaults to compensate for the difficulty of moving by
ground through the segmented terrain of irrigated farmland and canals.143
The area most lacking in coalition presence was an inhospitable 20-square-mile patch
of ground along a stretch of the Euphrates River near Yusifiyah where Kershaw was
determined to expand his brigade’s control.144 In its first operation to enter the area, the
brigade encountered a blocking obstacle of 14 IEDs along a section of road 1½ miles in
length, indicating that the enemy had prepared a deliberate defense to prevent the penetration of its safe haven.145 In October, however, the brigade seized the nearby abandoned
Yusifiyah power plant and converted the massive concrete structure from an AQI base
into a U.S. patrol base. Once gaining access to the enemy safe haven, the brigade captured
what amounted to an insurgent arms depot: Kershaw’s troops discovered 138 55-gallon
drums of ammunition and other materiel buried along previously inaccessible canals
within the Shakhariyah Triangle, some of them a mere 500 meters from coalition outposts. The discovery bolstered Kershaw’s arguments to his higher headquarters that the
area needed more U.S. patrol bases, not fewer. Adding other hubs soon after in a gradually constricting web of positions, the brigade robbed the insurgents of a fortified staging
area on the banks of the Euphrates and constricted their ability to maneuver freely.146
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Source: Photo courtesy of and by Major Adam Scher.

The Yusufiyah Power Plant.147
As the surge got underway in early 2007, Kershaw considered the new guidance he
received from Petraeus and Odierno to push troops forward into populated areas as validation of a course on which he already had embarked.148 In April 2007, Kershaw’s brigade
kept the same battle space but became part of the newly created MND-C area of operations. The arrival of Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Division as MND-C lent unity
of effort to the campaign in the southern belts and to the interdiction of accelerants to
Baghdad’s sectarian violence, but the principal way that Kershaw pursued his mission—
namely by establishing security through forward presence—remained unchanged.149
AQI and its allies responded with a wave of attacks against the brigade’s new occupied outposts and increased IEDs along the supply routes that linked its hub-and-spoke
system of patrol bases.150 This insurgent counterattack culminated on May 12 with an
abduction of U.S. Soldiers by Sunni fighters at almost exactly the location where U.S.
Soldiers had been taken the previous year. In a predawn ambush, about a dozen enemy
fighters surprised an American patrol watching over a section of road frequently planted
with IEDs.151 The insurgents quickly overwhelmed the crews of the two High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) there, killing four U.S. Soldiers and an
Iraqi soldier during the assault. The attackers snatched three wounded Americans and
dragged them east away from the river, disappearing before quick reaction forces from
two nearby patrol bases could arrive.152 It would emerge later that a leader from the local
Qarghuli tribe had organized the operation, but AQI claimed responsibility and declared
the attack as another retaliation for the rape and murder of a Sunni teenage girl by Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division in the same area more than a year earlier.153
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The coalition response to the abduction of Kershaw’s three Soldiers was swift and
intense. The BCT isolated the area and controlled access to the Euphrates River bridges.
Kershaw’s battalions began a nonstop series of operations to collect intelligence in support of the search. Within 3 days, the brigade launched 12 air assaults, made possible by
the provision of additional UH-60 helicopters. Two Stryker companies from Baghdad
also joined the search. These forces ramped up the hunt for insurgent leaders on their
target lists, conducting multiple raids each night, and maintaining an exhausting pace for
6 weeks.154 Colonel Michael X. Garrett, commander of 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division,
to the south, joined the effort by temporarily pushing troops into the northwestern tip of
his sector along an often-neglected tactical seam where he shared a unit boundary with
Kershaw on the Euphrates River.155 Meanwhile, Kershaw’s troops descended on Qarghuli village, where a sullen population maintained close ties with AQI. They questioned
every military-aged male and acquired biometric data—including fingerprints and other
identifying characteristics—on more than 800 people. Similar sweeps occurred elsewhere
in the area.156
A week after the attack, the BCT had amassed numerous tips from locals, including
the tribal elders of Qarghuli village, but neither these nor other intelligence reports could
definitively answer questions about the captives’ physical condition or location. On May
23, Iraqi police discovered the body of one of the Americans captured on May 12 drifting in the Euphrates River more than 10 miles downstream from the ambush site. The
search continued into June as hopes of finding the other two of Kershaw’s missing Soldiers alive faded, with a series of brutal battles occurring as a byproduct of the increased
operational tempo. While attempting to detain and search an insurgent on June 1, Staff
Sergeant Travis W. Atkins from 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, became involved
in hand-to-hand combat. Noticing the insurgent was about to detonate a suicide vest,
Atkins threw himself on his opponent, shielding the other members of his patrol from the
blast. For his selfless actions, Atkins was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.157 On June 10, U.S. Soldiers at the scene of a firefight 75 miles away in Samarra
recovered personal items belonging to the missing men. Given the expected seriousness
of their wounds, it was determined unlikely that the two could have survived a trip that
far north.158 Their remains finally were found more than a year later near Jurf as-Sakhr
after a man detained by U.S. special operations forces claimed to have knowledge of the
burial place.159
Although the search for the missing American Soldiers ended tragically, the operations during the weeks following the Soldiers’ May 12 abduction led to dramatic and
unexpected changes in the Triangle of Death. The intensity of the coalition’s response
shocked local Sunni leaders and local insurgent groups, who had witnessed a much
milder coalition reaction when insurgents abducted and killed U.S. Soldiers from the
same spot a year before.160 The 6 weeks of pressure against insurgents in the Mahmudiyah District had come just as a violent battle among Sunnis in the area peaked. For nearly
a year, tensions between AQI and some local tribal groups had worsened as the terrorist
group had murdered and intimidated Sunni opponents and encroached on economic
activities that were some tribes’ livelihoods. As tribes in eastern Anbar had taken up
arms against AQI in early 2007, some tribal groups in the Triangle of Death had begun
to do the same.161 Two of Kershaw’s battalions had a front-row seat to this “war within
a war,” as one commander called it.162 Down the western slice of the BCT sector, where
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the Zaidon and Radwaniyah areas straddled the unit boundary with the Marines south
of Highway 1, the coalition had little to no military presence. Focused on eliminating the
AQI sanctuary in his area of operation (AO) and on helping the Iraqi Army stabilize Mahmudiyah, Kershaw lacked the forces to venture often into Radwaniyah, let alone enough
to muster the combat power to stay. Nonetheless, as early as January 2007, U.S. Soldiers
observed from their patrol bases the sights and sounds of frequent nighttime skirmishes
as AQI and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades seemed to be fighting.163
Throughout the spring, locals began to provide tips to Kershaw’s unit and formed
neighborhood watch groups in some villages. Kershaw’s cavalry squadron commander,
who had made inroads with the Khartani tribe on the southern outskirts of Baghdad,
conferred with the Marine battalion to his west in Anbar and arranged to meet a leading
Zobaie sheikh whose tribal area stretched across division boundaries. The tribe’s leadership, he reported to Kershaw afterward, appeared interested in contributing by providing
tribal auxiliaries.164 The brigade commander sensed that this was a positive development
but remained circumspect. The Iraqi Army still had to be persuaded.165
This approach toward accommodation with formerly hostile or ambivalent tribes
accelerated in June. The swarming of U.S. troops in and around the search area after
the May 12 abduction, coupled with the spike in raids against insurgent leaders, had an
intimidating yet somewhat liberating effect on the population. Special operations forces
working closely with Kershaw lent their lethal precision to the fight and, by removing a
few key AQI operatives from the battlefield, opened the door to better intelligence-gathering as more civilians came forward with information on the enemy.166 On June 10, American guards stopped a dump truck laden with 14,000 pounds of explosives as it careened
down the market-lined main road of Sadr al-Yusifiyah toward the gate of a patrol base.167
To local sheikhs caught in the middle but favoring more tight-knit security arrangements
with Kershaw’s troops, the failed suicide truck bomb attack offered the latest evidence
that AQI constituted a threat while the Americans did not.168
Sensing that the Americans might be willing to help in their intra-Sunni battle with
AQI, local tribal fighters in Kershaw’s sector decided to solicit coalition assistance and
thus gain some respite in a multi-front war. In mid-June, armed men waving a makeshift
flag of truce approached a U.S. patrol in the west of the brigade’s sector.169 This encounter led to a meeting a few days later between two U.S. battalion commanders and one
of the group’s leaders, a soft-spoken but charismatic man whom U.S. officers described
as having a “dastardly” air about him.170 Intrigued by the man’s proposal to join forces
against AQI, the U.S. commanders tentatively agreed because they found little to lose
from the venture. One gave the insurgent leader a cell phone and a by-name list of the
high-value targets his battalion was hunting. In a week’s time, the man reported killing two on the list. As proof, the brutal demise of one had been captured on cell-phone
video. A third had been brought in alive for the Americans to arrest and interrogate. Told
about the outcome of this second meeting, Kershaw instructed his subordinates to exploit
what seemed to be a promising development but to proceed cautiously.171 For the BCT
commander, this was uncharted territory, but the killing and capturing of elusive AQI
operatives justified the associated risks in his mind.172 Within 3 weeks, the armed tribesmen delivered an enemy fighter for whom 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had been
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searching since September: the infamous Abu Rus, the insurgent who had abducted, tortured, and killed two 101st Airborne Division Soldiers in 2006.173
The man behind these meetings was Karim Ismail Hussein, a Zobaie tribesman also
known as Abu Maruf who was, almost incredibly, the brother of Colonel Faisal Ismail
Hussein, the insurgent-linked Fallujah police chief. Abu Maruf’s own shifting allegiances
embodied the complexity of the intra-Sunni struggle, as well as the murky origins of the
Awakening beyond Anbar. Although he described himself as “an independent,” MNF-W
in mid-2006 had characterized him as a Zaidon-based AQI leader, and at one time, he
had kidnapped two senior members of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades in order to derail
that organization’s cease-fire talks with the coalition. By the time Jaish al-Islami and the
1920 Revolutionary Brigades declared themselves against AQI in May 2007, Abu Maruf
himself had defected and joined “the 1920,” but al-Qaeda retaliated by slitting the throat
of his brother Ahmed.174 As the battle for control in Fallujah swirled into outlying areas
like Zaidon, opportunists like Abu Maruf saw a chance to expand the Awakening across
the provincial border and gain some relief in their simultaneous struggle against Sunni
extremists, the coalition, the Iraqi security forces, and Iranian-backed Shi’a militias.175

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Kerensa Hardy (Released).

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Coppersmith Talks to Abu Maruf, an Awakening Leader in
South Baghdad.176
Kershaw, for his part, welcomed cooperation with Abu Maruf and the tribesmen he
led, but this agreement with local insurgents, though the most dramatic in the colonel’s
sector, was just one of several initiatives there. In Sadr Yusifiyah, a sheikh belonging to
the Albu Issa tribe had broached the subject of an armed neighborhood watch group with
the U.S. company commander running the nearby patrol base. In another case, the carefully coordinated release of a sheikh’s detained son bought enough goodwill to entice
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local elements of the previously pro-insurgent Khartani tribe into Kershaw’s fold.177 The
collective impact of these cooperative security arrangements would be decisive in the
Mahmudiyah District, though at the brigade level they appeared disparate and fragmented, slowly gaining traction as battalions built relationships and proceeded through
trial and error.178 Kershaw also noted that reconciliation with erstwhile enemies actually
simplified very little. “We are working with a multitude of competing tribes who will
consistently seek to gain advantages against the other, and who will lie, cheat, and steal
to get a piece of the action that is emerging,” he advised subordinates in the summer
of 2007. “We are on the cusp of putting these people squarely in our court,” Kershaw
pressed, “Stay after it.”179
The final element of Kershaw’s approach was to broker peace between the local Sunni
fighters and the Iraqi security forces, especially Freiji’s Iraqi Army brigade, which had
taken heavy casualties against these same insurgents. Once he was satisfied that working
with the Sunni locals was a viable approach, Kershaw turned his attention to persuading Freiji and Iraqi 6th Division Commander Major General Abdul Ameer al-Lami of its
merits. Freiji was difficult to convince, at one point angrily calling one of Kershaw’s battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Suich, a “traitor” for making deals with local
insurgents. To involve Freiji closely in the Sunni volunteer initiative, Kershaw assigned
his field artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Morschauser, to spend
most of his time with the Iraqi commander, while Kershaw himself met with Freiji several times a week. As the months passed and Freiji grew more comfortable with the local
“volunteers” and with the coalition and ISF oversight of them, he eventually became an
advocate for the arrangement in appearances before Iraqi Government committees in
Baghdad, with Kershaw accompanying him to those meetings.180

Colonel Kershaw (second from left) with Colonel Ali Freiji (center).
Source: DoD photo by 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs (Released).

Colonel Michael Kershaw, Commander of the 2d BCT, 10th Mountain Division,
Walks With Colonel Ali Freiji, Commander of the 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi
Army Division, in the Mahmudiyah Marketplace.181
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By the time of its departure from Iraq during November 2007, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had 8,800 local Iraqi tribesmen incorporated into day-to-day security operations in the brigade’s sector, usually paid under security contracts funded by CERP, with
Petraeus’s and Odierno’s blessing.182 This Sunni tribal cooperation with Kershaw’s troops
and Freiji’s Iraqi Army brigade resulted in a staggering reduction of violence in what had
been a solid insurgent stronghold. Kershaw’s agreement with tribal irregulars led to the
apprehension of 85 insurgents on the brigade’s target lists.183 Where tribal fighters began
to cooperate in security operations, IED attacks on Kershaw’s troops plunged to nearly
zero, while successful raids against AQI operatives skyrocketed. In an area that had seen
only a thin security presence in 2006, Kershaw found himself in control of almost 20,000
counterinsurgents, including his 3,300 U.S. troops, Ali Freiji’s 5,500-strong Iraqi brigade,
1,500 Iraqi police, and the 8,800 local Awakening members—the equivalent of more than
a division’s worth of ground troops.184 After July 2007, the brigade did not suffer another
combat death.185
The Triangle of Death had experienced a total turnaround. Asked in fall 2007 what
percentage of the tribal irregulars in his area had been insurgents, Kershaw paused for a
moment and replied, “Probably all of them.”186
The Awakening in Babil Province
South and east of Kershaw, Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, experienced
similar summertime breakthroughs with the tribes across the BCT’s enormous sector of
Karbala, Najaf, and Babil Provinces. The brigade’s area, which had long been an economy
of force effort for MND-B, was strained by diverse threats at opposite ends of the battle
space. In its Shi’a-majority population centers, Shi’a militias such as the Badr Corps and
JAM vied for control, occasionally violently. The January battle against the Soldiers of
Heaven had occurred in Garrett’s sector, as had the AAH raid against U.S. police advisers in Karbala the previous week. These events had pulled the brigade’s attention to the
south. In the rural areas along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, however, Sunni militants
held sway, drawing the brigade’s attention north.187 With one of its three maneuver battalions detached to reinforce the Marines northeast of Fallujah, the brigade struggled to
control its portion of the southern belts and was forced to focus on the northern half of
Babil Province while Iraqi forces assumed responsibility for the rest.188 Like Kershaw,
Garrett maintained a generally favorable view of the Iraqi Army units with which he
worked, but could expect little from the police, though Babil police chief Major General
Qais Hamaz al-Mamouri proved both popular and dependable. The relative strength
of the 8th Iraqi Army Division, under the command of the highly regarded Major General Othman Ali Farhood al-Ghanimi, did not necessarily translate into a lighter burden
for Garrett.189 He still carried the responsibility of supplying and overseeing the military
transition teams stationed at the southern reaches of the expansive territory under his
purview in Karbala, Hillah, and even Diwaniyah, although Diwaniyah technically lay
inside the Polish-led MND-CS area of operations.190
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Colonel Garrett (left) and Brigadier General Sadiq Jafar Ali (right).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Steven Childers (Released).

Colonel Michael Garrett, Commander of the 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, and Brigadier General Sadiq Jafar Ali, Commander of the Diwaniya Provincial
Iraqi Police.191
In the north, closer to Baghdad, Garrett parceled out his available forces to manage
the risk of the vast sector. Jurf as-Sakhr, an insurgent hotbed on the Euphrates and a
stronghold of the Janabi tribe, was, according to the BCT commander, a “nasty little
place” where “every day was a movement to contact.”192 Without adequate U.S. or Iraqi
forces to occupy it, the town remained an enemy safe haven. To the north and east, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Odom’s cavalry squadron faced a similar situation in the Arab
Jabour region along the Tigris. Headquartered on the southern edge of the capital and
somewhat disconnected from Garrett’s other battalions, the squadron encountered difficulty expanding its forward presence because of its own limited size and a shortage
of capable Iraqi forces.193 One of Odom’s patrol bases astride a prime infiltration route
4 miles outside Baghdad came under attack almost daily. On April 12, AQI struck the
company-sized outpost with a truck bomb loaded with 600 pounds of homemade explosives, killing four U.S. Soldiers and wounding nine.194 Reporting on the attack, Petraeus
highlighted the “frontline nature” of such bases, stating that a strategy featuring a “visible, constant presence” was “not without risk.”195 Still, even the right approach required
sufficient resources. Without mutually supporting positions and enough U.S. and Iraqi
troops to patrol their surroundings, forward bases were exposed and, at times, besieged.
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The cavalry squadron abandoned the vulnerable patrol base in mid-June in conjunction
with a realignment of battle space as the final surge brigade arrived.196
Although Garrett’s thinly stretched brigade struggled with its vast battle space,
tribal security initiatives accelerated through the spring and began to succeed as Sunni
sheikhs who had been fighting a losing battle against both Shi’a enemies and Sunni terrorists approached coalition commanders to offer their cooperation. In early February
2007, Emad Mohammed Talel, a sheikh of the Khartani tribe, met with American leaders at Garrett’s headquarters at forward operating base Kalsu in Iskandariyah and proposed raising a force of 5,000 Sunni irregulars to fight AQI and drive JAM from the area.
Focused at the time on propping up formal governance and the Iraqi security forces, the
brigade discounted his offer as outlandish and risky, not least because Sheikh Emad was
reputed to be an AQI leader himself and was known to have carried out attacks on the
Iraqi police.197 However, as other tribal groups continued to approach Garrett’s troops
to ask for security assistance in exchange for information on insurgent activity, the brigade’s judgement changed.198 Sheikh Emad went on to organize the North Babil Tribal
Council, which convened with much fanfare at a May 15 ceremony hosted by Garrett
in which council members pledged to support the Iraqi Government, oppose sectarian
behavior, and stop intertribal violence.199 The raising of a tribal security force followed
quickly afterward.
Garrett and his brigade threw their weight behind this tribal initiative in part because
U.S. leaders had become disillusioned with the abysmal performance of the local Iraqi
Government. After several months of frustration, commanders in Garrett’s area finally
concluded that the official bureaucracy was akin to a sponge, “soaking up assets with no
appreciable movement.”200 Finding that such entities “just seemed to swell and ask for
more” without benefiting the people, the brigade sought to promote good governance
through less formal venues.201 U.S. Army units elsewhere had arrived at a similar conclusion.202 So, too, had Petraeus, who had begun to hope that the Sunni movement mobilizing against AQI might lead to the emergence of a more effective alternative to the Iraqi
Islamic Party.203
The kind of expansion Petraeus envisioned was not far from what the Sunni sheikhs
and former insurgent leaders of the Baghdad belts had in mind. As they watched the
Zobaie tribe benefit from new security agreements with coalition troops in Anbar and the
Triangle of Death, sheikhs from the Dulaimi and Janabi tribes farther down the Euphrates River sought to replicate the Zobaie tribe’s accommodation with local coalition forces.
Emboldened by Sattar’s success in Anbar and sensing their own opportunity, these onetime supporters of the Sunni insurgency turned on AQI rather suddenly. Once the scales
tipped—often over the course of tribal infighting—factions choosing not to reconcile with
the coalition were betrayed and rooted out quickly.204 In Jurf as-Sakhr and across the
southern swath of Garrett’s sector, U.S. forces and tribal leaders soon recruited more than
1,400 irregulars, including Shi’a farmers who signed on to combat the unwelcome militia
influence.205 To the north, in Hawr Rajab on the outskirts of Baghdad, Sheikh Ali Majid
al-Dulaimi cut his ties with the insurgency after AQI murdered his father, abducted his
cousin, and burned down his house.206 With coalition support, he would mobilize nearly
200 tribal fighters to secure the town by mid-fall 2007.207
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Across MND-C’s area of operations, agreements like these between sheikhs and
former Sunni insurgent leaders on one side and U.S. commanders on the other eventually would generate a massive indigenous force of tens of thousands of Sunni fighters.
Most were eventually paid as security contractors, costing the coalition an average of
$8 per fighter per day—a price that coalition commanders considered a bargain for the
improved security it helped to buy.208
THE AWAKENING REACHES BAGHDAD
The Insurgents of Baghdad
The Awakening movement that began in Anbar and spread to the regions south of
Baghdad had a profound impact on the various insurgent groups and leaders operating
in the Iraqi capital. By early 2007, the Sunni insurgency in the city and its close suburbs
had settled into distinct areas where Baghdadis and Iraqi military commanders recognized what groups tended to dominate, and often recognized which insurgent commanders dominated certain neighborhoods. In addition to the presence of AQI in the
city and its environs, Iraqi military commanders saw the insurgent enemy organized in
seven main geographical areas. East of the Tigris River in Adhamiyah, a contingent of
Jaish al-Islami operated under the command of Sheikh Wathiq al-Ubaidi, a Sunni cleric.
Also in Adhamiyah, a group of former Iraqi military officers constituted another insurgent network, calling itself the “Free Officers.” Iraqi military officials believed the Free
Officers were linked to the Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi, and
Hashimi’s assassinated brother, General Amer Hashimi. Meanwhile, in the farming areas
just beyond Adhamiyah, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades maintained a presence. These
three groups were engaged in a violent struggle with the adjacent Shi’a-majority areas of
Sadr City, Sha’ab, and Ur. Also east of the Tigris, a group of local Sunni insurgents dominated the Fadhel neighborhood under the command of Adel al-Mashadani, a community
strongman whose fighters had purged Fadhel of its minority Shi’a population by early
2007.209
West of the Tigris, a contingent of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades operated in the
Hayy al Adel neighborhood under the command of the sons of senior Iraqi Parliamentarian Adnan Dulaimi, himself a former leader of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood and one
of the leaders of the Sunni Parliamentary bloc. To the south of the Dulaimis’ turf, AQI
maintained a stronghold in the large Dora neighborhood. To the west, just outside the
walls of Camp Victory, a Jaish al-Islami contingent operated in the Ameriyah area under
commanders associated with Ameriyah’s Firdas Mosque.210
On the city’s outskirts, major insurgent bases were found in Abu Ghraib and in the
Taji area. In Taji and Tarmiyah, in addition to Abu Ghazwan’s AQI network, a potent
insurgent organization operated under Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmed al-Dabash. Dabash
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and his family originally were based in the Shi’a-majority neighborhood of Hurriyah, but
when Shi’a militias expelled Sunnis from Hurriyah in the early days of the war, he had
relocated to the area near Taji and Tarmiyah and organized his insurgent force under
the auspices of both the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and Jaish al-Islami. Dabash had
dispatched fighters and terrorists into west Baghdad to attack the Shi’a population there,
especially in his old neighborhood of Hurriyah. Over time, Dabash would pledge his
allegiance to al-Qaeda and become a senior AQI commander.211
Finally, in Abu Ghraib three major insurgent groups all had a large following. The
1920 Revolutionary Brigades had a sizable organization there under the command of the
family of Harith al-Dhari in nearby Zaidon. AQI had a strong presence as well, under the
command of a former Iraqi Army officer named Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed, who
had been an Iraqi staff college graduate before 2003. Mohammed was captured and held
in Camp Cropper in 2006, but his network survived. Finally, Jaish al-Islami had a large
contingent under the command of Abu Azzam, who served as Jaish al-Islami’s security
chief for Anbar Province.212
This Iraqi understanding of the geography and leaders of the Sunni insurgency was
often more nuanced than the coalition’s appreciation of the enemy situation, which
tended to focus on the more shadowy, cell-like al-Qaeda in Iraq networks such as the
Rusafa car-bomb ring headed by AQI commander Abu Nur. The AQI cells in Baghdad
tended to preserve their anonymity, but other insurgent groups were often well known
to Baghdadis. It was among these more prominent non-AQI groups that the Awakening
would have the greatest impact, as one insurgent commander after another would face a
choice between submission to AQI or accommodation with the coalition.
Breakthrough at Abu Ghraib
As the Awakening spread from eastern Anbar into the region south of Baghdad, it
also spread to the western outskirts of the capital city. The town of Abu Ghraib, the western gateway into Baghdad, had been a stronghold of the insurgent group Jaish al-Islami
for 3 years, but in late 2006, the group’s local leader Abu Azzam faced a crisis. He had
watched his organization dwindle in relation to AQI, and with Jaish al-Islami’s national
leadership shifting its emphasis to other parts of Iraq, the cells under Abu Azzam’s direction found it difficult to find funding and retain their independence in AQI’s shadow. In
an insurgency characterized by rapidly shifting alliances and easy individual migration
from one group to another, the threat of mass defections to AQI loomed. Meanwhile,
Jaish al-Islami ranks thinned as continuous coalition operations took their toll, and the
growth of the Awakening took more potential recruits off the board, making combat
losses harder to replace. Like other Sunni insurgent groups in the Baghdad belts, the
Abu Ghraib insurgents also found themselves increasingly pressured by the Iraqi Government forces and by Shi’a militias, and the idea of a truce with one of their multiple
enemies made increasing sense over time.
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Unlike Jaysh al-Islami’s national leaders, Abu Azzam favored a cease-fire with the
coalition in order to improve Jaish al-Islami’s position vis-à-vis the Sunni extremists
operating in Anbar and, ultimately, as a hedge against Shi’a militias. The insurgent leader
met with Iraqi Vice President Hashimi to discuss the terms of a cease-fire several times in
late October and shared the idea with other resistance groups, but senior Jaysh al-Islami
leader Mahmud Janabi disapproved. Abu Azzam shared his cease-fire idea with other
insurgent groups as well, but Ansar al Sunna, for its part, stood opposed to a truce with
“unbelievers” on ideological grounds. When AQI began moving against Abu Azzam and
his last remaining fighters in December 2006, he turned to Baghdad and the coalition for
help.213 He found a receptive audience at MNF-I, where Abu Azzam appeared to Lamb to
be one of those Sunni leaders who “saw the writing on the wall” and realized the Sunni
insurgents could not carry on a four-way war against the coalition, the ISF, the Shi’a militias, and AQI all at once.214
The local U.S. commander in Abu Ghraib had come to the same conclusion. Arriving
in town in November 2006 at the head of 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant
Colonel Kurt J. Pinkerton had heard about tentative talks with local insurgents and hoped
to use this connection to reduce violence in the restive town.215 Assigned to Colonel Paul
E. Funk’s 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Pinkerton’s squadron shared the two standing
tasks of its parent unit: maintaining freedom of movement on the supply routes running
out of the city and protecting the flank of MND-B as it secured the population in Baghdad’s neighborhoods. Occupying the upper-left quadrant of the belts, Funk’s BCT sat
astride a major line of communications traversing Tarmiyah and Taji to connect Baqubah
with the insurgent stronghold above Fallujah near Lake Tharthar. Its boundaries aligned
roughly with the territory of Abu Ghazwan, the al-Qaeda emir whose activity effectively
linked Baghdad to foreign fighter facilitation networks in the north.216 Significant in its
own right, Pinkerton’s sector on the brigade’s southern edge was the gateway to the capital. The squadron’s sector included the area where insurgents had destroyed a coalition
supply convoy and abducted and killed Army Specialist Keith M. Maupin during the
April 2004 uprisings. The local insurgents Pinkerton would engage were likely those who
had carried out the attack, and perhaps Abu Azzam among them.
Nonetheless, in the interest of exploring any local engagement that might prevent
attacks on his troops, the squadron commander attended a meeting arranged by Lamb’s
reconciliation cell in late 2006 and began working with Abu Azzam. The Jaish al-Islami
security chief told Pinkerton that his fighters could clamp down on AQI operations in
and around Abu Ghraib, piquing the colonel’s interest but not alleviating his suspicion.217
Pinkerton approached the relationship cautiously, “building the bridge as he walked
across it,” as one colleague termed it.218 In the first months of 2007, Abu Azzam’s men
helped U.S. troops mainly by providing intelligence tips, but under pressure from AQI
and the local Iraqi Army unit, the Jaish al-Islami leader desired to put the agreement with
the Americans on a firmer footing. As the Ramadi tribes had done, Abu Azzam eventually hoped to have his men recognized as their area’s official security forces and put on
the Iraqi Government payroll, an idea Pinkerton endorsed.219
This vision put Pinkerton squarely at odds with Brigadier General Nasser Ghanam,
commander of the 3d Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, known as the Muthanna Brigade.
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Lieutenant Colonel Pinkerton (left) Abu Azzam (right).
Source: DoD photo by Specialist Shea Butler (Released).

Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Pinkerton Meets With Awakening Leader Abu Azzam.220
Although Ghanam presented himself as a professional, the general reportedly maintained ties with
both Shi’a militia leaders and AQI, periodically releasing prisoners or returning confiscated equipment in
exchange for bribes. When Pinkerton approached
Ghanam about the budding accommodation with
Abu Azzam, the Iraqi commander feigned support—
even after receiving instructions from Baghdad
to keep his distance. Soon, the Muthanna Brigade
began raiding sites where Pinkerton held meetings
with former insurgents; however, the U.S. colonel
saw through the charade and shifted his meetings to
places outside the Muthanna Brigade’s sector.221
Despite the Iraqi commander’s attempts to sabotage the effort, by April 2007, the engagements
between U.S. forces and Abu Azzam had reached
the point of mobilizing another large emergency
response unit of Sunni fighters opposed to AQI and
friendly to the coalition. On April 23, Pinkerton
drove to a rural schoolhouse to meet again with Abu
Azzam, who had pledged to raise a substantial force
to assist with security in Abu Ghraib. The view that

175

Source: U.S. Army photo by United
States Forces-Iraq.

Staff Brigadier General Nasser
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greeted the U.S. commander when he arrived astonished him. As promised, a few thousand Iraqi men—most from the Zobaie tribe—had gathered to enroll in provisional units
forming under Abu Azzam. Present at the gathering to help organize the throng of volunteers was Abu Maruf, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades commander from Zaidon who
would soon after strike a cooperative agreement with Kershaw in the Triangle of Death.
Abu Maruf’s active participation illustrated the interconnected nature of local insurgent
groups as they tentatively cast their lot with the coalition in a broader communal struggle for power. It also highlighted the often-neglected agility that tribal ties afforded the
insurgency. The fact that Abu Maruf happened to be on Pinkerton’s high-value target list
suggested something about the complex negotiations that lay ahead as bottom-up reconciliation went mainstream.223
At MNC-I, Odierno considered the watershed event of that day and saw it as a chance
to shut down AQI in Abu Ghraib and “close the gate to the west.” However, Odierno
and other coalition leaders were alarmed when it appeared that the fleeing opportunity
in Abu Ghraib might soon be lost.224 In the week after Abu Azzam’s recruiting drive, the
Muthanna Brigade had gone looking for trouble at the site of the gathering and wound
up inciting a mob that threatened to overwhelm an isolated Iraqi Army platoon. Called
to the scene, Pinkerton restored order and rescued the platoon by requesting coalition
fighter aircraft to buzz the crowd as a show of force. The squadron commander was in the
middle of a dispute that would quickly escalate to a major point of contention between
U.S. forces and the Maliki government.
Like Odierno, Petraeus was struck by the decline in attacks around Abu Ghraib following the organization of local opposition to AQI and grasped both the potential and
urgency of the initiative. On May 12, he reported to Gates that the coalition had “a fairly
tight window of opportunity to permanently drive a wedge between Sunnis and AQI.”225
He also noted the challenge of persuading Maliki that the U.S. military’s relationship with
Abu Azzam supported the fielding of a provisional police force, not the arming of a Sunni
militia that would be a threat to the Iraqi Government.226 For his part, the Prime Minister
saw little difference between the two. In his view, Abu Azzam was “tricky as a fox” and
“a chameleon who changed his color” to suit the circumstances.227 Paranoid when it came
to anything tinged with the possibility of Ba’athist resurgence, Maliki viewed the developments on Baghdad’s doorstep with “considerable angst,” as Petraeus put it.228
This difference in attitudes between the Iraqi leader and the coalition commanders
meant that Maliki was not inclined to rein in Nasser and his troops in Abu Ghraib, where
the Muthanna Brigade’s aggressiveness toward Abu Azzam’s men, and Sunnis in general,
jeopardized the fragile accommodation the coalition had forged with insurgent leaders.
By mid-May, Abu Azzam and other local Sunni leaders demanded Nasser’s reassignment
or the removal of his brigade. Elevated to higher echelons, the issue became a matter of
priority to MND-B as Odierno’s frustration spiked.229 The engagement, an important test
case for the Anbar Awakening’s expansion, was “ready to fall apart,” Odierno believed.230
The enmity between Nasser’s Muthanna Brigade and Sunni resistance groups at the local
level pointed to a more serious obstacle. On June 2, Petraeus offered Gates a rundown of
how the Prime Minister and his co-sectarians likely viewed the matter.
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If we were to ask the Maliki government if they support Sunni tribal engagement and reconciliation,
they would answer “yes.” In Sunni provinces like Anbar and Salah ad Din, they would likely mean
“yes.” Closer to Baghdad, they might say “yes,” but would act to slow roll any movement. In
places like Diyala, they might say “yes,” but would be very unsure of how to proceed. The appetite
of the Shi’a leadership for Sunni tribal engagement lessens significantly as the issue gets closer to
Shi’a towns and neighborhoods.231

In retrospect, it also might have been the case in Abu Ghraib that Maliki was not
simply declining to rein in an obstructive Iraqi commander, but was directing the commander’s actions. In later years, the coalition would find that Nasser and Maliki had close
personal ties that potentially meant Nasser was acting on Maliki’s instructions. As the
coalition looked to expand the Awakening geographically and to solidify the resulting
security gains by integrating Sunni tribesmen into the Iraqi Army and police, the central
government’s hostility to the idea would prove increasingly problematic.
The Awakening Inside the Capital City
In Baghdad, as in Anbar and Abu Ghraib, the Awakening expanded in the wake
of crisis. By 2007, Sunnis in west Baghdad’s Mansour District had been pressured for
months by the Shi’a militias’ expansion across west Baghdad. Living adjacent to the massive coalition base at Camp Victory and at the convergence of two axes of Shi’a militia
encroachment, residents in the Sunni enclave of Ameriyah felt especially besieged. Local
community leaders with ties to the insurgency initially had regarded AQI as an ally,
enough so that in 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been able to convene an AQI leadership summit in the neighborhood. However, Ameriyah’s residents came to regret this
relationship once the terrorist group acquired enough power to dominate the neighborhood.232 Fighters driven from Haifa Street following U.S.-Iraqi clearing operations in January 2007 gravitated to Ameriyah and reinforced AQI’s contingent there.233 As had been
the case in Anbar, the AQI fighters soon alienated Ameriyah’s population by carrying out
a campaign of murder and intimidation while continuing attacks that shut down the local
economy and disrupted basic services. As a result, local leaders began to reconsider the
logic that had led them to support the group.234
This change in popular attitudes came just as Colonel J. B. Burton and his 2d Brigade,
1st Infantry Division, established a permanent presence among the population through
new combat outposts and joint security stations in early 2007. Three additional battalions
flowing into Burton’s sector between January and May as part of the surge reinforced
this effort and allowed Burton to concentrate Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. Kuehl’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, in Ameriyah as other units focused on curtailing JAM’s
aggressive sectarian forays elsewhere.235 As events would soon show, Burton’s troops’
expanding presence in west Baghdad would enable local Sunnis to challenge AQI.
The first weeks in Ameriyah were difficult, however. Clearing operations in April
spearheaded by 3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, seemed to accomplish little,
apart from prompting more deadly attacks against coalition forces patrolling the AQI
stronghold. Three deep-buried IEDs exploded the first week of May, killing five Soldiers
and one interpreter. Kuehl and his battalion responded by ramping up the frequency of
patrols and targeted raids while scouting for a suitable site for the battalion’s first forward
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outpost in Ameriyah. When the outpost was emplaced on May 19, another deep-buried
IED killed six Americans and one interpreter. The frustrated Kuehl upbraided Sheikh
Waleed al-Asawi, an influential cleric at Ameriyah’s Firdas Mosque, demanding he do
something to assist the coalition’s fight against an enemy that threatened both U.S. troops
and the local population.236
The U.S. battalion commander did not know it at the time, but the backlash against
AQI already had begun. Sa’ad Uraibi Ghafari, also known as Abu Abed, a Jaysh al-Islami operative and Saddam-era army officer whose two brothers had been tortured and
killed by Shi’a militiamen, had resolved to fight AQI after the group planted an IED
near his house despite his objections. With the backing of local clerics, Abu Abed began
targeting AQI fighters for assassination.237 As his military revolt against AQI kicked off,
popular dissent against the terrorist group peaked. When AQI operatives tried to kidnap
an elderly Christian and, amid the scuffle, humiliated his wife by yanking off her skirt,
it struck a nerve among Ameriyah residents. Asawi witnessed the disgraceful scene and,
considering the mounting beatings and beheadings AQI had carried out, determined that
the time finally had come to take a stand.238

Abu Abed (left), Lieutenant Colonel Kuehl (second from left), and General Petraeus (center).
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Awakening Leader Abu Abed Meets With Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. Kuehl,
General David Petraeus, and Senior Iraqi Leaders in Ameriyah.239
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On May 29, Sheikh Asawi informed Kuehl that armed volunteers planned to attack
AQI at noon the next day. The Americans simply needed to stay out of the way, the religious leader advised. Taken aback by the unexpected development, Kuehl countered
by suggesting the U.S. battalion should handle it, but then relented after it became clear
that Ameriyah locals intended to carry out the operation with or without his approval.240
When several mosque loudspeakers broadcast the call to arms, Abu Abed and dozens of
fighters attacked the AQI base at the Maluki Mosque, where a chaotic firefight went in
the attackers’ favor.241 The euphoric Sheikh Asawi relayed to Kuehl that they had secured
two-thirds of the neighborhood by sundown.242
However, when AQI launched a furious counterattack the next day, most of Abu
Abed’s contingent melted away, while a remnant fell back several blocks to the Firdas
Mosque and requested American assistance. In a scenario not unlike the late-2006 U.S.
rescue of the Albu Soda tribe outside of Ramadi, Kuehl dispatched two Strykers that
arrived to find Abu Abed and a half-dozen of his men fighting for their lives against the
AQI assault.243 With the Strykers on site, the AQI attack dissipated. Over the next several
days, a combined force of Americans, ISF, and Ameriyah locals reasserted control in the
neighborhood, killing 10 enemy fighters and capturing 15 in the process.244
During the weeks that followed, Kuehl and Abu Abed forged an informal alliance
that Burton sanctioned. The U.S. troops and Iraqis established a joint command and control center in southeast Ameriyah and began to plan operations against AQI. Unknown
to Kuehl, Abu Azzam, champion of the April cease-fire in Abu Ghraib, had been summoned to lend his experience to the organization of this latest manifestation of the Awakening. In the meantime, Burton approached the commander of 5th Brigade, 6th Iraqi
Army Division, with a request for support. Surprisingly amenable, the Iraqi commander
arranged for the delivery of 30,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, as well as medical
care for Abu Abed’s wounded.245 Formal integration into the security apparatus would
take time, but, in principle, the volunteers filled a crucial gap in Ameriyah, where there
virtually had been no police and the population distrusted the Iraqi Army.246 Combined
patrols comprised of U.S. Soldiers, Iraqi troops, and Abu Abed’s fighters sought to normalize relations between the locals and the ISF, but they also occasionally led to verbal
clashes between Iraqi Army commanders and their former insurgent enemies.247
Adopting the name “Knights of the Land of Two Rivers,” Abu Abed’s group grew
quickly to 300 fighters in summer 2007, with many of the men serving without pay in
the initial months.248 Clad in tracksuits and toting AK-47s and RPGs, the Ameriyah volunteers looked, to Kuehl’s troops, no different from AQI. In a bizarre scene that would
become relatively common in 2007, some of the Sunni fighters donned black ski masks
as they deployed for security operations atop the American Soldiers’ Bradley Fighting
Vehicles. The Ameriyah fighters generally impressed American observers with their military bearing and tactical skill. Later, Abu Abed outfitted his men with combat fatigues
and gear that gave them the sharp, professional appearance of shade-wearing security
contractors but made observers from the Iraqi Government nervous. “Who are these
guys really?” one U.S. officer wondered.249 Indeed, many, like their leader, had prior
military experience in addition to their affiliation with Jaysh al-Islami. In an unexpected
twist, Kuehl provided this organization of former enemies and once hostile or ambivalent
bystanders a dedicated advisory team manned from his own limited ranks.250 As the U.S.
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commander saw it, the Ameriyah Knights provided him with an additional battalion of
light infantry, and their impact on security was well worth the investment.251 After losing
14 Soldiers in May, Kuehl’s unit suffered no major attacks from early August until its
departure in January 2008. Murders and kidnappings, which had hovered around 30 per
month in Ameriyah in the spring, plummeted to an average of 4 during the latter half of
the year.252
For Petraeus, the events in Kuehl’s sector in May and June marked a crucial turning
point. By committing their troops to fight alongside erstwhile insurgents and then supplying them with ammunition, Burton and Kuehl both had pushed the limits of acceptable
risk. But the spectacle of Baghdad Sunnis decisively cutting their ties to AQI and risking
their lives to identify terrorist hideouts, point out IEDs, and locate weapons caches made
the MNF-I commander determined to support the initiative in spite of the likelihood of
infuriating the Maliki government.253 In any case, “nothing else worked in Ameriyah,”
Kuehl observed.254 A trip to see 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and observe Abu
Abed’s men on patrol left Petraeus convinced that what the coalition had witnessed in
Anbar could indeed be cultivated elsewhere.255 “Ameriyah stands as a promising example
of the general concept of local people helping secure local neighborhoods,” he told Gates
on June 9.256 However, to be sustained, the Awakening’s expansion had to be accompanied by a parallel effort to integrate newly allied fighters into the security forces. “The
key,” Petraeus wrote, “is to formalize the volunteers as quickly as possible by linking
them with Iraqi and coalition forces, as we did in Anbar.”257 Each case would be different,
he anticipated.258
Developments elsewhere in the city showed the MNF-I commander was right. Just
north of Ameriyah, another local Sunni security arrangement grew out of stability rather
than out of an all-out fight against AQI as Ameriyah had witnessed. In Ghazaliyah, Burton’s BCT had established a “safe neighborhood” protected from terrorist attacks by
concrete barriers and nearby combat outposts and joint security stations.259 As they had
done so, a former Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel approached locally based U.S. Soldiers to
propose a neighborhood watch group that would staff checkpoints and conduct limited
patrols. The well-organized Ghazaliyah “Guardians,” as they became known, initially
performed their duties without weapons, content to leave the hunting of extremists to
the Americans and the Iraqi security forces. Even inside a single BCT sector, two sets of
volunteers with distinct motivations and characteristics emerged.260
East of the Tigris River, by contrast, tensions exacerbated by intra-Sunni violence
led to further fracturing in the summer as long-time insurgent Sheikh Wathiq al-Ubaidi
openly broke with AQI after extremists murdered two of his nephews in Adhamiya.261
In nearby Fadhil, Sunni insurgent strongman Adel al-Mashhadani reached an agreement
with a battalion commander assigned to 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, after a ferocious gunfight with the Americans and Iraqi troops on April 10, 2007, left about a dozen
of his men dead. The arrangement effectively saved the insurgent leader from carrying
on an exhausting two-front war, allowing him to focus on the JAM onslaught emanating from Sadr City. Even as U.S. reconstruction money flowed into Fadhil, Adel maintained loose ties to AQI—though he would cut them completely in the fall after a suicide
bomber’s attempt on his life.262 Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, a growing
number of “awakenings” like these would emerge in the Baghdad region, and coalition
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commanders would increasingly choose to exploit these opportunities lest they wither
on the vine.
***
By the late summer of 2007, the series of local cease-fires between coalition troops and
Sunni insurgents accumulated into a broad movement that changed the security conditions and political situation across large regions of western and central Iraq. With more
than 20,000 Anbari tribesmen joining security initiatives against AQI, the once-violent
Anbar Province was well on its way to becoming the safest region in Iraq less than a year
after it had been the location of an al-Qaeda emirate. The region formerly known as the
Triangle of Death sat pacified, with almost 9,000 former Sunni insurgents joining the coalition and expelling AQI from one of its former strongholds. The AQI and Jaysh al-Islami
bases of Abu Ghraib and Ameriyah had become the headquarters of anti-AQI movements totaling more than 1,500 and 300 Sunni fighters, respectively. Thousands more
Sunni fighters mobilized to join similar efforts throughout central Iraq as well.
The effect of these local security arrangements was clear. Though aggregate U.S. casualties and aggregate insurgent attacks in Iraq remained high, in each area where Awakening groups had begun to cooperate with U.S. troops in security operations, attacks
dropped to near zero. The value of brokering cease-fires with insurgents and then joining
forces with them in the shared fight against AQI went beyond statistics charting the drop
in attacks and casualties or the steady rise in caches and IEDs found—as significant as
those numbers were. Just as the surge in BCTs extended the operational reach of coalition
forces and enabled the clearing of longtime enemy safe havens, so too did the Awakening
and the concurrent growth of its members. Throughout central and western Iraq, Sunni
fighters allied with the coalition complemented the escalation of U.S. troop levels, limiting AQI’s freedom of movement as their presence expanded.263 After 4 years in which
U.S. units had been thinly stretched across violent, vast Iraqi territories, some coalition
brigade and division commanders in mid-2007 finally found themselves with enough
U.S. troops due to the ongoing surge, enough ISF partners, and enough Sunni auxiliaries
to control their areas of operations. In eastern Anbar, the southern belts, and west Baghdad, the counterinsurgent lines had been strengthened enough to force AQI out of its
operating and support zones for the first time.
The process of striking these agreements with recent enemies was neither easy nor
without risk for many coalition units. After 4 years of warfare against many of these
same Sunni fighters, U.S. commanders had to balance caution and trust. Given that many
Awakening leaders had been senior insurgents responsible for American deaths, some
commanders were reluctant to move too quickly in entering into any agreement with
these former enemies. When leaders at the tactical level, such as Kershaw and his subordinates, witnessed the dramatic reduction in violence locally, they measured the gains in
terms of the number of American lives saved and found the risks associated with reconciliation worth taking. This was particularly true once it became clear in early 2007 that
senior commanders like Petraeus and Odierno stood ready to underwrite those risks—
and to make the creation of local cease-fires with Awakening groups a top priority for the
coalition for the first time.
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For many of the Sunnis who chose to make peace with the coalition and turn against
AQI, the impetus to make this fateful change was clear. Fighting a war on multiple fronts
against the coalition; AQI and other extremists; the Shi’a-dominant Iraqi security forces;
and, in mixed areas, Shi’a militias like JAM, desperate and besieged Sunnis reached out
to the foe they deemed least menacing to their way of life. This proved to be the coalition.
However, the participation of the Iraqi Government remained the missing element
in the initiative. Prime Minister Maliki and many other senior Iraqi officials looked with
alarm on what appeared to them to be a U.S. military campaign to arm and organize
Sunnis intent on overthrowing the government. To ease such fears and to solidify the
security gains of the Awakening, MNF-I would need to formalize the processes linking
local reconciliation efforts with the Iraqi Government, as the Joint Strategic Assessment
Team had recommended. Whether the short-term gains in the Awakening areas could
be converted into a sustainable long-term arrangement remained to be seen. Tensions
between MNF-I and the Iraqi Government over the initiative would take months to settle.
In the meantime, Petraeus and Odierno remained determined to build on the momentum that the surge of U.S. troops and the Awakening had generated. As the final surge
brigade arrived in June 2007, they prepared to launch one of the war’s largest operations
to retake the operational initiative in the Baghdad belts and Diyala, aiming to push AQI
out of striking distance from the Iraqi capital for good.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Interview, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group with
Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, January 27, 2014; Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed
Opportunities in Iraq, New York: Public Affairs, 2015, p. 179; Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with
General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013,
p. 85. All unpublished documents in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are in the Chief of Staff of the
Army (CSA) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group archives, Army Heritage and Education
Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA.
2. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Lamb, January 27, 2014, pp. 224-246.
3. Sky, The Unraveling, p. 179.
4. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, New York: Penguin Group, 2013, p. 248.
5. U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Dawn M. Price, “Polish Army Maj. Gen. Bronislaw Kwiatkowski, left, commander, Multi-National Division - Central South (MND-CS), speaks with British Army
Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, center, deputy commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, at the MND-CS Headquarters building on Camp Echo, Iraq, Oct. 5, 2006, during an office visit to obtain an operations intelligence
update and meet with the deputy commanding general of the 8th Division Iraqi Army,” DIMOC Identifier
061005-F-XM360-116, October 5, 2006, Released to Public.
6. Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Weekly Update, February 17-23,
2007.
7. See, for example, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 179, January 2,
2007, pp. 2-3.
8. Interview, Colonel Michael Visconage, MNC-I Historian with Lieutenant General Raymond T.
Odierno, June 24, 2007.

182

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

9. Ibid.
10. Timothy S. McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening, American Perspectives, Vol.
I, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009, p. 179.
11. Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War,
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 133.
12. William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV, “Al Anbar Awakening: AO Topeka,
Ramadi Area,” Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013, p. A-18.
13. Interview, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) with Brigadier General John R. Allen, April
23, 2009, p. 236.
14. Interview, William Knarr, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Graves, United States Marine Corps (USMC)
and Ms. Mary Hawkins with Sterling Jensen, October 20, 2010, p. A-41, in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The
Awakening, Vol. IV.
15. Interview, CMH with Allen, April 23, 2009, p. 236.
16. Interview, Knarr, Graves, and Hawkins with Jensen, October 20, 2010, p. A-41, in Knarr et al., Al
Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV.
17. Mansoor, Surge, p. 134.
18. E-mail, General David H. Petraeus to Colonel Joel Rayburn, February 3, 2016.
19. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant D. Myles Cullen, “Pace Visits Troops in Ramadi, Iraq,
[Image 6 of 11],” July 17, 2007, Released to Public, available from http://archive.defense.gov/dodcmsshare/
photoessay/2007-07/hires_070717-F-0193C-036a.jpg.
20. MNC-I, FRAGO 179, p. 7; Interview, Colonel Michael Visconage, MNC-I Historian, with Major
General Walter E. Gaskin, June 26, 2007.
21. Interviews, Knarr et al., with Major General Richard C. Zilmer, January 1, 2007, p. 142; Knarr et
al., with Robert B. Neller, January 23, 2007, pp. 164, 169-170. Both in William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The
Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, “Anbar Province Area of Operations Atlanta—The Insurgency,” Alexandria,
VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013.
22. William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-1–6-2.
23. MNF-I Battle Update Assessment, BUA, April 8, 2007.
24. Interviews, Knarr et al., with Neller, January 23, 2007, p. 167, in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar
Awakening, Vol. IIA.
25. Interviews, Knarr, Graves, and Hawkins with Jensen, October 20, 2010, p. A-41, in Knarr et al., Al
Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV; USMC History Division with Kurt Ebaugh, May 27, 2007, USMC History
Division, Quantico, VA.
26. Interview, MNC-I Historian with Major General Gaskin, June 26, 2007.
27. Briefing, MNC-I, Intelligence Fusion Brief, March 14, 2007.
28. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV, pp. 2-24–2-25.

183

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

29. Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds., From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in
Iraq, 2004-2009: Al-Anbar Awakening, Vol. II, “Iraqi Perspectives,” Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University
Press, 2009, pp. 194-195.
30. Interview, Steven Clay, Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Contemporary Operations Study Team, with
Colonel John W. Charlton, December 9, 2009.
31. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, February 17-23, 2007; MNF-I BUA, February 19, 2007; Odierno
Iraq Notebook No. 5, February 22, 2007, entry.
32. Briefing, MNC-I, Intelligence Fusion Brief, March 14, 2007.
33. DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell, “P4 with Colonel Charlton in Ramadi,” July 7, 2007,
Released to Public.
34. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV, pp. 2-24–2-25.
35. Ibid., p. A-224; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV, pp. A-21–A-22.
36. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, February 24-March 2, 2007; Interview, CSI with Charlton,
December 9, 2009; Interview, CSI with Charlton, December 9, 2009; Interview, CSI with Charlton, October
20, 2010; William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV-A: “Area of Operations Topeka, East
Ramadi, and the Shark Fins,” Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013, pp. 2-16–2-18.
37. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010,
pp. A-227–A-228; Briefing, MNC-I, Intelligence Fusion Brief, March 14, 2007.
38. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, March 10-16, 2007; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations
Study Team with Colonel Charlton, December 9, 2009.
39. Briefing, MNC-I, Intelligence Fusion Brief, March 14, 2007; Interview, CSI with Charlton, October
20, 2010, p. A-228.
40. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010,
p. A-229.
41. Interview, USMC History Division with Craig S. Kozeniesky, June 20, 2007, USMC History Division.
42. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010,
p. A-230.
43. Ibid., p. A-225.
44. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, December 9, 2009,
p. 26.
45. Ibid., p. 18; Interview, CSI with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010, p. A-250.
46. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-15–6-16.
47. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010,
p. A-240. See also Interview, Knarr, Graves, and Hawkins with Jensen, October 20, 2010, p. A-47, in Knarr
et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV.
48. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 28-May 4, 2007; in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-15–6-16.

184

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

49. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, March 17-23, 2007.
50. Ibid., March 10-16, 2007.
51. Ibid., March 17-23, 2007.
52. Ibid., April 21-27, 2007.
53. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, October 20, 2010,
p. A-250.
54. Ibid., MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 6-12, 2007; and May 13-19, 2007.
55. Ibid., January 9, 2008, pp. 15-16; December 9, 2009, pp. 16-17; and October 20, 2010, p. A-231.
56. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 7-13, 2007; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study
Team with Colonel Charlton, December 9, 2009, p. 14.
57. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, December 9, 2009,
p. 15; and October 20, 2010, pp. A-235–A-236.
58. Ibid., October 20, 2010, p. A-242; Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, January 9, 2008, pp. 20, 23; and December 9, 2009, p. 22.
59. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 14-20, 2007; in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening,
Vol. IIA, p. 6-16.
60. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, July 1-7, 2007.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Colonel Charlton, December 9,
2009, pp. 18-19.
63. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-2.
64. Briefing, Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) update, MNF-I Commander’s Conference, February
17, 2007; Interview, Lawrence Lessard, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. Crissman, December 1, 2009.
65. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Crissman, December 1, 2009.
66. Ibid.; MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, February 24-March 2, 2007; William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—
The Awakening, Vol. IIIB: “Al Anbar Province, Area of Operations Denver, Haditha-Hit Corridor,” Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013, pp. 2-22–2-23.
67. Ibid., p. 12; MNF-I BUA, March 5, 2007.
68. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, March 3-9, 2007.
69. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-9. Marines from the 1st Battalion, 2d
Marine Regiment, were dispatched to Baghdadi, a town on the Euphrates River roughly halfway between
Hadithah and Hit.
70. MNF-I BUA, March 26, 2007.
71. Ibid.; MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 21-27, 2007, and April 28-May 4, 2007.

185

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

72. MNF-I BUA, April 30, 2007.
73. Ibid., May 28, 2007, and June 11, 2007.
74. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Crissman, December 9, 2009.
75. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-1–6-2.
76. Interview, Knarr, Colonel Julian “Dale” Alford, USMC, and Major (Ret.) General Thomas Jones,
USMC, with Allen, March 16, 2010, pp. A-23–A-24, in William Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol.
II, “Al Anbar Province, Multi-National Force-West, Area of Operations Atlanta,” Alexandria, VA: Institute
for Defense Analyses, 2013; Interview, USMC History Division with Kurt Ebaugh, May 27, 2007.
77. Bobby Ghosh, “Al-Qaeda Loses an Iraqi Friend,” Time, May 14, 2007.
78. Captain Andrew E. Lembke, Commander, Charlie Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment,
“Zaidon Transition Paper,” March 2010.
79. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV, p. 2-11.
80. Interview, USMC History Division with Colonel Lawrence D. Nicholson, January 2, 2007, USMC
History Division.
81. Bill Roggio, “Securing Eastern Anbar Province,” Long War Journal, June 15, 2007, available from
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/06/securing_eastern_anb.php.
82. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, February 17-23, 2007; MNF-I BUA, March 5, 2007, and March 12,
2007; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-3, 6-8.
83. Interview, USMC History Division with Colonel Nicholson, January 2, 2007, USMC History Division.
84. Ibid.; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 6-7.
85. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, pp. 559-560.
86. MNF-W, Sunni Insurgency Study, June 13, 2007, p. 539.
87. Interview, USMC History Division with Nicholson, January 2, 2007, USMC History Division.
88. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-7.
89. MNF-I BUA, February 26, 2007; Interview, CMH with Allen, June 27, 2007.
90. Interview, CMH with Allen, March 16, 2010, pp. A-39–A-41, in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. IV.
91. Montgomery and McWilliams, eds., From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, pp.
87-88, 91-93; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-3.
92. Interview, Montgomery and McWilliams with Sheikh Aifan Sadoun al-Issawi, February 14, 2009,
pp. 93-94, in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. II.
93. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-10; Bill Roggio, “The Sunni Civil War,”
Long War Journal, March 27, 2007, available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/the_sunni_
civil_war.php.

186

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

94. Bill Ardolino, “Suicide Bomber Kills Iraqi Lawmaker Who Was Prominent Awakening Leader, and
5 others,” Long War Journal, January 15, 2013, available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/
suicide_bomber_kills_74.php.
95. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, June 24-30, 2007.
96. Interview, USMC History Division with Colonel Richard L. Simcock II, June 9, 2007, USMC History
Division.
97. Odierno Iraq Notebook No. 7, April 18, 2007, entry.
98. Roggio, “Securing Eastern Anbar Province.”
99. Ibid.; Interview, USMC History Division with Simcock, June 9, 2007; MNF-I BUA, May 7, 2007.
100. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-10; MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update,
March 24-30, 2007.
101. MNF-I BUA, March 5, 2007.
102. Lembke, “Zaidon Transition Paper,” March 2010.
103. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, March 17-23, 2007.
104. Ibid., March 24-30, 2007; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-13.
105. MNF-I BUA, April 16, 2007, and May 14, 2007.
106. Quoted from Ghosh, “Al-Qaeda Loses an Iraqi Friend.”
107. Quoted from Bill Roggio, “Islamic Army of Iraq Splits from al-Qaeda,” Long War Journal, April 12,
2007, available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/islamic_army_of_iraq.php.
108. Ibid.
109. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-14.
110. MNF-I BUA, May 7, 2007, slide 50. By mid-May, Ansar al Sunna had reaffirmed its allegiance to
al-Qaeda. See Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-17.
111. MNF-I BUA, June 11, 2007; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-18.
112. MNF-I BUA, June 4, 2007.
113. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, June 17-23, 2007.
114. Ibid., June 17-23, 2007; MNF-I BUA, June 18, 2007, and June 25, 2007; Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The
Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-19.
115. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 20-26, 2007.
116. Odierno Iraq Notebook No. 9, May 31, 2007, entry.
117. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, July 8-14, 2007.
118. Interview, MNC-I Historian with Allen, June 27, 2007, p. 14.
119. Interview, CMH with Allen, March 16, 2010, pp. A-30, A-34–A-35.

187

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

120. Ibid., April 23, 2009, pp. 232-333.
121. Ibid., p. 230.
122. Ibid., p. 231.
123. Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Anbar Awakening, Vol. IIA, p. 6-16.
124. Interview, CMH with Allen, June 27, 2007, p. 71.
125. MNF-I BUA, March 19, 2007, and July 2, 2007; Interview, MNC-I Historian with Gaskin, June 26,
2007.
126. Interview, CMH with Allen, June 27, 2007, pp. 74-75.
127. Ibid., pp. 13, 39.
128. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
129. Ibid., March 16, 2010, pp. A-39–A-41.
130. MNF-I BUA, June 18, 2007.
131. Ibid., June 26, 2007.
132. Interview, CMH with Allen, March 16, 2010, p. A-41.
133. Ibid., June 27, 2007, p. 64.
134. Dale Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 20072008, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2010, pp. 55, 58.
135. Press Briefing, Department of Defense, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, October 5, 2007, available
from http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4053, accessed May 20, 2016.
136. Ibid.
137. DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell, “Colonel Kershaw,” October 27, 2007, Released to Public.
138. Interviews, Michael Visconage, MNC-I Historian with Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, September
7, 2007; Steven Clay, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, February 12, 2010.
139. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Kershaw, February 12, 2010.
140. Report, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, Commander, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and
Major Kenneth Mintz, “Brigade S3, Lessons Learned—First 90 Days,” November 29, 2006, CSA OIF Study
Group Collection.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010.
144. Interview, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007.
145. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010.

188

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

146. Ibid.; Press Briefing, Kershaw, October 5, 2007; Interview, Steven Clay, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with John C. Valledor, Part II, January 22, 2010.
147. Photo courtesy of and by Major Adam Scher, “The Yusufiyah Power Plant,” September 2007.
148. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010; CMH
with Kershaw, September 7, 2007.
149. Interviews, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007; Angela McClain, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with John C. Valledor, Part I, November 24, 2009.
150. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010.
151. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, p. 88.
152. Ibid., p. 89.
153. Ibid., pp. 91, 94.
154. Ibid., p. 93; Interviews, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007; CSI Contemporary Operations
Study Team with Valledor, Part II, January 22, 2010.
155. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, p. 108.
156. Ibid., p. 90; Interviews, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007; CSI Contemporary Operations
Study Team with Valledor, Part II, January 22, 2010.
157. Military Times
php?recipientid=3667.

Hall

of

Valor,

available

from

http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.

158. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, pp. 92, 95, 97.
159. Alan Feuer, “With Final Word of Soldiers’ Deaths, More Tears, More Sorrow, Some Relief,” The
New York Times, July 12, 2008, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/us/12soldiers.html?_r=0.
160. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Valledor, Part I, November 24, 2009;
Steven Clay with Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Suich, March 23, 2010.
161. MNF-W, Sunni Insurgency Study, June 13, 2007, p. 328.
162. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Valledor, Part I, November 24, 2009.
163. Ibid.; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Suich, March 23, 2010.
164. Interviews, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007; CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team
with Suich, March 23, 2010.
165. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Suich, March 23, 2010.
166. Interview, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007.
167. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, pp. 110-111.
168. Interview, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007.
169. Interview, CSI with Valledor, Part II, January 22, 2010.

189

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

170. Quoted from Ibid.; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February
12, 2010.
171. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Valledor, Part I, November 24, 2009;
and Part II, January 22, 2010.
172. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010, p. 20.
173. Press Briefing, Kershaw, October 5, 2007.
174. Paper, Lembke, “Zaidon Transition Paper,” March 2010.
175. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Valledor, Part I, November 24, 2009.
176. DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Kerensa Hardy, “Rakkasan Cavalry Squadron proud of 90-day
progress [Image 1 of 2],” DVIDS Identifier 75025, January 29, 2008, Released to Public, available from https://
www.dvidshub.net/image/75025/rakkasan-cavalry-squadron-proud-90-day-progress.
177. Interview, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007.
178. Interviews, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Kershaw, February 12, 2010; CSA OIF
Study Group with Colonel Michael Kershaw, March 14, 2014.
179. Memo, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw for Commanders and Staff, n.d., sub: Thoughts on the Next
90 Days, CSA OIF Study Group Collection. Colonel Kershaw credited his brigade operations officer, Major
Kenneth Mintz, as a coauthor of this command guidance.
180. E-mail, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw to Rayburn, February 1, 2016.
181. DoD photo by 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs, “Commando and
Iraqi Troops ‘walk the Walk’ in Mahmudiyah,” DVIDS Identifier 34384, December 21, 2006, Released to Public,
available from https://www.dvidshub.net/image/34384/commando-and-iraqi-troops-walk-walk-mahmudiyah.
182. Press Briefing, Kershaw, October 5, 2007.
183. Ibid.
184. E-mail, Kershaw to Rayburn, February 1, 2016.
185. Interviews, CMH with Kershaw, September 7, 2007; CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team
with Kershaw, February 12, 2010. Of the 2,100 IED “events” observed during the brigade’s 15-month tour,
all but 100 occurred in first 11 months.
186. Staff Notes, MNF-I, Major Joel Rayburn, September 2007, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group archives, Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC),
Carlisle, PA.
187. Interview, Steven Clay, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Brigadier General
Michael X. Garrett, November 12, 2009; Unit History, H., 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 2006-2007
Iraq Deployment, n.d., CSA OIF Study Group Collection.
188. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, p. 63.
189. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Garrett, November 12, 2009.
190. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

190

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

191. U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Steven Childers, “Coordination continues in Diwaniyah
[Image 1 of 4],” DVIDS Identifier 41127, April 9, 2007, Released to Public, available from https://www.
dvidshub.net/image/41127/coordination-continues-diwaniyah.
192. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Garrett, November 12, 2009.
193. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, pp. 115-116.
194. Ibid., pp. 73-77; Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
195. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 7-13, 2007.
196. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, pp. 77-78.
197. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
198. MNF-I BUA, April 30, 2007.
199. Ibid., May 21, 2007.
200. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
201. Ibid.
202. For examples, see the aforementioned efforts of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Ramadi in
late 2006, and the case of 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, stationed north of Baghdad in Taji throughout
2007. Interview, Steven Clay, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Colonel Paul E. Funk II and
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick R. Michaelis, February 4, 2010.
203. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, April 28-May 4, 2007.
204. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
205. Ibid.
206. Michael R. Gordon, “The Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency,” The New York Times, September
2, 2007.
207. Unit History, 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
208. Interview, Steven Clay, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team, with Major General Rick
Lynch, December 4, 2009.
209. Interview, Colonel Joel Rayburn, CSA OIF Study Group, with Major General (Ret.) Aziz Swaidy,
February 2, 2016.
210. Ibid.
211. Ibid.
212. Ibid.
213. MNF-W, Sunni Insurgency Study, June 13, 2007, pp. 474-476, 523, and 539-540.
214. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Lamb, January 27, 2014, written summary.
215. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Lieutenant Colonel Kurt J. Pinkerton,
July 2, 2010, written responses.

191

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

216. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Funk and Michaelis, February 4, 2010.
217. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Pinkerton, July 2, 2010, written
responses.
218. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Funk and Michaelis, February 4, 2010.
219. Sky, The Unraveling, p. 179; Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Funk and
Michaelis, February 4, 2010.
220. DoD photo by Specialist Shea Butler, “Iraqi Citizens Take Part in Their Own Security [Image 1 of
4],” DVIDS Identifier 54131, August 14, 2007, Released to Public, available from https://www.dvidshub.net/
image/54131/iraqi-citizens-take-part-their-own-security.
221. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Pinkerton, July 2, 2010, written
responses.
222. U.S. Army photo by United States Forces-Iraq, “File: Staff Brigadier General Nassir al-Hiti &
Captain James Văn Thach.jpg,”
April 1, 2008, Released to Public, modified (cropped), available from
∙
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Staff_Brigadier_General_Nassir_al-Hiti_%26_Captain_James_V%C4%83n_
Th%E1%BA%A1ch.jpg.
223. Interview, CSI Contemporary Operations Study Team with Pinkerton, July 2, 2010, written
responses.
224. Odierno Iraq Notebook No. 8, April 23 and April 30, 2007, entries.
225. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 6-12, 2007.
226. Ibid., May 13-19, 2007.
227. Quoted from Sky, The Unraveling, p. 179.
228. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 13-19, 2007. See also Interview, MNC-I Historian with
Odierno, June 24, 2007.
229. Briefing, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Reconciliation and the Abu Ghraib Iraqi
security forces, May 16, 2007.
230. Odierno Iraq Notebook No. 9, May 17, 2007, entry.
231. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 27-June 2, 2007.
232. Dale Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People Are the Key,” Military Review, March-April
2009, p. 77.
233. Ibid., p. 73.
234. Ibid., p. 77. See also Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search
for a Way Out of Iraq, New York: Public Affairs, 2008, p. 231; Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of
America’s Wars in the Muslim World, New York: Nation Books, 2010, pp. 323-335.
235. Interview, Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War, with Colonel J. B. Burton, November
29, 2007.
236. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 75.

192

THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM

237. Mansoor, Surge, pp. 138, 311n; Rod Nordland, “Some Progress Seen in Baghdad,” Newsweek,
November 17, 2007; Ned Parker, “Abu Abed: Ruthless, Shadowy—and a U.S. Ally in Iraq,” Los Angeles
Times, December 22, 2007.
238. Nordland, “Some Progress Seen in Baghdad.”
239. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell, “Gen. David H. Petraeus and high-level Iraqi
officials meet with Abu Abed, a former insurgent commander who now leads Ameriya volunteers fighting
against al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Image Identifier 20070815-A-4584J-0079, August 15, 2007, Released to Public,
modified (cropped).
240. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 76.
241. Nordland, “Some Progress Seen in Baghdad”; Joshua Partlow, “For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, an Alliance of Last Resort,” The Washington Post, June 9, 2007.
242. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 76.
243. Ibid., pp. 76, 78.
244. Partlow, “Alliance of Last Resort.”
245. Interview, Institute for the Study of War with Burton, November 29, 2007.
246. Ibid., November 14, 2007.
247. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 78; Rosen, Aftermath, pp. 306-308.
248. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 78.
249. Partlow, “Alliance of Last Resort.” See also Mansoor, Surge, p. 139.
250. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 78.
251. Mansoor, Surge, p. 138.
252. Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah,” p. 80.
253. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, May 27-June 2, 2007, and June 30, 2007.
254. Partlow, “Alliance of Last Resort.”
255. Mansoor, Surge, p. 139.
256. MNF-I, SECDEF Weekly Update, June 3-9, 2007.
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid.
259. Interview, Institute for the Study of War with Colonel Burton, November 14, 2007.
260. Ibid., November 29, 2007.
261. Mansoor, Surge, p. 140.
262. Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Empowered by the U.S., Imprisoned by the Iraqis,” Stars and Stripes,
September 24, 2009.

193

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

263. Interview, Knarr, Alford, and Graves with Colonel (Ret.) Richard Welch, April 25, 2010, p. A-133,
in Knarr et al., Al Sahawa—The Awakening, Vol. II.

194

CHAPTER 5
SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS
The surge of additional forces into Baghdad and the gathering momentum of the
Awakening movement in Anbar and the belts around the city changed the situation in the
Iraqi capital significantly in the first 5 months of 2007. For more than a year, Sunni insurgent groups and Shi’a militias had controlled large swaths of territory inside Baghdad
as the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) transition strategy played out. By June 2007,
the U.S. and Iraqi surges of reinforcements had quieted the Shi’a militias and robbed
the Sunni insurgents of most of their territory inside the city, but this progress had come
at significant cost. May 2007 had been a harrowing month, with 120 American combat
deaths, the worst monthly tally since 2005. “This is a period in which it gets harder before
it gets easier,” General David H. Petraeus told one journalist at the time.1 Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno had also foreseen this steady increase in violence and was not
inclined to abandon his deliberate approach.2 In a certain sense, the fight had just begun.
As the last surge units arrived in May and June 2007, Petraeus and Odierno looked to use
their additional forces to extend Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s (MNC-I) forward presence
deeper into the belts surrounding the city, with the aim of pushing al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
and its allies farther away from their former operating zones in Baghdad.
The first step, however, was settling the deployment cycle of the 5 surge brigades and
the 15 other brigade-sized U.S. units in Iraq to ensure that the “surge of operations” could
extend far enough into 2008 to complete MNF-I and MNC-I’s new campaign plan. If
these brigades served the usual 12-month rotation period in Iraq, the surge would begin
winding down at the end of 2007, little more than 6 months away. To give the campaign
plan sufficient time to unfold, the units deployed to Iraq would have to stay longer than
the normal year-long combat tour. Petraeus and Odierno recognized this and lobbied
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert M. Gates to extend the length of unit deployments so as to provide, in Petraeus’s words, “the flexibility to continue with the new
strategy into early 2008 if needed.”3 Convinced, in April Gates announced that he would
be extending the deployments of most active-duty Army units stationed in Iraq from 12
to 15 months. Even so, the announcement caught some units off guard. One deploying
brigade commander learned of the extension by reading a Department of Defense (DoD)
press release on his BlackBerry on his way through Kuwait.4 The 25th Infantry Division’s
commander, Major General Benjamin R. Mixon, whose headquarters was responsible for
Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), was stunned to see the announcement on an
airport television monitor on his way back from mid-tour leave.5 All the same, the extension seemed the only way to keep force levels in Iraq elevated without shortchanging
other Army commitments.6
In mid-June, with the future of the surge forces settled, MNC-I would kick off the
first of three major operations in 2007-2008 to push AQI out of its support zones and
sanctuaries beyond the city and then pursue the group as it displaced in search of new
safe havens—a process that Petraeus described as a “surge of operations.”7 After more
than 2 years in which MNF-I’s insurgent enemies had enjoyed the initiative, the coalition
commanders were determined to seize it once again.
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REGAINING THE INITIATIVE: OPERATION PHANTOM THUNDER
The first phase of the “surge of operations” was Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, a
set of division operations across central Iraq and portions of Anbar and Diyala Provinces
in which Odierno and MNC-I intended to stop the “accelerants” that flowed into Baghdad to perpetuate the cycle of sectarian violence. Having created the new Multi- National
Division-Center (MND-C) area of operations and redirected MND-N’s focus to the lower
Diyala River Valley, Odierno intended to send his late-arriving surge units and his operational reserve into those same areas to disrupt or destroy the support zones and sanctuaries from which AQI and its allies had terrorized Baghdad since 2004.8 To accomplish
this objective, Odierno tasked MND-N with conducting a new operation to clear AQI
from the lower Diyala Valley, and particularly from the provincial capital of Baqubah.
During Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, each of the other U.S. divisions—Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), MND-C, and Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W)—
would mount supporting operations in their own areas of operations at the same time.
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Map 13. Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, June-August 2007.
After 5 months of operating as MNC-I, Odierno and his III Corps staff had zeroed in
on the areas they judged to be the most important support zones and sanctuaries for AQI
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and its allies, and in Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MNC-I’s units would attack
into these zones in central Iraq. Within the III Corps staff, Colonel James B. Hickey and
his Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Operations Integration Cell (COIC) had
noted particular “no-go” areas that coalition and Iraqi units had come to avoid over time
because of the certainty of being attacked there, either by small arms or IEDs. The COIC
was especially keen to locate areas where insurgents had had time to emplace belts of
blocking obstacles in the form of deep-buried IEDs that could destroy any coalition vehicle, including tanks. As Hickey saw it, those areas were likely the enemy’s most important bases, which is why the enemy had set up a deliberate defense of them. Rather than
avoid these areas as coalition and Iraqi units had tended to do, Odierno, Hickey, and III
Corps intended to attack into them and seize what they believed was key terrain to the
enemy.
Hickey and the cell had also drawn from several years of significant activities
(SIGACTs) and other data to predict where insurgent groups in each of these zones were
likely to displace once they came under pressure. The COIC was able to do so because in
almost every case, coalition troops had previously conducted raids into the Sunni insurgency’s support zones—sometimes on multiple occasions—and it was possible to examine SIGACT data, intelligence reports, and tribal ties to see where the insurgents had fled
on those previous occasions. It had been rare in previous years for the coalition to pursue
AQI and other groups into their secondary locations, but in late spring 2007, III Corps
aimed to break that pattern and maintain the pressure as the insurgents sought new
bases. Using Hickey’s analysis, Odierno would plan follow-on operations to disrupt the
terrorists before they could establish new support zones elsewhere.
This concept determined where MNC-I deployed the surge units arriving from April
onward. Shortly after Gates’s announcement of the extended combat tours, the third
surge brigade, Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, deployed to MND-C, commanded by Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Division. Odierno detached Grigsby’s tank battalion to MND-B and his artillery battalion
to the Camp Bucca guard force, but he sent the remainder of the brigade to a sector
where only a handful of Iraqi units guarded the eastern desert approaches to the capital.9
Though it was difficult to support this remote location in logistical terms, Grigsby’s position at a new operating base nearly 32 kilometers east of Baghdad (Forward Operating
Base Hammer) placed him astride a troublesome route used by Shi’a weapons smugglers
while allowing him to support operations against well-defended Sunni insurgent strongholds south and west of the capital.10
When the fourth surge brigade, Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 2d
Infantry Division, arrived in April, Odierno assigned it to Mixon’s MND-N and deployed
it to Baghdad’s northern belt stretching from the Tigris River east toward Diyala Province.
By giving Lehr and his brigade responsibility for Tarmiyah, a critical node in AQI and
other Sunni insurgents’ northern line of communications, Odierno enabled Colonel Paul
Funk’s MND-B’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, to shift its focus west
toward Sunni insurgent sanctuaries near Lake Tharthar.11 A few weeks later, the 13th
Marine Expeditionary Unit, U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) theater reserve, also
deployed to the Tharthar region northeast of Fallujah to operate in the “seams” among
the MNF-W, MND-B, and MND-N boundaries. Finally, when the last surge brigade,
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Colonel Terry R. Ferrell’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, arrived in May,
Odierno deployed it into MND-C’s area of responsibility to occupy the thin wedge of
farmland along the meandering Tigris River south of Baghdad that included the longtime
AQI stronghold of Arab Jabour.12 With the addition of four American brigades’ combat
power between April and June, III Corps and four American divisions were positioned to
apply pressure simultaneously along sectarian fault lines in Baghdad and along the lines
of communications essential to controlling the city. It would be the largest operation in
the Baghdad region since April 2003.
Clearing Baqubah
Within MND-N, the main task for Operation PHANTOM THUNDER was to retake
the city of Baqubah from AQI. Diyala had been the scene of ethno-sectarian violence since
the early months of the war. With its volatile mix of Sunni and Shi’a tribes and tensions
stemming from Kurdish encroachment, the rural province had often been described as
“little Iraq,” a microcosm of the broader ethno-sectarian divisions that spanned the country. It was also a key al-Qaeda stronghold. In spring 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had
declared Baqubah the capital of his new “caliphate,” and the AQI leader had been killed
only a few kilometers west of the city in June 2006.13 In the first months of 2007, many of
the AQI operatives who fled Anbar and Baghdad under the twin pressures of the Awakening and the surge had reestablished themselves in Baqubah, after which the city’s security eroded rapidly.14 By late spring 2007, the city’s population was nearly under AQI’s
control, with the group in control of the city’s services, including water and electricity,
and the local mosques taken over by AQI imams who began enforcing Sharia law.15 Coalition analysts estimated there were between 300 and 500 AQI fighters terrorizing the
population and preparing a deliberate defense in the city. The situation was exacerbated
by the behavior of the Diyala-based 5th Iraqi Army division and the local police, both of
whom were led by sectarian commanders who allowed Shi’a death squads to operate in
the province.16
The extent of AQI’s grip on Baqubah stunned Odierno, who described the entire city
as a “war zone” after returning from a visit.17 The sectarian struggle among rival militant
groups to control the lines of communication running between Baghdad and Baqubah,
along with the Iraqi Government’s almost willful neglect of Sunnis in the contested areas
of the province, made the dire situation far more than the single U.S. brigade in the province could handle. With responsibility for all of Diyala, Colonel David W. Sutherland’s 3d
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was already stretched thin by its mission to
screen the Iranian frontier. Sutherland’s remaining units struggled to hold their own both
in the city and throughout the highly contested villages along the shifting sectarian fault
line near the convergence of the Diyala and Tigris River valleys. As violence in Baqubah
rose in early 2007, Mixon and MND-N asked MNC-I for an additional brigade to operate in the lower Diyala River Valley while Sutherland’s brigade focused on the upper
valley. However, with most of the surge brigades still en route, Odierno had been able to
send only an additional battalion from his operational reserve, Colonel Steven Towsend’s
3d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, in March. The additional troops, from
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Antonia’s 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, enabled Sutherland’s
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brigade to secure a foothold in eastern Baqubah, but coalition intelligence estimated that
AQI had mined the western half of the city with about 175 deep-buried IEDs and had
booby-trapped an unknown number of houses to prevent U.S. troops from clearing the
area.18 The group had also dug defensive positions throughout the dense palm groves
around the city.

Source: DoD photo by Specialist Benjamin Fox (Released).

Colonel David Sutherland With General David Petraeus in Baqubah.19
For U.S. units, the fighting in Diyala in the late spring and summer of 2007 would be
some of the most intense of the entire war. Antonia’s troops encountered heavy resistance
as they attempted to clear the areas surrounding the city, especially in the form of IEDs
that destroyed U.S. vehicles on an almost daily basis, sometimes accompanied by insurgent small arms fire. In one instance on April 5, 2007, after an IED destroyed a Bradley
fighting vehicle in Baqubah, Specialist Christopher Waiters ignored commands to stay in
his nearby Stryker vehicle and braved heavy insurgent fire to pull two wounded Soldiers
from the Bradley to safety, returning to remove a third dead Soldier from the vehicle as
well. For this act, Waiters received the Distinguished Service Cross. In another incident
on April 23, two suicide car bombs rammed a U.S. outpost in the village of Sadah near
Baqubah, after which insurgents mounted an unsuccessful ground assault on the troops.
The car bombs collapsed a building on the compound, killing 9 Soldiers and wounding
20 more.
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Source: DoD photo courtesy 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Released).

Soldiers Move Through the Outskirts of Palm Groves in Baqubah
During the Night of March 25.20
As Antonia’s battalion fought AQI around Baqubah in April and May, the fourth
surge brigade—Lehr’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division—flowed into the
northern belt, strengthening the coalition position along the western boundary of Diyala
and providing another Stryker battalion to operate in the highly violent area between
Baqubah and Baghdad. As the Stryker units isolated AQI in Baqubah by clearing the
roads and villages surrounding the city, they found that the deep-buried IEDs AQI
emplaced on Diyala’s roads were often powerful enough to destroy the heaviest American armored vehicles. In early May, deep-buried IEDs destroyed three Stryker vehicles
and killed eight U.S. troops in 1 week in the Baqubah area alone. “[W]e’re in for some
tough challenges in Diyala,” Petraeus observed when he reported the incident to Gates.21
Illustrating his point, later in the month, a deep-buried IED in the city destroyed an M1
tank. The area was dangerous for U.S. aviators as well. In the last week of May, insurgents shot down two U.S. helicopters using truck-mounted heavy machine guns, one of
them just northeast of Baqubah.22
In the same week, on May 25, U.S. troops attempting to push AQI from the villages
south of the city captured a house that AQI had used as an ad hoc prison and liberated
42 Iraqis that AQI fighters had imprisoned and tortured there. The site was just one of
multiple “torture houses” that AQI had set up in the area to terrorize the population into
submission.23 The group also took aim at local Iraqi officials for much the same purpose.
In a high-profile case, AQI attacked the home of the Baqubah police chief on June 8, killing his wife and 13 others, but missing the police leader himself.24
The arrival of the final surge brigades in May and June 2007 finally generated enough
combat power for MNC-I to allow Odierno to send an additional brigade to Diyala. In
late May, he pulled the rest of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, from
its duties as MND-B’s mobile strike force and made them available to MND-N for a decisive operation to retake the whole of the Baqubah area from AQI. It was an operation for
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which Townsend himself had lobbied for Odierno’s support. After dispatching Antonia’s 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, from his own brigade in March, Townsend
had followed the battalion’s progress from his headquarters in Baghdad and had seen
what he believed was an opportunity to help Sutherland seize most of Diyala from the
enemy. Although Major General Joseph F. Fil, Jr., protested the proposed redirection of
his strike force, Odierno agreed with Townsend that the coalition now had the opportunity to apply simultaneous pressure on AQI across central Iraq. He also believed that
the ongoing surge mitigated the risk of reducing the Strykers in Baghdad, where incoming battalions would offset the departure of Townsend’s units. Accordingly, Odierno
directed Townsend to take his brigade headquarters and two more Stryker battalions to
Diyala to fight alongside Sutherland’s 3d Brigade, under MND-N’s control.25
The Stryker brigade’s move to Baqubah marked the beginning of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER for MND-N (and the beginning of Townsend’s brigade-level portion called Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER). On the night of June 18, 2007, one of
Townsend’s battalions, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, road marched 90 kilometers from Baghdad to Baqubah while U.S. air strikes pounded AQI positions in the
city. The two U.S. battalions already outside the city conducted air assaults into blocking
positions to cut off any AQI fighters’ escape.
Pausing only briefly outside the city to let the air strikes and air assaults take place,
Townsend’s troops attacked on June 19 at 1 a.m., assaulting AQI positions in the western
side of the city. Within hours, the Strykers and their dismounted infantry squads were
moving through the town and pushing back AQI fighters. With the help of tribal irregulars who pointed out about 30 deep-buried IEDs on the main road through the city,
Townsend’s units lost only 1 Bradley fighting vehicle destroyed on the operation’s first
day, while killing 36 enemy combatants.26

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Armando Monroig (Released).

Soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army Division and 3d Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division,
During Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER.27
MNC-I’s operational maneuver appeared to have achieved its aim of surprising
the large AQI contingent in Baqubah, which was clearly unprepared for the sudden
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appearance of a brigade’s worth of additional U.S. combat power. Townsend’s move
to Baqubah doubled the number of coalition forces in the provincial capital and freed
up Sutherland’s troops to shift their focus northeast toward Muqdadiyah, interdicting
enemy fighters as they withdrew north and east up the Diyala River Valley in search of
new sanctuaries.28 Clearing west Baqubah was not easy, even after most AQI fighters
had fled. The terrorist group had rigged dozens of houses to explode as U.S. or Iraqi
troops entered them, in one case booby-trapping two entire city blocks of houses. Even
so, by June 25, Townsend’s troops had finished clearing west Baqubah and had enabled
local Iraqi security forces, Iraqi officials, and the Diyala provincial reconstruction team to
return to the cleared areas. Operations in and around Baqubah continued through July,
with elements of the two brigade combat teams (BCTs) implementing tactics similar to
those introduced in Baghdad: deliberate house-by-house clearing, followed by the establishment of company-sized combat outposts and the use of concrete barriers to control
access to neighborhoods.29
In the first month of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MND-N’s troops in Baqubah
killed more than 60 AQI fighters and captured another 215, while eliminating more than
130 IEDs.30 By July 26, Baqubah was firmly enough in coalition and Iraqi security forces
(ISF) control to enable Odierno to take Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to the city to meet
with local officials and tribal leaders.31 Iraqi officials responded to urgent coalition appeals
to cultivate good will among the populace by arranging for the delivery of food and
other supplies in the wake of U.S. clearing operations.32 Earlier engagement efforts with
Sunni tribes in Diyala also bore fruit, maturing more slowly than they had in Anbar, and
nascent Awakening groups began to consolidate security gains, while the newly formed
Diyala Support Committee worked to improve the fractious political environment.33
The province was far from pacified, however. By early July, almost all the surviving
AQI fighters and commanders from Baqubah had fled to the Diyala towns of Muqdadiyah, Balad Ruz, Khalis, and Khan Bani Sa’ad and had begun to attack ISF and Shi’a militias in those areas to secure new safe havens.34 In most of these areas, existing sectarian
tensions made the situation ripe for AQI to exploit, as did the corruption and sectarian
behavior of the Shi’a-dominated ISF units in the province. By the time Operation PHANTOM THUNDER ended in mid-August, Diyala’s provincial capital was back under coalition and Iraqi Government control, but further operations would be needed to roust AQI
and its allies from the rest of the province.
Closing the Lake Tharthar Seam
As MND-N battled AQI around Baqubah, other units from MNF-W and MND-N
moved to push AQI fighters out of another Sunni insurgent safe haven in the badlands
south and east of Lake Tharthar. The sparsely populated area lay at the edge of the division boundaries of MND- N, MND-B, and MNF-W, meaning that no single coalition unit
had ever assumed responsibility for securing it. Consequently, the Tharthar area had
long served as a base of support for AQI, from which jihadi leaders and fighters could
easily transit Anbar, Salahadin, and Diyala without significant coalition interference. The
ability to move freely through the Tharthar area enabled Sunni insurgents to attack or
control the western and northern belts of Baghdad with relative ease.
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As a result of these factors, the AQI fighters driven out of Ramadi, Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, and Baghdad in spring 2007 were able to hold on to support bases in towns such as
Karmah, Taji, and Tarmiyah and to mount significant attacks against both the local populace and the thinly stretched coalition units responsible for those areas. In February, for
example, Sunni insurgents north of Taji had been able to gather enough combat power
to conduct a rare company-sized attack on a U.S. unit in the area. A platoon of Funk’s
brigade that erected a new combat outpost near Tarmiyah on February 16 found itself
attacked 3 days later by a succession of three suicide car bombs that rammed the outpost’s entry point and collapsed part of the building where the U.S. element was sleeping.
An insurgent infantry assault followed and lasted for several hours before close air support and ground reinforcements helped drive the attackers off. Funk’s platoon suffered
2 killed and 17 wounded, rendering it combat ineffective. Meanwhile, Sunni insurgents
south of Taji were carrying out attacks against the residents of the Shi’a-majority town
of Sab al-Bour, forcing 50,000 of them—90 percent of the population—to flee by March,
leaving AQI in charge of the town.
The arrival of Lehr’s brigade in April enabled MNC-I to deploy an additional Stryker
battalion to the Taji area, but it was not enough to stop insurgents from attacking the
lines of communications in the area with large IEDs on an almost daily basis. In one incident on May 22, an IED made of 20 strung-together artillery shells destroyed a Stryker
from Lehr’s brigade north of Taji, killing or wounding 5 of its 6-man crew. Miraculously
unhurt in the blast, the vehicle’s driver, Specialist Erik Oropeza, quickly treated a fellow
Soldier’s mangled leg with a tourniquet and then ran through enemy small arms fire to
summon help. For this act, Oropeza would receive the Distinguished Service Cross.35

Source: DoD photo by Corporal Neill Sevelius (Released).

U.S. Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit During
Operations in Karmah.36
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With these developments and similar attacks in eastern Anbar in mind, Petraeus and
Odierno requested that CENTCOM dispatch its theater reserve, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), to reinforce MNF-W in the Karmah area south of Lake Tharthar.
Arriving in June 2007, the Marine unit was on the ground in time to press the fight near
Lake Tharthar without requiring Odierno to draw from U.S. units committed elsewhere.37
Under the leadership of Colonel Carl E. Mundy III, son of a former Marine Corps commandant, the 13th MEU began a large-scale sweep around the crossroads of Karmah on
June 24 to disrupt AQI weapons distribution and supply routes. The clearing operation
quickly revealed that the area served as a large-scale IED arsenal for AQI and its allies.
In their first few days of clearing, the Marines and their partnered Iraqi units discovered
car bomb factories, large stocks of nitric acid and explosives, and hundreds of alreadybuilt IEDs. One of the caches was large enough that the Marines called in an F-18 Hornet
strike to destroy it with a 500-pound bomb.38 These discoveries reinforced the assessment
that the Sunni insurgents who carried out attacks in Baghdad and eastern Anbar had
long enjoyed sanctuary in the rural areas northeast of Fallujah. The MEU would remain
in the region through the summer to search for and destroy AQI’s caches and disrupt the
group’s ability to produce and employ its weapon of choice.
Interdiction in the Southern Belts
As MND-N cleared AQI from Baqubah, Lynch’s MND-C undertook its portion of
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER in Baghdad’s southern belts by conducting operations to interdict the “accelerants” of sectarian violence that trickled from that area into
the capital in the form of car bombs and Sunni insurgents.39 The division’s main effort
would come in the areas of Arab Jabour, Mada’in, and Salman Pak, all of which had
served as Sunni insurgent support zones and the scenes of sectarian cleansing for several
years. The town of Mada’in had been the site of an alleged massacre of dozens of Shi’a
townspeople in April 2005 that had sparked a political crisis during the formation of the
Ja’afari government. Adjacent to Mada’in, the picturesque river town of Salman Pak, site
of an ancient arch marking the one-time Persian imperial capital of Ctesiphon, had been
the area where hundreds of corpses dumped into the Tigris in Baghdad had washed
ashore in 2005-2006. Between Mada’in and southeast Baghdad, the town of Jisr Diyala
had been an Iraqi military housing community and the site of the Iraqi regime’s Osirak
nuclear reactor destroyed by Israeli planes in 1981. Opposite Jisr Diyala on the west bank
of the Tigris, Arab Jabour was home to a Sunni population of 120,000, just 6 kilometers
south of Baghdad, close enough to the capital to have served in Saddam Hussein’s day
as a convenient getaway for prominent Ba’athists, many of whom had built villas there.40
In short, the area had been a Ba’athist regime stronghold and was fertile ground for the
Sunni insurgency.
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Map 14. Disposition of U.S. Forces in Central Iraq, June 2007.

205

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

Source: DoD photo courtesy Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (Released).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen With Major General
Rick Lynch, Commander 3d Infantry Division.41
When Colonel Terry Ferrell’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, reached
Iraq in May as the fifth and final surge brigade, Odierno and MNC-I gave Ferrell responsibility for the Arab Jabour area just ahead of the start of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER. With two of his battalions already detached to other areas, Ferrell would have
two battalions to use for the task. Although coalition special operators had carried out
frequent raids in Arab Jabour, the brigade’s arrival broke a 3-year streak in which U.S.
ground troops had largely steered clear of the stretch of canal-notched farms and palm
groves that bordered the Tigris River to the west as it snaked south out of Baghdad.
Taking stock of his new area of operations, Ferrell estimated that the safe haven contained
about 1,500 AQI operatives, including close to 200 foreigners, with those numbers swelling as the group shifted fighters south from Diyala Province to bolster the Arab Jabour
defenses in anticipation of a coalition offensive.42 The area was a “critical hub for trafficking weapons, bombs, and fighters into Baghdad,” Ferrell concluded, with a sophisticated
enemy command-and-control structure “on the scale of a conventional military force.”
In their first month on the ground, the brigade withstood an average of over 40 attacks
per week, including the same kind of deep-buried IEDs and explosive-rigged houses that
U.S. troops in Diyala were encountering.43 Like their fellow Soldiers in Diyala and the
Tharthar region, Ferrell’s troops were dealing with the difficulty of seizing long-uncontested enemy-held territory.
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Just across the Tigris near Salman Pak, Grigsby’s 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division,
geared up to move against another AQI transit point that had long fed the violence in
Baghdad. Like Arab Jabour, the town of Salman Pak had close historical ties with the
Ba’athist regime. Saddam’s special intelligence service operated a headquarters there
before the coalition invasion, and the dictator had purportedly authorized secretive biological weapons testing at a nearby facility.44 More recently, Salman Pak had been the
scene of a cycle of intimidation, violence, and retribution between Sunnis and a restive
Shi’a minority, with the latter backed by National Police units notorious for sectarian
abuses. Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) had also participated in the fight for control of the critical
crossroads—and for good reason.45 Exploiting Sunni resentment toward the Shi’a-dominated security forces and in an environment characterized by minimal U.S. presence, AQI
used the highways running along the Tigris through Salman Pak to attack into eastern
Baghdad, particularly Rusafa and Sadr City. The extremist group also funneled men and
supplies by boat across the river into Arab Jabour and then north toward staging areas
in the Rashid District such as the Dora neighborhood.46 In June, Grigsby estimated that
20 percent of the attacks occurring in the capital were “facilitated by accelerants moving
through AO [area of operation] Hammer,” the BCT’s sector southeast of Baghdad.47
Eager to set the division offensive—labeled Operation MARNE TORCH—in motion,
Lynch ordered Ferrell’s brigade, along with Iraqis from the 6th Iraqi Army Division, to
clear the Arab Jabour region southward from the outskirts of Baghdad and construct
combat outposts in the AQI sanctuary. As a supporting effort, Grigsby would advance
concurrently along the opposite bank of the Tigris southeast of Salman Pak to block the
escape of enemy fighters if they should attempt to cross the river.48 On June 15, the division carried out ferocious preparatory fires on suspected AQI sites in Arab Jabour, during
which 40,000 pounds of ordnance fell in a 10-second span.49
Lynch’s use of massive demonstrations of firepower in MND-C stood out among the
coalition operations in central Iraq in 2007, most of which were characterized by clearing
operations, patrolling among the local population, and the kind of restraint that the Army
and Marine Corps’ new counterinsurgency field manual tended to encourage. “This is all
about killing and capturing bad guys,” Lynch told his subordinates. “Later, we can do
area security. So use anything you can to hit him in the nose. Once he is back on his heels,
then we can worry about the population.”50 In this case, the MND-C commander sought
to dislocate AQI cells by destroying weapons caches and rendering unusable roads and
river crossings that could serve as enemy exfiltration routes. Lynch also acted on the
claims by local Iraqis that boats moored along the Tigris or plying its waters belonged
exclusively to insurgents or smugglers. Suspicious of the absence of commercial docks
along this stretch of the river and the fact that most boats appeared to sail only at night,
Lynch concluded that all vessels afloat were likely hostile and ordered them destroyed in
support of the operation.51
With the American attack driving expectantly into what Ferrell described as a “hornet’s nest,” progress came slowly.52 The brigade’s calculated advance cleared less than 6
kilometers of Arab Jabour’s IED-laden main road over the course of 2 grueling weeks.53
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Nevertheless, after 1 month, the division operation yielded a number of new patrol bases
in rural areas long under AQI’s sway. In the process of wresting control of key terrain
on either side of the Tigris River, MND-C killed 83 insurgents and captured another
280. Forty of those captured were on coalition high-value target lists. The division also
destroyed dozens of boats on the Tigris, many of which when struck produced secondary
blasts that suggested they were carrying explosive material, seeming to confirm Lynch’s
suspicions about their use.54
Lynch extended his interdiction efforts to the western half of his sector in July, focusing on enemy lines of communications up the Euphrates River, as well as Highway 8.
Spearheaded by Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th
Infantry Division, and supported by elements of the 6th and 8th Iraqi Army Divisions,
operations centered on the mixed-sect Iskandariyah, a small city of 120,000 mostly Shi’a
civilians, and on the Sunni town of Jurf al-Sakhr, situated as a gateway on the Euphrates between Anbar and the southern belts.55 As in Arab Jabour, MND-C began the new
operation, called MARNE AVALANCHE, with a striking display of airpower as a single
B-1B bomber dropped nearly 10,000 pounds of munitions on selected bridges across the
Euphrates to isolate enemy fighters and restrict their maneuver.56 In a month-long series
of platoon- and company-sized attacks and air assaults against militants of both sects, the
division killed 16 enemy fighters and captured 110, including local top-level AQI leaders
and operatives from JAM mortar-and-rocket teams.
IED attacks in the Euphrates Valley area south of Baghdad fell from 111 in June to 55
the following month, signifying to Lynch that MND-C’s approach of highly mobile and
firepower-intensive operations was succeeding in disrupting insurgent activity there.57
Still, by Lynch’s own admission, the summertime operations into AQI’s sanctuaries had
not defeated the terrorist group. As an indication of the enemy’s persistent strength in
Arab Jabour, for example, four of Ferrell’s Soldiers were killed and another four wounded
while clearing a booby-trapped house on August 11, and troops elsewhere continued
to face roadside IEDs, small-arms fire, and rocket attacks aimed at recently established
combat outposts. To be sure, the coalition had seized the initiative and had gained “tactical momentum” in the southern belts, but it had not proceeded as smoothly as Lynch had
hoped.58 The MND-C commander chafed at his division’s dearth of engineer support,
which meant that he lacked the construction capability required to build patrol bases at
a pace aligned with his push into enemy-controlled territory.59 Regardless of the security
gains made, in Lynch’s view they could not be confidently sustained without more and
better-trained Iraqi forces, which, he believed, needed to triple or quadruple in size for
his area of responsibility.60 Even the notable turnaround in places witnessing a reinvigorated American presence seemed tempered by what some Iraqis viewed as the heavyhanded and unnecessary destruction of local bridges and fording sites upon which so
many depended for their livelihood. Once seized, the initiative would still have to be
exploited and the security of key terrain solidified by efforts to secure the goodwill of the
population through improved governance and economic development.61
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Map 15. Disposition of U.S. Forces in Baghdad, June 2007.
The Continuing Fight for Baghdad
For Fil and MND-B, Operation PHANTOM THUNDER inside Baghdad would be
a continuation of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, the U.S.-Iraqi effort to clear the
remaining Sunni insurgent strongholds in the city and to solidify the renewed security
presence in the city’s neighborhoods. The introduction of the surge units into the city
beginning in early 2007 had put AQI and other insurgent groups off-balance, but the first
4 months of the surge in Baghdad had been difficult and violent. The AQI car bomb rings
on both sides of the Tigris had continued to do their grisly work, though on a decreasing
scale as Fil’s troops pressured them and expanded the coalition and ISF footprint. Shi’a
death squads had continued to operate as well, though with a greatly reduced freedom
of movement. During March through May, Sunni insurgents had attempted to separate
the two halves of the city by repeatedly bombing the bridges that spanned the Tigris. One
massive truck bombing on April 12 entirely collapsed the spans of the Sarafiyah Bridge
between Karkh and Adhamiyah, probably an attempt by Sunni insurgents to stop their
Shi’a militant enemies from crossing between the two sides of the city. The following
month three successful bridge attacks took place on one day, May 11.62
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Sarafiyah Bridge, After Its Destruction by al-Qaeda in Iraq on April 12, 2007.63
MND-B’s share of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER was not just a matter of hunting
down AQI and other Sunni insurgent cells, however. As the summer months approached,
Colonel J. B. Burton’s brigade sector in northwest Baghdad remained one of the most
problematic areas in the country because of the activities of both Sunni insurgents and
Shi’a militias and death squads. As had been the case in Burton’s sector for the better part
of a year, U.S. units were bedeviled continually by the sectarian behavior and corruption
of the local ISF. The most egregious example was in Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah District,
where Burton and his subordinates discovered numerous illicit connections between the
Sadrists and local security forces and developed Operation SEVENTH VEIL to find guilty
Iraqi officials and hold them accountable.64 Begun as a response to the battery of civilian complaints against units infiltrated by Shi’a militants, this systematic effort eventually led to a violent confrontation at the Kadhimiyah shrine, one of the four holiest sites
of Shi’a Islam. Family ties clouded army loyalties and bolstered the Sadrists’ position.
Sadrist cleric Hazem al-Araji controlled the shrine—a moneymaker during pilgrimage
seasons—while his brother Baha al-Araji served in Iraq’s Parliament and a cousin, Lieutenant General Faruq al-Araji, directed Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief, a
special action arm that reported directly to Maliki and frequently bypassed the military
chain of command in order to pressure Iraqi commanders.65
When Burton’s troops closed in on the Araji-controlled shrine on April 29, 2007, to
detain JAM leaders they knew to be present, they came under rocket-propelled grenade
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(RPG) and small-arms fire. The Americans had called on a battalion from the 1st Brigade,
6th Iraqi Army Division, for assistance, but rather than helping them, the Iraqi soldiers
came to the aid of JAM militants in the shrine. The ensuing 2-day standoff resulted in
the deaths of at least nine Iraqi soldiers who had allied themselves with the militia and
ended with a Parliamentary decree barring U.S. troops from a 1-square-kilometer zone
around the shrine. In the aftermath of this incident, Petraeus noted that General Abud
Qanbar’s attitude toward JAM seemed to be hardening—along with that of Maliki’s—
since the Baghdad commander pressed for fewer restrictions on coalition operations near
the militia’s strongholds.66 This, nonetheless, provided little comfort, given the extent of
JAM’s infiltration of the army in Kadhimiyah. Throughout the summer and the duration
of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, Burton’s troops would maintain a tense standoff
with both Shi’a militants and pro-militia ISF units in the shrine neighborhood, a factor
that complicated the effort to complete the expulsion of Sunni insurgents from other parts
of west Baghdad.
Meanwhile, MND-B’s main effort was in the AQI-dominated neighborhood of Dora.
In the heart of the Rashid District—which Petraeus had labeled as “the most challenging
in Baghdad”—the streets bounding the once-vibrant Dora market proved key terrain
in a hard-fought sectarian struggle.67 The neighborhood sat astride an expressway that
crossed the nearby Tigris River and fed into Shi’a-dominated eastern Baghdad. Likewise,
a well-traveled north-south route provided access to the belt areas of Hawr Rajab and
Mahmudiyah. Thus, the Dora neighborhood proved to be an important transit point for
insurgents inside the city. Al- Qaeda in Iraq intended to defend the stronghold with a layered network of deep-buried IEDs, sniper positions, and jury-rigged passageways that
facilitated maneuver between buildings.68
The 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel
Ricky D. Gibbs, had spent the spring closing in on the Sunni extremist fighters ensconced
in Dora. After establishing 12 combat outposts and joint security stations across the Rashid
District, Gibbs launched a series of clearing operations with support from attached Stryker
units and Iraqis from the 2d National Police Division.69 Perceiving that AQI “wanted to
plant their flag and hold” Dora as a launching point to wreak havoc across Baghdad,
the colonel marshaled his forces to root out the extremist cells and “send the message to
the enemy that we weren’t leaving anytime soon.”70 The brigade concentrated on three
specific mahallas (neighborhoods) where resistance proved most stubborn and began
house-by-house clearing operations on July 1. Gibbs’s units netted over 100 suspected
AQI fighters and discovered some 200 weapons caches within 2 weeks. Operations in
Dora continued through late September when the brigade commander announced the
reduction of the Sunni extremist stronghold, along with a general decline in violence.
Murders in Rashid, for example, had fallen by 65 percent since the brigade’s arrival in
mid-March.71
The erecting of combat outposts and a sustained presence in neighborhoods, coupled with attacks into erstwhile safe havens, had comparable effects on other Baghdad
hotspots. Burton’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, observed a steep drop
in violence in Kadhimiyah and Mansour in the 3 months following the kickoff of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER.72 Burton attributed this improvement to a combination
of clearing operations that targeted extremist leaders, the formation of local Awakening
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groups, and the further development of “safe neighborhoods” and “safe markets,” all
of which were byproducts of surging additional American troops into his sector.73 Progress—mixed across Baghdad—had come more quickly in Karkh District, where Colonel
Bryan T. Roberts’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, presided over a dramatic turnaround on Haifa Street. By the summer of 2007, attacks on coalition forces had
fallen by 60 percent, with reported civilian murders plummeting at an even faster rate.
With violence waning, Roberts focused increasingly on essential services, reviving the
local economy, and area beautification.74 A comprehensive approach that paired security
operations with initiatives to improve governance and economic development also bore
fruit in eastern Baghdad. There, the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division,
juggled the AQI threat based in Old Adhamiyah along with the persistent problem of Iranian-supported JAM Special Groups operating out of Sadr City. While attacks against the
airborne brigade initially rose with the establishment of forward positions in February,
they had declined markedly by August, persuading American leaders to finance local
reconstruction projects totaling some $2.5 million—with another bevy of projects costing
$8 million scheduled to follow.75

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).

Soldiers From 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, During a Firefight in Baghdad’s
Adhamiyah Neighborhood on June 16.76
Looking at the whole of Iraq’s capital as Operation PHANTOM THUNDER wound
down in mid-August, Petraeus assessed the results of the operation with a characteristic
blend of caution and optimism. “Security has improved in almost every area of Baghdad,” he reported to Gates on August 11, adding that, nonetheless, “improvement has
been very uneven and remains tenuous” in places.77
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From Operation PHANTOM THUNDER to Operation PHANTOM STRIKE:
Pursuit Operations Against al-Qaeda in Iraq
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER ended on August 15, 2007. In the 60 days of the
operation, the coalition divisions had driven AQI out of Dora, Baqubah, and the Fallujah
area and had greatly damaged the militant group and its allies in their former safe havens
throughout the Baghdad belts. Coalition troops had killed 1,196 enemy fighters, wounded
419, and captured another 6,702, with 382 of the captured considered high-value targets. U.S. and Iraqi troops together had captured more than 1,100 weapons caches, found
almost 2,300 IEDs, and disabled 52 car bombs.78 During the same period, U.S. units lost
150 troops killed by hostile fire, the vast majority of them to IEDs.
The change in the security situation in Baghdad and its environs was significant. In the
5 months before Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, an average of 298 Baghdadi civilians
were killed in acts of violence each week. By the end of the operation, the weekly civilian
death toll in the capital had fallen to about half of that figure, and from that point to the
end of 2007, the weekly average of violent civilian deaths fell to 91, a level not seen in
Baghdad since early 2005.
Encouraged by these improved security trends and an overall reduction in violence in
and around the Iraqi capital, MNC-I sought to capitalize on those hard-won gains and to
continue the pressure against AQI as it attempted to regroup. On August 15, Operation
PHANTOM THUNDER gave way to another corps-level operation, Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, designed to serve as a framework for the aggressive pursuit of AQI in the
immediate aftermath of operations that had worn down the extremist group’s ranks and
had rendered longtime sanctuaries increasingly untenable. Like its predecessor, Operation PHANTOM STRIKE consisted of a set of operations oriented on a common purpose
but planned and executed by lower echelons of command. Nonetheless, it differed in
emphasis, with the clearing of enemy strongholds and the seizure of key terrain that had
characterized Operation PHANTOM THUNDER yielding to a focus on solidifying progress. Although U.S. troops maintained a forward presence among the population, they
generally refrained from explicit efforts to extend their control into new areas.
This shift did not entail a scaling back in activity, however. Nor was the situation any
less dynamic. Sensing that coalition forces had retaken the initiative at the operational
level, Petraeus, Odierno, and other coalition commanders looked to keep AQI’s leaders
off-balance and on the run by orchestrating targeted raids across the country to exploit
the enemy’s dislocation, drive its center of activity farther from Baghdad, and prevent
its consolidation.79 In MND-B, U.S. troops concentrated on reducing the AQI stronghold in the Hadar neighborhood just south of the Dora expressway running through
Rashid. Arriving to replace Townsend’s Stryker brigade in late summer, Colonel John S.
RisCassi’s 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment became the corps operational reserve and, like
its predecessor, served as MND-B’s “above-ground” strike force—a role that freed the
Stryker unit from responsibility for the security of a particular sector and leveraged the
formation’s mobility and comparably large infantry troop strength. Supporting Gibbs in
Rashid, RisCassi’s regiment cleared Hadar while BCTs elsewhere in Baghdad constricted
AQI with the help of partnered Iraqi security forces and increasing numbers of Sunni
irregulars.80 The “pursuit” in MNF-W took the form of continued operations northeast
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of Fallujah, with Marines striking into the hinterlands around Lake Tharthar as the Iraqi
police tightened its grip on the city.81 In Baghdad’s southern belts, Lynch faced manpower constraints that discouraged MND-C from expanding its area of control, but, in
accordance with Operation PHANTOM STRIKE’s intent, the division managed to launch
operations designed to keep AQI off-balance. Colonel Daniel L. Ball, commander of the
3d Infantry Division’s combat aviation brigade, for example, organized a flurry of raids
and air assaults that drew on U.S. conventional and special operations forces to disrupt
insurgent staging areas around Mahmudiyah and the Euphrates River Valley.82 In Arab
Jabour, Ferrell’s BCT conducted strikes against AQI death squads reportedly formed to
assassinate Awakening fighters. Lynch again employed tremendous firepower, and in
1 day alone in September, four B-1B aircraft dropped eight 500-pound and two 2,000pound laser-guided bombs on enemy targets in Arab Jabour, while the division’s artillery
fired 45 missions.83
For Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, MNC-I intended to pursue AQI fighters who had
fled Baqubah farther up the Diyala River Valley to the town of Muqdadiyah and into
the remote Hamrin Ridge area, an important insurgent line of communications between
Diyala and the Za’ab Triangle south of Mosul. By August, MND-N’s task was more difficult than those of the other divisions. As Anbar, the Baghdad belts, and Diyala became
dangerous territory for AQI leaders and fighters, they increasingly chose to displace to
far northern Iraq, where the coalition and ISF presence was thin. Mixon’s main effort,
designated Operation LIGHTNING HAMMER, would focus on the upper Diyala Valley
beyond Baqubah. Sutherland’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, would
lead the fight for Muqdadiyah and other towns in upper Diyala.
At the same time, however, rising attacks elsewhere in MND-N’s area of operations
signified that AQI and other insurgents were flowing toward areas where the coalition
was weak, as they had done so many times in the past.84 In Salahadin Province, IEDs and
insurgent ground attacks grew in frequency in late summer, with Samarra as particularly contested ground for the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. In one
incident on August 26, more than 40 AQI fighters attacked one of the battalion’s observation posts, seeking to abduct the 4 American Soldiers posted there. Two of the American
infantrymen were killed in the ensuing firefight, but Specialists Christopher Corriveau
and Eric Moser mounted a fierce defense and held off dozens of attackers until a U.S.
quick-reaction force arrived. These actions earned the two Soldiers the Distinguished
Service Cross.85
In another incident in Samarra just 2 weeks later, a team of U.S. special operators
and their partnered Iraqi special operations forces conducted a nighttime attack against
an AQI hideout that was the suspected location of the city’s AQI emir. Blinded by sand
kicked up by their own helicopters and cut off from their Iraqi partners, three special
operators assaulted the AQI emir’s building and found themselves in a close-quarters
gunfight with more than a dozen AQI fighters. When his two fellow Green Berets were
wounded, Staff Sergeant Jarion Halbisengibbs continued to clear the building by himself
in complete darkness, not stopping even when shot in the hand and abdomen. Despite
his wounds, he made contact with the Iraqi special operators and reorganized them to
continue the attack. During the engagement, Halbisengibbs killed six of the AQI men,
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including the AQI emir himself. For his actions, the Green Beret sergeant received the
Distinguished Service Cross.86
The situation was even more dangerous in Ninawa Province, where in late summer
and early September Colonel Stephen Twitty’s Mosul-based 4th Brigade Combat Team,
1st Cavalry Division, detected a migration of AQI fighters north from Baghdad. The first
sign had come when Twitty’s troops began capturing enemy fighters who possessed
Baghdad area identification cards.87 As the terrorists arrived, Twitty recorded a corresponding uptick in enemy activity.88 This migration of AQI fighters to the north led
to the Iraq War’s most deadly terrorist incident. On August 14, the day before Operation PHANTOM STRIKE began, AQI attacked 2 Yazidi towns near Sinjar with massive
truck bombs that killed about 300 civilians and wounded at least 700 more, according to
MNF-I’s reports.89 Iraqi reports put the toll even higher, at almost 800 killed and 1,500
wounded. Either way, the attack on the Yazidis resulted in the highest death toll of any
single terrorist attack of the entire war, and it indicated AQI’s resilience as well as its
determination to hold onto Mosul and Ninawa Province despite its loss of almost all of
its territory in central Iraq. While the coalition necessarily focused on ending the sectarian
civil war in Baghdad, the civil war among ethnic groups and sects in Ninawa had continued, offering a political opening for AQI and other hard-line Sunni insurgent groups.
The civil war in the north would flare again as AQI members made their way north and
as the group attempted to switch its cross-border infiltration routes from the increasingly
difficult Anbar Province to the more AQI-accessible Sinjar-Tel Afar-Mosul corridor.
By intensifying the pressure on Sunni militants and sustaining the surge of operations
through Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, Odierno hoped to prevent AQI from carrying
out its usual spike in attacks and killings of civilians during the holy month of Ramadan.
If the coalition could constrain AQI’s normal level of activity once the holy month began
on September 12, it would demonstrate the group’s waning power and neutralize its psychological effect on Iraqis.90 For Petraeus, the pursuit of the enemy in August occurred
in the context of his impending congressional testimony with Ambassador Ryan Crocker
in Washington, where the next month the two men would be expected to report on the
first 7 months of the surge. Petraeus would have to assess publicly the interim results
of the surge of operations while Operation PHANTOM STRIKE was still underway, a
task that would be fraught with political implications. The summer 2007 operations were
succeeding in pushing AQI away from Baghdad and the Awakening was turning tens
of thousands of local Iraqis against AQI, but it was not yet clear that reconciliation with
the Iraqi Government would follow. Ever mindful of the steadily ticking Washington
“clock,” Petraeus knew that time was running short.
SUMMER OF THE AWAKENING
The Coalition and the Iraqi Government Organize for Reconciliation
In addition to the offensive operations of the four U.S. divisions in central Iraq, the
surge of operations of summer 2007 had a significant tribal outreach component. Though
senior coalition commanders had been somewhat divided and cautious about the Awakening’s potential in early 2007, by late May the unexpected spread of the tribal movement
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had shown them that they were witnessing a golden opportunity not to be squandered.
The MNF-I and MNC-I commanders became determined to continue building the Awakening’s momentum and to make the tribal movement a force multiplier in the coalition’s
major operations, including Operation PHANTOM THUNDER. Petraeus had already
told Gates and his coalition subordinates that the tribal movement’s continued growth
would depend to a great degree on the Iraqi Government’s acceptance of it. Accordingly,
and as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team had recommended, Petraeus took steps to
institutionalize the coalition’s oversight of the Awakening and to broker an accommodation between the multiplying Awakening groups and the Maliki government. At MNF-I,
the small cell created under British Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb responsible for
tribal engagement carried on but expanded in size and scope. In the spring, it received
its own co-directors in British Major General Paul R. Newton and Donald A. Blome, a
senior aide to the U.S. ambassador. The Force Strategic Engagement Cell, as it came to
be called, would have the job of prodding the Iraqi Government as it shuffled down
the path toward national reconciliation and attempt to convince Maliki that integrating
Sunni tribal irregulars into the security forces lay in his best long-term interests.91
One of the cell’s initial quandaries was what name should be assigned to the disparate
groups that made up the broader Awakening movement. Before creating a standardized
name, coalition staff officers referred to the tribal irregulars by a variety of terms including “potential reconcilables,” “Sunni groups,” “local security forces,” and “police support units” before settling on the term “Concerned Local Citizens” in June 2007. Even that
term proved unworkable, as coalition leaders soon discovered that “Concerned Local
Citizens” was more accurately understood in Arabic as “People who worry a lot.” After
several more months of searching for an appropriate name, MNF-I staffers settled on the
term “Sons of Iraq” in February 2008.92
Naming conventions aside, at MNC-I, Odierno, who had been initially cautious
regarding outreach to former insurgents, changed course and made the facilitation of
bottom-up reconciliation a top-tier priority for his headquarters and subordinate units.
By late spring 2007, the MNC-I commander concluded that the short-term security gains
realized through bottom-up reconciliation could not be sustained without top-down
efforts to integrate armed tribesmen or former insurgents with the Government of Iraq.
But he also realized that the Maliki government, for the time being, was at best ambivalent and at worst downright hostile to the Sunni groups with whom MNC-I’s units had
begun to work. Rather than wait for the Maliki government to move ahead with a formal
reconciliation process of its own, Odierno encouraged his subordinate commanders to
engage anyone who was willing to talk. In new written guidance to his units in June 2007,
Odierno instructed commanders to use dialogue with local groups to stop attacks against
the coalition and to broker cease-fires among warring parties. The MNC-I commander’s
goal was not for his subordinate commanders to pressure extra governmental armed
groups to lay down their weapons, but rather that they should convince those groups to
turn their weapons against AQI and other irreconcilable terrorists.93 In writing to MNCI’s units, Odierno conceded that “some may be skeptical” of facilitating bottom-up reconciliation—as he, too, had initially been—but like Petraeus, he believed the initiative to
work with Sunnis who had at one time fought against the coalition reflected a new reality.94 On the streets and in the rural districts of Iraq, insurgent groups and their affiliated
216

SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS

tribes were breaking from AQI and seeking local accommodations with the coalition that
promised to reduce violence sharply in the near term.
Odierno’s June 2007 directives laid out broad guidelines on the use of the tribal irregulars and authorized a wide array of “tools” to reach accommodations, including targeted detainee releases, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded
infrastructure security contracts, and employment in positions that would lead to a more
permanent job with the Iraqi police.95 To help synchronize local engagements throughout
the country and implement MNC-I’s new guidelines, Odierno created a new reconciliation directorate within MNC-I and encouraged each of his divisions to set up similar
“reconciliation cells.”96 Given the rather unconventional directive to facilitate reconciliation, Odierno saw his primary contribution as underwriting the risk subordinate commanders assumed as they engaged with insurgent groups.97 For the colonels in charge
of BCTs and battalions, this top cover afforded by Odierno, as well as Petraeus, allowed
for aggressive engagement in an unavoidably decentralized environment in which they
often found themselves making “handshake agreements” with recent enemies.98
When it came to negotiations with Sunni insurgents, the Maliki administration was
less inclined to take such risks. Petraeus found this somewhat understandable, given
Iraq’s recent history of Ba’athist rule and conspiracy-fueled fears of the party’s resurgence, but he believed the time had come to stop the bureaucratic foot-dragging on
national reconciliation.99 Provincial elections would perhaps be the most straightforward
way to draw Sunnis into the political process, but in the summer of 2007, prospects for
convincing the Iraqi Government to hold new elections were dim. Instead, in June, Prime
Minister Maliki formed the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) to manage the Iraqi Government’s part in brokering agreements with
the many local Sunni groups coming forward.100 One
crucial task for the Iraqi Government, as coalition
commanders saw it, involved vetting the names of
Awakening members—many of whom were contractors compensated through CERP funds—and
then expediting their induction into the Iraqi police
and thus onto official government payrolls.
Petraeus considered the IFCNR a good idea in
theory but doubted its members would perform
their duties in an evenhanded way, especially after
Maliki staffed the committee with personnel from
the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC),
the special arm that allowed the Prime Minister to
bypass the military chain of command.101 Moreover,
the dominant voice on the IFCNR was Bassima Luay
Hasun al-Jaidri, a military technology specialist who
had served in Saddam’s rocket and missile program
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st
before 2003 and since then had become a senior govClass Kerensa Hardy (Released).
ernment administrator and a Maliki confidant.102 In
February, Odierno had noted Jaidri’s Shi’a sectar103
ian bent and judged that her interference in security Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri.
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affairs was discrediting Baghdad commander General Abud Qanbar.104 American officers
regarded her appointment to be the IFCNR’s gatekeeper for the entry of Sunnis into the
Iraqi police with disappointment. “The fact that [the IFCNR] is led by Jaidri and other
sectarian OCINC personalities makes us a bit cautious as to whether it exists to rapidly
assist local accommodation efforts or to protect Shi’a equities while dealing with these
tribes or groups,” Petraeus wrote to Gates in late June.105
The first major task for Jaidri and the IFCNR was dealing with Abu Azzam’s large
Awakening group in Abu Ghraib. By midsummer 2007, the coalition had registered more
than 1,700 of the Abu Ghraib volunteers for potential induction into the Iraqi police and
onto government payrolls, a step that coalition commanders believed needed to take
place quickly in order to ensure that the volunteers did not become discouraged and
drift back into the insurgency.106 Odierno saw Abu Ghraib as a test case.107 If the Iraqi
Government balked at absorbing Abu Azzam’s men into the government security forces,
it could undercut the only measurable progress made toward reconciliation and doom
the whole venture. To press Jaidri and other IFCNR leaders to see beyond their sectarian
perspectives, Odierno dispatched his political adviser Emma Sky to lobby the IFCNR
about the benefits of bottom-up reconciliation and specifically to persuade them to issue
hiring orders for the Abu Ghraib volunteers. Sky worked to win Jaidri’s trust, gradually chipping away at the common perception among the Shi’a ruling class that U.S.
cooperation with Sunni groups was part of some American scheme to fuel civil war and
hasten Maliki’s overthrow. Nonetheless, the Iraqi official still felt strongly that integrating former insurgents into the security forces was equivalent to arming AQI. As Jaidri
saw it, American commanders like Odierno seemed obsessed with the Sunni irregulars in
nearby Abu Ghraib, and senior American officials’ occasional public antagonism toward
her only raised her suspicions.108 Under her leadership, the new IFCNR moved slowly
on vetting the Abu Ghraib volunteers, letting the process drag on well into the summer.
When coalition commanders learned in late July that the IFCNR was prepared to consider
fewer than half the names submitted from Abu Ghraib and, of those, none who had ever
been affiliated with Jaysh al-Islami, they braced themselves for a serious confrontation
with the Prime Minister. However, at the 11th hour Sky persuaded Jaidri to relent and
approve the list in its entirety.109 The following week, the MNF-I commander conveyed
the encouraging news to Gates and hoped the development indicated Maliki’s “increased
commitment to moving forward on reconciliation—not just in word, but also in deed.”110
However, the action foretold no guarantee of future success.
Control Measures and Tensions Over the Awakening
At the tactical level, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders’ encouragement and guidance about the Awakening came as brigade and battalion commanders were experimenting with ways to work with Sunnis who were mainly former enemies, balancing the need
for caution with the need to keep local cease-fires from stalling so that Sunni groups did
not drift back into the anti-coalition camp. As U.S. units monitored the activity of Awakening groups in their area, they demanded full transparency of the group’s members
and required the Sunni fighters to coordinate their operations and movements. Many
commanders also devised arrangements that encouraged or even compelled the Sunni
groups’ cooperation with local Iraqi security forces. In Ameriyah, for example, Lieutenant
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Colonel Dale C. Kuehl instituted combined patrols and expected Abu Abed, the local
Awakening leader, to post representatives in joint security stations at all times for liaison
purposes.111 To the south around Mahmudiyah, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, “partnered” a U.S. unit with each armed
tribal group while ensuring that the local Iraqi Army brigade commander, Brigadier General Ali Freiji, met regularly with Awakening members in his sector.112 One of Kershaw’s
battalion commanders even organized his local Sunni irregulars into “platoons” to secure
areas that would have stretched the capabilities of available U.S. forces.113
To supplement the standard practice of cataloging biometric data and weapon serial
numbers, Kershaw required sheikhs to vouch formally for the loyalty of each fighter.114
He found that this obligation not only yielded insights into the insurgency and its leaders, but it also provided a great deal of leverage over those who had cast their lot with
the coalition against AQI.115 Similarly, in his dealings with Awakening members in northwest Baghdad, Burton employed the contract as a mechanism to apply leverage, investigating alleged violations of the agreed-upon terms and holding offenders accountable.116
Of course, the fact that the tribal irregulars benefited from stores of U.S. or Iraqi ammunition gave coalition forces considerable leverage.117 American units also had to deal with
the ethically tricky matter of how Awakening groups handled the detainees they captured. Most commanders prohibited unsupervised interrogations by irregular forces and
limited the time they were allowed to hold prisoners before transferring them to U.S. or
Iraqi units.118
Yet in spite of these control measures, enlisting new partners in a multifaceted struggle for stability created its own problems, reminding commanders that accommodations
with one-time insurgents stemmed primarily from momentary alignments of interest and
thus were delicate in nature and, at times, volatile. Kershaw’s involvement with former
1920 Revolutionary Brigades leader Abu Maruf was a prime example. On occasion,
Kershaw’s brigade employed Abu Maruf and his men in raids, exploiting their general
knowledge of enemy tactics as well as their precise intelligence of the locations of extremist leaders. One operation coordinated with Kershaw’s troops lasted an entire night as
Sunni fighters cleared from Radwaniyah south to the Euphrates River, raiding AQI safe
houses and opening an IED-choked road along the brigade’s sparsely manned western
boundary.119 Abu Maruf embraced his role as informal ambassador for the Americans
among nearby tribes, spurring further local accommodations, but was nonetheless an
opportunist at heart.120 Funk, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, commander whose unit was responsible for Taji, also had dealings with Abu Maruf. Since the
former insurgent’s idea of which Sunnis belonged to AQI seemed contrived and inconsistent, Funk found Maruf capricious.121 The Awakening leader also magnified the already
hostile relations between Sunni volunteers and General Nasser Ghanam’s Muthanna Brigade in the Abu Ghraib area. In late summer, Abu Maruf’s men launched an independent attack on some of the Muthanna Brigade’s checkpoints, having previously warned
local U.S. officers that they might do so if tensions with Ghanam’s troops continued.
When Kershaw learned that the armed tribal group had staged the raid from his sector,
the U.S. commander clamped down and directed one of his battalions to act as a buffer
between the hostile forces.122 Though a key figure in rallying the Zobaie tribe in the Radwaniyah-Zaidon area against AQI, Abu Maruf never completely severed his ties with the
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insurgency and occasionally antagonized even his new American friends by continuing
to speak, as he described it, the “language of the resistance.”123
Like Abu Maruf, Abu Abed also had shown courage in taking on Sunni insurgent
cells in Ameriyah in May 2007, as well as a ruthless knack for rooting out their neighborhood sanctuaries. Indeed, U.S.-backed fighters organizing across Baghdad demonstrated
this unique expertise—not least because they knew where AQI operatives lived, recognized their faces, and could pinpoint the locations of their weapons caches. The cumulative effect was akin to squeezing the irreconcilable extremists out of Baghdad.124 Yet, like
Abu Maruf, Abu Abed was a controversial partner for U.S. units. A charismatic figure,
the self-styled “Robin Hood” made enemies in the Iraqi Islamic Party, whose Sunni
power brokers saw his rapid rise in popularity politically threatening, while the Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)-like efficiency of his men elicited uneasy scrutiny from the
conspiracy-minded Shi’a running the national government. That Abu Abed seemed to
embrace the high-profile persona of a temperamental mafia boss did not help. On top of
the infighting in his own organization, he occasionally had heated arguments with local
Iraqi Army commanders, requiring the Americans to mediate.125 These factors created
challenges in solidifying the security gains in Ameriyah. Recognizing Abu Abed as a
leader of influence, the IFCNR engaged him in dialogue but delayed the police enrollment of the Ameriyah “Knights” on the basis of accusations that the armed men carried
on like thugs, charges that Kuehl, the U.S. commander of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, in Ameriyah, investigated but largely dismissed as a disinformation campaign
intended to undermine the Awakening.126
Despite Petraeus and Odierno’s enthusiasm for U.S. units’ outreach to local Sunni
groups, not all of the higher coalition headquarters’ involvement in reconciliation efforts
was welcomed at lower unit levels. MNF-I’s strategic engagement cell, for example, was
established mainly to track and coordinate the dozens of local reconciliation initiatives to
prevent divisions from working at cross-purposes, or to identify additional opportunities
for reconciliation and pass on the information to subordinate echelons. Lower-level units
resented instances when the strategic engagement cell interacted directly with insurgent
leaders and appeared to intervene in tactical activities. Marine Brigadier General John
R. Allen, deputy commander of MNF-W, considered MNF-I’s involvement with tribal
engagement disruptive and even harmful, since it potentially undermined the MEF as the
coalition’s primary interlocutor with the Anbari sheikhs. “We bristle when higher headquarters wants to help us,” he told historians in late June 2007, disparaging the strategic
engagement cell’s efforts to establish a unilateral relationship with the tribes in MNF-W’s
area of operations.127 MNF-I’s supposed presumption that the delicate nature of reconciliation inside Anbar was best left to “the next group of British officers in the front office”
incensed him. “We love them coming down here, and we’re happy to brief them . . . and
introduce them to people,” he offered, but “we don’t need their help.”128 Venting just
days after a suicide bomber at Baghdad’s Mansour Hotel killed several Awakening leaders who had been summoned for talks with the Maliki government, an angry Allen proposed that, rather than try to control negotiations with the sheikhs, higher headquarters
should contribute resources instead: “If you want to help me . . . give me $20 million. I’ll
spend it where I know it’ll make some good.”129

220

SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS

Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Paul Bishop (Released).

Major General John Allen With a Sheikh of the Albu Issa Tribe at Camp Fallujah.130
In the MND-C area of operations, another serious disagreement over reconciliation
matters arose when MND-C commander Lynch developed guidance at odds with ways
in which Kershaw’s brigade had begun to employ the newly minted Concerned Local
Citizens (CLCs). Focused on major combat operations to clear Arab Jabour and Salman
Pak as part of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, Lynch considered MNC-I’s guidance
to broker cease-fires with local tribes as contradictory with his operations, and a lower
priority in any case.131 When it came to reconciliation, the division would “start small,”
Lynch determined.132 Expecting a cool reception from the populace as U.S. forces pressed
deeper into AQI sanctuaries, Brigadier General James L. Huggins, one of Lynch’s deputies, believed, as late as mid-July, that reconciliation in the area of operations would come
primarily “out of the barrel of an M4.”133 By contrast, Kershaw, whose 2d Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division, had been fighting vigorously in the “Triangle of Death”
for 8 months, was pushing ahead of his boss to embrace tribal engagement and incorporate the CLCs into his brigade’s security scheme. As the summer progressed, the difference between the two commanders’ views grew wider, especially as Lynch, who had
ordered 40,000 pounds of munitions dropped in the opening 10 seconds of clearing operations in Arab Jabour, emphasized overwhelming firepower. In the Triangle of Death,
Kershaw wanted a more restrained use of firepower and clashed with Lynch on this issue
and on the employment of the division’s combat aviation brigade. Kershaw frequently
used helicopters to enhance his unit’s mobility, but he considered the division’s AH-64
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Apaches too aggressive for a complex battlefield where U.S. and Iraqi troops maneuvered
in conjunction with Sunni irregular forces. When MND-C’s attack helicopters mistook an
armed group of tribesmen in Kershaw’s sector for AQI and fired on them, the brigade
commander began to rely on OH-58 reconnaissance helicopters for support instead.134
Kershaw’s decision to employ the CLCs as “shock companies,” rather than merely
informants or guards at fixed sites, also ran afoul of Lynch’s more conservative guidance.
Concluding that an auxiliary force of armed tribesmen only would lead to more bloodshed, the MND-C commander initially prohibited the practice. Forbidding his units to
issue weapons and ammunition to the CLCs, Lynch also banned the act of fighting alongside them. “They can give us the intel and we will fight al-Qaeda,” he directed.135 Having
already gone through months of trial and error with Awakening forces, Kershaw considered Lynch’s restriction unnecessary and self-limiting, especially if U.S. units could monitor the armed groups closely and oversee them in operations.136 Kershaw also disagreed
with Lynch’s view that the coalition should avoid working with Sunni fighters who had
American blood on their hands and dismissed his commander’s concern that AQI could
infiltrate the armed groups cooperating with the brigade. In a midsummer memorandum
to his subordinates, Kershaw emphasized the utility of prudent control measures, but
implicitly criticized MND-C’s directives by warning against the impracticality of overly
prescriptive guidance. “As I look at the daily disposition of the groups, it occurs to me
that they exactly mirror the same cells that we were fighting against 2 months ago,” Kershaw explained to his units. “We are now working with many of the same people we
were fighting against. . . . So, the groups are already ‘infiltrated.’ Get over it.”137
THE WAR AGAINST IRAN’S MILITANT PROXIES
EFP Networks and the Iranian Border Problem
As the MNC-I operations against AQI intensified in the Baghdad belts and beyond,
the coalition’s Shi’a militant problem grew, requiring more attention from U.S. commanders. Taking advantage of MNF-I’s renewed focus against Sunni militants elsewhere,
Shi’a militants increased their attacks in the first half of 2007, conducting 65 explosively
formed penetrator (EFP) attacks against coalition troops in April alone.138 As in 2006, a
well-established network of Iranian-sponsored militants were smuggling EFP devices
and other weapons across the Iran-Iraq border in the south and in the Diyala Valley. The
most active EFP smugglers were the operatives headed by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani and
his brother Abu Yaser al-Sheibani, who moved the Iranian weapons through Maysan
and Wasit Provinces to deliver them to JAM and other militant groups. In addition to
the border crossings near Amarah and Kut, coalition analysts suspected the Sheibani
brothers and other smugglers were using routes through the vast marshes that spanned
the border south of Amara, just as they had done in their shadowy war against Saddam’s
regime during and after the Iran-Iraq War. Though coalition special operators were able
to capture Abu Yaser al-Sheibani on April 20, the incidence of EFP attacks nevertheless
increased as the summer approached, eventually rising to 99 attacks during July.139
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Russell Bassett (Released).

Fully Constructed EFPs.140
The nature of the EFP smuggling operation and the employment of EFPs left U.S.
commanders with no doubt that the weapons were part of an Iranian regime proxy war
against the United States and parts of the Iraqi Government, a judgment that Petraeus
and Crocker relayed to the visiting Nebraska Senator Charles T. Hagel on April 15.141 At
that time, U.S. analysts believed that 100 percent of EFPs were meant to target coalition
troops, though they often killed or wounded Iraqis as collateral damage.142 The EFPs also
never proliferated into the hands of Sunni militants, indicating that the Iranians kept
tight control of their distribution.
For coalition commanders, the operational problem was the difficulty of controlling
the porous southeastern border—the same problem Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli had reported to Casey almost exactly a year before. Reporting to Gates in midMay 2007, Petraeus noted that the Iranian regime appeared to be directly involved in
the cross-border smuggling, with the coalition detecting at least 10 Iranian helicopter
incursions into Iraq in the marsh-covered border area of southeastern Iraq since January.
“Most of the observed flight paths followed smuggling routes,” Petraeus noted, “which
may mean those routes are being reconnoitered to allow smugglers to avoid detection by
border patrols and also assess deployed Coalition Forces.”143
To improve the coalition’s monitoring of the troublesome border area, Petraeus and
Odierno expected MND-C to deploy coalition combat power to Wasit Province, in addition to its continuing efforts to support the Sunni Awakening and interdict AQI in Baghdad’s southern belts. Situated between the Iranian border and Baghdad, Wasit Province
contained key routes between Iran and various Shi’a militias and Special Groups, and
in the past efforts to disrupt these supply lines suffered from a distinct lack of coalition
troops and resources. The closest permanent coalition presence to the main border crossing of Zurbatiyah was a hazardous 80-kilometer drive away from Forward Operating
Base Delta, near the city of Kut, and coalition border security teams were able to search
only a handful of the approximately 300 trucks that crossed into Iraq daily.144 The arrival
of the 2,000 soldiers of the 3d Infantry Brigade from the Republic of Georgia in July 2007
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enabled MNC-I to “thicken” the space between Kut and the border with a coalition troop
presence and checkpoints designed to disrupt smuggling of weapons and explosives. In
addition to the Georgian checkpoints, coalition commanders made plans to secure the
primary border crossings with six new outposts constructed as a secondary screen to
the existing Iraqi outposts. These new facilities would be outfitted with X-ray machines
that would permit more effective vehicle searches as well as biometric systems to allow
guards to identify known terrorists or militants.145 In September, construction began on
Combat Outpost Shocker, which would allow MNC-I to station U.S. troops just 8 kilometers from the Zurbatiyah crossing and allow a permanent coalition contingent on the
border.146 Although smugglers would no doubt still find alternative routes along smaller
roads or across the open desert, they would be vulnerable to detection by satellites or
aerial surveillance.147
South of MND-C’s area of operations in Wasit Province, Maysan Province and its
unruly capital of Amarah represented another, more complicated problem. In keeping
with the transition campaign plan of 2006, the province had been passed to Provincial
Iraqi Control in mid-April 2007, making the coalition’s ability to operate there unilaterally more difficult.148 Unlike the border crossing area in Wasit, Maysan’s marshy border
was largely unwatched by either Iraqi or coalition forces, and coalition commanders suspected Amarah to be a major Shi’a militant logistics hub. The province was riddled with
Shi’a militant activity. On June 18, for example, coalition troops conducting a series of
raids against the Special Groups (a term referring to highly trained, Iranian-sponsored
Shi’a militants such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq) in Amarah and the border town of Majar al
Kabir came under heavy small arms and RPG fire. In the ensuing firefight, they killed at
least 20 militants before leaving the area with a captured member of an EFP smuggling
network.149 Throughout June and July, coalition troops made similar raids throughout
the province to try to stem the flow of EFPs into central Iraq, but with no real coalition
presence in Amara or on Maysan’s border, U.S. commanders would have difficulty preventing the Sheibani Network or other Shi’a militants from moving lethal materials into
Iraq at will.
The Trilateral Talks and Iranian Involvement
In addition to the clear forensic evidence of Iranian-sponsored lethal assistance across
the Iran-Iraq border, coalition commanders were learning more about Iranian involvement with Shi’a militant groups from top Shi’a militant leaders themselves. On March 20
in Basrah, coalition troops had captured Qais al-Khazali and his brother Laith al-Khazali
based on evidence that the two men and their Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq group had been behind
the January 2007 killing of U.S. military advisers at the police compound in Karbala. They
had also captured a third man whose identity was unknown but who had pretended to
be mute. On May 1, the third detainee, whom coalition officers referred to as “Hamid the
mute,” began speaking to his captors in a coalition detention center, revealing himself to
be Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior leader of Lebanese Hizballah’s external operations group.
Daqduq admitted that he had deployed to Iraq to advise Qais al-Khazali and Asa’ib Ahl
al-Haqq in their campaign against the coalition. Once talking, he and Khazali revealed
extensive details about their Iranian-sponsored operations. “The evidence is impressive,”
Petraeus wrote to Gates in late May:
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The five-page Qais Khazali sworn statement, made last week and marked with his inked
fingerprints, is an unequivocal indictment of Iranian interference. His statement, along with those
of his brother and other detainees, provides incontrovertible evidence that Iran is arming, funding,
training, equipping, and advising Shi’a extremists operating in Iraq. Iranian interference began
shortly after the Coalition began operations, but advanced significantly after the Najaf operation
in 2004. The statements of those interrogated are buttressed by dozens of documents taken from
the captured laptops. As Qais asserted, without Iranian funding, JAM special groups would not be
able to function.150

Petraeus had spoken publicly about the implications of this evidence just a few days
before, telling an American reporter that Iranian regime activities in Iraq were “absolutely nefarious” and “hugely damaging to Iraq.” The Iranian regime had provided millions of dollars to different Shi’a militias since the 2003 invasion, Petraeus noted, and the
scale of support was such that it had to denote Iranian regime policy. Asked whether the
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei might not know about these Quds Force activities, Petraeus was emphatic. “He can’t not know,” the MNF-I commander said, noting
that Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani reported directly to Khamenei. “It’s a
massive operation. . . . If he doesn’t know about it, it’s the most out-of-control operation
in the world.”151

Source: DoD briefing slides (Released).

Brothers Qais and Laith Khazali, Commanders of the
Militia Group Asa’ib Ahl al Haqq.152
Within 2 weeks, Petraeus began briefing senior Iraqi officials on what MNF-I was
learning from Khazali and others. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and National
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie were “properly taken aback and left for Iran on
Sunday determined to take a strong message to Tehran” after they were informed, Petraeus reported to Gates. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar
Zebari urged Petraeus to broadcast Khazali’s and Daqduq’s taped confessions on Iraqi
television—something Petraeus had to inform them the Geneva Convention would not
allow.153 MNF-I leaders had their own plans to explain to the world the scale of Iranian
involvement in any case. On July 2, Petraeus’s MNF-I spokesman, Brigadier General
Kevin Bergner, held a press conference in Baghdad to lay out the evidence of the Iranian
regime’s lethal involvement in Iraq, particularly its training and operational direction
of the Special Groups. While capturing Qais al-Khazali, the coalition had discovered a
22-page “in-depth planning and lessons learned document” about the January 20 attack
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Khazali’s operatives had carried out against the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination
Center, Bergner explained, and in the course of their questioning by coalition officials:
Ali Mussa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Qods Force knew of
and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers. Ali Musa
Daqduq contends that the Iraqi Special Groups could not have conducted the complex operations
without the support and direction of the Qods Forces. Daqduq and Khazali both confirm that Qais
Khazali authorized the operation, and Azhar al Dulaimi, who we killed in an operation earlier this
year, executed the operation.154

Although Petraeus and other coalition officials had previously mentioned their suspicions of Iranian involvement in Iraq, the July 2 press briefing was the most comprehensive public exposure of the evidence of Iran’s destabilizing role and Lebanese Hizballah’s
involvement. As Petraeus described to Gates, the rollout was meant to “put Iran on
notice that we know of their activities and that those activities are unacceptable.”155 As
if to punctuate MNF-I’s point, on the morning of Bergner’s press conference Shi’a militants shelled Forward Operating Base Echo in Diwaniya, attacking the Multi-National
Division-Central South (MND-CS) base with 80 mortar rounds.
Later the same month, against the backdrop of the public exposition on July 2, Crocker
met with Iranian ambassador Hassan Kazemi-Ghomi in the second round of trilateral
talks among the United States, Iraq, and Iran, where the American and Iranian representatives agreed on July 24 to form a security subcommittee that would conduct further
talks. “On one hand, we’ll seek cooperation on an anti-AQI agenda,” Petraeus reported to
the Pentagon, but “on the other hand, we’ll remain firm in showing the Iranians we have
extensive knowledge of their activities and will confront them as they support Shi’a militias inside Iraq.”156 With Operation PHANTOM THUNDER pushing AQI away from the
capital, MNF-I’s statistics showed that Shi’a militias were likely responsible for approximately two-thirds of attacks against U.S. troops in Baghdad, and Petraeus and Crocker
intended the coming security talks to be a venue for senior Iraqi and U.S. officials to present a united front against Iranian lethal aid to the militias.157 On August 6, Bergner and
Crocker’s political-military counselor, Ambassador Marcie Ries, met with Iranian counterparts again in a meeting hosted by the hard-nosed Iraqi Interior Ministry intelligence
chief Hussein Ali Kamal. The “surprisingly good” Kamal “kept [the meeting] focused on
AQI and the militias,” Petraeus recounted, while the U.S. officials “stressed the need for
tangible improvement in reducing EFPs, indirect-fire, and support to special groups.”
As U.S. officials had noted in the earlier meetings, “the Iranians seemed off-balance in
comparison to their Iraqi counterparts’ determined leadership of the meeting,” Petraeus
added in his weekly letter to Gates.158
In fact, U.S. officials noted that the Iranian delegates had appeared nervous and
unsure of themselves in each of the trilateral meetings, seemingly afraid of being held
to account for going beyond a very limited set of talking points. An incident the same
week as the August 6 meeting might have explained why. On August 11, Iraqi Minister
of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan al-Waeli brought to Petraeus a message
from Qassem Soleimani, who told Waeli to relay word that he, Soleimani, was “the sole
decision-maker on Iranian activities in Iraq” and that he was willing to decrease the Special Groups activities in exchange for the release of Qais al-Khazali.159 “I told Waeli to
relay back to Soleimani that we believe that Iran has overreached and is on the brink of
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attracting international isolation,” Petraeus reported back to Gates. “I noted that I am not
a policy maker,” he continued, but:
as the commander on the ground, I am starting to think that Iran is attacking Iraqi and coalition
soldiers through proxies - the JAM they have trained, funded, armed, and in some cases even
directed. To provide a bit more jolt, I said that I am considering telling the President that I believe
Iran is, in fact, waging war on the US in Iraq, with all of the US public and governmental responses
that could come from that revelation. For what it’s worth, I do believe that Iran has gone beyond
merely striving for influence in Iraq and could be creating proxies to actively fight us, thinking
that they can keep us distracted while they try to build WMD and set up JAM to act like Lebanese
Hezbollah in Iraq.160

Soleimani’s message sent two signals. First, it reinforced how important the Special
Groups were to the Iranian regime, particularly Qais al-Khazali and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq,
which Soleimani and the regime clearly considered a vital Iranian instrument inside
Iraq. Second, it seemed timed to neutralize the trilateral talks going on in Baghdad and
ensure that no other channel might emerge to challenge Soleimani’s control of the Iranian
regime’s operations in Iraq. The Iranian delegates at the trilateral meetings were “on a
short string,” clearly not empowered to deal substantively with the United States, and
“had to take breaks and make frequent calls back” to their superiors for guidance during
the talks, one U.S. diplomat recalled.161 Soleimani, by contrast, demonstrated through
his continuing sponsorship of Shi’a militants, and by the toll they took on U.S. troops in
summer 2007, that he had a virtually free hand in his Iraq operations.
For American officials in Iraq, expectations for the talks were low at the outset and
sank even lower after three rounds of talks that produced nothing. As one senior diplomat put it, “as a practical matter, it was hard to see how you get to a stable arrangement
on anything that Iran and its many clients actively opposed, so it was important to make
the effort.”162 Crocker and the U.S. Embassy prepared for a planned fourth round of talks
in the fall of 2007, bringing some of the State Department’s top Iran experts to Baghdad
in anticipation of the talks, but as the weeks and then months passed, the Iranians failed
to set a return date and let the engagement lapse.163 In retrospect, the three sessions of
the trilateral talks of 2007 may have represented a debate between two camps within
the Iranian regime: one that saw some utility in talks with the United States if it would
ultimately remove the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and another that believed the talks
were, at best, premature. If there was in fact an intra-Iranian policy debate, the latter view
apparently prevailed.
The JAM War Against ISCI and the Maliki Government
Despite his assertion that he controlled Iran’s Iraq policy and his offer to rein in his
Iraqi proxies if the United States was willing to deal with him, in August 2007 Soleimani
was in the midst of an intra-Iraqi Shi’a conflict that threatened the viability of his Iraq
strategy. Since striking his deal to support the Special Groups and JAM in 2004, Soleimani had sought to maintain a unified Iraqi Shi’a militant front against the U.S.-led coalition, with the aim of forcing the U.S. military out of Iraq. For 3 years, he and his Quds
Force generals had been highly active in arming, training, and funding any of the major
Shi’a militant factions that were willing to fight against the coalition. By the summer of
2007, it was clear that his militant proxies were fighting each other as much as they were
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fighting coalition troops, and his continued support to Shi’a militant factions had begun
to amount to an arming of Shi’a groups that were in rebellion against a Shi’a government
ostensibly aligned with the Iranian regime. In short, by trying to arm all Iraqi Shi’a opponents of the United States, Soleimani and the Quds Force had helped incite a civil war
among their top Iraqi clients, and it was unclear whether Soleimani or anyone else was
actually in full control of the most active Shi’a militant elements.
A series of high-profile attacks drew attention to the broader intra-Shi’a conflict pulsing ominously throughout the southern provinces. On June 5, the chief Sadrist official in
Babil was killed, followed by the murder of a Najafi cleric associated with Sistani. The
Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence surged as the summer progressed, with operatives from JAM and
Badr engaging in a deadly tit-for-tat as Sadrists and Sistani representatives were killed
in rapid succession through July and early August. The tensions between the two sides
escalated into larger-scale violence as well. On June 19 and 20, the Nasiriyah Tactical Support Unit, a well-regarded ISF unit headed by Colonel Naji Rostum Sahra (also known
as Abu Liqa), came under attack by as many as 200 JAM fighters north of the Euphrates River. Through 2 days of fighting, MNC-I provided close air support and coalition
reinforcements as Abu Liqa and his SWAT operators held off their JAM enemies. Prime
Minister Maliki and Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi (himself a Nasiriyah native) gave
coalition commanders a green light to attack “any and all JAM elements” in the city, even
though the province was already under Iraqi control.164 At least 20 JAM fighters died in
the clashes before calm was restored.165

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

General David Petraeus With Iraqi Police Colonel Naji Rostum Sahra,
Also Known as Abu Liqa.166
The fighting in Nasiriyah was followed 2 weeks later by another large engagement in
still-restive Diwaniya, initiated by a JAM indirect-fire attack against Camp Echo on the
same day as Bergner’s press conference. Accurate enough to suggest that JAM elements
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had benefited from “inside help” in their targeting, the barrage of more than 75 rockets
and mortars only wounded 1 coalition soldier, but it damaged equipment and came close
to igniting critical ammunition stores. F-16 fighters streaked over Diwaniyah in response,
destroying three buildings identified as enemy firing points. A raid by U.S. special operations forces against a JAM cell later that week brought a large number of fighters into
the streets, where they seemed poised for a march on Camp Echo until an AC-130 strike
mowed down scores of fighters, decisively ending the attack.167 With close air support
readily available, the coalition retained ample firepower, but that advantage itself could
not prevent JAM from returning to Diwaniya’s neighborhoods in strength once again.
However, Petraeus noted in his report on the battle that Diwaniya residents—and Prime
Minister Maliki as well—had responded favorably to the coalition’s actions, while Sadrist
leaders had chastised JAM members for firing from inside the city.168
The Nasiriyah and Diwaniya clashes were part of an escalating confrontation between
JAM and the Special Groups on one side and the Shi’a parties inside the government
on the other, with the coalition increasingly active in support of the government and
JAM ever more active against the coalition, especially in Baghdad. The same week as the
Diwaniyah fighting, coalition troops conducting a raid to arrest a police officer connected
to JAM in Sadr City found themselves under heavy fire from other presumably JAMlinked Sadr City policemen as they withdrew from the neighborhood. Four days later,
Shi’a militants attacked the International Zone with 35 mortar rounds launched from
multiple locations in Sadr City during a 90-second synchronized attack, a sharp change
from the Shi’a militants’ previous tactics of firing only 1 or 2 rounds at a time. The militia
attack on the Green Zone had “a psychological effect” and had even “shaken the Prime
Minister a bit,” Petraeus reported.169 The Shi’a militants were shelling the seat of their
own government, where the Sadrists still had members in the Parliament.
Meanwhile, the Shi’a militants’ assassination campaign in southern Iraq culminated
with the killing of two Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) governors in mid-August.
On August 11, Qadisiyah Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza and the provincial police chief
died amid a hail of small-arms fire and an EFP explosion in Diwaniya. MNF-I quickly
concluded that the attack had been carried out by JAM operatives in retaliation for Hamza’s support for the ongoing coalition-ISF operations against local JAM groups.170 Nine
days later, Muhammad al-Hassina, a former Badr Corps member who was governor of
Muthanna Province, fell victim to a string of EFPs that tore through his convoy. Reeling
from these high-profile losses, ISCI politicians blamed the Iranian-backed Special Groups
immediately, and by summer’s end the new ISCI governor of Qadisiyah was calling for
another offensive against the militias in Diwaniya.171
Commenting on the two assassinations, Petraeus noted “Tensions between ISCI/Badr
and JAM are high now in the southern provinces. This also may heighten tensions with
Iran, as there is considerable belief that Iran may have been connected to these events.”
The events also underscored for Prime Minister Maliki the threat that the Iranian-backed
militias posed, Petraeus continued, observing, “Iranian influence appears to be more
damaging over time.”172
It was a judgment that Petraeus had been forming for several months, as the Shi’a
militant threat gradually came into greater relief and al-Qaeda in Iraq receded from the
Baghdad region. “I tend to agree with the assessment of Ray Odierno and see that JAM
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is more of a hindrance to long-term security in Iraq than is AQI,” he had written to Gates
on June 30, adding that, “JAM is a much tougher nut and will require kinetics against the
rogue leaders and active engagements to make the mainstream more constructive.”173 In
terms of the militias’ lethality, Petraeus was right—about two-thirds of U.S. casualties
in the following month of July came at the hands of Shi’a militants. The events of the
summer also showed a Sadrist militant front that was in disarray as it faced pressure
from both the coalition and its rivals in the Iraqi Government. The Sadrists’ top problem
was that their leader, Moqtada Sadr, appeared not to be in full control of his numerous
militant commanders and fighters. In early July, he had suddenly returned to Iran, leaving Sheikh Ahmed al-Sheibani in charge of JAM activities and issuing little guidance to
his organization.174 As Sheibani took command back in Iraq, MNF-I detected that JAM
leaders were purging their ranks, and as JAM groups mounted large-scale indirect fire
attacks in Baghdad, coalition commanders could not tell how many of the Sadrist militant
groups actually followed Sadr’s commands.175 Sheibani left for Iran in mid-July, part of
an exodus of JAM commanders who were spending more time in Iran as Maliki consented to more coalition operations against longtime JAM sanctuaries in Baghdad and
elsewhere.176 By mid-August, Petraeus judged that “Sadr is at least a bit marginalized;
even the Iranians think he is a weak leader.”177
The most significant factor working against the Sadrists, however, was that they had
worn out their welcome with Nuri al-Maliki, and the Prime Minister was increasingly
willing to fight them. After the Sadrists had withdrawn from his cabinet in April, Maliki
had spent 3 months working toward fashioning a new governing coalition among Iraq’s
four major parties that excluded the Sadrists. Petraeus anticipated that Maliki was “setting the stage for a more direct confrontation with the radical elements of JAM.”178 Both
Petraeus and the Iraqi Prime Minister detected an erosion of JAM’s popular support as
well. A late July coalition clash against JAM in Karbala had revealed local disaffection
with the militia when JAM fighters commandeered a hospital and demanded that the
doctors treat their wounded, instigating a “ruckus” when the doctors refused. “This attitude seems to match that of many Karbala residents, who believe JAM’s presence will
bring on AQI attacks,” Petraeus reported.179 When an August 8 coalition operation in
Sadr City resulted in 32 JAM militiamen killed, Petraeus observed, “while such an operation would have received great opposition only a few months ago, today Iraqis are happy
to have these rogue militias cleaned off of their streets.”180
The Karbala Fiasco and the JAM Freeze
The week following the assassination of Governor Hamza in Diwaniya, Maliki told
Petraeus that “many Shi’a communities are getting fed up with JAM,” and discussed the
Sadrists’ prospects among a Shi’a population that was growing resentful of them. Reflecting on the discussions, Petraeus reported to Gates on August 18:
my take on JAM is that they, like AQI, have overplayed their hand in some areas. . . . JAM continues
to demonstrate the destructive nature of their organization, and we are seeing a growing rejection by
Iraqi citizens of JAM. JAM protected Shi’a communities when AQI and Sunni insurgents threatened
them, but with that threat dissipating in some areas, JAM is being viewed more as criminal gangs
and thugs than protectors. Many Iraqi leaders talk about the danger of the Hezbollization of Iraq by
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JAM, as well, but both the Prime Minister and I sense that JAM lacks the capability and widespread
acceptance among the Shi’a to take on such a role. When the Shi’a communities turn against JAM,
as many of the Sunni communities have done against AQI, this effort will turn more to the good.181

The turning of the Shi’a population against JAM was not long in coming. The lowlevel conflict among the Shi’a factions finally boiled over in late August in the shrine city
of Karbala. On August 27, Sadrist gunmen attacked Badr-associated government security
guards at the Imam Ali shrine, the destination of more than one million pilgrims who
had made their way to the city that month to celebrate the birth of the twelfth imam. For
weeks, Iraqi security forces and the coalition had made careful plans to guard the pilgrimage against AQI attacks, but had not anticipated that the actual threat would come
from the Sadrists. Horrified Iraqis watched footage of the fighting as 52 people were
killed and another 279 wounded, many of them pilgrims caught in the crossfire.
The clashes in Karbala quickly set off fighting between JAM and Badr elsewhere,
including in Baghdad, where gun battles broke out between the groups for 2 days before
finally calming down. The day after the Karbala violence, an enraged Prime Minister
Maliki led a 52-vehicle convoy to Karbala to confront JAM fighters and leaders, arrest
local officials who had been complicit or incompetent in the JAM attacks, and shut down
the pilgrimage, ordering the hundreds of thousands of remaining pilgrims to leave the
city for their own safety. The Prime Minister, cheered by crowds along the route from
Baghdad, brandished a pistol upon arriving in Karbala and arrested scores of Sadrists
implicated in the violence as quick reaction forces from the Interior and Defense ministries deployed to lock down the city, including Major General Othman al-Ghanimi and
his 8th Iraqi Army Division.182
The Karbala fiasco forced Moqtada Sadr to act quickly to deflect the criticism descending upon his party and repair the embarrassing impression that his movement had become
dominated by out-of-control, murderous gangs. The carnage near one of the Shi’a world’s
holiest sites was a clear sign of the depths to which JAM had sunk: a militant organization
formed in 2003 expressly to protect Shi’a pilgrims from violence was now seen on television slaughtering them. Three days after the incident, Sadr’s top representatives read out
a public statement in which he announced a freeze of all JAM operations for 6 months,
during which he encouraged militia members to cooperate with the ISF and refrain from
attacking the coalition.183 Inside the JAM leadership, Sadr went further and ordered his
subordinates to overhaul the militia with an educational program for the rank and file,
while reportedly clashing with his deputy Ahmed al-Sheibani over Sheibani’s handling
of the Karbala incident.184
The Sadrist fiasco and JAM freeze delivered MNF-I an unexpected respite from the
main body of the Sadrist militia organization and also handed Petraeus and coalition
leaders a useful tool with which to attack those militias that continued to fight. Coalition
leaders could now argue that any Shi’a militants that attacked coalition forces were not a
part of Sadr’s “honorable” followers, but rather criminal groups who were subject to coalition and ISF targeting. The halt to “mainstream JAM” activities helped coalition commanders identify and target Special Groups, breakaway groups, and rogue militants who
distinguished themselves from mainstream JAM by continuing their activities despite
Sadr’s call for a freeze on activities. Coalition commanders also judged that Sadr, though
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weakened, had not decided to drop militant resistance against the coalition for good.
“They were embarrassed over the Karbala events,” Odierno concluded. “I think they
called the ceasefire not because they want to stop violent action, but because they want to
regroup, reorganize, [and] see if they can get control of their forces so they can continue
to influence the future of Iraq.”185
Some analysts later concluded that the coalition benefited from a strategic windfall as
Sadr supposedly unilaterally ordered his militia to stand down from attacks against the
coalition. In truth, the JAM freeze was Sadr’s desperate attempt to rescue his movement
from a severe political backlash inside the Iraqi Shi’a community. The Sadrist stand-down
was also, at least in part, a defensive reaction to several months of intensifying pressure
on JAM and the Special Groups from both the coalition and the ISF. On a macro scale, it
represented the beginning of a reversal of fortunes for Maliki and Sadr. Just as the Karbala incident caused a dramatic change in the Sadrists’ near-term political position, it did
the same for Maliki. The Prime Minister’s decisive action had increased both his stature
and his confidence, Petraeus noted a few days later, as well as Maliki’s confidence in the
ISF units that had responded quickly to secure Karbala.186 The confrontation with JAM
in Karbala marked the beginning of a high-stakes Maliki-Sadrist showdown that would
culminate in Basrah and Baghdad the following spring.
MNF-I AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE SURGE
CENTCOM Has Its Doubts, Again
As the operational situation in Iraq began to change in the summer of 2007, the views
of the MNF-I and CENTCOM commanders diverged again. Less than 3 months into
Admiral William J. Fallon’s command, his initial skepticism about the prospects of the
surge had developed into virtual opposition to Petraeus’s approach. By late May 2007,
before the last of the surge units had arrived in Iraq, Fallon concluded that the surge was
doomed to strategic failure. He set out to develop an alternative campaign plan for Iraq
that would, in his view, allow the United States to regain its strategic flexibility by reducing what he believed was an over-commitment of U.S. military resources to the Middle
East. In June, as Petraeus and Crocker’s subordinates fleshed out the new joint campaign
plan, Fallon dispatched Rear Admiral James “Sandy” Winnefeld to Iraq to assess the
situation and formulate a plan to significantly drawdown U.S. troops by year’s end, far
ahead of the scheduled end of the surge. The Navy men shared the belief that Army leaders had become invested emotionally in Iraq and could no longer clearly judge Iraq’s strategic importance and the coalition’s chances of success. Journeying to Baghdad to attend
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) change of command
in early June, Fallon took it as a bad sign when incoming commander Lieutenant General
James M. Dubik delivered his assumption of command speech in phonetic Arabic. Dubik
had meant it as a gesture of respect to the assembled crowd of hundreds of Iraqi officers,
but Fallon saw it as evidence that Army leaders had become too deeply ensconced in
Baghdad.187 Visiting the vast post exchange at Camp Liberty later, Winnefeld walked
through rows of flat-screen televisions for sale to American troops, a sight that seemed to
him emblematic of an Army that had settled into a permanent mission in Iraq—though
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Petraeus coincidentally had tasked MNF-I
Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill to quietly end such sales.188 The CENTCOM commander and Winnefeld were determined to
help extricate the U.S. military from the Iraq
morass. Fallon and Winnefeld’s alternative
Iraq strategy involved ending the U.S. combat
mission in the country and accelerating the
transition to Iraqi control, virtually the same
concept U.S. forces would adopt during Operation NEW DAWN more than 3 years later.189
To assist Fallon in refining this approach,
Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, having
recently served as the commander of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, traveled to Tampa to help Winnefeld set down the
particulars of how to end combat activities and
convert U.S. units into transition teams. As the
plan took shape with Bolger’s input, Winnfeld shared its details with U.S. commanders Source: U.S. Navy photo by Monica A. King
(Released).
in Iraq and the Gulf region. In Kuwait, he met
with Army Central commander Lieutenant
Rear Admiral James Winnefeld.190
General R. Steven Whitcomb to discuss ways
in which the command could more quickly
withdraw the Army from Iraq.191 In Bahrain, he
met Marine Corps Central commander Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, but when
Winnefeld offered the observation that the surge had failed in its objectives and that
U.S. forces should begin to withdraw, an astounded Mattis protested that the Marines
in MNF-W were close to winning their war against AQI. Enemy activity had dropped
to just a few incidents per week, and the Marines had partnered with the Awakening to
mobilize tens of thousands of new Anbari counterinsurgents. However, in his exchange
with Winnefeld, it seemed to Mattis that these strategically significant developments in
Anbar had somehow escaped CENTCOM’s notice. “We’ve got our boots on their windpipe and you’re telling me to lift my foot and let them live,” the Marine general declared,
incredulously.192
In Iraq, Winnefeld met with each of the division commanders and Odierno. The
MNC-I commander was not receptive to the CENTCOM commander’s withdrawal plans.
Odierno believed that Winnefeld’s planning was conceptually sound and represented
what the United States would eventually have to do in Iraq, but he was alarmed that
Winnefeld and Fallon were promoting the idea at such an early stage, when the loss of
badly needed combat power would probably ensure the failure of the U.S. campaign.193
Near the end of the admiral’s fact-finding tour, Winnefeld and Petraeus met and calmly
debated the competing strategies. In the end, Petraeus noted that he believed the President had given him the task of formulating the mission and campaign plan for U.S. forces
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in Iraq, and offered, “if someone else is going to present an alternative plan to my boss,
then I’m going to have a problem with that.”194
At a 2-day commanders’ conference at CENTCOM’s forward headquarters in Qatar
the following month, Fallon pressed subtly for a change of mission in Iraq. The admiral told his subordinates that the commands across the CENTCOM area of responsibility were “too operationally and tactically focused” and were failing to be “cognizant of
strategic realities that are changing.”195 He also contended that the political dynamics
in Washington militated against the continuation of the surge. “We are not going to be
able to make any of the domestic political constraints go away,” Fallon warned his subordinates. “Dave [Petraeus] is going to have to deal with alternatives . . . that may be
pushed on us,” the admiral said, and, as a result, MNF-I should, “prepare for a change of
mission, the downgrading of population security to secondary concern in favor of transition.”196 Signaling the depth of the divergence in worldviews, as the conference turned
to regional security matters beyond Iraq, Petraeus weighed in, offering counterpoints to
Fallon’s perspectives.197
In keeping with his warning, 3 days later Fallon dispatched Winnefeld to Baghdad
again to present the conclusions of his campaign assessment to Petraeus. Winnefeld and
the CENTCOM commander proposed a gradual troop drawdown to 10 brigades starting
in November 2007, with three-quarters of U.S. combat forces departing Iraq by the end
of 2009.198 Just as Casey had recommended in 2006, Winnefeld proposed that U.S. troops
should focus on transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis, while special operations forces continued to hunt AQI and Special Group leaders. Only with this mission
change, Winnefeld argued, could the U.S. military restore the strategic flexibility needed
to respond to crises in other parts of the world.199 A puzzled Petraeus replied that, while
MNF-I would examine some of Winnefeld’s ideas, no one could be expected to come up
with a credible Iraq strategy after spending only a few days on the ground as Winnefeld
had done.200 The general pointed out that the last elements of the fifth surge brigade
had only arrived in June, and time was needed to gauge the surge’s impact. Fallon and
Winnefeld’s proposal to withdraw troops was also disconnected from major upcoming
Iraqi political events, he observed, such as the provincial elections expected in late 2008.
What was more, Petraeus argued, their plan was essentially the same one U.S. troops had
employed from 2003 to 2006, which had already failed. Petraeus also reiterated that he
would protest strongly—even to the point of offering the President his resignation—if
someone attempted to present an alternative Iraq strategy to the President or SECDEF.201
Comparing notes after the discussion, Fallon and Winnefeld shared the belief that
Petraeus was manipulating the President into sticking with a failing surge strategy, and
that an intervention by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SECDEF was needed.202 Among
the senior Army officers in Baghdad, the Winnefeld-Fallon plan caused confusion and
frustration. “[Winnefeld] came here with a conclusion and was looking for evidence,”
one U.S. commander charged.203 Instead of attempting to undermine the strategy set by
Bush and MNF-I, Petraeus believed that Fallon and CENTCOM should be working to
gain support and aid from other Middle Eastern countries and focusing on resolving
regional issues, especially by stemming the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.204 Senior
MNF-I officials also were frustrated at Fallon’s seeming obstruction of MNF-I’s requests
for forces and other resources needed to support the surge. There was a suspicion at the
Baghdad headquarters that Fallon’s focus on developing an alternative to the surge was
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distracting him from his other duties.205 Petraeus followed up his July 17 meeting with
Winnefeld by calling Fallon in order to reemphasize his opposition to a what he saw
as CENTCOM’s “simplistic and strategically unsound proposal.” He also registered his
disappointment that his immediate boss in the chain of command was undermining—
rather than supporting—a surge plan that was only 4 months into execution, with the
final surge forces barely established and operating. Commanders in Iraq were beginning
to see significant gains from the surge operations, Petraeus said, and further progress
appeared likely in the months ahead. He also noted his concern about the amount of
time that requests for forces were taking to get through CENTCOM. “I can take ‘No’ for
an answer, admiral,” Petraeus said, “but I can’t take no answer.” Yet if the answer was
no, the MNF-I commander said, the admiral should be prepared for Petraeus to raise
the issue with the President and SECDEF, given the assurance of support the President
had made before Petraeus took command and had reiterated in weekly videoconferences
ever since.206
Back in Washington, however, an increasing number of U.S. leaders seemed to agree
with Fallon’s view that the surge was doomed to fail. By midsummer, the odds had grown
that the U.S. Congress might pass legislation for an early end to the surge.207 Eventually,
these dynamics influenced Fallon’s military advice to his superiors. During a videoconference with Bush on August 30, Fallon questioned whether a continuation of the surge
could garner enough congressional support, to which Bush replied that politics and Congress were his concern, not the admiral’s. Five days later, the President, accompanied
by the other National Security Council (NSC) principals, met with both Fallon and Petraeus at Al Asad air base, where Bush received updates on the situation in Baghdad and
also met Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the Awakening in Ramadi. In the
presence of his war cabinet at Al Asad, the President reaffirmed his support for Petraeus’s campaign plan, finally and firmly resolving the 5-month-long dispute between the
CENTCOM and MNF-I commanders in Petraeus’s favor.208
The September Congressional Testimony
The President’s and NSC principals’ visit to Anbar on September 3 took place 1 week
before Petraeus and Crocker were scheduled to appear before the U.S. Congress to give
their assessment of the surge and its progress. The direction of the Iraq War had become
one of the most divisive political issues in the United States since the Vietnam war and the
two men’s scheduled congressional testimony was a highly anticipated and high-stakes
event. Although the summer had passed without a congressional effort to terminate the
surge, the idea of a legislative intervention was still a possibility, and much would hinge
on whether Petraeus and Crocker could point to an improving situation on the ground. A
few late-summer events had greased the rails for the MNF-I commander and U.S. ambassador, most notably a visit to Iraq by influential American think-tank scholars. After touring conflict zones around central Iraq with MNF-I escorts, Kenneth Pollack and Michael
O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution co-wrote a New York Times op-ed entitled, “A War
We Just Might Win,” in which the scholars argued that “we are finally getting somewhere
in Iraq,” with “sustainable stability” potentially within reach of the U.S.-led coalition due
to the significant security gains and the growing competence of the ISF.209 The article was
so effective at slowing the congressional move toward anti-surge legislation that Petraeus
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referred to it as a new phenomenon, the “strategic op-ed,” and thereafter opened Iraq to
a series of similar visiting delegations of U.S. scholars and other intellectuals. In addition
to these delegations, Petraeus, Crocker, and Odierno had also hosted dozens of members
of Congress in Baghdad by the end of the summer, considering the visiting delegations
not as a distraction, but rather as opportunities to clarify the situation on the ground to
U.S. policymakers.210
In his prepared statements to the Foreign
Relations and Armed Services committees
in both the Senate and House of Representatives on September 10-11, Petraeus gave
a data-based assessment of the campaign.
“The military objectives of the surge are, in
large measure, being met,” Petraeus judged,
before walking the committee members
through a series of detailed statistical reports
and charts displayed on easels in the hearing
room. Overall, Petraeus noted that security
incidents had declined in 8 of the previous 12
weeks, to levels not seen since spring 2006.
The decline was mostly because of U.S. and
Iraqi troops’ success in driving AQI out of
its sanctuaries and disrupting the Shi’a militant groups. “The fundamental source of the
Source: DoD photo (Released).
conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic
General David Petraeus Testifies
and sectarian communities for power and
Before Congress, September 2007.211
resources,” Petraeus testified, and in this
regard, it was encouraging that ethno-sectarian deaths had dropped by 55 percent since
December 2006 across Iraq, and 80 percent in Baghdad. Iraq as a whole was becoming
less volatile, with violent civilian deaths declining by 45 percent since December, and by
70 percent in Baghdad itself.212
Petraeus reported that the nascent Awakening among Sunni tribes had had a significant impact on these figures and was spreading quickly from Anbar to other areas, in the
process damaging AQI’s ability to operate. In 8 months, MNF-I and its Iraqi allies had
killed or captured nearly 100 AQI leaders and about 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. They
had also robbed AQI of its war-making machinery. “As we have gone on the offensive in
former al-Qaeda in Iraq and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches,” Petraeus noted. U.S. troops had already seized 4,400 caches
in 2007, about 1,700 more than MNF-I had discovered in all of 2006. Partly because of
this massive loss of materiel, insurgent IED attacks had dropped by one-third during the
summer of 2007, and car bombs had declined from a high of 175 in March to about 90 in
August. In Anbar, monthly attacks had dropped sharply from 1,350 in October 2006 to
just over 200 in August 2007, a decline of more than 80 percent.213
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At the same time, more than 20,000 Awakening members had come forward to join
the Iraqi police and thousands more had hopes of joining the army. The ISF was set to
expand from 445,000 to as many as 485,000, and the Iraqi Government was committed
to spend $1.6 billion in foreign military sales with the United States. In other words, Petraeus reassured Congress that the Iraqis would soon be paying their own way for their
security forces. The general also noted that about 95 of Iraq’s 140 combat battalions were
now capable of taking the lead, with coalition support.214
Alongside these positive signs, Petraeus identified a number of serious obstacles that
needed to be dealt with before Iraq could be stabilized. “Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition
toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence,” he
reported. He added that “lack of adequate government capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq’s challenges.” Not all of Iraq’s provinces were progressing at the same rate: Ninawa and Salahadin, in particular, remained
violent and had not yet experienced the same stabilizing trend that had come to Anbar
and Baghdad. The IRGC Quds Force and its Iraqi Shi’a militant proxies were a persistent
problem as well. “It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran,
through the use of the Quds Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq,” Petraeus noted.215
Though MNF-I had increased its targeting of Shi’a militia leaders in the previous 6
months, the Quds Force proxies had still “assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi Governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by
Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere.”216
Nevertheless, Petraeus concluded that, based on the prevailing trends, he and Odierno
agreed that the surge brigades could be withdrawn from Iraq by summer 2008 without
endangering Iraq’s security. He added that he would allow the 13th MEU to depart Iraq
later in the month without requesting another unit to replace it, followed by the withdrawal of a BCT in December, also without a replacement. Four additional brigades and
two Marine battalions would depart without being replaced in the first 7 months of 2008,
bringing MNF-I to its pre-surge level of 15 brigade-sized units in mid-July.217
From that point, however, Petraeus argued that the drawdown should slow, and that
the United States should not yet try to prescribe the troop levels or pace of withdrawal
after mid-2008. “In my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time,” he offered. “In fact, our experience
in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it
can be misleading and even hazardous.” In this line of argument, Petraeus pushed back
directly on Fallon and others who wanted to institute a scheduled drawdown, rather than
the conditions-based approach Petraeus favored. Petraeus also argued against Fallon’s
months-long pressure for a change of mission:
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission
from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to one that is
strictly focused on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now would, in our view,
be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi
Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant.218
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Alongside Petraeus’s presentation on Iraq’s security, Crocker delivered a sober
assessment of the state of Iraqi politics and national reconciliation. Crocker emphasized
the enormity of the challenges facing Iraq, a “traumatized society” exiting 35 years of
Ba’athist rule. “A new Iraq had to be built almost literally from scratch,” he observed,
adding that Iraq was “experiencing a revolution, not just regime change.” The surge had
provided Iraqis with “time and space” to pursue national reconciliation, but “some of
the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in
benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad.” The process of stabilizing Iraq “will
not be quick, it will be uneven,” Crocker judged, meaning that the United States would
need to display “strategic patience,” especially since, in the ambassador’s view, the alternatives—such as withdrawal—would be “far worse” for U.S. vital interests.219
Petraeus’s testimony that the surge was working and Crocker’s judgment that the
United States should exercise strategic patience in Iraq prompted endorsements from
members of Congress who favored the surge and criticism from those who did not. The
two men’s hearings before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services were highly charged, particularly since five Presidential candidates from both parties served on those committees, and the hearing room thus became an extension of the
Presidential campaign.220 Illinois Senator Barack H. Obama was skeptical of Petraeus’s
reports of progress, arguing “I think that some of the frustration you hear from some of
the questioners is that we have now set the bar so low that modest improvement in what
was a completely chaotic situation, to the point where now we just have the levels of
intolerable violence that existed in June 2006, is considered success. And it’s not.” Obama
judged that the effect of the surge, “has been relatively modest,” and added that, “it is
not clear to me that the primary success that you’ve shown in Anbar has anything to do
with the surge.” Concerning Crocker’s plea for strategic patience, Obama offered that
the country was already out of patience, and that “the question I think that everybody is
asking is: How long will this take, and at what point do we say, ‘Enough’?”221
For her part, New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed deep skepticism
of Petraeus and Crocker’s reports, telling the MNF-I commander and ambassador that
“You have been made the de facto spokesmen for what many of us believe to be a failed
policy,” and that, despite the two men’s efforts, “the reports that you provide to us really
require a willing suspension of disbelief.” Continuing in Iraq would be counterproductive, she judged, since, “any fair reading of the advantages and disadvantages accruing
post-surge, in my view, end up on the downside.”222 Connecticut Senator Christopher J.
Dodd, another Presidential candidate, argued, “People are getting tired of hearing that
things are better. I don’t know anybody who believes that,” while Delaware Senator
Joseph R. Biden, also a Presidential candidate, told Petraeus, as one reporter put it, that
“he had not heard anything that persuaded him that the military was pursuing a new
strategy as opposed to new tactics in Iraq.”223
Despite the vehement response from some senior members of Congress, the Petraeus
and Crocker reports offered enough evidence of progress in the surge campaign to begin
to relieve some of the pressure to end that campaign early. “Those hearings gained us
critical additional time and support, without which it is likely that the mission in Iraq
would have failed,” Petraeus later wrote.224 Yet, at the same time the hearings had placed
a senior military leader in the awkward role of defending strategy in the political realm.
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Two days after Petraeus and Crocker concluded their testimony, Bush gave a televised
speech reiterating the evidence the two had given Congress, emphasizing the security
gains that had been made in Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala and highlighting the spread of
the Awakening. Now was the time to secure a “return on success,” Bush declared, and
consequently he had chosen not to replace the 2,200 Marines from the 13th MEU due to
redeploy at the end of September and would also consider bringing home an Army BCT
before Christmas. These moves would result in a total reduction of 5,700 troops by the
end of the year. The President also informed the nation that Petraeus expected to be able
to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq from 20 to 15 brigades by July 2008.225 The end point of
the surge was now a formal U.S. policy.
***
The surge of operations in summer 2007 had enabled the coalition to retake the initiative for arguably the first time since MNF-I’s offensive in fall 2004 to clear insurgent sanctuaries before the elections. MNC-I’s Operation PHANTOM THUNDER had coordinated
the activities of four U.S. divisions to push AQI away from Baghdad and out of support
zones and sanctuaries the militant group and its allies had dominated in some cases for
more than 3 years. At the same time, MNC-I and MNF-I had taken steps to institutionalize the Awakening by brokering formal agreements between vetted groups of armed
Sunnis and the Maliki government, though it was not clear Maliki and his officials could
be convinced of the Awakening’s merits. Nevertheless, Operation PHANTOM THUNDER had allowed the Awakening to spread even further in the Baghdad belts, Diyala,
and southern Salahadin Province and had sent AQI reeling.
By early September, this strategic turn of events and the corresponding drop in violence in Baghdad helped limit the effects of criticism from opponents of the surge in
Washington. The Sadrists had inadvertently assisted the coalition, too, by overreaching
and creating a backlash among the Iraqi public. Worsening tensions between the Iraqi
Government and the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies would occupy more of the
coalition’s attention as the months passed.
Petraeus and Crocker would return to Baghdad to see the onset of Ramadan amidst
the continuing Operation PHANTOM STRIKE. With the main battlefields of the antiAQI fight shifting to northern Iraq, the coalition commanders were poised to pursue the
remaining hardcore Sunni insurgents further from Baghdad than ever and to plan decisive operations to finish them off in early 2008.
However, a single event cast a pall over the September testimony and the security gains
the coalition and the Awakening had made. Hours before Bush’s nationwide address on
September 13, AQI operatives killed Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha in a car bombing in
Ramadi, robbing the Awakening of its most prominent founding leader just 10 days after
he had met with Bush at Al Asad and showing that AQI remained a potent threat to the
Sunni Iraqi leaders that had begun to turn against it. The war was far from over.
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CHAPTER 6
“THE DARKNESS HAS BECOME PITCH BLACK”
By early fall 2007, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had endured more than 3 months of intensifying pressure from coalition operations as well as from Sunni tribes and former insurgents that had turned against the extremist group. For the first time since 2004, AQI lost
its support zones inside the capital city and was on the verge of suffering a defeat in the
Baghdad belts. At the same time, the Iraqi security forces were growing rapidly, adding
to the counterinsurgent forces in the field, although they still suffered from significant
shortcomings and sectarian behavior.
These factors alarmed al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in Pakistan who had declared the
battle for Iraq as central to their global jihadist efforts. As AQI’s fighters were forced
farther from Baghdad in search of new safe havens, the organization’s leaders refocused
their forces on slowing the growth of the Awakening, which they had deemed an existential threat to AQI. At the same time, Moqtada Sadr’s decision to “freeze” his militia’s
activities created an opportunity for the coalition to fracture the Shi’a insurgency and
hopefully to neutralize the Shi’a groups that had helped plunge the country into civil
war. Political reconciliation—the overall goal of the surge—lagged behind the improving
security situation because of both tensions among the competing Iraqi political factions
and destabilizing interventions by Iraq’s neighbors. Coalition leaders would find it difficult to translate the military gains of the surge into political ones.
AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ LOSES THE INITIATIVE
Operation PHANTOM STRIKE Continues
By the time of General David Petraeus’s much-anticipated testimony before Congress in early September 2007, coalition operations were “taking out [AQI] networks at a
faster rate than they can replicate themselves,” Petraeus reported to Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Robert M. Gates. The coalition had killed or captured more than 2,500 AQI
members between February and September, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander wrote, including 94 key AQI leaders.1 One reason for this damage to AQI had
been the increasing number of successful intelligence-driven raids by coalition special
operators, whose operational tempo in July and August often totaled more than 60 raids
per week.2
Despite the successes of the special operators, the key to robbing AQI of its vast territory in central Iraq had been the continued, large-scale ground operations led by Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The corps-level Operation PHANTOM STRIKE that jumped
off on August 13 was a month old by the time Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker
completed their congressional testimony in Washington. As with the midsummer Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, General Raymond Odierno and MNC-I used Operation
PHANTOM STRIKE to synchronize the four U.S. divisions in central and northern Iraq
as they conducted division-level operations. These operations caused a visible reversal of
251

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

AQI’s fortunes in Baghdad, where, by mid-September, insurgent attacks had declined by
70 percent from their peak in 2006 and by 50 percent since the start of Operation FARDH
AL-QANOON in January. Car bombs and suicide attacks fell to their lowest levels in a
year.3

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Shawn M. Cassatt (Released).

Soldiers From 3d BCT, 2d Infantry Division, During Operations in Muqdadiyah.4
Also as in Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MNC-I’s main effort in Operation
PHANTOM STRIKE was General Benjamin R. Mixon’s Multi-National Division-North
(MND-N). In June and July, Mixon and MND-N had used Colonel Steven Townsend’s
3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, to retake Diyala’s provincial capital of Baqubah from
AQI and reestablish the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Iraqi Government in the city. In
August and September, Mixon followed up by using Colonel David Sutherland’s brigade to pursue AQI farther up the Diyala Valley to Muqdadiyah, where many of the
surviving insurgent defenders of Baqubah had displaced. In the ensuing MND-N operation, Sutherland’s troops forced AQI fighters to withdraw yet again from towns around
Muqdadiyah where the extremist group had attempted to regroup, on some occasions
fighting pitched battles against company-sized AQI groups. Over the course of 2 weeks,
MND-N killed or captured 78 AQI fighters, with the remainder fleeing farther from the
Diyala cities to remote areas such as the hills surrounding Hamrin Lake.5
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Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Richard Ybarra (Released).

A Soldier From 4th Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division, Fires an AT-4 during
Operations South of Baqubah.6
On September 5, Mixon redirected MND-N’s focus to the areas to which the Diyalabased enemy groups were likely to move. In MND-N’s Operation LIGHTNING HAMMER
II, Mixon shifted the division’s main effort from Sutherland to Colonel Stephen M.
“Steph” Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, as the latter launched an operation
into the long-time insurgent sanctuary in the Za’ab Triangle south of Mosul. Two other
brigades supported Twitty’s operation to the south, with 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, moving into the Hamrin Mountains between Diyala and Salahadin Provinces and
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, launching operations into enemy strongholds near
Bayji and Tikrit. By mid-September, MND-N had killed another 72 enemy fighters and
captured more than 600, and Twitty’s troops had established several new combat outposts in the Sharqat area and were in a position to control the lines of communications
between Mosul and Tikrit.7 In late September, MND-N shifted its main effort again, this
time to Colonel Jon Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, in Tarmiyah as the brigade
carried out raids against AQI and created new Sunni irregular groups to hold the area
that Abu Ghazwan and Ahmed Dabash had controlled with their insurgent armies just
months before.8 This would be the last operation Mixon and his 25th Infantry Division
would conduct before being replaced by the 1st Armored Division in October.
Each of the three other U.S. divisions—Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W),
Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), and Multi-National Division-Center
(MND-C)—conducted supporting operations in their respective areas as Mixon’s brigades operated in August and September. Among these, Major General Rick Lynch’s
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MND-C conducted the largest-scale supporting operations to continue to push AQI and
its allies out of their sanctuaries in the Tigris River towns southeast of Baghdad, forcing
the extremist group farther south. MND-C’s midsummer operations had disrupted AQI
and its allies in Arab Jabour and the Triangle of Death, but it also had stretched Lynch’s
four maneuver brigades dangerously thin. Only Colonel Peter Baker’s field artillery brigade, reassigned from Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) to MND-C in
July, remained as a maneuver unit in the Kut sector. With little combat power left to spare
for new operations, Lynch used an ad hoc brigade combat team (BCT) under his division
aviation brigade commander, Colonel Daniel Ball, to conduct MND-C’s portion of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, called Operation MARNE HUSKY. With one infantry battalion at his disposal, Ball carried out air strikes and raids against suspected AQI hideouts
in the Tigris River area between Salman Pak and Suwayrah, the latter of which was the
last Sunni-majority town before reaching the overwhelmingly Shi’a area stretching from
Kut to the Persian Gulf. As he had done before, Lynch emphasized the use of firepower
in Operation MARNE HUSKY and targeted dozens of Tigris River boats. From mid-August to mid-September, the operation yielded 256 enemy fighters killed and captured and
pushed AQI to the edges of predominantly Shi’a controlled territory.9
To follow up on his operation on the east bank of the Tigris, Lynch shifted his main
effort in mid-September to Colonel Terry Ferrell’s 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in
Arab Jabour. The midsummer operations had begun to take the riverside town from AQI,
but the extremist group had reduced Arab Jabour to one-sixth its normal population
and rigged many houses to explode when coalition and Iraqi troops entered. Having
established a foothold in Arab Jabour, Ferrell pushed farther west into enemy territory
in September and October, creating additional outposts and building new roads to reach
them. By mid-October, MND-C had killed or captured another 252 enemy fighters and
had planted a large patrol base in the heart of a previously inaccessible canal-crossed
agricultural area that had served as an enemy sanctuary.10

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Kevin Stabinsky (Released).

Colonel Terry Ferrell, Commander of 2d BCT, 3d Infantry Division,
With Sheik Ali Majid, a Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) Leader.11
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As Odierno intended, the operations to push AQI farther from Baghdad limited the
damage the terrorist group could do during the holy month of Ramadan, which for 4 years
had been a period of heightened violence since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had launched the
first “Ramadan Offensive” in 2003. AQI announced its plan to carry out a similar offensive through October 22, 2007, but when the holy month began on September 13, the
group and its Sunni allies managed only a 3-day spike in car bombs and suicide attacks
against mainly ISF and Awakening targets. Casualties from the worst of these attacks
numbered “in the dozens . . . not the hundreds we saw in previous signature [Ramadan]
attacks,” Petraeus reported to Washington in late September.12 Odierno observed on September 20 that Iraq was experiencing its lowest levels of violence in the 19 months since
the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing.13 The overall Iraqi civilian and police death
toll for the month-long period was less than half that for the Ramadan period of 2006, and
the level of violence for the month was 40 percent lower than in 2006.14 The reduction in
the Sunni insurgents’ activities also translated into a reduced level of indirect fire against
coalition bases and Iraqi towns, down by nearly 40 percent from the previous month and
at its lowest level since 2005.15
AQI’s decreased ineffectiveness in the capital was partly due to the coalition’s continuous clearing of Baghdad’s worst neighborhoods. Three days into Ramadan, on September 16, MND-B launched an operation to clear east Rashid, where AQI operatives
had long maintained a foothold. After 5 days, MND-B Commander Major General Joseph
F. Fil, Jr., reported that the ISF and coalition forces were in control of approximately 56
percent of Baghdad and in the process of clearing another 28 percent. Enemy fighters
dominated the remaining 16 percent of the city.16
Continued Pressure From the Awakening
The rolls of the Awakening continued to expand through the fall of 2007. Even the
AQI assassination of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha on September 13, the first day of
Ramadan, could not slow the movement’s growth. Abu Risha’s younger brother Ahmed
assumed leadership of the Ramadi Awakening Council the following day, undeterred
by AQI’s revenge campaign targeting Awakening leaders. Two weeks after Abu Risha’s
assassination, Petraeus reported that the Awakening’s numbers had doubled in a month.
In total, more than 52,000 had joined the program throughout Iraq with more than
30,000 being paid wages through Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)
contracts.17
As the Awakening expanded geographically, it put pressure on AQI in regions where
the extremist group had previously faced nominal opposition. In Baqubah, scores of 1920
Revolutionary Brigades members joined the Awakening group dubbed the “Baqubah
Guardians” in the wake of Multi-National Division-North’s (MND-N) clearing operations in July and August and began assisting Townsend’s brigade in attacking AQI cells
in the area. The group’s emergence prompted AQI to counter with suicide bombings
against Baqubah’s Awakening leaders, such as the September 24 suicide car bomb at a
city mosque that killed 24 attendees of a reconciliation meeting hosted by the Diyala governor. That attack also killed the Baqubah police chief, Ali Dilayan, who had escaped the
AQI attack against his home in June. Nevertheless, the Baqubah Guardians continued to
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grow, reaching more than 1,000 members who patrolled and conducted raids alongside
the U.S. troops they formerly had fought.18
Similar scenarios emerged elsewhere. After AQI operatives murdered 3 Sunni imams
in Mosul on September 27, local volunteers killed 11 AQI members in retaliation the
following day.19 Five days later, a Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) group led Iraqi Army
and police units to a foreign fighter base at the abandoned Muthanna chemical complex
northwest of Baghdad, where the ISF units and Sunni irregulars jointly attacked militants
holding hostages there. The ISF and CLCs rescued 27 hostages while killing 6 militants
and capturing 37 more, though 7 ISF members and 1 of the CLC sheikhs were killed in
the action.20
Meanwhile, in Arab Jabour and adjacent towns, two of Colonel Terry Ferrell’s battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Adgie and Lieutenant Colonel Mark
Odom, were fostering a large Awakening group whose members—many of them admittedly former insurgents—provided detailed intelligence against local AQI members. In
Odom’s sector, Sheikh Maher Sarhan al-Muini, a Sunni sheikh who had been imprisoned
in Camp Bucca earlier in the war, led local fighters who helped hunt down AQI members
and pointed out improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to U.S. troops. In Adgie’s sector,
a former military officer known locally as General Mustafa Jabouri helped establish a
group of local scouts that Adgie’s men called the “Bird Dogs,” whose intelligence tips
led to a long string of captures of AQI men. “Where local citizen groups are actively
participating in security, violence levels have plummeted,” Petraeus noted on October
13.21 As if to illustrate his point, on October 23, Anbar Province experienced no attacks
at all, and 2 days later Baghdad experienced just three attacks, all of which were ineffective.22 Walking through Arab Jabour on October 26, Petraeus saw the effects of the local
Sunni mobilization and Odom’s and Adgie’s handiwork. “Nearly 700 concerned local
citizens have joined with our forces and taken back their villages,” he wrote on October
26. “There were no Iraqi police or army forces in the area, and these locals are now under
contract to secure their communities.”23
At the same time, an AQI commander south of Balad made a similar observation that
validated Petraeus’s assessment. Writing on October 15 in a journal captured by coalition
troops a few days later, AQI emir Abu Tariq lamented:
There were almost 600 fighters in our sector before the tribes changed course 360 [sic] degrees
under the influence of the so-called Islamic Army (Deserter of Jihad) and other believer groups.
Many of our fighters quit and some of them joined the deserters . . . things started getting worse
ever since, and as a result of that the number of [our] fighters dropped down to 20 or less.24

On October 28, an embittered Abu Tariq stated that he and his group had been betrayed
by the local tribes as they joined the Awakening:
We were mistreated, cheated, and betrayed by some of our brothers who used to be part of the
Jihadi movement . . . [They] were very good faithful Jihadi Fighters, but later on we found out
that those people were nothing but hypocrites, liars, and traitors and were waiting for the right
moment to switch sides with whoever pays them most and at the end they fought against us and
they tried to prevent us from attacking the al-Sahwah [Awakening] groups in [the] area.25

It was a stark reversal of fortune for AQI in a district that had been a safe haven for Zarqawi in 2006 and the site of the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq.
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The Blackwater-Nisour Square Incident
Despite MNF-I headway against AQI, an incident in an unrelated area showed that
the coalition’s campaign in Iraq remained in a fragile state. The action also highlighted
a troublesome aspect of security operations in a counterinsurgency setting. On September 16, U.S.-Iraqi relations suffered a significant setback when a U.S. Embassy security
detail staffed by Blackwater security contractors opened fire on traffic in the busy Nisour
Square in west Baghdad, killing 14 civilians and wounding 17 others. Although the Blackwater guards alleged they had taken fire from hostile elements, the incident immediately
sparked outrage among Iraqis and a crisis in U.S.-Iraqi Government relations. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki charged that Blackwater’s actions challenged Iraqi sovereignty, and
the Iraqi Government froze the company’s operations while government officials moved
to ban it from the country.26
In the face of the public outcry and “tremendous angst among the Iraqi leadership,”
as Petraeus put it, the U.S. Government opened several investigations into the incident.27
Even so, U.S. Embassy leaders had few alternatives to the Blackwater contractors to fulfill
the American mission’s extensive diplomatic security requirements. Just 5 days before
the shootings, Crocker testified to Congress that there was “no way” to provide security
in Iraq without contractors. In the wake of the shootings, embassy officials judged that
the company’s sudden departure would create a security vacuum.28 As a result, less than
a week after the Nisour Square killings, the State Department authorized Blackwater to
resume its security escort missions.29
The incident highlighted what had been an under-examined aspect of the Iraq campaign: the coalition’s heavy dependence on private security contractors (PSC) to perform
what in the past had been military missions. These included a broad range of security
tasks such as convoy escort, base security, and personal security, as well as intelligence
analysis, security training, and operations and movement coordination. As of September
2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) employed an estimated 6,000 PSCs in Iraq, a fraction of the estimated 25,000 to 30,000 contractors employed throughout the country by
federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and private firms.30
On average, only 7 to 10 percent of DoD’s security contractors were U.S. citizens, with the
remainder coming from more than 30 countries, including Iraq.31
The majority of these contractors appeared to perform their duties professionally, but
actions by a portion of the foreign security contractors had bred resentment among Iraqis
for several years before the Nisour Square incident. Numerous instances occurred of
PSCs running Iraqi cars off the road, disabling vehicles by shooting into the engine block,
throwing objects at civilians, and in extreme cases, actually shooting civilians—most
often in the course of escalation of force incidents. As the 3d Infantry Division’s assistant
commander in September 2005, Brigadier General Karl R. Horst investigated complaints
against security contractors and found that, during a 2-month period, 12 shootings by
contractors had resulted in 6 Iraqi civilian deaths in the MND-B area of operations.32 At
the time, Horst—who also discovered the infamous Jadriyah bunker torture chamber in
the same period—had said to a reporter that security contractors “run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There’s no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them
hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the
257

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Marshall Thompson (Released).

Ugandan Contractors From a Private Security Company Named SOC,
at a Gate at Al Asad Air Base.33
aftermath.”34 In some cases, the contractor shootings had been part of darker incidents
than escalations of force. A few months after Horst’s comments, security contractors for
the United Kingdom-based Aegis Defence Services allegedly assembled a “trophy video”
set to Elvis Presley music that showed themselves shooting civilian cars on Iraqi roads.
At the same time, contractors working for U.S. security company Triple Canopy alleged
their coworkers were firing on Iraqi cars for sport. In December 2006, a Blackwater guard
allegedly shot and killed a bodyguard of Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi during
an argument in the Green Zone.35
The coalition often had difficulty maintaining awareness of the security contractors’
activities. A 2007 Washington Post investigation found that weapons discharges by PSCs
rarely were reported to U.S. or Iraqi authorities, and that the 2007 contractor shooting
incidents reported between May 2006 and May 2007 may have represented as little as
15 percent of the actual number.36 The popular backlash against the contractors after the
2007 Nisour shootings affected the U.S. military campaign, because Iraqis tended not
to distinguish between American Soldiers and American-hired security guards. As one
Iraqi Interior Ministry official noted, the contractors “are part of the reason for all the
hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don’t know them as Blackwater,
they know them only as Americans.”37 The observation was true even when the contractors were not U.S. employees. In October 2007, MNF-I found itself managing the consequences of an incident in which Australian PSCs killed two Iraqi Christian women. The
Iraqi Government “accepted it reasonably well,” Petraeus noted, because the Australian
company promptly took full responsibility, “acknowledged the event, expressed regret
that it happened, made immediate reparations, and pledged full cooperation with the
investigation into the incident.”38 Commenting on the episode to Gates, Petraeus judged
that “we cannot accomplish our mission in Iraq without Private Security Contractors, but
we need to reduce the friction they sometimes cause before the Government of Iraq uses
the sovereignty card to try to shut them down completely.”39 When PSCs were involved
in 3 escalation of force incidents in a single week a month later, Petraeus decided to gain
control of the situation by requiring a meeting between MNF-I’s J-3 and 54 leaders of the
PSC elements in Iraq to address procedures and the critical nature of their actions.40
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The shootings in Nisour Square were deeply troubling for a U.S. military force whose
commanders had begun to adopt population-centric counterinsurgency tactics throughout the country. One military official opined that the consequences of the Nisour Square
shootings “may be worse than Abu Ghraib.” From Washington, Gates concluded that
security contractors’ activities were often “at cross-purposes to our larger mission in
Iraq.”41 Petraeus saw the problem as one of fundamentally differing philosophies and
roles on the battlefield:
At the heart of the matter is a subtle, but critical, difference in how [private security contractors]
and military elements view their mission. Mission success for [private security contractors] is safe
delivery of the “package,” and this makes them very risk averse in the battlespace. Our soldiers,
focusing on improving security for the population, accept a bit more personal risk and are likely
more cognizant of the impact of their actions on civilians.42

This difference in missions had the potential to derail even the most carefully conducted
military campaign. In the months following the Nisour incident, MNF-I continued to
tighten its monitoring of contractor activities, requiring security contractors to clear their
operations and locations with coalition units—a policy with which contractors complied
unevenly.
The Sinjar Documents
As AQI’s situation in central Iraq worsened under the combined pressure of the coalition, the Awakening, and the Iraqi security forces, the terrorist group received another
blow in early fall 2007 as its machinery for sending foreign fighters into Iraq came under
more intense pressure than ever before. Since 2003, Zarqawi and other insurgents had
created networks inside Syria that facilitated the movement of fighters from around the
Arab world to be suicide bombers or fighters in Iraq. From the Damascus airport, militant fixers helped foreign fighters move into Iraq’s Euphrates River Valley or the Jazeera
desert of Ninawa Province. Some of these networks using Ninawa Province had belonged
to former Ba’athist regime leaders, such as Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad. Another significant network belonged to the former Iraqi military officer Suhail Hammo, a Sunni
Turkoman from Tel Afar who sent insurgent fighters into Iraq from the Syrian border
town of Qamishli and would later be a senior leader in the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant.43
The most prolific network belonged to AQI’s top Syria-based facilitator, a young Iraqi
named Badran Turki al-Mazidih—also known by the nom de guerre Abu Ghadiyah.
From 2003 forward, Abu Ghadiyah split his time between the eastern Syrian cities of
Deir ez Zour and Albu Kamal, helping probably thousands of foreign fighters move into
Iraq to join AQI’s ranks there. Just across the border from the Iraqi city of Al Qa’im in
the Western Euphrates River Valley, Albu Kamal was a perfect launching point into Iraq.
However, as the anti-AQI Awakening movement took hold in Anbar in fall 2006, AQI’s
foreign-fighter pipeline through the Euphrates River Valley became increasingly tenuous, and Abu Ghadiyah apparently moved the group’s primary facilitation route north
to Ninawa. From there, AQI recruits made their way to the town of Sinjar, 30 miles west
of Tel Afar, before moving to Mosul or central Iraq.44
The flow of foreign fighters through Sinjar was heavy enough that in the fall of 2006
AQI stationed a “border emir” known as Abu Muthanna near the town to receive the
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fighters Abu Ghadiyah sent into Iraq and send them to their specific assignments.45
Around the same time, senior AQI leader Abu Usama al-Tunisi assumed overall command of AQI’s foreign fighter networks. Considered a likely successor to Abu Ayyub
al-Masri, Tunisi had been AQI’s military emir in Baghdad’s southern belts and had been
behind the June 2006 abduction and killing of two American Soldiers from 1st Battalion,
502d Infantry Regiment, near Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad.46 His assignment to the
management of the foreign fighter influx indicated its importance to AQI’s leaders.
According to later coalition estimates, by early 2007 the Abu Ghadiyah-Abu Muthanna northern network was pushing 80 to 110 foreign fighters into Iraq each month. The
influx of these foreign fighters coincided with the spring 2007 spike in suicide bombings
in Iraq, which peaked at 59 in the month of March 2007.47 With the onset of summer, the
coalition’s surge of operations and ramping up of special operations took its toll on the
northern facilitation network. As AQI’s cells dispersed and its leadership cadre thinned
out, coalition leaders determined that the group was suffering a decline in funding,
including money from outside donors, and was having difficulty paying its facilitators.48
By the end of the summer, U.S. officials began to see signs of reticence by outsiders to
send their fighters into Iraq, and the flow of foreign fighters dropped to an estimated 60
per month across the country.49
In September 2007, the coalition dealt the northern facilitation network two severe
blows with raids that killed its most senior leaders. On September 11, coalition special
operators located and killed AQI border emir Abu Muthanna near Sinjar.50 Coalition
troops followed that raid a week later with the destruction of 15,000 pounds of explosives in a remote nearby site.51 The coup de grace for the northern network came a few
days later on September 25, when a U.S. air strike killed Tunisi near Musayyib, in Babil
Province.52

Source: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (Released).

An AQI Foreign Fighter Registration Form Captured in the Sinjar Documents.53
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The most significant long-term impact from these operations came not from the killings of the senior AQI men, but from the data yielded from the raid near Sinjar. According
to journalists, Abu Muthanna had detonated a suicide vest to evade capture, but the U.S.
special operators recovered five terabytes of data and hundreds of personnel files he had
maintained onsite, a collection that provided extensive insight into AQI’s operations.54 A
subsequent report by the U.S. Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, based
on access to these “Sinjar Documents” as they became known, painted a detailed picture
of AQI’s networks of foreign supporters and volunteers. The documents contained personnel files of 606 foreign fighters who entered Iraq between August 2006 and August
2007 by crossing the Syrian border. Many had passed through the important AQI hub of
Deir ez Zour in Syria.55 Among the foreign fighters, 40 percent were from Saudi Arabia,
with the largest portion coming from the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Another 8 percent each
had come from Yemen and Syria. A surprising 31 percent had come from North Africa,
a region that U.S. officials previously had believed provided only a small fraction of foreign fighters.56 Even more surprising was that about one of every five foreign fighters
was Libyan, making that country the highest contributor of foreign fighters per capita.
Most of the Libyans came from the cities of Derna and Benghazi and appeared to have a
well-established route to Damascus via Egypt. Libyan recruits had surged in spring 2007,
apparently coinciding with a new relationship between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group, an organization that would later cooperate with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Gadhafi regime in 2011.57
As a whole, the foreign fighters depicted in the Sinjar Documents had a median age
of 22- to 23-years-old, suggesting that most of them were first-time volunteers. Of those
who listed a profession, two-thirds described themselves as students. In Abu Muthanna’s files, almost 400 of the foreign recruits had been sorted into specific roles, the most
common of which were “suicide bomber” (56 percent) and “fighter” (42 percent).58 Many
of the fighters arrived at Abu Muthanna’s processing point on the same day, suggesting they had traveled together in groups. The records listed no fighters entering Iraq in
March or April 2007, indicating that the facilitation network may have been disrupted
during those months.59
As the coalition began to release information about the Sinjar Documents to the media
in late 2007, the knowledge that AQI had relied on a large number of foreign suicide
bombers and fighters created a public relations problem for the group, which had tried
to cultivate the impression within Iraq and the Arab world that it was an Iraqi organization.60 The disruption of the northern facilitation network also seemed to have had a
significant impact on AQI’s operations. After the September 2007 raids, MNF-I estimated
the number of foreign fighters coming into Iraq each month fell to fewer than 40, and
the number of suicide bombings in the country fell to just 16, half the monthly average
during the summer.61 These coincided with a weekly attack average in October that was
64 percent lower than the all-time high of late June 2007, and a U.S. battle death toll of 29,
the lowest monthly figure since before the Samarra mosque bombing.62
Though he attributed these changes partly to the disruption of AQI’s foreign facilitation networks, Petraeus judged that “the trends are the result of many factors,” including
the rapid coalition-ISF operational tempo against AQI, the emergence of the Awakening,
and “the restraint being exercised by some Jaysh al Mahdi elements.”63 He also might
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have added the fact that the coalition’s total strength on the ground had swelled to over
178,000 troops, close to the highest level of the entire war. Even so, the MNF-I commander
was guarded in his pronouncements. “We continue to stress the point that success in Iraq
will not be like flipping a light switch,” he wrote to Gates. “It will emerge slowly and
fitfully.”64 It was a prudently optimistic point he already had made to Prime Minister
Maliki a few weeks earlier. “The PM [Prime Minister] said he believes he is seeing the
beginning of ‘victory,’ in a psychological sense, given the damage done to AQI and the
militias, combined with the people’s rejection of them as well,” Petraeus reported on
September 22. “I cautioned him that we still have much work to do and that achieving
political progress is what is needed to move toward that ‘victory’.”65
Osama Bin Laden’s Response
On October 21, in response to the situation in Iraq, Osama bin Laden released his third
audio recording in 2 months, which aired on al-Jazeera television. Entitled “Message to
the People of Iraq,” the recording presented a dire assessment of the situation in Iraq, differing greatly from Ayman al-Zawahiri’s January 2007 pronouncement that America was
“weaker than before” and that the mujahideen in Iraq had already “broke[n] its back.”66
Bin Laden began his October message by extolling his Iraqi audience, declaring that they
had been “steadfast in the war against President George W. Bush and his riffraff” while
the world had stood “stunned, amazed, delighted and wonder-struck watching America
the tyrannical [have] its brigades being wiped out in front of your raids and its battalions
being obliterated.” He had particular praise for “the champions of the Fedayee [martyr]
operations . . . rushing with their car bombs into the midst of the armored vehicles.”67
The al-Qaeda leader then turned to the grave matter facing him and his followers:
the failure of AQI leaders to attract recruits to the Islamic State of Iraq and to prevent
the defection of former AQI allies such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, Jaysh Mujahideen, and Jaysh al-Islami, all negotiating truces with the coalition. Addressing “my
brothers, the amirs of the Mujahid groups,” bin Laden warned that “some of you have
been tardy in performing another duty, which is also among the greatest of duties: combining your ranks to make them one rank. . . . the Muslims are waiting for you to gather
under one banner.” Apparently acknowledging the overbearing AQI behavior and violence that had fractured the Sunni insurgency, he spoke of “the mistakes that take place
between the brothers,” noting that, “when they happen, differences break out [among]
the people.” However, he was quick to ascribe some of the Sunni insurgency’s infighting
to “those in whose hearts there is a disease [who] look for the faults and lapses of the
Mujahideen and exaggerate them, and perhaps allege that they are a consequence of the
devotion of Jihad, which they label violence and terror.”68
Turning to the phenomenon of the Awakening that had begun to damage his Iraqi
franchise, bin Laden argued that AQI commanders and tribal leaders alike had a duty to
resolve the disputes among them. “It is incumbent on the men of knowledge, amirs of
the Mujahideen, and Shaykhs of the clans to make every effort to engender reconciliation
between every two parties in dispute,” he implored. He added an allegation that Saudi
Arabia partly was behind the Awakening, asserting that “those in the land of the Two
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Sanctuaries [Saudi Arabia] . . . forbid the Mujahideen from fighting the army and police
of the traitors—like al-Alawi, al-Jafari and al-Maliki—although they know that they are
tools of the American occupation helping it to kill the people of Islam.”69
Delving into operational matters, bin Laden commented on AQI’s diminishing effectiveness on the battlefield, which he partially attributed to a breakdown in operational
security. He warned AQI commanders to beware “the hypocrites who infiltrate your
ranks to stir up strife among the Mujahid groups,” and to:
protect your secrets and excel in your actions, for among the things which sadden the Muslims and
delight the unbelievers is the hindering of some combat operations against the enemy because of
negligence in any of the stages of preparation for the operation, whether it be reconnaissance of
the target, training, integrity and suitability of weapons and ammunition, quality of the explosive
device or other such arrangements. And when you lay a mine, do it right, and don’t leave so much
as one wounded American soldier or spy.70

Bin Laden reserved his most emphatic criticism for Iraqis who had split from AQI’s jihad
and abandoned the establishment of an Islamic emirate out of sentiment for Iraqi nationalism or tribal affiliation:
[B]eware of fanatical partiality to men, groups and homelands. . . . The brotherhood of faith is what
ties the Muslims together, not belonging to the tribe, homeland or organization. And the interests
of the group take priority over the interest of the individual, and the interests of the Muslim state
take priority over the interests of the group, and the interest of the Ummah take priority over the
interests of the state.71

In closing, bin Laden defiantly exhorted “our people in Iraq” to redouble their efforts
despite the fact that with the coalition’s growing advantage over the insurgency, “the
malice has increased, and the darkness has become pitch black.”
The Ummah had reserved you for the darkest of nights, because you are their lions who don’t
care. . . . You refused to abandon the homeland to the unbelievers, or allow their tanks to roar
between the Tigris and Euphrates. . . . You massacred the enemy and applied yourself to fighting
them, until they became prisoners of their bases and the Green Zone, fearing danger. So continue
to make the soldiers of unbelief drink from the bitter cup of death, and leave not one of them on
the soil of Iraq.72

For coalition commanders, the al-Qaeda leader’s admission of mistakes by his organization’s Iraqi branch validated that the Awakening had created major fractures within
the insurgency and that surge operations were having a significant impact. Bin Laden’s
speech also was a windfall for MNF-I’s information operations organizations, which acted
quickly to turn the al-Qaeda leader’s remarks to the coalition’s advantage and amplify
the message that bin Laden believed his followers were losing in Iraq. “Strategically, we
were heartened this past week by Usama bin Laden’s admission of mistakes by AQI in
their brutal methods and by Al Jazeera’s relatively truthful coverage of his admission,”
Petraeus wrote to Gates 6 days after bin Laden’s message. “This crack in Al Qaeda messaging sheds light on the enormous amount of hard work done by our troops and our
Iraqi partners over the course of this year.”73
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Operation PHANTOM STRIKE in Salahadin, Nahrwan, and the
Euphrates River Valley
The day after bin Laden’s message was released, Mixon and the 25th Infantry Division
handed command of MND-N to Major General Mark Hertling and the 1st Armored Division. The 1st Armored Division became the first U.S. division headquarters to deploy to
Iraq with none of its subordinate brigades, and the division continued MND-N’s portion
of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE by quickly executing an operation that Mixon already
had prepared its brigades to conduct. On November 5, Operation IRON HAMMER
shifted MND-N’s main effort from the Za’ab Triangle farther south to the Tikrit-Bayji-Hawijah area of Salahadin Province, where Colonel Michael S. McBride and the 1st
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, recently had arrived. Over the next 2 weeks, McBride’s
Soldiers moved into insurgent-dominated neighborhoods in Bayji and nearby Siniyah,
detaining dozens of suspected enemy fighters and raising 230 new recruits for the CLC
program. Throughout the division’s area of operations, MND-N units captured about 400
suspected insurgents during the same period and established new outposts that encouraged large numbers of locals to join the Awakening. Three weeks after Operation IRON
HAMMER began, Colonel David Paschal’s 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, coordinated with local tribal leaders in Hawijah to enroll 6,000 security volunteers to work with
coalition troops against the militant presence.74 It was the first major Awakening group
to appear in the upper Tigris region and was striking in that it came in Hawijah, a city
that was a support base for the Naqshbandi Army, a Ba’athist insurgent group loyal to
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The area was also the home territory for the Obaid tribe, some of
whose members had been fighting the Kurdish parties since their takeover of Kirkuk in
2003. The Sunni tribal forces would be useful against AQI, but stood to pose a challenge
to the Kurds if not watched closely.
The success of coalition operations, coupled with the expansion of the Awakening,
drove AQI leaders as well as fighters toward Mosul. Hertling, concerned with the trend,
took stock of the broader picture in northern Iraq. Violence in Mosul rose as this relocation
took place. From March to September 2007, the city, home to more than 2 million Arabs,
Kurds, Turkomans, and other minorities had witnessed about 60 attacks per week, but
by late October, the average had risen to 80.75 At the same time, Tel Afar Mayor Najim
Jabouri reported to coalition officers that, although Tel Afar remained in friendly hands,
AQI fighters moved freely through Mosul, especially at night, and senior AQI commanders such as Masri had relocated to the area.76 Coalition officials later noted that Masri traveled through Mosul at least twice during the late fall, validating Jabouri’s information.77
The city felt AQI’s impact in neighborhoods west of the Tigris, across the river from the
Kurdish-populated areas on which the Kurdish-led local security forces tended to focus.
As it had done since late 2004, the terrorist group aimed many of its attacks at the Mosul
police, such as the October 17 suicide truck bombing of a west side police station that
killed 16 people and wounded another 50, an unusually large attack for the city.78
Petraeus echoed Hertling’s concern over the worsening situation in Mosul, writing to
Gates that the city was “an area of concern that never had an adequate force presence.”
With all U.S. brigades committed in central Iraq and Diyala, Petraeus and Odierno hoped
that the 2d and 3d Iraqi divisions and two U.S. battalions under Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division, could keep Ninawa Province under control for the time being.79 As the
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1st Armored Division arrived, Hertling posted one of his assistant division commanders,
Brigadier General Raymond A. “Tony” Thomas, in Mosul to keep an eye on the restive
city, but the single U.S. battalion stationed there to support the Iraqi 2d Division was
insufficient to prevent AQI from ramping up its activity.
There were few Awakening groups in the Mosul area, where rivalry between Kurds
and Sunni Arabs and Turkomans meant the local ISF and political leaders discouraged
the mobilization of Sunni security volunteers. For Ninawa-based leaders of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party and their local allies, the idea of Ninawa’s Sunni Arabs
and Sunni Turkomans banding together in armed groups under U.S. sponsorship threatened Kurdish control of the province. MND-N leaders, too, were skeptical of sponsoring
Sunni tribal groups that might challenge Ninawa’s Kurdish-dominated provincial government, judging that an Awakening there could shatter the fragile political détente and
plunge the province into sectarian conflict. The dearth of coalition forces also meant that
a critical catalyst for the gestation of such groups was missing.
The security situation in Ninawa reflected this absence of a large-scale local Sunni
resistance to AQI. By the end of November, the weekly attack average for the Mosul area
rose again to more than 100 incidents, including several major attacks.80 On November
23, AQI carried out 2 coordinated suicide car bombings against Iraqi police targets, killing 21 Iraqis and wounding 35 more. On the same afternoon, a truck bomb destroyed one
span of the Qayyarah Bridge, a major Tigris River crossing about 50 miles south of Mosul,
in an apparent attempt to isolate the city.81

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Samuel Bendet (Released).

Soldiers From 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, Search Remote Terrain
in Salahadin Province.82
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Despite the danger AQI posed to Ninawa, Hertling decided to defend the province by
first blocking AQI fighters’ escape routes elsewhere. On November 27, he shifted MNDN’s main effort farther south again, this time to the area spanning southern Salahadin and
western Diyala Provinces where fighters from the Diyala River Valley had been escaping
MND-N’s operations in the upper Diyala by transiting to the Tigris River Valley. In the
towns of Khalis, Hadid, and Hibhib, Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, teamed
with local units of the 5th Iraqi Army Division to conduct 3 weeks of searches for suspected terrorist safe houses and weapons caches in the area where Zarqawi had located
his own hideout and had been killed in June 2006. The operation netted about 60 suspected insurgents and about 80 weapons caches, a reduction in tallies from Diyala operations in previous months, suggesting that most of the remaining AQI cells had probably
escaped the trap.83
As MND-N conducted its operations in Diyala and Salahadin, Lynch and MND- C
continued to seize territory south of Baghdad that militant groups had used as support
zones and sanctuaries from which to threaten the capital, including areas dominated by
Shi’a militias. As MND-C’s main effort from mid-October to mid-November, Colonel
Wayne Grigsby and his 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, tightened their control over the
Diyala River bridges leading to east Baghdad, making it more difficult for Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) and other Shi’a militants to move weapons and fighters into the city. Grigsby also
established a new outpost in the town of Nahrwan east of Baghdad, a town of 120,000
that had become a Shi’a militant stronghold. The town’s market was adjacent to a large
vacant area that local Shi’a and Sunni militants used as a dumping ground for the bodies
of their victims. When Grigsby located his new outpost in the middle of the vacant lot,
murders in the town nearly ceased overnight and locals began tipping off U.S. troops,
who then cracked down on what Grigsby assessed to be a JAM battalion.84

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Natalie Loucks (Released).

Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., Commander of 3d BCT, 3d Infantry Division,
With a Senior Iraqi Officer.85
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THE AWAKENING, THE MALIKI GOVERNMENT, AND AQI
One week after Osama bin Laden released his October audio message, AQI already
was responding to the increased pressure from the coalition and the Awakening. Signs
quickly emerged that AQI’s main effort in the weeks following bin Laden’s message was
to strike back against the CLCs, as well as against the Iraqi police in Sunni areas. The day
after Hertling’s division took control of the north, a suicide bomber killed 27 policemen
in Baqubah by detonating a bomb hidden on a bicycle. In the same week, insurgents
killed 11 ISF members in Mosul in 3 separate attacks.86 The following week, a small war
played out between AQI and local Awakening fighters in the area between Baqubah
and Samarra. On November 8 in that area, coalition troops killed a senior AQI leader,
Mohammed Sulayman Shunaythir al-Zubai. The following day, an AQI suicide bomber
killed a coleader of the Diyala Salvation Council, an Awakening umbrella group associated with the Baqubah Guardians, in his home in Khalis. On the same day, November 9,
a group of Jaysh al-Islami fighters who had joined the Awakening attacked AQI positions
near Samarra and claimed killing 18 AQI members, while losing 15 of their own.87 In a
bigger operation the following day, Awakening fighters and local ISF members attacked
an AQI force near Baqubah, reportedly capturing 60 AQI men.88 On the same day as the
Baqubah attack, Petraeus noted to Gates, “while the [Iraqi] Government might underestimate the importance of the CLC movements, AQI certainly does not. AQI’s recent
targeting of Concerned Local Citizen leaders highlights its awareness that Concerned
Local Citizen efforts pose the greatest threat to AQI’s freedom of movement and ability
to conduct activities.”89
Events south of Baghdad 2 days later underscored the general’s point. On November
12, at least 30 AQI fighters attacked 2 of Odom’s and Adgie’s partnered CLC detachments
in the Arab Jabour area, leading to a long engagement that killed 5 of the CLCs and 18
AQI fighters.90 Two days later, in the town of Haswa a short distance to the west, a suicide bomber killed Sheikh Emad al-Ghurtani, the Awakening leader who had worked
with both Kershaw’s and Garrett’s brigades to organize 700 Awakening volunteers in
the formerly violent area between Haswa and Yusufiyah. Sheikh Ghurtani had met with
3d Infantry Division Commander General Lynch a few days before his death, telling
the American general, “Honestly, I’m not going to hide this from you . . . There is some
al-Qaeda here in this area. But, God willing, we will get rid of them . . . The citizens are
coming out. They’re not afraid anymore.”91
Despite setbacks like the loss of Sheikh Ghurtani, by November 2007 coalition commanders could see their partnership with the Awakening as a potentially decisive change
in the war. By mid-November, coalition units had registered 77,000 CLCs, representing
an increase of 25,000 in 6 weeks. Of that number, 49,000 CLCs were paid by CERP, and
south of Baghdad, MND-C had registered about 20,000 CLCs in only 4 months.92
U.S. commanders often described the monetary expense of Sunni irregulars in relative terms, pointing out, as Petraeus did, that “the savings in vehicles not lost because
of reduced violence—not to mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the
cost of their monthly contracts.”93 Fil, commanding MND-B, noted in late 2007 that the
division had spent $17 million to enroll and pay about 67,000 fighters—a sum less than
the cost of a single Apache helicopter.94 In Salahadin Province, Colonel Brian R. Owens
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and his 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, saw CLCs as a similarly prudent investment.
During a visit to Iraq, Senator John S. McCain challenged Owens, “Aren’t you just paying
them not to emplace IEDs?” Owens responded, “No, I’m giving them an alternative to
planting an IED . . . some way to feed their families.”95 Aside from saving CLC soldiers
and equipment, the investment pumped money into the local economy, where their
enrolled soldiers spent their $300 monthly salary.96
Despite the steep decline in violence in large part due to the Awakening, Prime Minister Maliki’s and other senior Shi’a leaders’ paranoia toward the Awakening increased,
further frustrating senior U.S. officials. Concerned that the CLCs would turn their guns
toward the Iraqi Government, Maliki pressed his coalition counterparts to slow down
the program and announced a freeze on the hiring of CLC members into the Iraqi security forces. This move, if not reversed, would thwart the coalition’s plans to transition
the CLCs into local police forces in Sunni areas. It validated Petraeus’s and Odierno’s
suspicions that Maliki had created the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for
National Reconciliation under Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidari to slow the Awakening
rather than to institutionalize it. Petraeus did not hide his concern, “As you would imagine, this has been a frustration for us, as we try to take advantage of what likely is a narrowing window of opportunity to reconcile with Sunni former resistance elements that
now oppose AQI,” Petraeus reported to Gates on November 17. “Taken together with the
halting progress on legislation and the slow movement on provision of services to Sunni
communities, the freeze on CLC hiring for the ISF has us concerned that Maliki is not
taking the necessary steps to capitalize on a fleeting opportunity to cement fragile gains
in the security arena.”97 The Prime Minister, Petraeus observed, was “naturally suspicious and inclined to believe rumors that he hears from his Shi’a advisors, to include the
Commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command [General Ali Ghaidan].”98
At the same time, Maliki repeatedly told his coalition counterparts of his plans to
declare an amnesty for those who had been “deceived” into joining the insurgency, a
policy that seemed at odds with his suspicions about the CLCs. Maliki described his plan
as a general amnesty for those who had been detained for taking up arms against the
Iraqi Government—a criterion that seemed to require the freeing of many thousands of
detainees being held by the coalition. Alarmed by the prospect of such an arbitrary process, coalition leaders quietly engaged Maliki’s national security staff to clarify the policy
and apply it only to vetted detainees whose behavior could be guaranteed by local Iraqi
leaders.99
Maliki’s paranoia toward the CLCs manifested itself in the Iraqi capital in November, when General Faruq al-Araji, director of Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief,
came to Maliki with “intelligence” that MNF-I was about to implement a plan under
which the CLCs would seize the entry points into Baghdad and then remove Maliki in a
coup. The Prime Minister responded to Araji’s fantastic rumor by deploying trusted ISF
units for a day to checkpoints on the major roads leading into Baghdad, prepared for a
supposed U.S.-led coup attempt that did not come. As coalition commanders realized the
meaning of the strange ISF movements, astonished coalition officials met with Maliki’s
Iraqi advisers to assure them that the U.S. military did not intend to lead a coup against
him, with the CLCs or with anyone else.100
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Not all of Maliki’s suspicions toward the CLCs were unfounded, however. In midNovember, coalition special operators fought Sunni militants north of Baghdad who had
obtained heavy antiaircraft guns. The special operations forces (SOF) operators killed
20 of the militants and destroyed 14 of their machine guns before finding out they were
a new CLC group. The incident prompted Petraeus to observe that MNF-I needed “to
remain vigilant to the possibilities that some insurgent groups could be using CLC elements as a cover to regroup, rid their areas of al-Qaeda, and retain combat power for the
future.”101
To resolve the CLC impasse with the Iraqi Government, Odierno went before the Iraqi
National Security Council on December 2. With the recent history of ISF “ghost soldiers”
in mind, Maliki and his advisers had scoffed at reports that the coalition had registered
103,000 CLCs, more than 80,000 of which were Sunnis. The Iraqi leader’s skepticism had
turned to alarm as Odierno revealed that coalition units had collected individual data,
some of it biometric, for each CLC, establishing the accuracy of the figure. Nevertheless,
when confronted with the scale of what the coalition already had done, and assured by
Odierno that MNC-I would continue to monitor the CLCs’ activities to pick out “bad
apples,” Maliki finally relented. The Iraqi Prime Minister ostensibly accepted the coalition proposal that 20 percent of the CLCs should be absorbed into the ISF and the remainder given public sector jobs with the Iraqi ministries, declaring, “I agree with everything
that General Odierno laid out!”102

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Curt Cashour (Released).

General Raymond Odierno, Commander of MNC-I, With Local Sheiks.103
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The day after Prime Minister Maliki lent his approval to the coalition’s partnership
with the CLCs—at least for the time being—Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the
AQI-founded Islamic State of Iraq, called for a campaign of terror attacks against those
same Sunni irregulars. “The individual mission of each mujahid,” Baghdadi declared,
“is to conduct three IED attacks or three attacks with explosives, especially martyrdom
attacks, or at least to kill three apostates and traitors” by a deadline of January 29, 2008.104
Baghdadi also announced the creation of a special “Al Siddiq Corps,” that specifically
targeted those he considered apostates and heretics—namely Sunnis who had joined the
Awakening.105 AQI kicked off its anti-Awakening campaign with eight attacks during
its first five days. Fighting between the Awakening movements and AQI spiked during
mid-December as clashes erupted in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninawa, and Diyala Provinces.106
At a political level, though, the Awakening showed it had gathered a level of momentum that AQI could not impede. Ten days after AQI’s call for terror attacks against the
Awakening, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani assembled 750 Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders in
an “Awakening Council” meeting in Baghdad. Attended by Petraeus, who addressed the
crowd, and other senior officials, the large gathering showed that in central Iraq at least,
the reconciliation movement had begun to gain political traction.107 The following day,
the Sunni insurgency took another blow. Iraq’s Government-run Sunni religious endowment evicted Harith al-Dhari’s Association of Muslim Scholars from the west Baghdad
Umm al-Qura Mosque, the vast complex from which Dhari’s colleagues had cheered the
attacks against the coalition as well as the Iraqi Government since 2004. The action represented how far in public standing the Sunni insurgency’s supporters had fallen.
Despite the Maliki government’s lukewarm reception to the Awakening, as well as
AQI’s vicious hostility toward it, by December 2007, the CLC initiative had grown to an
extent that no coalition commander would have thought possible in early 2007. The decision by Petraeus, Odierno, and others to support the mobilization of tens of thousands of
former Sunni insurgents had been a serious gamble, and many reasonable coalition officials in spring 2007 had argued against taking the risk—or at least in favor of mitigating
the risk by moving more slowly than the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders had decided.
The risk had been a political one as well. The coalition commanders had granted their
tactical leaders autonomy as well as the latitude to use CERP funds to create a force of
more than 100,000 Iraqi security volunteers where none had existed, all with the reluctant
agreement of the Maliki government. It would remain to be seen in 2008 whether they
could solidify that buy-in to make the Sunnis’ rejection of AQI permanent.
The End of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE
The last phase of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE found MND-C as the corps’ main
effort. The operations south of Baghdad since June had established coalition and ISF control of the Triangle of Death and had forced AQI to move southwest into remote areas
across the Euphrates River. In mid-November, MND-C launched an operation to establish a foothold on the south bank of the river using Colonel Dominic Caracillo’s newly
arrived 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which had replaced Kershaw and 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. In the final weeks of 2007, Caracillo’s troops built a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates at the town of Owesat, the same spot where U.S. troops
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twice had been abducted and killed by Sunni insurgents in June 2006 and May 2007. On
the southern bank, Caracillo’s brigade established a new combat outpost and branched
out to patrol the local area, raise security volunteers, and drive AQI out of its last large
sanctuary in the MND-C area of operations.108
Caracillo and his troops inherited a Triangle of Death that bore little resemblance to
the violent area that Kershaw’s brigade had found on its arrival in fall 2006. Once the
heartland of AQI and a major base for the terror attacks that nearly brought the collapse
of the Iraqi state in 2006, by late 2007 the area was one of the most peaceful in Iraq.
With the manpower raised during the Awakening, Kershaw had created a local army of
almost 9,000 former Sunni insurgents, enabling the Awakening to spread beyond Anbar
and change the strategic situation in central Iraq in ways that coalition leaders had not
thought possible at the beginning of the year. Kershaw himself, however, would reap no
professional reward. His clashes with Lynch over the use of firepower and the practice of
operating with former insurgents meant that he would finish his career as a colonel. Of
the four maneuver brigade commanders in MND-C during summer 2007 who drove AQI
from the southern belts, Garrett, Ferrell, and Grigsby later commanded at the division
level. Only Kershaw would not be promoted to general officer.

Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Ben Brody (Released).

Soldiers From the 101st Airborne Division Conduct Air Assault Operations
in Ubaydi, December 29, 2007.109
Across Iraq, Operation PHANTOM STRIKE had maintained the pressure begun by
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER and, as the coalition commanders had intended, had
disrupted the flow of “accelerants” into the Iraqi capital. The result was a significant
drop in violence in central Iraq. Before Operation PHANTOM THUNDER began in June,
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insurgent attacks had averaged 58 per day, but for the period of July to November, the
daily attack average fell to just 27. By the end of 2007, days with no attacks became a
common occurrence in Anbar Province. Change also swept Baghdad as well, where surge
operations cut violence levels in half. On November 3, Baghdad experienced its first day
of no reported violent incidents. On December 7, there were only 13 effective attacks in the
country, and overall violence had fallen to levels not seen since 2004.110 Diyala, Salahadin,
Kirkuk, and Babil also experienced steep drops. The surge of operations had resulted in a
massive capture of the enemy’s munitions as well.111 By October, U.S. and Iraqi troops in
Anbar had found twice as many weapons caches as in 2006.112 In Baghdad, coalition and
Iraqi troops discovered more than 1,000 caches by the end of 2007, compared with 213 in
2006.113 These captures diminished insurgent means to employ IEDs and other bombs.
Only Ninawa Province did not experience these trends. Violence in Ninawa had risen
during the surge of operations to more than 15 attacks per day, making it Iraq’s most
violent province. “We have seen a general movement of AQI to the north,” Petraeus
reported during the week following Baghdadi’s call for a terror campaign. “Kurdish
expansionism and the real/perceived disenfranchisement of the Sunni majority play a
role here,” the MNF-I commander explained to Gates, “as AQI is able to find some refuge
in Sunni communities that feel under pressure.”114 In some cases, AQI also benefited from
drought conditions that had devastated the Sunni farmers of Ninawa, with conditions
made worse at times in areas where Kurdish parties controlled the water supply, such as
the western Ninawa town of Biaj.115
The outburst of AQI activity, especially in the far north, made clear that the coalition’s
hold on Ninawa Province was tenuous and would require reinforcement. The rotation
of Colonel Michael A. Bills’s 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and two of its squadrons
into Ninawa Province in relief of Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in early
December meant a modest increase in U.S. troop strength in the province, but Odierno
and MNC-I doubled the U.S. strength in Mosul by moving the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry,
from Baghdad. With the addition of the battalion, the 3d ACR could split the city between
two U.S. battalions, one on each side of the Tigris River. U.S. and Iraqi commanders also
recalled two Iraqi battalions that had deployed from the 2d Iraqi Division to Baghdad as
part of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, increasing the number of Iraqi battalions in the
city from seven to nine.116
To manage the situation in Mosul and the surrounding region better, in December Prime Minister Maliki took a step further and created a Ninawa Operations Command and assigned Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq, a Sunni officer who had
commanded the 9th Division in Baghdad, to head the new command. For Maliki, the
new command was a way of balancing “the Kurd dominance of political and military
elements in Mosul,” a dynamic that he had complained about to Petraeus and Crocker
since September. For coalition commanders, the new operations command was a badly
needed structure for unifying the effort of the two Iraqi divisions and various police
forces spread across Ninawa. Petraeus also noted that the move would “help reassure
Arabs in Mosul that Kurds are not running the province,” though with the governorship,
deputy governorship, provincial council, and police chief posts in the hands of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and its allies, the Mosul Arabs’ perception of Kurdish control
was not wrong.117 As 2007 ended, coalition leaders unanimously judged that with a heavy
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AQI presence and a smoldering Arab-Kurd conflict, Ninawa Province would require a
full-scale offensive of its own.
THE WAR AGAINST THE SHI’A MILITANTS
Monitoring the Sadrist “Freeze”
As the coalition commanders pressed their operations against AQI, they monitored
Shi’a militant activities to gauge the effect that Moqtada Sadr’s “freeze” on JAM operations would have on the security situation. Before the late-August Karbala violence and
Sadr’s damage-controlling response, MNF-I had estimated that Shi’a militant groups
were responsible for two-thirds of all attacks on coalition troops in Baghdad, and in the
month of July alone, explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks had killed 23 coalition
troops and wounded another 89.118 The weeks following the “freeze” declaration seemed
to offer hope that political efforts could make Sadr and his organization cease all or most
of their attacks. On September 16, senior Sadrist Parliamentarian Baha al-Araji told Petraeus that Sadr was “now open to dialogue with the Coalition.”119 For his part, Prime
Minister Maliki told Petraeus that low-level U.S. outreach to Sadrists in Baghdad seemed
to be gaining traction and asked that MNF-I “calm down” its raids against targets in Sadr
City in order to encourage political reconciliation. Petraeus answered that he would be
glad to do so “if there is a reciprocal calming down of EFPs and [indirect fire.]”120
The fall 2007 period following Sadr’s JAM freeze announcement was marked by the
same disconnect between the coalition and the Maliki government that had characterized
each side’s approach to the Shi’a militant problem since late 2006. While Maliki continued to reach out to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) and other Special Groups in hopes of using
them as a political counterweight against Sadr and “mainstream JAM,” whom Maliki
considered more threatening than the Special Groups, MNF-I pursued the exact opposite
course. Petraeus and other U.S. commanders intended to use Sadr’s freeze as a means of
splitting the Sadr movement and driving a wedge between those who were “mainstream
JAM” followers of Sadr and those in the Special Groups that continued attacks against
the coalition and the ISF in defiance of Sadr’s instructions. Throughout fall 2007, Petraeus
and other coalition spokesmen made frequent public statements clarifying that the coalition did not consider Sadr and his obedient followers to be enemies, while Petraeus continued to order intense targeted operations against the Special Groups that Maliki was
trying to entice into politics under the auspices of his Da’wa Party.
As Maliki and his advisers saw it, the Special Groups, especially the imprisoned Qais
al- Khazali, were potentially reliable partners for the Maliki government, while the erratic
Sadr was immature and troublesome. In mid-October, Maliki’s office requested that
MNF-I release 40 “reconcilable” Shi’a militants from coalition detention centers. Petraeus
responded by authorizing the release of nine that coalition officials deemed safe.121 Maliki
and his advisers also wanted MNF-I to remove a number of prominent Special Groups’
leaders from coalition target lists, but reluctant coalition commanders hesitated, given
the Special Groups’ continued attacks on coalition troops. On October 21, the coalition’s
operations against the Special Groups collided with Maliki’s outreach efforts when U.S.
troops conducting a raid against a Special Groups target in Sadr City became engaged in
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a large-scale firefight. U.S. forces killed an estimated 49 Special Groups fighters in a battle
that required air strikes before the raiding party could be extricated. Pro-militia media
outlets immediately claimed the coalition troops had killed only 15 people—all civilians, and some of them children. An infuriated Maliki and other Shi’a politicians publicly
denounced the raid and MNF-I’s “lack of regard for Iraqi sovereignty,” showing that the
coalition’s operations against the Special Groups remained politically sensitive.122
Even more politically sensitive were the coalition’s activities against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) Quds Force, which had continued its lethal assistance to the Special Groups and other Shi’a militant proxies. On September 20 in the
Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, coalition troops captured an undercover Quds Force officer, and the Iranian regime protested by closing several border crossing points with Kurdistan.123 The following month, more evidence of the Quds Force’s activities in Iraq came
to light when U.S. troops in Diyala uncovered a cache of 280 fully or partially assembled
EFPs and at least 300 pounds of plastic explosives with January 2007 Iranian manufacturing labels, all transported from Iran by a JAM member.124
The Quds Force activity presented a problem for the U.S. diplomatic initiative to
engage in trilateral security talks with the Iraqis and Iranians in Baghdad. As a result,
Petraeus noted to Iraqi leaders, “We believe the caches were established prior to the Iranian leaders pledging that they would stop the arming, training, and funding of Iraqi
militia extremists.” He added that he and other coalition officials “hope[d] that the Iranian leadership is adhering to the commitment they made to PM Maliki in July and that
we welcome the next round of sub-ambassadorial talks with Iranian representatives.”125
On November 9, in a goodwill gesture meant to support the trilateral talks, Petraeus and
Crocker released nine Iranian detainees, deemed as no security risk by coalition officials,
to Iraqi Government custody so they could be returned to the Iranian Government.126
Eleven days later, five of the Iranian men were captured attempting to cross back into
Iraq, for which they gave the unlikely explanation that Iranian officials had refused to
take them back into Iran and had transported them back to the Iraqi border.127
Diwaniya, Poland, and the Special Groups
The Special Groups’ activities were intensifying as well, partly in response to a new
and unexpected assertiveness from the Polish coalition contingent. On September 25,
the MND-CS commander, Polish Major General Tadeusz Buk, reversed his command’s
long-standing caution in Diwaniya and launched Operation OIL DROP to emplace a
second joint security station inside the city and extend the Polish and ISF presence there.
In this operation, Buk partnered with 8th Iraqi Army Division Commander Major General Othman al-Ghanimi. Both generals were assisted by a small team of U.S. Marines
whom Petraeus had assigned to Diwaniya to create a local force of anti-JAM Shi’a tribal
auxiliaries, including Captain Seth Moulton, a future U.S. congressman; Captain Ann
Gildroy; and Staff Sergeant Alex Lemon. Together, the Polish general, the Iraqi general,
and the young Marines put into motion an operation to clear the city of its JAM cells,
already under pressure following al-Ghanimi’s operations of spring and summer 2007.
In an assault that seemed an apparent response to Operation OIL DROP, on October 2, an Iranian-sponsored Special Groups’ cell attacked the Polish ambassador in the
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Baghdad neighborhood of Karada, hitting his convoy with several EFPs. The wounded
ambassador was evacuated to a U.S. military hospital in Germany. The assassination
attempt was clearly meant to intimidate the Poles into ceasing their Diwaniya operations.128 Two weeks later, Special Groups fighters attacked Buk’s troops in Diwaniya,
wounding seven American and Polish soldiers and killing four Iraqi civilians in several
days of rocket and mortar attacks that JAM-friendly media outlets attempted to attribute
to coalition air strikes.129 During the same week, Special Groups fighters bombarded the
U.S. Embassy’s regional office in Hillah but caused no casualties.130
Back in the Baghdad area, on October 28, a Special Groups cell abducted eight Sunni
sheikhs from a nearby area of Diyala, but General Tawfiq—soon to be assigned as the
Ninawa operations commander—and troops from his 9th Iraqi Division rescued the
sheikhs the following day, though not before one of the hostages was killed.131 On the
same day as the rescue, Brigadier General Jeffrey Dorko, commander of the Gulf Region
Division of the Army Corps of Engineers and responsible for most of the coalition’s construction projects, was seriously wounded by an IED that hit his convoy as it passed
through northern Baghdad. In what was likely a Special Groups EFP attack, Dorko
became the highest-ranking U.S. officer wounded in the Iraq War.
Much of the increased Special Groups’ activity like this in central and southern Iraq
was the handiwork of Akram Kabi and AAH, the militant group commanded by the
imprisoned Qais al-Khazali. At the time, MNF-I incorrectly associated the group with a
new Special Groups-affiliated political party in Nasiriyah, the Iraqi National Gathering.
MNF-I officials did correctly guess that Kabi and AAH were splinter groups that “seem
to be rejecting Muqtada al Sadr and reaching out to Hezbollah and Syria along the lines
of Arab identity,” though they again misjudged that the Iranian-allied AAH were “distancing themselves from overt Iranian connections.”132
General Buk believed the Special Groups attacks against the Polish ambassador and
against his base camp in Diwaniya also were meant to influence the Polish elections to be
held in October in much the same way the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attack had influenced the Spanish elections, and had led to the withdrawal of the Spanish military contingent from Iraq. Unfolding events supported Buk’s theory. Elections in Poland resulted
in a change of government to the anti-Iraq War party of Donald Tusk. On November 14,
General Othman launched the ISF-led Operation LIONS’ POUNCE to continue pressure
against JAM elements in Diwaniya. Two days later, Poland had a new government and
a new defense minister who promptly announced on November 17 that Poland would
withdraw from its combat mission within months.133
Evidence continued to emerge of active Iranian regime sponsorship of AAH and other
militant groups. On November 17, coalition troops captured a cell of militants, possibly
from AAH, that had returned from Iran in late October after undergoing Quds Force
training in explosives, sniper, and other militant activities. Under questioning, the men
admitted to crossing the border east of Amarah and being escorted by Quds Force officers to a training camp near Tehran.134
The following day, November 18, Special Groups members simultaneously attacked
several U.S. bases in the Baghdad area by firing large oxygen cylinders mounted on 107mm. rocket motors and filled with bulk explosives and ball bearings. It was the first use
of an Iranian-designed weapon that coalition troops eventually named the improvised
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rocket-assisted munition (IRAM) and whose design indicated that it was intended to
cause mass casualties. The IRAM’s bulkiness meant that it had to be fired from a range of
no more than 200 meters, indicating that the Special Groups who fired no fewer than 31
of them on November 18 had been able to come extremely close to the perimeter of U.S.
bases. The IRAMs wounded 12 U.S. Soldiers and damaged or destroyed 24 vehicles.135
The Special Groups’ attacks were not always against coalition troops or political enemies. On November 23, Special Groups’ members bombed east Baghdad’s Shorja Market,
killing eight fellow Shi’a in an attack. The Shi’a militants perversely intended to blame
AQI to justify the Special Groups’ presence in Shi’a neighborhoods. When four Special
Groups’ members were arrested shortly after the bombing, they tested positive for handling the type of explosives used in the attack and confessed to having carried out the
attack under orders from a Special Groups’ leader. “We believe the Special Groups are
finding their criminal activities under ever more scrutiny and are trying to justify the
need for militia security, and we think they thought they could get away with blaming
AQI for the attack,” Petraeus explained to Gates on November 25.136
Fragmentation of the Shi’a Militants
Despite the continued Special Groups’ activity, the Sadrist freeze on JAM activities
resulted in fewer than 40 EFP attacks in November, roughly half the number carried out
in June.137 “The Sadrist interlocutors we are engaging [claim] that the decrease in violence
toward the Coalition Forces (CF) and ISF reflects good intentions in following Sadr’s
ceasefire; that the Sadrist trend is a nationalist party with wide support at the grassroots;
and that they are committed to fighting Iranian influence over Iraq,” Petraeus reported
on November 9. It was an opening that the MNF- I commander was eager to exploit. “As
I have repeatedly observed, we cannot kill our way out of the JAM problem,” he wrote to
Gates, “and I don’t think we need to, given the increasing sense of extremist rejection.”138
By late November, the Special Groups’ disregard for Sadr’s freeze order led Petraeus to
conclude that:
JAM no longer exists as a relatively unified entity, and we are working hard to keep it fragmented
while peeling away reconcilable elements, similar to what we have done with AQI and the Sunni
insurgency. The military arm of the Sadrists is fractured and relatively incoherent, and Sadr himself
is being intimidated by his affiliates. . . . Exposing and stopping Iranian influence and destroying
the Special Groups without reunifying JAM will require a nuanced approach—reaching out to
reconcilables and hammering irreconcilables (quietly), all the while keeping the government of
Iraq (GOI) on [our] side and the larger strategic context involving Iran in mind.139

In part, the disarray inside the Sadrist militant movement resulted from Sadr’s
absence and his failure to manage his own organization. He returned to Iraq through the
Maysan marshes in early October to try to impose some order over his followers, but by
early November, he left for Iran again, claiming he would enter a program of additional
religious training, presumably so he could claim ayatollah status at some future point.140
However, the Sadrist issues also were the culmination of the fissures between Sadr and
his senior lieutenants, such as Khazali, in the wake of their defeat in Najaf in 2004. One
senior Shi’a militant leader in coalition detention, a former Sadr lieutenant who had been
involved in the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) attack, described to
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coalition officials in late 2007 the reason that so many Special Groups leaders, like Khazali
and Kabi, had chosen to break from Sadr:
[H]e [Moqtada] himself is not stable but he is constantly changing his mind and that reflects on
his followers. One day he will tell you that the American forces or CF are an occupying force
and he will tell you that we should resist by political means. Then he will draw back from that
conclusion and tell you that we must resist by military means. This mind changing creates too
much waste, obstacles, and hardships because you do not understand his right clear thinking in
order to dialogue or converse with him. We believe that this problem is much greater than if he
had a negative assumption or understanding of things. . . . He has demonstrated through time that
he is not focused, organized, or competent. He does not take advice from others and often acts
unilaterally and makes decisions on his own on matters which he is not knowledgeable on. As a
result, two distinct sides have formed within the Sadrist movement. There is [Moqtada] and those
who are loyal to him as the leader of the movement and representative of their political interests.
Then there is the collection of former associates and supporters of [Moqtada], who still subscribe to
the teachings and philosophy of the late Muhammad al-Sadr, but have determined that [Moqtada]
is not an appropriate leader or the proper successor to his father.141

In a number of ways, Moqtada Sadr had failed to continue his father’s practices and
ideas, becoming “more dictatorial and controlling in his approach,” the detained militant
leader said, adding that Sadr was a self-centered leader unconcerned with the welfare of
his many followers. He had seen this side of Sadr’s character firsthand while hiding Sadr
in Baghdad after the August 2004 Battle of Najaf and had “decided to part ways with
[Moqtada Sadr] strategically.”142 The militant leader also charged that Sadr had failed to
support the Najaf hawza, Shi’a religious colleges, in their competition with the Iranian
regime’s religious center in Qom, thereby creating a “strategic danger” of deep Iranian
influence over Shi’a Iraq.143
In December, coalition leaders thought Sadr appeared to be preparing for a violent
power struggle with those Sadrist militant leaders who had challenged his leadership. In
early December, Interior Minister Jawad Bolani reported to Petraeus that “mainstream
JAM members are beginning to bring in information about JAM Special Groups activity.”144 A few days later, Sadrist representatives in Baghdad told journalists that Sadr was
“happy with the results of his ceasefire and may even seek to make it permanent, while
emphasizing his organization’s social role over its armed wing.” A JAM commander in
southern Iraq added, “we listen to his orders, even if he were to decide to abolish [JAM].
He understands our interests more than ourselves.”145
As Sadr’s militant followers awaited his instructions, the Special Groups struck a serious blow against the ISF in the mid-Euphrates region on December 9 when they assassinated Babil Province police chief Qais al-Mamouri, a nationalist Shi’a officer who had
used his highly capable special weapons and tactics (SWAT) battalion against both AQI
and Shi’a militant targets for several years. A Special Groups’ cell from Sadr City orchestrated the attack, which was carried out with an array of five Iranian-provided EFPs.146
Within days, coalition special operators struck back by capturing several Special Groups
leaders who had received advanced Quds Force training in Iran. By December 23, the
coalition had detained 8 of the 16 Special Groups leaders and had begun interrogating
them to gain information that could be used in the pending trilateral talks with the Iranians and Iraqi Government.147 Four days later, coalition special operators carried out
another raid near Kut. Eleven Shi’a militants died in the firefight that followed.148
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Sadr’s apparent response to this flurry of Special Groups and special operations activity encouraged coalition leaders. The week after the Kut firefight, Petraeus reported to
Gates, “Sadr is upset with the Iranian-supported Special Groups that continue to defy his
ceasefire order. . . . He may be on the verge of authorizing their targeting by his own elements.”149 The same week, Sadrist representatives met with Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI) leaders in Nasiriyah to solidify an October cease-fire between Sadr and Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim’s ISCI, after which clerics loyal to Sadr during Friday sermons on January
4 called on his followers to “respect the ceasefire” and make peace with rival factions.150
However, on the diplomatic level, the situation was less encouraging. Any hope for
the talks faded as it became apparent the Iranians did not intend to continue them. The
talks, originally scheduled for August, had been postponed repeatedly, and after setting
dates of December 18 and then December 28, the Iranians backed out of the meetings
again with no indication they would return.151
Some Iraqi leaders believed the December 3 public release of the U.S. national intelligence estimate, which concluded that the Iranian regime had halted its nuclear weapons
program, had relieved international pressure on the Iranians, who had consequently seen
no reason to return to the negotiations in Baghdad. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari
also believed the intelligence estimate’s publication had emboldened the Iranian regime
and would lead to increased assertiveness by both the Iranians and Syrians.152 The Iranian
regime’s posture in early 2008 indicated no interest in diplomatic engagement with the
United States in Iraq, as Petraeus noted on January 13: “The tri-partite talks between the
United States, Iran, and Iraq are again on hold. No date has been negotiated, and the Iranians have spent the week criticizing President Bush’s Middle East trip.”153 The expected
next round of trilateral talks would never take place.
THE IRAQI SURGE
General Dubik at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
By fall 2007, the increasing pressure on AQI and other militants came not just from coalition troops and the Awakening, but also from a large-scale expansion of the Iraqi security
forces and an improvement in their capabilities. The dramatic expansion coincided with
a significant change in the coalition’s effort to develop Iraqi forces. Although Lieutenant
General James Dubik’s MNSTC-I was a peer headquarters to Odierno’s MNC-I, Dubik
arrived in Iraq in June 2007 with the view that the MNC-I mission should have primacy
over that of his own command. Under Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I
had followed its own campaign plan, setting priorities for resources and areas of Iraq that
were not strictly connected to MNC-I’s ongoing war against AQI and the Shi’a militant
groups. As Dubik saw it, there could be no transition to the ISF unless MNC-I could succeed in improving the overall security situation, and his command should therefore be
in a supporting role to MNC-I’s campaign plan rather than following a campaign plan of
its own.
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Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Ira B. Goldfrank (Released).

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, MNSTC-I Commander,
Greeting Iraqi Representatives From Anbar Province.154
Beginning in the summer of 2007, Dubik and MNSTC-I let MNC-I’s plan for offensive
operations drive the creation and replenishment of ISF units. By specifically targeting
those ISF units who would play a role in upcoming MNC-I operations, MNSTC-I would
work to provide the Iraqi forces required to maintain momentum in areas of Iraq where
MNC-I’s decisive operations were taking place.155 MNSTC-I would no longer focus on
transitioning to an Iraqi lead in security affairs, but would focus with MNC-I on repairing
the security situation itself.
Dubik rejected what he regarded as a “false dilemma” of quality versus quantity. A
focus on quantity would result in an ISF composed of “a whole bunch of people that were
worthless on the battlefield,” he judged, while an overemphasis on quality would result
in a campaign timeline “so long that we would not be able to contribute to the counteroffensive and achieve the effects that we knew we needed to achieve on the timeline
that General Petraeus had set for us.” Instead, Dubik focused on sufficiency: “what is
good enough to create the combat power necessary, relative to the enemy? If it was good
enough, we fielded it and we augmented ‘good enough’ with iterative quality improvements.”156 Determining what constituted sufficiency was a subjective matter and Dubik’s
perspective faced challenges created by Iraqi priorities, the bureaucratic foreign military
sales program, and Washington’s desire to reduce spending. Dubik also believed the
coalition’s separate efforts to generate tactical forces and to mentor the security ministries
needed to be combined into one effort to build an entire defense and police “enterprise,”
in which the tactical forces on Iraqi streets reflected a coherent national strategy, with
ministries that could plan and sustain a security campaign.157
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Dubik’s tenure led to a dramatic increase in the size of the Iraqi security forces. After
taking command, he commissioned several studies to determine the proper size of the ISF
for securing the country, and polled his superiors and the Ministers of Defense and Interior on the question. The figure that emerged was an ISF with an end strength between
600,000 and 650,000, very different from the 380,000, evenly split between military and
police, which MNF-I and MNSTC-I had previously set as the goal for the ISF.158
Dubik’s raising of the Iraqi forces’ end strength coincided with an “Iraqi surge” that
resulted in a net increase of more than 106,000 Iraqi soldiers and police over the course of
2007. “That is a substantial growth for any country, let alone one in the middle of a tough
war, lacking mature institutional structures, and hampered by an inefficient, marginally
capable government,” Petraeus observed on December 23, adding that “quantity has a
quality all its own in a COIN fight.”159
Under MNSTC-I’s plans, the rapid increase of 2007 would continue into 2008, when
the Iraqi Army would grow by another 41,000 men. The additional troops would enable
the Iraqis to staff their 13 existing divisions at close to Petraeus’s and Dubik’s goal of 120
percent, with some select units at 130 percent. The increase in 2008 would also allow for
the creation of 24 new battalions and 5 new brigade headquarters.160 The vast expansion
of Iraqi troops came partly from a significant increase in Iraqi training capacity. In addition to the large combat training center at Besmayah, east of Baghdad, MNSTC-I began
creating training centers for each Iraqi division, with a mix of Iraqi and coalition trainers,
including a small but important contingent from NATO.161 Between March and November 2007, 53,000 soldiers were trained at these and other locations, increasing the assigned
strength of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the Iraqi Army from 33 percent to 43 percent and that of officers from 43 percent to 57 percent. The average daily strength of the
Iraqi divisions also rose to 77 percent, a 10 percent increase since June.162 One important
change was that, under Dubik’s guidance, MNSTC-I focused not just on generating new
Iraqi units, but also on replenishing existing ones that had been much reduced through
combat and other attrition. By establishing the “second production line” of replacements
for existing units, Dubik aimed to raise the effectiveness and confidence of Iraqi units
that in some cases had been worn down by constant combat, losing much of their manpower and their tactical skills as a result. This change also enabled MNSTC-I to accelerate
toward its goal of 120 percent staffing of existing Iraqi units even as new formations were
being built.163
The Awakening helped contribute to the overall ISF expansion as well by providing Sunni recruits, mainly police, in Sunni-majority areas where ISF recruiting had been
slow and unpopular before 2007. The integration of Sunnis into the Iraqi Police allowed
MNSTC-I to reopen the Habbaniyah police academy and graduate a class of 537 in August
2007, a reversal from 2 years earlier when the academy had been closed for lack of volunteers.164 The influx of Sunnis spread to Baghdad as well, where they constituted most of
the 9,000 new police recruits in the city in January 2008.165
The new ISF troops and units were expensive, requiring an outlay of $5.7 billion by
the Iraqi Government in 2007, but even this barely kept pace with the ISF expansion. The
Ministry of Defense spent a full $1.1 billion through the U.S. foreign military sales (FMS)
program to equip its units in 2007, but the Interior Ministry spent nothing through its
own FMS accounts for the year, as it had to divert large sums of money to pay salaries for
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new police officers.166 MNSTC-I considered the Interior Ministry too inefficient to spend
FMS funds for the time being, in any case. “Our priority was the Army initially, then the
police,” Dubik recalled later. “With the police we had to get the ministry working better
and [place] the National Police on a reform agenda. Otherwise any money spent would
have been wasted.”167
This approach collided with differing priorities in the United States. As U.S. leaders
in Baghdad planned for the training and equipping of the expanded ISF in 2008, they
found themselves in a debate with officials in Washington and at U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) who favored reducing or postponing the $3 billion the United States had
planned to contribute to the Iraqi defense budget in 2008 that would be in addition to the
$8 billion the Iraqi Government was able to muster. Gates eventually decided this dispute
in MNF-I’s favor, but as violence ebbed in Iraq, U.S. agencies were beginning to question
U.S. expenditures in the country precisely when Petraeus, Odierno, and Dubik aimed
to bolster the ISF to take over territory from departing U.S. units.168 In the longer term,
the Iraqi Government’s rising oil revenue and defense expenditures would theoretically
make U.S. spending for the ISF unnecessary, but in 2007-2008, there was a funding gap
to be bridged, and the U.S. generals in Baghdad believed their Iraqi counterparts were
increasingly unwilling to bridge it, regardless of the strategic consequences.
As pressure built to equip the growing Iraqi Army, Iraqi leaders were frustrated by
the slowness of the U.S. foreign military sales system to deliver weapon systems, vehicles, and other equipment Iraqi commanders required immediately for the ongoing war
against AQI and other insurgent groups. In mid-2007, DoD took an average of 5 months
just to approve Iraqi purchase requests, with the actual delivery of equipment taking
months longer. “FMS is a peacetime mechanism and not really suited for wartime speed,”
Crocker noted to a visiting congressional delegation.169 Through considerable personal
attention to the problem inside the Pentagon, Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen were able to cut the FMS request timeline from 5 months to
2½ months, but even so, delays in awarding contracts and in production eroded Iraqi
confidence in the system. In one high-profile case, the FMS contract for new Harris radios
for the ISF stalled due to DoD’s contracting regulations. The radios, which the MNF-I
commander deemed critical to ISF capabilities, were scheduled for delivery to Iraq in
November 2007, but another vendor protested the award of the contract and initiated a
bureaucratic process that delayed delivery for more than 3 months. Over time, MNSTC-I
came to rely on FMS for less urgent equipment needs that could be programed over a
greater length of time and to use the Iraqi Security Force Fund to direct purchase items
that the ISF needed in a more timely manner.170
In addition to the bureaucratic demands of the FMS process, there were self-imposed
U.S. constraints, such as the U.S. failure to grant Iraq “dependable undertaking status,”
a category that allowed countries to pay for their equipment purchases in installments.
Leaving Iraq out of this category meant that the Iraqi security ministries were forced to
pay in full for any equipment before the U.S. Government would deliver it. At MNSTC-I,
Dubik warned that the failure to grant the Iraqi Government dependable undertaking
status was a “strategic hindrance” that encouraged the Iraqis to purchase arms from other
countries that would let them pay over time.171 In the view of Petraeus and other senior
leaders in Baghdad, the U.S. handling of the FMS problem was especially shortsighted
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because equipment was one of the two main limiting factors in building new Iraqi units,
along with the development of Iraqi military leaders.172 Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdel
Qader al-Mufreiji expressed a preference for U.S. military hardware such as the M1 tank,
which he believed would raise the prestige of the Iraqi Army and mark a break with
Soviet-era equipment. By late 2007, Mufreiji was “shopping for other weapons suppliers due to the time required for FMS deliveries,” Petraeus reported. In arms deals with
Serbia, Ukraine, and China, the Iraqis ordered 380,000 assault rifles, 110,000 pistols, and
over 27,000 machine guns. They sought secondhand helicopters and heavy mortars from
Serbia as well. While buying from these countries allowed the Iraqis to get equipment
and weapons into their hands more quickly, the result was a mix of different models
of hardware that made maintenance and logistics more difficult.173 Petraeus encouraged
Mufreiji and other Iraqi leaders to “[buy] for the long term” and build the Iraqi Army
around American-made weapons, vehicles, and aircraft rather than “[get] deflected by
apparent bargains from Central Europe.”174
One idea Dubik, Odierno, and Petraeus formulated to equip the Iraqi Army and
police with U.S. hardware was to accelerate greatly the delivery of American up-armored
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to the ISF by transferring
the vehicles as U.S. units in Iraq began to receive deliveries of mine resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) vehicles. Handing the displaced up-armored HMMWVs to Iraqi units
would be a welcome change for Iraqi troops that had generally faced the IED threat with
soft-skinned vehicles with little protection, and the transfer accordingly promised to
increase ISF units’ confidence, capability, and operational tempo.
Petraeus hoped to transfer 8,500 of the HMMWVs to the Iraqis in 2008, with the Iraqi
Government paying a nominal fee of $1,000 per vehicle. When defense officials in the
United States insisted on charging the Iraqis $11,000 per vehicle, however, the Iraqis
could only afford to buy about half the 8,500 vehicles in 2008, leaving the rest to be purchased in 2009. In ways that frustrated Petraeus and other U.S. commanders in Baghdad,
the policy change slowed the effort to increase the Iraqi troops’ mobility and survivability, and further undermined senior Iraqi leaders’ confidence in the U.S. Government’s
commitment to equip the ISF.175 It also slowed Dubik’s plans to use the unwanted U.S.
HMMWVs to give the Iraqi Army and police a coherent maintenance program in which
drivers, mechanics, and maintenance supervisors throughout the ISF could be trained on
the same standard system, with the security ministries using a common vehicle system in
their budgeting and staffing.176
Aside from the equipping of the ISF, there were problems within the Iraqi security
structure. The sectarian power struggle that had manifested itself in incidents such as the
assassination of Lieutenant General Amer Hashimi in late 2006 had partially receded by
late 2007, but assassinations still occasionally took place. In one high-profile case, the Shi’a
deputy commandant of the Iraqi military academy in Baghdad kidnapped and murdered
his own commandant, then later kidnapped but did not kill the murdered commandant’s
successor. When the deputy commandant’s role was uncovered, the Ministry of Defense
dispatched Iraqi special operations forces to detain him on September 25.177
Another problem that bore watching was Prime Minister Maliki’s attempt to exert
control over the Iraqi Army and police by proliferating regional operations commands.
Using the Baghdad Operations Command as his precedent, Maliki created other regional
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commands in Basrah, Diyala, the mid-Euphrates region, and Ninawa, and others would
follow. Initially coalition leaders welcomed the idea of regional commands that could
create unity of Iraqi effort, but their enthusiasm faded as Maliki began to use the new
headquarters to bypass the formal chain of command. Over time, coalition commanders
bristled as Maliki began issuing orders to tactical units through the politically connected
General Faruq al-Araji and the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) rather than
through the Iraqi Joint Forces Command. Coalition officials noted it was a practice resembling the operating mode of the Saddam Hussein regime and a signal that Maliki might
be creating a structure to politicize the Iraqi military as the Ba’ath Party had done. Petraeus shared these concerns but was reluctant to wrestle Maliki over control of the Iraqi
military in the midst of a difficult campaign. The MNF-I commander preferred to embed
coalition officers as advisers within the OCINC and the regional commands to keep a
watchful eye on their behavior instead.178 MNF-I would then try to undo Maliki’s consolidation of control once the crisis of the insurgency had passed.
The Jones Commission and the National Police
During the “Iraqi surge” year, the Interior Ministry remained a problem, with a significant portion of its police forces either ineffective or divided by sectarian behavior.
Partly in reaction to coalition reports about the ministry’s destructive sectarian role in late
2006, the U.S. Congress in 2007 formed an independent commission of former military
officers and senior defense and security officials led by retired Marine General James L.
Jones, the former NATO commander and future national security adviser. After months
of examination, the Jones Commission released a detailed report on the state of the ISF
on September 6, 2007, just 5 days before the Petraeus-Crocker congressional hearings.
Among its general findings, the report found that the Iraqi Army was gradually improving, but not ready to operate independently. The commission also noted several major
areas in which the Interior Ministry required urgent reforms in order to produce effective
police. Its most striking finding stated that the National Police were hopelessly sectarian
and should be disbanded:
The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its
ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be
disbanded and reorganized. . . . It should become a much smaller organization under a different
name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks.179

The Jones Commission’s recommendation to do away with the National Police, which
at that time numbered more than 30,000, received a great deal of attention in the United
States, but it was an idea with which Petraeus strongly disagreed. Speaking to his senior
advisers in Baghdad, the MNF-I commander argued that the United States already should
have learned the folly of disbanding large security organizations in Iraq. As bad as the
National Police might be, Petraeus judged, it would be better to reform it than to put tens
of thousands of armed men out of work as had been done in 2003.180
To formulate an alternative to the Jones Commission’s recommendations, Petraeus
and Dubik pressed Interior Minister Jawad Bolani to present his own plan for reforming
his ministry and the National Police, with extensive coalition input. Dubik used the Jones
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Commission report as leverage to push Bolani and other Iraqis to accept politically difficult reforms, showing that if the reforms did not come, the U.S. Government in Washington was certain to cut off funding and assistance to the Interior Ministry. This pressure
forced Bolani and the Maliki government to institute some of the coalition’s recommendations, but progress was slow and inconsistent.

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Selesnick (Released).

Jawad Bolani, Iraqi Minister of the Interior (2006-2010).181
As Dubik pressed Bolani to make these changes, Petraeus tapped Colonel H. R.
McMaster to conduct a 2-month countrywide inspection of the Interior Ministry and recommend additional ways to reform it. Going far deeper into the ministry’s operations
than the Jones Commission had done, McMaster found that corruption and sectarianism thrived inside the ministry mainly because of the political pressure that Iraq’s major
parties placed on it. The ministry and its police forces had become a battlefield among
the warring parties, a fact that the coalition’s capacity building efforts had naively failed
to recognize. The sectarian takeover of the ministry had taken place under the eyes of
hundreds of coalition advisers who had done little to stop it, McMaster noted. The worst
actors took advantage of the absence of written policies for most of the ministry’s activities, creating a gray area in which there were few explicit prohibitions against corrupt,
sectarian, and nepotistic behaviors—an underestimated factor in the legalistic Iraqi Government system. The ministry’s outdated bureaucracy created room for large-scale corruption within its vast budget that could not be easily traced. Against this backdrop, the
influence of the Badr Corps was particularly negative, because the Badr Corps officers
who had infiltrated senior ministry positions under Bayan Jabr continued to use the ministry’s troops and resources to implement a sectarian agenda.182
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McMaster also found that there already were a small cadre of reform-minded officials
inside the ministry, and if they could be insulated from political pressure, they might
have a chance to institute reforms. As Dubik also noted, McMaster discovered that Interior Minister Bolani quietly had begun to purge sectarian officials such as Bashir Nasser
al-Wandi, the infamous Engineer Ahmed, shifting some of them to powerless jobs or
firing them altogether. In addition, many Interior Ministry officers had served in the Iraqi
Army during the Iran-Iraq War and resented the ministry’s Badr Corps appointees, most
of whom had fought on the Iranian side. These officers were glad to see some of the Badr
Corps men sidelined within the ministry and quietly told McMaster so. The McMaster Report concluded that the coalition needed to make dramatic changes, exerting its
advantage over the ministry, making its security assistance conditional on appropriate
behavior, and strongly supporting the ministry’s reformers, if the Iraqi police were to be
salvaged.183
As McMaster delivered his findings, Dubik saw additional ways the coalition might
change its approach and improve the National Police, working closely with National
Police commander Lieutenant General Hussein al-Awadi as he did so. In early November,
the final National Police unit completed its “rebluing” training and returned to operations
in the Baghdad area, where the National Police no longer played as destabilizing a role
as they had done in 2006. “Rebluing” was a process where each National Police unit was
pulled from security duties and put through a 3- to 4-week program that involved vetting
its personnel and retraining in democratic policing and respect for human rights. Many of
the units were renamed, and officers were issued new digital camouflage in yet another
effort to rebrand the troubled organization. Also in early November, a newly arrived
contingent of Italian Carabinieri, operating under Dubik’s NATO element at MNSTC-I,
began retraining National Police units to operate as a paramilitary gendarme-type force,
a process that Dubik and other coalition commanders hoped would help curb the organization’s sectarian activities when deployed as reinforcements for local police.184
At the same time, General Awadi removed the commander of the notorious “Wolf
Brigade,” making him the 10th National Police brigade commander to be replaced in
2007, and meaning that all nine of the organization’s brigades had seen their commanders
replaced—one of them twice.185 That the diminutive Awadi was bold enough to fire politically well-connected sectarian commanders surprised coalition leaders. At one point in
early 2007, coalition commanders misjudged Awadi as a Shi’a sectarian responsible for
some of the National Police’s destructive behavior—and had even briefly put him on
Petraeus’s notorious “top 20 sectarian actors” list. Not until working more closely with
Awadi to institute reforms in fall 2007 did the general’s coalition partners fully realize
that he and many other senior Shi’a officers with an Iraqi Army background were nationalists who had been constrained by sectarian political pressure from 2004 onward. Once
the coalition helped provide Awadi political top cover, he had been quick to purge many
of the sectarian commanders who had caused such trouble in Baghdad in 2006.186
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PLANNING FOR DRAWDOWN
As the Iraqi security forces continued their expansion in late 2007, coalition commanders already were planning for the reduction of their own troops. The surge was a
temporary initiative, and whatever the exact numbers or timeline, MNF-I would need to
prepare for its orderly conclusion—though Petraeus and Odierno were loath to signal
publicly that the coalition troops who were pressuring AQI and the Shi’a militias would
soon begin to leave. The Joint Campaign Plan of June 2007 had assumed that the United
States would maintain 20 BCTs in Iraq only through March 2008, though with the Army’s
extension of unit deployments and individual augmentees from 12 to 15 months, the endpoint of the surge could stretch to June 2008.187
As early as June 2007, Odierno judged that conditions likely would allow for a reduction of U.S. troops beginning in December 2007, while Petraeus believed a reduction of
approximately 30,000 U.S. troops would be warranted by mid-2008.188 Together, MNF-I
and MNC-I planned for a gradual reduction of U.S. brigades beginning in December
2007, reaching the pre-surge level of 15 in July 2008. Upon reaching 15 brigades, the force
level would remain steady for a period of several months as commanders judged whether
the security progress of the surge could be sustained with a smaller force. U.S. forces in
Iraq at that point would number 137,000, higher than the pre-surge troop total due to
the addition of a division headquarters, combat aviation brigade, and a larger number of
combat support troops than before the surge.189 There were also two nonstandard brigade
headquarters that controlled almost no subordinate forces but assisted with governance
and ISF development in select areas where security had improved.
MNC-I’s concept was for U.S. forces to thin out across the country rather than disappear from any particular area in order to maintain situational awareness and to continue
the partnering of U.S. units with ISF counterparts at lower echelons. Drawing down by
30,000 troops would be a complex undertaking that depended on a variety of physical
factors and policy considerations. Some were straightforward, such as the U.S. Army
component of CENTCOM’s (U.S. Army Central [ARCENT]) capacity to process only two
and half brigades per month through Kuwait. Others were more complicated, such as
unanswered questions about which equipment should be turned over to the Iraqi security forces to enhance their capability and interoperability.190 MNC-I would also have to
plan how to administer not just the 15 BCTs but also individual battalions, provincial
reconstruction teams, combat support and combat service support units, and ISF formations to cover the country. Instead of closing bases as part of its drawdown scheme,
MNC-I would “transition parts of each base by reducing the Coalition ‘fence line’ within
the base simultaneous with conducting a partial handover to the ISF.”191
In a larger sense, the end of the surge would mean a coalition return to the concept
of transition to Iraqi control, the same process that had fallen apart in 2006. As Petraeus
described it to British Defence Secretary Desmond Browne, the coalition would move
over time from “leading to partnering to over watching” as the Iraqi forces continued to
develop.192 Unlike the premature drawdown of 2006, the coalition hoped that transition
to Iraqi control in 2008 would take place “in a deliberate fashion and . . . based on local
conditions,” according to an MNC-I operations order of December 20, 2007.193
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The MNC-I order presented two different operational concepts for transitioning
security responsibility to the Iraqis and shifting U.S. forces to an overwatch role. In the
first approach, military transition teams (MiTTs) in a given area would double or even
quadruple in size, as preserving security gains would fall on the shoulders of the ISF,
U.S. advisers, and embedded provincial reconstruction teams.194 A prime example of this
approach was in Ramadi where Colonel John Charlton’s 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, would not be backfilled after it departed Iraq in April 2008, and MNF-West would
lose two additional Marine infantry battalions elsewhere in Anbar the following month.
The second overwatch concept was one of “scalable strike packages,” in which Iraqi
units would pair with embedded coalition advisers from the Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) who would receive priority of fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and lift assets, while local conventional units would provide a
quick reaction force.195 MNC-I considered Nasiriyah the prime example after Abu Liqaa’s
specialized police unit and its supporting CJSOTF advisers suppressed a JAM attempt to
take over the city in June 2007.196 In December 2007, MNC-I directed its subordinate units
to develop scalable strike packages of their own using Iraqi special operations forces and
their CJSOTF advisers.
No matter the approach, it was difficult to mitigate the impending rapid loss of 30,000
U.S. troops. By late 2007, one of Petraeus’s biggest challenges was persuading coalition
allies to maintain or even expand their troop presence as the United States reduced its
own. Like the 2,000-strong Georgian brigade that arrived as MND-C in late summer 2007
making the nation the third-largest contributor of troops to the coalition, Petraeus sought
to convince others to increase their participation in the “Coalition of the Willing.”197 In
October, MNF-I hosted a conference of 35 partner countries in Bahrain, but it produced
no new major troop commitments.
Some countries’ commitments to MNF-I were contingent on domestic political developments. In mid-December, Kevin Rudd, Australia’s newly elected Labor Prime Minister, informed Petraeus and Crocker that he would withdraw the Australian battle group
in August 2008, though Australia would consider providing advisers to build Iraq logistics capacity after that time.198 Similarly, on November 17, the Polish Defense Minister
announced that his country would withdraw its 900-man contingent in MND-CS in 2008,
a development Petraeus believed might endanger the gains against JAM in Diwaniya and
put Camp Echo outside the city at risk.199 The Poles also sought an accelerated relief of
their responsibilities through the early transfer of Qadisiyah Province to provincial Iraqi
control (PIC), but Petraeus replied to the Polish ambassador that Qadisiyah would “PIC
when the conditions are right to do so and not when it is politically convenient for the
Polish Government.”200 The promise of logistical assistance from MNC-I for the Polish
redeployment, coupled with a reminder of the agreement between Bush and the Polish
Government, helped convince Polish leaders to maintain responsibility for MND-CS until
October 1, 2008.201 Gains with partner nations proved insufficient, and by the end of 2007,
U.S. commanders could see that within months U.S. units would have to expand farther
into southern Iraq to cover areas left open by vacating allies. A diminishing number of
U.S. troops would be required to hold more territory than ever before.
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IRAQI POLITICAL TENSIONS AND PROGRESS
The strategic purpose of the surge had been not just to defeat AQI and other major
insurgent groups, but also to create conditions in which the Iraqi political factions would
reconcile and use politics rather than violence to pursue their political goals. As the security goals of the surge appeared to come closer to fruition in summer and fall 2007, the
political goals remained elusive. Kurdish-Arab tensions simmered, with the governing
parties deeply divided over the question of Kirkuk and the future relationship between
the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government in Baghdad. The Awakening offered a political opening against the Sunni insurgency, but Maliki and other Shi’a
leaders were reluctant to partner with a movement that they considered infiltrated by
Ba’athists and sectarian enemies. The Sunni Parliamentary bloc remained outside the
government altogether, leaving most of Iraq’s Sunni electorate without representatives
in the Iraqi cabinet. The large Sadrist bloc remained in opposition to the government as
well. As these major political groupings jostled for political power in the Green Zone and
in provincial councils, their disputes often fueled violent clashes among their various
militias or security forces on the street, and they often seemed more concerned with fighting one another than fighting the worst of the terrorist groups.
A few major political disputes stood out. The fate of Saddam’s former senior deputies
became a Sunni-Shi’a political divide when Maliki and other Shi’a leaders pressed MNF-I
to allow the execution of the men sentenced to death by an Iraqi court for the 1988 chemical weapons attacks against Kurds in Halabjah. The coalition had agreed to the execution
of Ali Hassan al-Majid (also known as Chemical Ali) after Jalal Talabani and his Vice
Presidents had agreed to sign the execution warrant. A dispute arose, however, when
Maliki pressed to execute former Minister of Defense General Sultan Hashem, the Mosul
native who had signed the 1991 cease-fire agreement with General Norman Schwarzkopf,
and who had surrendered to Petraeus in Mosul in 2003. Many Iraqi Sunnis considered
Hashem blameless in the 1988 war crime and looked on him as a potential Sunni political leader. Sunni opposition to his execution was broad; as a result, President Talabani
and others had declined to sign his execution order rather than anger the Sunni political
parties with what they would consider a sectarian killing. Nevertheless, Maliki pressed
MNF-I to release Hashem from coalition detention so that the death sentence could be
carried out, something Petraeus and Crocker refused to do without the full approval of
Talabani and his Vice Presidents.202
The coalition had hoped to encourage the Sunni bloc’s return to Maliki’s government
in fall 2007, but Maliki’s ongoing dispute with Vice President Tariq Hashimi and other
senior Sunni politicians thwarted this idea. Maliki considered Hashimi a recalcitrant
sectarian linked to terrorist groups, and Hashimi had reciprocal feelings about Maliki.
Some of Maliki’s distrust of the top Sunni Parliamentary leaders seemed warranted when
coalition troops raided Sunni leader Adnan Dulaimi’s residence in the Green Zone the
following month to arrest one of his aides for murder and found Dulaimi’s bodyguards
with a car bomb at the house. “The incident has created political problems and is likely
to heighten sectarian tensions and farther increase the divide between the government of
Prime Minister Maliki and the Sunni Tawafuq alliance,” Petraeus noted dryly.203
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Source: DoD photo courtesy of Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Public Affairs (Released).

Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi Greets Major General Joseph Fil, MND-B,
Commander.204
For its part, the coalition occasionally considered Hashimi difficult to deal with as
well, and Petraeus sometimes withheld coalition airlift support for Hashimi in response
to his public criticism of the coalition and of Maliki.205 As Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha and
the Anbar Awakening grew in prominence in fall 2007, both U.S. officials and Maliki
considered giving the Awakening the power to name Sunni ministers to fill the cabinet positions Hashimi and the Sunni Parliamentary bloc had abandoned earlier in the
year. “We are going to reduce our support for Vice-President (VP) Hashimi and see how
Sheik Ahmed performs in a more high profile role for a while,” Petraeus reported in
early October. “We need to find some Sunni leaders able to bring the Sunni community along the road to reconciliation, and our early impressions are that Sheik Ahmed
may fill such a role.”206 Petraeus was reacting partially to a budding intra-Sunni power
struggle between the Awakening and Hashimi’s Iraqi Islamic Party, the latter of which
dominated the Sunni bloc in Parliament. In early 2008, 300 sheikhs in the Awakening met
in Ramadi to elect a central committee and announce they would form a political party,
called Sahawa al-Iraq. The new political challenge had the potential to create intra-Sunni
political violence. “Our message is that both parties have a right to exist, and threats or
acts of violence are unacceptable,” Petraeus noted.207
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The intense rivalry among the major parties spilled over into the coalition’s detainee
releases, as the major political leaders vied to preside over the frequent detainee release
ceremonies in order to claim credit for extricating Iraqis from coalition custody. After
Vice Presidents Tariq Hashimi and Adel Abdel Mahdi presided over release ceremonies
in October, MNF-I held one on November 8 at which Maliki presided. “Hopefully this
ceremony (larger than the one at which VP Tariq Hashimi presided) will help compensate the PM’s distress over the good will received by the Iraqi vice Presidents when they
hosted previous detainee release ceremonies,” Petraeus commented.208 Perhaps carried
away by the emotion of the event, Maliki mentioned to Odierno the following day that
he was considering declaring a general amnesty for those in detention, an ill-formed idea
that alarmed coalition leaders who knew their detention centers still held thousands of
hard-core fighters.209
The Turkey-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Crisis
Signs of political discord between Shi’a and Sunni parties in Baghdad were eclipsed
by the flaring of ethnic warfare in northern Iraq. The coalition found itself in fall 2007
with yet another conflict on its hands when the decades-long war between Turkey and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) broke out again. From its bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK had launched intermittent attacks against Turkey even before 2003, but the
conflict had slackened until several high-profile violent events occurred in 2007. On May
22, a suspected PKK suicide bomber killed eight people in Ankara, after which Turkish
leaders threatened to invade Iraqi Kurdistan to root out the PKK, and even to attack
Massoud Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whom Turkey blamed for
harboring the PKK. Barzani responded by declaring that the peshmerga would resist
any Turkish incursion. Turkish troops shelled PKK positions inside Iraq and even briefly
crossed into Iraq in “hot pursuit” of PKK fighters.210
After an October battle left dozens of Turkish soldiers and PKK fighters dead, the
Turkish Parliament authorized its military to use “every kind of measure” against the
PKK, including ground operations inside Iraq. Under threat of Turkish attack, Barzani
wrote to Petraeus, warning that he would recall Kurdish troops from Iraq to defend
the Kurdistan region if necessary.211 Since Kurdish troops were a key part of Operation
FARDH AL-QANOON and the ongoing operations in Ninawa and Salahadin, their withdrawal would put the security of those provinces and Baghdad at risk.
After further bloodshed, Petraeus and Crocker found themselves “in a difficult position with our Iraqi partners and our Turkish NATO allies,” as the general put it.212 Iraqi
leaders in Baghdad and Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, protested to U.S. counterparts that Turkey was illegally invading their country, while Turkish leaders in Ankara
protested that MNF-I had done nothing to prevent the PKK from using Iraq as a base
from which to attack Turkey. The situation worsened when Kurdish peshmerga took
several Turkish soldiers who had crossed into Iraq hostage, a crisis that Petraeus defused
by taking custody of the Turks and personally returning them to the Turkish Army on
November 3.213
The Turkish attacks had a significant political impact both in Iraqi Kurdistan and in
Baghdad. The Turkish bombing campaign angered the Kurdish public and made it difficult for Kurdish leaders to back down. It also forced Barzani to declare that Turkey’s
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actions violated Iraqi sovereignty, a surprising claim for a Kurdish separatist to make.
In Baghdad, the Kurdish parties began to indicate to Maliki and other Iraqi leaders that
if the Iraqi Government did not resist future Turkish incursions into Iraq, the Kurdish
Alliance would withdraw from the Maliki government, causing its collapse. The crisis
thus threatened to leave Iraq without a prime minister and a government—and leave
MNF-I without Iraqi Government partners—in the midst of the fragile security gains of
the surge.
Petraeus’s preferred solution to the crisis was for U.S. leaders to force Turkish representatives to negotiate with the KDP, which had fought a civil war against the PKK in
the 1990s and had no fondness for the party.214 Before diplomacy could be given a chance
to work, however, the Turks expanded their operations into a full-scale air campaign
against the PKK on December 16. Turkish military leaders, eager to signal that they had
American support, announced that the United States had opened Iraqi airspace to Turkish attack aircraft and had provided Turkey with targeting intelligence against the PKK.215
In fact, the U.S. European Command and MNF-I had indeed coordinated with the
Turkish general staff on the operation in order to restrict its potential damage, but when
the bombing actually began, Turkish leaders gave U.S. counterparts a mere 30 minutes
notice. The Turkish air strikes also extended far beyond the area MNF-I had agreed could
be struck, and angry Kurdish leaders reported to MNF-I that the first air strikes had
killed some Iraqi Kurdish civilians.216 The following day, PKK spokesmen warned, “if
colonialist powers in Kurdistan are continued to be supported, it should be known that
the Kurdish people have the power to spoil the balances in the Middle East and hurt the
interests of Western powers.”217 A letter from the PKK to Petraeus 3 days earlier had been
far more conciliatory, asking Petraeus and U.S. leaders to broker a political resolution to
the conflict, but lacking policy guidance from Washington, Petraeus did not reply.218 “It
would be most helpful if the Turks would employ some ‘constructive ambiguity’ and
at the least remain quiet about any strikes they conduct,” Petraeus wrote to Gates on
December 23. He added, “Given the minimal amount of damage we assess they have
afflicted on the PKK to date, the better solution is to pressure the Turks to stand down
altogether and refocus on a broad, politically-led strategy against the PKK.”219 For the
time being, however, the Turks and the PKK remained on a war footing, and the coalition
remained braced to deal with the political repercussions.
Political Crisis and Prime Minister Maliki
The crisis in the north came at a time when political tensions between Prime Minister
Maliki and the other parties in his government were near the breaking point. A significant factor in the infighting among the major parties was the tendency for Maliki and
his personal advisers to make decisions in a secretive, insular fashion without consulting
the other parties in the government. The Prime Minister, a deeply distrustful man who
had come of age as an exiled Da’wa Party member under constant threat from Saddam’s
intelligence apparatus, tended to interpret political events as conspiracies and viewed
the other parties in his national unity government as potential enemies rather than partners. Before the Turkish campaign against the PKK began, he had begun to take steps in
October to curb the KDP’s political dominance of Ninawa Province.220 At the same time,
an early October Sadr-Hakim truce that the coalition welcomed as a way of suppressing
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intra-Shi’a violence seemed to strike Maliki as a potential Sadrist-ISCI alliance against
Maliki and Da’wa. By late October, Petraeus noted, “unfortunately, we are beginning
to see some suspicion of ISCI and VP Adil Mahdi akin to the suspicion once reserved
for VP Hashimi.”221 For their part, the other parties complained to coalition leaders that
Maliki had cut them out of the decision-making process and had refused to abide by an
agreement among the parties to use a “3+1” arrangement, in which major policy choices
would come from consensus among the Prime Minister, President Talabani, and Iraq’s
two Vice Presidents.222
Matters started to come to a head in mid-December as ISCI and the Kurdish parties began to raise the idea that the Iraqi Parliament should vote Maliki out of office.
On December 16, the same day that Turkey launched its air campaign against the PKK
in Iraqi Kurdistan, Petraeus reported to Gates that Kurdish leaders had “presented a
long array of grievances and frustrations with the exclusive and conspiratorial Maliki
inner-circle.”223 Three days later, on December 19, several of the same leaders met with
visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Baghdad and asked for U.S. support for
a Parliamentary vote to remove Maliki as Prime Minister. Rice threw cold water on the
idea, however, and told the Iraqi leaders that they should look instead to “implementation of the 3+1 concept and true leadership of the [Iraqi Government] to capitalize on the
improvements in security that the surge has brought.”224 The matter did not end there.
On December 23, Petraeus reported to Washington that almost all of Iraq’s major political
groups continued to move toward Maliki’s ouster. The Kurdish parties were “increasingly frustrated with what its members perceived as Maliki’s ineffective leadership and
isolated decision-making” and considered withdrawing from the government. Ayatollah
Ali Husayni Sistani and other religious leaders in Najaf were “worried about their reputation being tarnished by the GOI’s ineffectiveness,” while Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi
Islamic Party were on the verge of forming an alliance.225
The political pressure took its toll on Maliki, who physically collapsed on December
29 and was evacuated to London by the coalition to seek medical treatment for exhaustion and dehydration. “At this point, we don’t have any additional evidence that planning for a putsch has progressed,” Petraeus noted on December 30, though he reported
the following week that Vice President Mahdi was traveling to Tehran seeking Iranian
support for Maliki’s ouster, while Abdul Aziz al-Hakim visited Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf
probably asking for the same.226
The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) Rollover
In actuality, coalition leaders had mixed feelings about the prospect of Maliki’s
replacement. Rice and others were wary of recreating the government vacuum of early
2006, when, for 5 months, Iraq had gone without political leadership and the government
machinery ground to a halt. U.S. officials in Baghdad also had seen worrying signs that
Maliki and his Da’wa allies were becoming authoritarian and difficult to deal with, especially on issues related to the U.S.-Iraqi security and political relationship.
When the time came in late 2007 to renew the UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) that authorized MNF-I’s presence in Iraq, U.S. officials in Baghdad found
themselves negotiating not with Iraqi ministers, but with Maliki’s Da’wa Party advisers,
who appeared to discount the U.S. military’s role in tamping down the Iraqi insurgency
292

“THE DARKNESS HAS BECOME PITCH BLACK”

and displayed an ill-informed distrust of common international legal language. Across
several weeks of negotiations, the Da’wa men started by “dredging up language from the
Amman letter of October 2006” and declaring that they expected the terms under which
MNF-I operated to be significantly restricted to reflect “the progress that has been made
over the past year.”227 As the talks proceeded, Maliki’s advisers insisted that the Iraqi
Government be given “all functions and authorities concerning detention, arrest, and
imprisonment,” which would have prevented coalition units from detaining anyone in
Iraq.228 Only after some dramatic confrontations that Petraeus described as “contentious”
did the Maliki government agree to allow the UNSCR to go forward for approval on
December 19. The UNSCR “was in question until a few hours before the vote, with Iraqi
officials rejecting language in the resolution that suggested their security forces be subjected to international law,” Petraeus reported. The general added that the resolution was
adopted only after Rice assured Maliki that the resolution’s language did not undermine
Iraqi control of its security forces. The process left U.S. officials concerned that American
plans to negotiate a strategic partnership and bilateral security agreement with the Maliki
government in 2008 could run into similar problems.229 The vast improvement in security
during the course of 2007 had not yet made relations among the Iraqi political parties or
between the United States and the Iraqi Government much easier.
***
The First Year of the Surge: General Petraeus’s Analysis
As 2007 ended, Petraeus took stock of the changed situation in Iraq since the surge had
begun almost 11 months earlier. By December 2007, the average number of violent incidents per week in Iraq dropped to less than 40 percent of the peak violence of June 2007
and was on par with the level of violence of early 2005. High-profile bombings had fallen
to less than one-third of the June 2007 peak. The number of civilian deaths had fallen to
one-sixth the peak total of November 2006, when more than 3,000 civilian deaths had been
recorded. In their internal reporting, the coalition commands estimated that over 7,400
enemy fighters had been killed in 2007, compared to about 5,000 in 2006.230 Conversely,
2007 had been the deadliest year of the war for U.S. troops, with 864 killed, compared to
770 in 2006, but losses had been dropping steadily since the summer. Twenty-two U.S.
troops had been lost in December 2007 (seven of them nonbattle deaths), the second-lowest monthly total since the beginning of the war.231 Among ISF units, 2,452 Iraqi troops
and police were killed in 2007, a slight decrease from the 2,590 killed in 2006.232 “In many
ways we spent 2007 creating a new situation—one of reduced violence—that replaced
the horrific existence most Iraqis bore for the past 12 to 18 months. Now we obviously
need to make the most of the new situation,” Petraeus noted as December ended.233
On January 6, 2008, the MNF-I commander wrote to Gates to report these figures and
to reflect on the dynamics that caused such significant improvements in the security situation. He began by writing, “the past 12 months were made possible by the courageous
decision in early December 2006 by General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad to state
that the strategy at the time was not working. This acknowledgement paved the way for
the surge—ours and the Iraqis—and for the change in strategy that made securing the
population the central tenet.”234 It was a backhanded compliment, considering that Petraeus understood Casey had not agreed that the transition plan needed to be abandoned.
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Moving to security arrangements, Petraeus noted that by living in Iraqi communities
alongside the ISF, “we not only improved security, we also fostered and supported
movements in local communities to reject AQI.” As Iraqi tribal leaders had come forward
willing to turn against AQI, coalition units had been flexible enough to exploit the opportunity that the Awakening presented. “With experienced leaders like Ray Odierno at the
helms of our units, our elements made the most of the situations that developed (validating Seneca’s observation that ‘Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity.’),” Petraeus observed. The coalition had also been able to bring local political and
economic initiatives to bear along while clearing and holding AQI sanctuaries on a large
scale. “[S]uccessful counter-terrorist/counterinsurgency operations on the scale of those
in Iraq require conventional forces [and] special forces . . . all working together and augmented by host nation forces and supportive local communities,” Petraeus wrote.235
A few other factors had contributed to the improvement in security. AQI had exhibited
“genuine tone deafness” about the Iraqi population’s disapproval of their brutal tactics
and ideology, Petraeus noted, making it easier for the coalition and the Iraqi Government
to sway public opinion against the terrorist group. The Sadrist cease-fire had been an
important development as well, though Petraeus noted that “we remain very wary of the
assistance the Quds Force continues to provide” and that MNF-I would not be “handing
out any badges for good behavior to Teheran any time soon.”236
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Looking ahead in 2008, Petraeus judged that, although coalition forces had done considerable damage to AQI, more remained to be done because the group was “far from
finished” and remained “the most serious near-term threat to Iraq.” Where the Shi’a militant groups were concerned, MNF-I would “continue to quietly target members of the
JAM Special Groups, to contribute to additional fissures in the Sadr organization, and
to cultivate the seeds of a Shi’a Awakening by increasing that community’s recognition
that Special Group extremists are the long-term threat to security and the rule of law in
Iraq.” In 2008, Petraeus and MNF-I would seek to replicate the effect of the Sunni Awakening among the Shi’a militant groups’ constituencies, based on his judgment that “the
same power of the people that made such a profound change in the Sunni communities
is present and waiting to be activated, and we have some reason to believe that the basic
sensibility of the Iraqi people will lead them to a broader rejection of bad behavior.”237
Also in 2008, Petraeus reported coalition leaders and units would aim to increase the
capacity of the Iraqi Government to try to consolidate the year’s security gains. “Given
that much of 2007’s progress was based on the Iraqi people rejecting extremism, we’ll
have to work with the GOI [Federal Government of Iraq] and use all of our available
means to help the government deliver basic services, job training, and employment to
those same people to cement the security gains we’ve made together,” he noted. For that
reason, “there will be a need in 2008 for additional aid, advisors, and capacity building
efforts in the coming year.”238
Petraeus’s report indicated the growing sense inside the coalition headquarters that
the coalition’s position was growing stronger week by week. Conversely, for AQI and its
allied insurgent groups, the situation bin Laden had described as “pitch black” darkness
in October 2007 had become even bleaker by year’s end. AQI had lost thousands more
fighters killed and captured. The Awakening had become the dominant force in former
insurgent strongholds such as the Hawijah and Arab Jabour, and the insurgency’s overall prospects looked dim. Across central and northern Iraq, AQI remained strong only in
Mosul and its environs, and coalition commanders already were planning a large-scale
offensive led by U.S. forces to drive AQI out of Mosul before the departure of the surge
brigades. However, as events transpired, it was an offensive that would never take place.
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CHAPTER 7
ENABLING THE SURGE, 2007-2008
The increase in U.S. forces’ operational tempo and effectiveness that General David
Petraeus noted in his January 2008 retrospective on the first year of the surge could not
have taken place without the addition of thousands of support forces and significant
changes in the way the United States prosecuted its campaign in Iraq. The surge in Iraq
was substantially more than just the deployment of 21,000 additional combat troops and
roughly 8,000 support troops that accompanied them. Several major supporting factors
enabled the coalition’s combat forces to conduct the security operations of the surge
campaign and to pivot into large-scale stabilization activities that helped tamp down
Iraq’s sectarian civil war. The campaign of 2007-2008 was enabled by an unusual level
of U.S. civil-military unity of effort and focus from the strategic to the tactical levels. The
fielding and maturation of a series of technological enablers and innovative practices
greatly enhanced coalition and Iraqi units’ ability to engage in close fights with enemy
groups and to survive the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that had become the most
common enemy weapon.
The coalition’s intelligence capabilities had matured as well, with thousands of intelligence professionals gaining the experience and knowledge base needed to support
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Coalition units also enjoyed access to
sophisticated intelligence resources at lower echelons than ever before, giving tactical
U.S. units an unprecedented advantage in their local operations. The idea of “money as
a weapon system” took root at all levels of the coalition’s operations, enabling both the
spread of the Awakening and the dismantling of important portions of the insurgency’s finances. Finally, the coalition was able largely to regain control of its own detention centers, though the results of its rehabilitation programs were mixed. By early 2008,
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its units were operating with new capabilities
and new ways of integrating them that gave the operations of the surge campaign a different look and feel than those that had preceded them.
GENERATING UNITY OF EFFORT
The Civil-Military Campaign Plan
Beyond additional troops, implementing the new strategy in 2007-2008 required strategic coherence, active leadership, and an uncommon degree of U.S. civil-military cooperation. President George W. Bush’s level of direct involvement in the Iraq campaign had
grown over time, as had his direct interaction with senior U.S. officials in Baghdad. By
the onset of the surge, the President had instituted regular, typically bi-weekly, meetings
of the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee on the situation in Iraq that
featured the MNF-I commander and the U.S. ambassador reporting via video teleconference from Baghdad, and often included the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander as well. Throughout the surge, Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker were
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able to offer their unfiltered updates on the situation directly to the NSC principals and
often received immediate guidance. This arrangement, which had begun when General
George Casey, Jr., was in command in Baghdad, was a significant change to the traditional procedure in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented the views
of field commanders in NSC meetings.

Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates With U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker
and General David Petraeus.1
Having the top U.S. military commander and diplomat in Iraq report to the NSC
principals as a team also enabled Petraeus and Crocker to keep their respective home
agencies’ military and diplomatic activities aligned in a way that had been impossible
to do in the early years of the war. With the support of Bush and Gates, Petraeus aimed
to ensure that MNF-I’s security operations supported the larger political goals of the
President’s New Way Forward. The Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) launched
by Petraeus and Crocker in March 2007 provided the basis for a joint embassy and force
campaign plan with a common mission statement and the political line of effort, rather
than security, as the main effort.2
Petraeus and Crocker oversaw the execution and integration of the joint civil-military
campaign plan from offices in Baghdad’s Republican Palace that were separated only
by a waiting room. The two men met daily to coordinate their activities. About every
6 weeks, they jointly chaired the Campaign Assessment and Synchronization Board, in
which senior leaders from the military commands and the U.S. Embassy teamed up to
examine each line of effort in the Joint Campaign Plan, with coalition ambassadors and
United Nations (UN) representatives usually present. Petraeus and Crocker also met
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with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki together several times a week, usually choreographing what each would say to the Iraqi leader beforehand—sometimes in a “good cop, bad
cop” approach.
Within the theater headquarters, Petraeus created or gave new emphasis to several
staff elements to execute the surge. Three, in particular, were noteworthy for their contribution to the conduct of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Headed by a
British major general and a senior State Department officer, the Force Strategic Engagement Cell met with Sunni and Shi’a insurgents in an attempt to identify “reconcilables”
and bring them into some kind of accommodation with the Iraqi Government. Petraeus
had ordered the formation of this cell after he returned to Iraq in 2007, reflecting a tenet
in his counterinsurgency guidance: “We must strive to make the reconcilables part of the
solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.”3
Next, to help sort the reconcilables from irreconcilables, the Strategic Debriefing Element
that interrogated high-level detainees took on renewed importance, enabling the command to have extensive conversations with senior detainees and, in the process, “map”
enemy networks and better gauge their motivations.
Finally, the MNF-I Information Operations (IO) Task Force provided tailored media
products as part of a psychological operations effort to influence attitudes in the Iraqi
population and encourage rejection of violent extremists. These sophisticated information operations served as an important force multiplier. Taking guidance from Petraeus,
the IO Task Force sought to “turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies,
oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.”4
The joint campaign plan also served to align and synchronize all the U.S. military
and coalition efforts in theater with the MNF-I strategic approach, as happened when
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) changed its objective
in mid-2007 to partnering with and building Iraqi security force (ISF) capacity to better
align with MNC-I, the main effort. At the same time, the shift in the theater strategy
also served to synchronize the efforts of special operations forces into the overall theater
campaign. These organizations all participated in MNF-I’s daily Battle Update Assessment, but Petraeus also gathered his senior commanders at weekly meetings in which the
commanders of Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Gulf Regional Division, the CENTCOM Joint Contracting Command, and Task Force 134
joined as well. These sessions complemented the senior commanders’ daily dialogue in
the Battle Update Assessment and were typically followed by detailed updates and planning sessions with Petraeus and key subordinate commanders.5
The Civilian Surge
Alongside the deployment of additional U.S. troops, 2007 and 2008 witnessed the
deployment of a smaller, but significant, contingent of U.S. civilians to help execute the
civil-military campaign in Iraq. However, across the U.S. Government, coordination
dilemmas, institutional cultures, and a lack of execution oversight or accountability
meant that the civilian surge lagged behind the military deployment.
An important component of Bush’s New Way Forward strategy was to increase the
number of civilians serving with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq from about
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100 civilians in early 2007 to over 450 by the end of the year.6 In addition to increasing the
size of each team, the new PRT program, renamed embedded provincial reconstruction
teams (EPRTs), added personnel that specifically focused on facilitating reconciliation
initiatives, economic development, and delivery of essential public services at district
level and below. By the end of 2008, the State Department had a total of 14 EPRTs in
Baghdad, Anbar, north Babil, and southern Diyala.7
The civilian staffing for this expansion of the PRT program was a source of friction. The
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) struggled
to provide the foreign service officers, administrative personnel, and Arabic language
interpreters to fill the new requirements.8 Diplomats who specialized in the Arab world
were already fully committed, and the resulting shortfall had to be filled by the Department of Defense (DoD) or by private-sector experts hired as temporary State Department
employees.9 By the time the second phase of the embedded PRTs came into theater, 99
of the 133 personnel on those teams were DoD military and civilians.10 Both Gates and
Army Chief of Staff General Casey believed the small number of foreign service officers
serving on the PRTs represented the State Department’s lack of commitment to the Iraq
campaign, a sentiment that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice resented.11
The missions of the EPRTs evolved over time. Although the EPRTs were conceived to
focus on sustainable, longer-term reconciliation, governance and development projects,
their priorities gradually shifted to more immediate stabilization activities that would
tamp down attacks against coalition soldiers.12 Some EPRT leaders were uncomfortable
answering directly to military commanders instead of the U.S. Embassy, though Rice
recalled that “there was never any question that the PRTs would be run by the battle
space owner,” and Crocker worked to enforce that arrangement.13 Additionally, the PRTs
and EPRTs both had to rely on U.S. military forces for sustainment and security, particularly those that were co-located with U.S. military units.
In general, shortfalls in the U.S. Government civilian ranks in Iraq in 2007 and 2008
resulted in an increase in contractors providing services ranging from security to engineering and technical support, construction, economic development, and humanitarian
assistance.14 DoD had the lion’s share, with 149,000 DoD contract personnel in Iraq and
another 30,300 elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, though some of the
latter supported operations in Afghanistan rather than Iraq. The State Department had
approximately 6,700 contractors in Iraq, of which 2,300 were U.S. citizens, and about
40 percent of the department’s total provided security. By mid-2007, USAID directly
employed another 3,500 contractors, of which about 2,900 were Iraqis, and sponsored
programs that employed another 75,000 Iraqis. The Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Treasury employed about 500
additional contractors among them.15 Throughout the surge, the number of U.S.-employed contractors in Iraq exceeded the strength of U.S. military forces in the country,
demonstrating the degree to which MNF-I’s operations depended on civilian manpower
and support.
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ENABLING THE CLOSE FIGHT
Improved Coordination With Special Operations Forces
One of the central components of Petraeus’s strategy was to use special operations
forces (SOF) to strike at the generators of sectarian violence—namely al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) and Shi’a militias—to help buy time and space for the political process to develop.
By 2007, a combination of internal developments and improved relationships with conventional forces had enabled special operations forces to fulfill their assigned mission
to a degree that had not been possible previously. Better intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, as well as revised tactics that sped up the organization’s targeting
cycle, led the number of monthly raids conducted in Iraq to jump from 18 in August
2004 to 300 in August 2006.16 The withering series of nightly attacks stunned its sectarian
opponents, putting them into a reactive mode that helped tactical commanders regain the
initiative on the battlefield as well as operational leaders to advance the political process
in Baghdad.
Yet the commandos’ crushing pace could not have been implemented without dramatically improved relations with the Army and Marine forces responsible for battle
space across Iraq. While some coordination challenges remained, by and large, relations
between the two elements had improved considerably from 2005 to 2006—which itself
was a period of marked improvement from the beginning of the war. Many leaders
on both sides benefitted from trust established across multiple deployments to Iraq or
Afghanistan, where the two elements learned how to best partner for synergistic effects.
Officers who had been battalion commanders in 2003 and 2004 had returned in 2006 and
2007 as brigade staff officers and commanders, with similar increases in responsibility
for more junior officers. Reflecting on that period, one special operations task force commander conceded, “We really didn’t mesh completely with the conventional war effort
[in Iraq] until 2006 [and] 2007.”17 By 2007, the effects of SOF’s pace of intelligence-driven
raids against high-value targets and the presence of conventional units often were mutually reinforcing, improving security while accruing additional intelligence to keep the
enemy off-balance. A symbiotic relationship had developed in most locations where
each element provided its strengths, compensating for the other force’s weaknesses.
Conventional units provided quick reaction forces, logistics support, evacuation, and an
understanding of the local battlefield, while SOF provided intelligence, precision strike
capabilities, flexibility, and speed. In particular, when special operations elements shared
their in-theater document exploitation capabilities and technical capabilities, conventional forces benefited greatly.
Despite the progress, problems remained. There were still examples in 2007 of poorly
coordinated SOF raids that produced collateral damage that set back conventional units’
counterinsurgency efforts. In addition, there were problems coordinating priorities
between rotating SOF elements that caused a lack of continuity and difficulties synchronizing the SOF effort with MNC-I’s priorities. While overall conventional-SOF coordination was indeed getting better, there was still room for improvement.18
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The Counter-IED Effort and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
From the outset of the surge, Gates placed heavy emphasis on efforts to counter the
insurgents’ use of IEDs, the weapon that caused a majority of coalition casualties. By
late 2006, there were over 1,200 attacks and attempted attacks per week and an average
of over 50 IED explosions every day, despite more than 3 years of work by the U.S. military on countermeasures.19 IEDs had been the insurgents’ weapon of choice because of
their simple construction, the ready availability of the materials to make them, and their
effectiveness against coalition forces’ superior military systems and vehicles.20 In June
2003, Commander of CENTCOM General John Abizaid had declared the IED to be his
“No. 1 threat.” Almost 3 years later, in March 2006, Bush announced that defeating the
IED threat was a top priority.21 From 2005 until the spring of 2008, IEDs were responsible
for well over half of U.S. fatalities in Iraq, and the IED challenge seized media and public
attention.
In 2007, counter-IED efforts matured to such a degree, when complemented by the
rapid fielding of vehicles with more effective armor protection, that they constituted an
essential enabler for the surge of forces. What began as an ad-hoc 12-member Army counter-IED task force in 2003 evolved by 2006 into the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), a large DoD sub-agency whose mission was to “defeat
the device, attack the network, [and] train the force” by disseminating effective counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures to units in the field.22 By 2007, JIEDDO had a
staff of 3,100 and an annual budget of over $4 billion. Under retired Army General Montgomery Meigs, JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations pursued an approach dubbed
“left of boom” that, consistent with the U.S. Army’s preference for initiative and offensive
action, focused on attacking the networks of bomb builders and facilitators in order to
find IEDs and prevent them from exploding.23
While JIEDDO’s early years involved many of the growing pains experienced by
newly formed government organizations, by the surge period, the group was having an
operational level effect. Between January 2007 and June 2009, from the time the surge
was announced to the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq’s cities, JIEDDO launched
29 different initiatives to counter IEDs, often pushing technical assets down to the brigade level or below in order to enable ground commanders in the tactical fight.24 Technical advances in IED forensics were some of the most effective initiatives, linking those
responsible for the deadly weapons to their progeny with enough confidence to be able
to arrest and detain the builders in addition to the triggermen. During the surge, the
original IED forensics cell, the Combined Explosives Cell (CEXC), grew into multiple
cells that served as crime scene investigation-type teams for the counter-IED fight. CEXC
teams consisted of intelligence, law enforcement, and explosives experts, as well as electrical engineers, information technology experts, and intelligence analysts who investigated IED incidents and surveyed post-blast sites for fingerprints, telltale signs of specific
bomb makers, and unique aspects of how devices were employed. The counter-IED effort
also brought new emphasis on Shi’a militants sponsored by the Iranian regime. JIEDDO
funded additional personnel in Iraq from the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism, to provide advanced analysis and actionable
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intelligence about Iranian-sponsored militant groups employing IEDs that contained
EFPs.
An important part of JIEDDO’s operations was the Counter-IED Operations and
Integration Center (COIC), which reached full capability in 2007 as a supporting element to General Raymond T. Odierno’s III Corps headquarters after the corps assumed
duties as MNC-I. The COIC provided essential intelligence for attacking networks of IED
makers, trainers, and financiers and maintaining awareness of IED developments worldwide. Under its director, Colonel James B. Hickey, the COIC generated unique analyses
of attack trends and helped shed important light on the operational posture and intentions of the coalition’s enemies. The COIC played a major role in 2007-2008 by helping
Odierno and an adaptive MNC-I make tough choices about how to employ forces and
their relationship to key terrain and a thinking enemy. Even so, when XVIII Airborne
Corps headquarters assumed the MNC-I mission from III Corps in early 2008, the COIC
was dissolved and its functions migrated to other MNC-I staff sections or to JIEDDO.
The integration of U.S. and multinational counter-IED capabilities fell to Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF) TROY. Initially established in 2005, Task Force TROY was staffed
by joint service explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and a diverse group of
subject matter experts, including some from the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia,
who brought a depth of EOD and electronic warfare expertise to the task. With teams in
direct support of multinational divisions and combat brigades, CJTF TROY conducted
weapons technical intelligence collection and exploitation to defeat IED networks. It also
disseminated actionable intelligence and kept coalition and Iraqi units informed about
new counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures.25
Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) represented another
counter-IED innovation during the surge. In 2006, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General
Richard Cody, who had overseen the creation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization, saw
a critical requirement to “win back the roads” from IEDs and help improve the coalition
and Iraqi units’ freedom of movement.26 The result was the creation of Task Force (TF)
ODIN, an aviation battalion equipped and outfitted to “improve the detection of roadside
bombs before they explode[d], and to strike more adversaries safely, from a distance.”27
The TF ODIN battalion consisted of three companies, each with different platforms and
equipment to detect and destroy IEDs before coalition troops encountered them. These
included C-12 Cessnas refitted for aerial reconnaissance and real-time imagery transmission, the Warrior Alpha and Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the Constant Hawk forensic back-tracking system capable of detecting the point of origin for IED
attacks.28 After fielding at Fort Hood, TX, Task Force ODIN deployed to Camp Speicher
near Tikrit in July 2007 to support of commanders at the brigade level and below.
The Push for MRAPs
Decreasing the vulnerability of the armored vehicles used by the coalition proved
one of the most difficult challenges to the counter-IED effort. Through 2007, the United
States and its allies relied heavily upon High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) for daily operations, but its basic chassis and frame offered limited ability
to improve protection against IEDs. As the basic vehicle had been retrofitted as much
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as possible with armored shields, improved doors, and better floor armor, any further
improvements in protection would require the fielding of an entirely new vehicle. Soon
after Gates became the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), he reviewed the programs that
aimed to replace the HMMWV and was shocked by what he felt was a lack of progress.
After Gates ordered the process accelerated, the search quickly settled on the MRAP vehicle as the best alternative. MRAPs were armored trucks based on South African vehicles
used in conflicts in Angola and Rhodesia that had a V-shaped hull designed to channel
the blast from land mines or IEDs away from the crew compartment.

Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Paul Tuttle (Released).

An MRAP Vehicle Arrives in Kuwait.29
Gates believed the program to replace the HMMWV with a more survivable vehicle
had languished in the Pentagon from 2004-2006 primarily due to what he called “next
war-it is,” a focus on preparing for hypothetical future wars rather than winning the current war in Iraq.30 To a degree, this resistance was a legacy of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reform Act in which the uniformed services focused on organizing, training, and
equipping forces for future conflicts while regional combatant commanders had responsibility for conducting contingency operations. That divergence in purpose gave the service headquarters’ bureaucracies little incentive to modify their programs for current
operations. To complicate matters further, the framers of Goldwater-Nichols had envisioned that future demands on the force would consist of discrete, short-duration contingencies, rather than the extended conflict of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Faced with
limited budgets, the institutional Army and Marines experienced considerable tension
between the demand to field a vehicle such as the MRAP—which might only be useful
for the conflict in Iraq—and developing future combat systems that might be needed to
fight a peer competitor. The procurement and sustainment costs made funding both priorities impossible, even with the supplemental appropriations received from Congress.
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Indeed, the Army’s program to field a new reconnaissance helicopter, the Comanche, had
already collapsed under the weight of budgetary pressures, and by 2009, the Army’s new
armored vehicle program would also be canceled. Prior to the surge, this tension between
current and future needs had been lessened somewhat by CJTF-7 and MNF-I’s campaign
plans, which set concrete, even if shifting, dates for troop withdrawals and a transition
of security to Iraqi authorities. Bush’s decision to surge forces to Iraq and his demand
that the war had to be won effectively resolved the tension in favor of developing a new
vehicle capable of surviving IEDs and ambushes in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Fielding MRAPs in Iraq quickly became a priority for both Gates and Petraeus because
they provided a compounding effect on the battlefield. In addition to being much more
effective against the IED threat than other combat vehicles, once fielded in Iraq the
MRAPs would free up thousands of HMMWVs that MNF-I could transfer to the Iraqi
security forces to replace the ISF’s ubiquitous light-skinned commercial pickup trucks.31
Coalition and Iraqi commanders alike believed the introduction of armored HMMWVs
to the ISF would improve Iraqi troops’ survivability, freedom of movement, and willingness to patrol.
Once MRAPs began to arrive in Iraq, the advantage of the level of protection they provided became evident quickly. In January 2008, Petraeus notified Gates that “10 MRAPs
have been struck by IEDs to date and every soldier has walked away” with only minor
injuries.32 The MRAP was not invincible: on April 12, 2008, the first U.S. Soldier was
killed in an MRAP when an EFP pierced his vehicle in Baghdad.33 Nevertheless, although
EFP attacks increased by 40 percent between February and April 2008, deaths from IEDs
decreased by 17 percent over the same period. When the first MRAPs arrived in Iraq
in 2007, 60 percent of all U.S. casualties were a result of IEDs, but this rate plummeted
to 5 percent by the end of 2008, when 10,000 of the vehicles had been fielded.34 Several
U.S. Government studies estimated the impact MRAPs would have had in Iraq had they
been fielded when the Defense Department first received an urgent needs request from
CENTCOM and MNF-I in February 2005. At the lowest end, these studies estimated that
speeding the fielding of MRAPs by 2 years likely would have reduced U.S. casualties by
50 percent. Other estimates ranged as high as an 80 percent reduction in casualties.35
The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Surge
In addition to MRAPs, Gates also played a decisive role in deploying additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to Iraq during the surge. Writing in Foreign
Affairs in 2009, Gates noted that it had been “necessary to go outside the normal bureaucratic process” to counter-IEDs, build MRAPs, and quickly expand ISR capability.36 By
April 2008, Gates had doubled the ISR capacity in the Iraq theater of operations, but
expressed his frustration that “our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime
to provide resources needed now on the battlefield.” Accordingly, Gates created a new
ISR task force to focus on getting additional ISR support to deployed forces and exploring “more innovation and bold new ways” to assist the war fighter.37 These included
small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), blimps and aerostats, Predators, and Task Force
ODIN’s C-12 aircraft. A program supplied by the National Security Agency (NSA) also
helped by speeding up the processing of the information collected by the additional ISR
platforms arriving in Iraq.38
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Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Jason Sweeney (Released).

Contractors Load Hellfire Missiles onto an MQ-1C Gray Eagle in Iraq.39
During 2003-2004, the operational commands in Iraq could count on at most two UAV
systems to meet all of their full-motion video (FMV) requirements, and most divisions
and brigade combat teams (BCTs) had no capability at all. By 2007-2008, MNC-I had
daily support from at least 12 FMV systems and was pushing them to the lowest possible
echelon. This increase in ISR capability was most apparent at the BCT level. The BCTs
of 2003 had little ISR or analytical capability of their own, but by 2007-2008, BCTs had
three times the analytic capability and twice the human intelligence capability of a 2003
brigade combat team. Additionally, each BCT had an organic tactical UAV platoon that
could provide 18 hours of full-motion video surveillance coverage a day, and BCTs could
often count on additional FMV support from corps’ assets allocated to support division
operations. The U.S. brigades of 2007-2008 also had much greater bandwidth to handle
internal communications needs and to link to higher echelon intelligence organizations.40
The decentralization of ISR assets and the increased connectivity among brigades, battalions, and companies enhanced commanders’ agility while giving corps and higher
echelons immediate visibility and support. As Petraeus reported to Gates, by 2007 these
factors enabled Army BCTs to execute missions once solely reserved for SOF, including operations against high-value enemy targets. More robust ISR and other intelligence
enablers pushed down to lower echelons also provided new support to nontraditional
missions such as reconciliation, key leader engagements, border security, ISF development, and detainee release decisions. The units who were carrying out these tasks were
among the largest consumers of intelligence information during the surge.41
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Biometrics and Population Control
Like ISR, the fielding of biometric scanning capability to tactical units proved to be a
valuable technological enabler for the coalition. In a campaign in which the enemy hid
among the population, coalition units found the Iraqi insurgents’ anonymity a constant
challenge. The basic task of identifying Iraqis was often a murky proposition. Iraqi personal identification documents were easily forged, while the coalition’s sporadic attempts
to track the Iraqi population by conducting censuses had sectarian and political implications that made the surveys difficult to perform.42 Census figures potentially affected the
major political parties’ claims to particular neighborhoods and could even jeopardize
the parties’ shares of oil revenues. To identify persons of interest better, MNC-I fielded
biometric scanners as the surge began that were portable and simple enough for Soldiers
to use on the streets. These biometric tools allowed U.S. forces to scan fingerprints and
irises during routine operations and then gradually build a personal identification database.43 Eventually, the coalition had the means to trace fingerprints found on IEDs and
match them to biometric data gathered elsewhere, an effect that was compounded when
JIEDDO was able to field remotely operated robots to defuse IEDs and at the same time
collect biometric data, rather than having the data disappear upon detonation.44 By the
end of the surge, the coalition had matched over 1,700 sets of fingerprints to those who
had placed the IED.45 The use of biometrics had a palpable effect at the tactical level,
where some U.S. officers noted that once enemy fighters lost their anonymity, they were
quick to flee for fear of capture.46

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Robert DeDeaux (Released).

U.S. Troops Scan an Iraqi With Handheld Biometric Equipment.47
Tracking Iraqi identity also extended to the ISF and Awakening. As the coalition began
to field M16 rifles to the Iraq military and police in 2007, each weapon was individually
tagged to its Iraqi recipient’s fingerprint and iris scan.48 Similarly, the coalition collected
biometric data for all concerned local citizens (CLCs), a policy which discouraged those
irregular forces from returning to the insurgency. Additionally, as Prime Minister Maliki
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became concerned toward the end of the surge about the size and potential influence of
the CLCs, Petraeus and Odierno tried to mitigate these concerns by showing that rather
than constituting a “hidden army” as Maliki feared, the CLCs were identifiable and controllable because their biometric data had been cataloged.49
The cataloging of Sunni irregulars was a tool that cut two ways. The gathering of the
members’ biometric data helped the coalition ensure their good behavior, and knowledge that the database existed helped allay Maliki’s concerns about the Awakening in
2007-2008. As U.S. forces began withdrawing from Iraq later in the war, the data would
also make it possible for Maliki government officials to track and purge some of the very
people who had been most responsible for tamping down the Sunni insurgency.
THE INTELLIGENCE WAR
Innovations among operational and tactical commanders from 2005 to 2007, who
learned on the job how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, were equally matched
by Army and Marine intelligence personnel who made creative adaptations to doctrine
and policies in order to improve their contributions to the war effort. Specifically, organizations and leaders who had spent most of their professional lives training to fight
massed armored formations of peer competitors retooled themselves to provide better
understanding of the social fissures and political struggles that caused intercommunal
violence and fueled Iraq’s insurgent groups. By 2007, coalition intelligence leaders and
analysts at all levels had begun to accumulate the experience and knowledge needed to
understand the motivations and relationships among Iraq’s various personalities, groups,
and tribes. Four years into the war, the coalition could draw on a large pool of civilians,
military service members, and contractors who had served in intelligence roles ranging
from the tactical to strategic levels. These professionals were far better equipped than
they had been in 2003-2004 to support the full range of missions and tasks demanded by
a counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign that varied from combat operations to
political-economic issues and security force development.50
As coalition intelligence leaders sought to optimize their organizational structure and
resources, one approach that proved effective was the assignment of intelligence liaison
officers (LNOs) to counterpart organizations. The range of entities that received intelligence LNOs included the Kurdistan Regional Government; Iraqi National Intelligence
Service (INIS); Iraqi Operational Centers (National Operations Center, and Baghdad
Operations Command); Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE); Multi-National
Division-Central South (MND-CS), and even some military transition teams (MiTTs)
operating with ISF. MNSTC-I also assisted in the development of Iraqi intelligence capabilities within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, while helping to coordinate the activities of the INIS and the Iraqi National Security Adviser.51
At the tactical level, recommendations made in early 2005 to push intelligence capabilities to division and below bore fruit in 2007. Until that time, the corps and division
analysis and control elements were the main hubs of coalition intelligence, in keeping
with the Army’s traditional doctrinal perspective and reflective of the fact that the signal
intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human intelligence capabilities and tools needed
for targeting networked insurgent or terrorist organizations simply were not widely
available before late 2006. Without those capabilities at division and brigade levels, it
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was difficult to develop targets and pursue the enemy across different coalition units’
areas of operation, particularly because coalition unit boundaries did not match those of
enemy networks.52 But as the coalition commands began to distribute integrated intelligence capabilities more broadly across the force, intelligence cells were able to develop
and share good targeting sets across unit boundaries, resulting in more constant pressure on enemy groups.53 Even before the surge, the Army had recognized the need for
dedicated military intelligence personnel at the lowest tactical level to support the coalition campaign’s focus on enemy networks and population security. Tactical intelligence
leaders often created ad hoc intelligence support teams to bring biometric, analytical,
communications, mapping, and document exploitation systems to company and even
platoon-level operations. By the time of the surge, these arrangements had become more
formal. The BCTs of 2007 and later received national intelligence assets and capabilities to
support tactical operations, and often even had national agency personnel such as cryptologists embedded at the brigade level, with connectivity back to their home agencies
enabling them to bring intelligence directly to frontline units.54
These changes represented a significant shift for the U.S. intelligence community,
especially the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Iraq Study Group (ISG) reported
in December 2006 that DIA had fewer than 10 analysts with more than 2 years of experience in studying the Iraqi insurgency and concluded that the U.S. intelligence community
should implement “a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the
insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand
it on a national and provincial level.”55 DIA’s official response “clarified” that instead of
10 DIA analysts who had studied the Iraq insurgency for more than 2 years, the number
was closer to 20. In conjunction with the President’s New Way Forward, the ISG report
served as a wake-up call that led DIA and other national agencies to change their posture
in Iraq.
In early 2007, DIA Director Lieutenant General Michael Maples began committing
additional DIA resources and personnel to Iraq, resulting in higher numbers of intelligence operators and analysts forward deployed at lower echelons. Under Maples’s
direction, DIA established a large forward presence of analytical support in Iraq, while
nearly tripling the size of its Pentagon-based Iraq task force to provide enhanced reachback support and to build a cadre of experienced analysts who could rotate into the theater. Other agencies such as National Geospatial Agency, National Ground Intelligence
Center, and the NSA followed suit. As an important enabler, DIA coordinated a unified
intelligence operation over multiple time zones, managing the flow of personnel, support
requirements, and work among Iraq, CENTCOM, and the national level agencies.56As
these national agencies became integrated into collection and analytical structures in
Iraq, they facilitated greatly increased “reach forward” and “reach back” capabilities,
integrating the Iraq campaign into the national intelligence structure in a way it had not
been before.
MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM
Petraeus’s campaign guidance to the force prominently featured the concept of money
as an important enabler for commanders on the ground. “Money can be ‘ammunition’
as the security situation improves,” he noted, adding that commanders should “use a
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targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each ‘round’ expended and to
ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s
overall objectives.”57 MNF-I and its units benefited from a number of important financial
initiatives during the surge.
The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
Before the surge, more than 90 percent of U.S. funds intended for Iraq’s reconstruction
had already been obligated, meaning that commanders had decided on what reconstruction projects to fund, and contracts had been awarded to complete those projects. As a
result, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) took on greater importance for U.S. military units’ local stabilization and reconstruction projects.58 Initially
funded from the seized assets of Saddam Hussein’s regime, CERP shifted to congressional funding over time.59 By summer 2006, over $2.8 billion in U.S. Government funds
were spent through CERP on a broad range of items, such as damage compensation,
condolence payments for loss of life, medical expenses, infrastructure improvements,
and local employment.60 As U.S. funding to
rebuild Iraq dwindled, CERP funds filled
the gap, evolving from small-scale disbursement into sometimes massive reconstruction projects. The money dispersed by CERP
ranged from $25 to replace a window to $33
million for a hotel, office, and retail complex
at Baghdad International Airport.61 In fiscal
year 2007, U.S. units spent $915 million in
CERP. “Every one of my commanders will
tell you of the incredible vale that funding
provided in their battlespace,” Petraeus
reported to Gates in January 2008.62 CERP
was also the vehicle that allowed the coalition to pay monthly stipends for the CLCs
while coalition leaders tried, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to persuade the Maliki government to absorb them into the Iraqi security forces or other government jobs.63 The
U.S. Government spent approximately $300
million funding the CLCs through 2008,
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Natalie Loucks
an amount that Petraeus believed paid for
(Released).
itself in fewer American troops killed or
wounded, fewer lost or damaged vehicles,
Soldiers Talk to a Contractor and Local
and more secure communities.64
Even so, CERP received sharp criticism Villagers at a Windmill-Powered Ground
Water Pump Reconstruction Project.65
from some important quarters. U.S. Government development experts pointed out
that, in some cases, short-term CERP projects undermined longer-term economic goals
or skewed local economies. In addition, critics noted as CERP-funded projects became
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more costly and lengthy, problems with corruption and accountability also increased.66
Some military leaders believed CERP exacerbated intercommunal strife by creating a
new source of competition and corruption. In some cases, projects were funded but never
completed, leaving only shells of buildings or utilities infrastructure. Reports occasionally surfaced of U.S. military members misusing CERP funds, or of CERP funds making
their way to Iraqi insurgents. These were difficult developments for the U.S. Congress to
overlook as the Iraqi Government’s own revenues grew to surpass $60 billion.67
Yet, while CERP had many long-term challenges, there was little doubt that in the
short term it helped tamp down violence, as unemployed Iraqis queued up to work on
projects as simple as picking up garbage, which helped remove hiding places for IEDs, or
laying gravel to make newly established combat outposts more livable. As congressional
reluctance to continue funding CERP in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
began to develop, Petraeus expressed concern that its absence could hinder the projected
U.S. military drawdown.68 Worried that CERP would dry up while it was still relied on
heavily in the field, Petraeus advised Gates that “we have often talked about the value
of CERP in cementing the gains won through hard kinetic fighting. One of our battalion
commanders said recently that ‘if money is ammunition, then we are ‘black’ on ammunition’.”69 Congress eventually made provisions to keep CERP funds going through
July 2008, but in light of the U.S. Government’s waning interest in spending money in
Iraq, Petraeus encouraged the Iraqi Government to supplement CERP and to establish
a matching Iraqi-funded “I-CERP” using the same U.S. procurement and disbursement
policies already in existence.70
The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
Along similar lines, DoD established the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) under Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Paul Brinkley in 2006. Brinkley was a former Silicon Valley executive and proponent of establishing a free market
system in Iraq. Much like CERP, DoD envisioned TFBSO as a tool for economic growth
that could improve Iraq’s harsh economic conditions and create jobs for young Iraqis
who might otherwise turn to militancy.71 In the post-World War II era, most of the U.S.
Government’s major economic reconstruction programs in foreign countries were not
orchestrated by DoD, but Brinkley argued that DoD’s involvement in the Iraqi economy
was necessary because economic improvements went hand-in-hand with improved security.72 In Brinkley’s view, DoD was best suited to handle the economic side of Iraqi reconstruction because the lives of American Soldiers were at risk if security did not improve,
and because DoD was the largest industrial enterprise in the world.73
Brinkley encouraged private investment in Iraq by inviting American and other foreign industrialists to tour Iraq with U.S. military escorts and survey economic opportunities in the country.74 Brinkley focused on revitalizing Iraq’s state-owned enterprises that
had employed an estimated 200,000 Iraqis before 2003.75 Rather than attempt a “shock
therapy” model of quickly privatizing former state-owned businesses—an approach the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had advocated in 2003—Brinkley implemented
a gradual privatization process so that the effects of reopening Iraqi companies might
improve security in the long term.76 TFBSO received approximately $103 million dollars
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to revitalize state-owned enterprises in Iraq between 2007 and 2008 and finalized its first
private investment deal in January 2008, working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to
privatize three state-owned Iraqi cement factories valued at $3 billion and capable of creating 5,000 jobs.77 Although most investors in the cement plants were foreigners, TFBSO
required all state-owned enterprise investments to include at least one Iraqi so that a business leadership base could be developed within Iraq.78 By late 2009, TFBSO reportedly
had helped restart more than 60 Iraqi factories, creating approximately 250,000 jobs.79
The Energy Fusion Cell and Task Force Hydra
Iraq’s energy sector was problematic for the Iraqi Government and the coalition campaign in two major ways. The Iraqi Government relied on oil production for more than
90 percent of its revenues, but the country’s oil production infrastructure suffered from
chronic mismanagement and security threats. At the same time, the Iraqi population
relied on free state-provided electricity, but the supply constantly suffered from infrastructure and security problems. To help alleviate these problems, MNF-I established an
Energy Fusion Cell to “synchronize efforts of different ministries to provide energy to
the people of Iraq and facilitate the export of oil.”80 Under the direction of British Brigadier Carew Wilks, the Energy Fusion Cell brought together representatives from the
United States and pertinent ministries of the Iraqi Government to overcome departmental infighting and offer solutions to energy problems, such as increasing Iraq’s oil exports
to generate higher revenues needed to stabilize the state. It was also Wilks’s job to help
coordinate the various ministries of the Iraqi Government as they quarreled over energy
priorities. On one hand, the priority of Prime Minister Maliki and Minister of Oil Hussein al-Shahristani was to generate government revenues by exporting as much oil as
possible, not holding it back for domestic use.81 On the other hand, popular demand for
electricity was mounting while oil-fired generator plants throughout Iraq sat idle and
produced only one-third of the country’s peak demand.82 Much of the oil used to fuel the
generators was imported from Kuwait, while more than 10 percent of Iraq’s electricity
was imported from Iran.83
In addition, there was significant disparity in access to the limited electricity the Iraqi
Government grid produced. In 2008, the Energy Fusion Cell had to respond to the problem of outlying provinces (some of which had been starved of resources by Saddam)
shutting down transmission lines to Baghdad in order to keep the electricity supply in
their own areas rather than sharing it with the capital. Some provinces received an average of 23 hours of government-supplied electricity a day, while Baghdad often received
fewer than 12 hours.84 During the surge campaign, Iraqi public demand for electricity
only increased, constantly outstripping supply as Iraqis who felt more secure began purchasing additional electrical appliances.85 The constant gap between demand and government supply bred resentment among a population accustomed to state-subsidized
electricity.
A different coalition organization dealt with the other major problem plaguing Iraq’s
energy sector: corruption. Corruption was widespread in Iraqi society, with many Iraqis
considering a certain amount of bribery and kickbacks simply as the cost of doing business. When international sanctions cut off much of the country’s oil revenues, corruption
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became even worse. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, corruption not only threatened
to undermine economic recovery and development goals but also, in some cases, funded
the insurgency, leading Maliki to declare corruption Iraq’s “second insurgency.”86 Corruption in Iraq’s oil sector, based on the scale of the money involved, was the major cause
of concern.
Before 2006, coalition officials had had trouble defining the problem and accepting
the cultural differences associated with it. Often, MNC-I categorized the issue as one of
supply and demand of fuel. In the months after the end of major combat operations and
the fall of Baghdad in 2003, fuel demand surged, and by late 2005 much of the refined fuel
used in Iraq, approximately 40 percent, was being imported from Turkey. After Iraq’s
State Oil Ministry Office took control of domestic oil refinery operations in late 2004, the
coalition lost control of the process, leading to a lack of oversight and rampant corruption. By early 2006, MND-N concluded that corruption at the sprawling Bayji Oil Refinery, itself responsible for a third of Iraq’s output, had been financing insurgent activities
since the start of the war. To combat this, in late 2007, MNF-I formed a small interagency
group named Task Force Hydra, with representatives from the Department of State,
Department of Treasury, and CENTCOM focused on AQI’s involvement in the flow of
black market oil revenues from the refinery. Ultimately, Task Force Hydra uncovered a
vast network of smuggling and extortion, about half of whose profits apparently went to
AQI.87

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Bayji Oil Refinery in June 2007.88
Task Force Hydra pieced together a 5-year history of illicit activity at the Bayji refinery. The technocrats at the refinery, who had run the facility during Saddam’s rule, had
few local ties and continued operations regardless of the warfare that raged across the
countryside. They made little protest as insurgents skimmed oil, refined product, and
cash from the refinery’s activities. Local tribes were also involved in the rampant corruption, with three tribes controlling much of the distribution and sale of refined gasoline
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and other by-products such as kerosene. Not to be left out, the Kurds to the north had a
strong financial interest in the continued flow of Kurdish crude oil to the refinery, especially from the nearby Kirkuk oil fields. While any of these actors could have shut down
Bayji by pulling out of the illicit arrangement, it was in the best interest of all parties to
maintain the status quo.89 As Task Force Hydra unraveled the intricacies of corruption at
Bayji, it concluded that nearly 70 percent of its $2 billion in fuel production in 2007 and
at least a third of profits in 2008 were transferred to the black market. Estimates deemed
that between $50 and $100,000 a day were being funneled from the refinery to AQI.90
Uncovering these illicit links helped Task Force Hydra solve the mystery of the timing of
recurring attacks on the crude oil lines running from Kirkuk to Bayji: insurgents apparently worked in concert with tribal sheiks to systematically attack certain portions of the
8-inch product line to control the output at Bayji. Task Force Hydra determined that the
timing of these attacks was linked to a price fixing scheme rather than to outright insurgent activity.91
Revelations like these enabled coalition and Iraqi forces to plan sophisticated operations to take out critical nodes in the illicit northern oil enterprise from 2008 onward,
seriously damaging one of AQI’s important funding streams. As the task force was successful at diagnosing corruption at the Bayji refinery, the unit was not intended to redress
the overall corruption problem in Iraq and its link to the insurgency. Therefore, in spring
2008, MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy established the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), a joint
venture of the Department of Treasury, law enforcement agencies, and CENTCOM to
conduct financial intelligence analysis of insurgent and terrorist elements in Iraq. The
ITFC’s analysis of insurgent and terrorist finances, both inside and outside Iraq, became
an important generator of targets against AQI and other groups as the kinetic aspect of
the surge campaign began to wind down in 2008.
DETENTION AND RULE OF LAW
Overcrowding and Other Detention Facilities Problems
By spring 2007, the surge of U.S. BCTs and reinvigorated security operations in the
Baghdad region led to a sharp rise in the number of captured insurgents, intensifying
already overcrowded conditions in MNF-I’s detention facilities. Overwhelmed by the
increasing number of prisoners, MNF-I’s TF 134 for detention operations lost control of
its detention facilities, resulting in a near repeat of the riots and escape attempts of early
2005. This crisis delayed Petraeus’s plan to have detention operations serve as an additional enabler for his larger campaign.
The overcrowding challenge had been a problem long in the making. As early as January 2006, Major General John Gardner, who had replaced Major General William Brandenburg as commander of TF 134, warned MNF-I of the danger developing in the camps:
Gains to the detainee population have outpaced releases almost 2 to 1 since Oct[ober] 2004.
The new expansion compounds we are starting to build at [Camp] Bucca will help mitigate
the overcrowding, but continued growth at this rate is not sustainable without an increased
level of releases or a subsequent major expansion of Bucca and corresponding increase in
U.S. personnel. . . . We are approaching an excessive level of crowding throughout the system.92
324

ENABLING THE SURGE, 2007-2008

At the same time, continuing pressure from
SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld to transfer responsibility for detention to the Iraqis as soon as possible
detracted from efforts to regain control of the rapidly expanding detainee population and to institute
counterinsurgency measures in the detention facilities.93 Gardner later recalled that he had been told
before deploying to Iraq that he would be the last TF
134 commander and was warned, “If you cannot get
the U.S. out of detention, they will replace you with
someone else that can.”94 Throughout 2006, Rumsfeld stymied the task forces’ operations by reducing
its overall funding, and also blocked the task force’s
Source: U.S. Army photo (Released).
new construction plans in order to compel TF 134
to transition its activities to the Iraqi Government. Major General John D. Gardner,
As a result, Gardner was forced to rely on internal
Commander TF 134.95
initiatives to reduce the mounting detainee population pressure.96 First, aiming to trim the population through increased releases, Gardner doubled the number of Combined Review and
Release Boards held each week and created an expedited release program that freed lowthreat detainees within the first 30 days of their detention. These changes increased the
number of average monthly releases from 650 to 1,100 by mid-2006.97
Gardner also aimed to reduce pressure by instituting a “counterinsurgency in the compounds” program that sought to defuse detainee anger and hopelessness that stemmed
from an inconsistent and confusing detention process as well as to attack the threat of
jihadist radicalization and recruitment inside the camps.98 The core of this effort came
from counterinsurgency teams that paired intelligence personnel with the guard force
of each facility, a bold move considering the integration of intelligence personnel with
detention guards was believed to have contributed to the detainee abuse scandal at Abu
Ghraib in 2004.99 Brigadier General David Quantock, who would serve as TF 134 commander in 2009, later recalled:
Abu Ghraib was still fresh in everyone’s mind and no one wanted intelligence specialists inside the
wire working with the security forces. But General Gardner and his team were able to assemble
counterinsurgency (COIN) teams that ran informants in the compounds to really sort out the
population. Without the COIN teams figuring out the extremists from the moderates, none of the
[later] rehabilitation efforts would have worked.100

As the teams slowly worked their way through each camp, they segregated detainees according to the relative danger they posed and placed them in one of five categories: AQI,
takfiris, moderate Sunnis, JAM, and moderate Shi’a.101 Takfiris were considered higher-threat Sunni militants not affiliated with AQI, while moderates were assessed to be
less ideologically committed prisoners who might have joined the insurgency for money.
Among the moderates, Gardner later opined that perhaps 1 in 10 probably should not
have been detained in the first place.102
The counterinsurgency programs also included efforts to help reintegrate detainees
into Iraqi society upon release: inmates could attend classes taught by fellow detainees
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who were teachers, outside agencies provided skills training to help newly released Iraqis
find jobs, and moderate religious voices provided an alternative to the preaching of more
extremist religious figures.103 With no doctrine to guide their effort, TF 134 applied lessons from the U.S. prison system and experimented with different tactics, techniques,
and procedures of its own.
By February 2007, however, it was clear that the change in coalition strategy would
dramatically increase the number of the coalition’s detainees, with TF 134 officials estimating that the surge could create an additional influx of 2,000 prisoners per month.104
With a total capacity of 18,000 across all coalition theater detention facilities and a
detainee population standing at 15,840, little slack remained in the system to absorb such
increases.105 The same month, TF 134 officials noted that the detainee population could
double in 6 months’ time, prophetically warning that they were gravely concerned with
“maintaining the required guard-detainee ratio to maintain order” as well as the “likelihood of increased violence, escape attempts, and use of lethal force.”106 Gardner’s internal
measures would not be able to compensate for the expected flood of detainees.
Informed by Gardner of the worsening situation, Petraeus initially hoped transferring
detainees to Iraqi-run facilities could relieve some of the pressure. However, after discussing the issue with Maliki in April 2007, the MNF-I commander realized that the Iraqi
corrections services would provide no relief to the coalition detention problem in the
near term. The Iraqis themselves still struggled with prison capacity, arresting criminals
and suspected insurgents in increasing numbers but committing few resources toward
building new facilities in which to hold them. Pointing out the equally glaring problem
that the Iraqi Government had no reliable judicial system to try prisoners, Petraeus noted
that Maliki’s unsatisfactory plan for addressing the overcrowding problem was to “cut a
political deal, declare amnesty, and release 90 percent of the detainees.”107
With no help from the Iraqi Government, Gardner moved to address the expected
overcrowding by increasing the size of his guard force and by growing the capacity of
his facilities. To counter Gardner’s insufficient guard-to-detainee ratio, MNF-I requested
nine additional U.S. Army military police companies, nearly a brigade’s worth of one of
the Army’s least-populated specialties. When these predominantly reserve component
forces proved unable to deploy quickly, MNC-I diverted an artillery battalion from the
surge brigades to augment TF 134’s guard force.108 To resolve the mismatch in the detainee
population and capacity, Gardner ordered the construction of temporary facilities to meet
immediate needs and requested military construction projects for enduring structures
through the budgetary process, aiming for a total capacity of 30,000 prisoners.109 The
majority of the new facilities were hastily built by Navy Seabees and consisted of groups
of large plywood shacks or air-conditioned tents able to sleep 20 men. Although the new
facilities were separated from each other by chain-link fences reinforced with earth-filled
HESCO barriers, detainees within subdivided areas could roam freely under the observation of the guard force. By April, only one-third of the new temporary compounds were
complete.110 The longer-term solution, which included additional permanent buildings, a
supermax-style facility for hard-core terrorists, and a brick factory where prisoners could
work, received funding from Congress in March, but construction did not begin until
October 2007.111
These changes proved insufficient. As Gardner had predicted, the coalition’s detainee
population climbed steadily, from 18,000 the week of April 14 to more than 20,000 just 2
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weeks later.112 True capacity never caught up with the tidal wave of new detainees, and
many of the crises that had shaken TF 134 in 2005 developed again. In spite of efforts to
categorize inmates by sect and threat level, segregation in the relatively open compounds
could not curtail intimidation and recruitment by dedicated jihadists.113 Hardened radicals intimidated and recruited other inmates, with an estimated 1,350 dedicated members
of AQI conscripting new members in Camp Bucca daily. Under the weight of overcrowding, many of Gardner’s promising “counterinsurgency inside the compounds” programs
collapsed, and the coalition again lost control of its major detention facilities.114
“COIN Inside the Wire”
As Gardner and his replacement, Marine Corps Major General Douglas Stone, conducted their transition in April 2007, the simmering problem of detention facility overcrowding finally exploded. A riot that included nearly 10,000 detainees broke out at
Camp Bucca, where mobs of inmates set fire to their tents and slung “chai balls”—hardened projectiles molded from tea, sand, and milk—at the guard force as it attempted
to restore order.115 As the riot dragged on and worsened, Stone became convinced that
decisive action had to be taken to change the way the coalition conducted detention operations.116 A second riot of several thousand detainees again roiled Camp Bucca in May,
and in June guards discovered a completed 80-foot long escape tunnel with an exit outside the wire.117 When the rioters came close to breaching the perimeter fence during the
May riots, Stone called Petraeus in Baghdad to discuss whether to use deadly force to
regain control. Such a measure had not been employed at Bucca since 2005, but the prospect of inmates seizing American hostages troubled the new Task Force 134 commander.
Not ready to pull the trigger, Petraeus arranged for Multi-National Division- Southeast
to mobilize a mechanized quick-reaction force from nearby Basrah for shock effect if
needed. In the end, Stone’s troops put down the riot with tear gas and nonlethal munitions and corralled extremist ringleaders into the more isolated and recently completed
compounds.118 As the riots overwhelmed TF 134’s day-to-day operations, the detainee
population reached 22,400, and staff officers predicted the coalition could be holding as
many as 53,940 detainees by September 2008.119

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Confiscated Weapons at Camp Bucca Similar to Those Used During
the April 2007 Riots.120
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Armed with this dire assessment, and having seen firsthand the impact of overcrowding, Stone set about building upon Gardner’s efforts to transform detention operations
into a crucial arm of the coalition’s efforts, viewing the handling of the coalition’s detainees as an opportunity to enhance reconciliation within Iraqi society. Stone believed the
detainees could be rehabilitated through reeducation and vocational training programs
and changed from security threats into assets in the counterinsurgency campaign.121 As
Stone saw it, TF 134’s mandate was an integral part of the surge, which aimed to:
. . . establish an alliance and empower the moderate Iraqis to effectively marginalize the violent
extremists. That’s what victory means to me [ . . . ] I’m going to replace that destructive ideology
and then, when [a detainee is] assessed to no longer be a threat, I’m going to release the detainee
less likely to be a recidivist . . . they’re not going out of here unless I can feel comfortable about
that.122

Stone outlined his plan for “COIN inside the wire” to MNF-I and MNC-I leaders in June
2007. He intended to transform the detention facilities, which he described as “jihadi
universities”—where AQI not only recruited new members but intentionally sent experienced cadres to recoup, network, and plan during their temporary incarceration—
into facilities that would facilitate ethnic and political reconciliation.123 Stone’s first step
was to increase the capacity of the camps to facilitate the segregation of detainees and
then, through a program of vetted and targeted releases and job training programs, to
reeducate and reintegrate detainees with their local communities, tribes, and families.124
Toward this end, Stone benefitted from the support of Petraeus, who also saw detention
operations as a crucial component of counterinsurgency. Concerned that detention operations were not properly resourced, the MNF- I commander reported to Gates in May
that “we have a lot of work to do to provide higher-security detention facilities, more detainee capacity, a carefully developed release program, and a way ahead in coordination
with our Iraqi partners.”125 Petraeus conceded that the problem of overcrowding had created a situation in which, “We essentially had maximum security detainees in minimum
security facilities.”126

Source: DoD photo by Cherie Cullen (Released).

Major General Douglas Stone, Commander TF 134.127
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With support from MNF-I, Stone intended to distribute the detainee population more
evenly across Iraq, putting more funding into regional facilities in order to take pressure
off of Camp Bucca and better reintegrate detainees into local communities.128 Stone also
proposed that MNF-I establish theater internment facility reconciliation centers at Taji
and Ramadi to provide recently released detainees and unemployed adult Iraqi males
with vocational and civil training, pay them a small stipend, and maintain a relationship
with former prisoners to gain a better understanding of the insurgency.129
To reduce the pressure of overcrowding further, Stone proposed expanding the
release program, estimating that up to 25 percent of inmates could be released with no
issues, 30 percent could not be released under any circumstances based on the gravity
of their offenses, and the remainder could go either way.130 Petraeus approved the proposal, cautioning Stone to avoid any perception of “catch and release” while reducing
the overall detainee population to 15,000 or fewer by the end of 2008.131 TF 134 would
accomplish these releases by converting the review board process used by Gardner into
a new Multi-National Force Review Committee Process. The revised system added nonU.S. multinational personnel and ensured that the material in a detainee’s file could be
shared with the detainee, thus demonstrating that a review process was ongoing, reassuring the often-bewildered detainees that their cases were being properly adjudicated.132
Three coalition military officials reviewed the detainees’ files and assessed each prisoner’s progress in detention. After hearing the detainees speak in their own defense, they
made a recommendation for release or continued detention.133
Unfortunately, the new process suffered many of the same problems from the previous process. Neither the multinational members of the committee nor the detainees could
review the classified information that might have led to their detention. TF 134 lacked
the capacity to convert all of the authorized materials into Arabic for the detainees to
read. Another problem pertained to the veracity of information provided by Iraqi informants, many of whom may have had motives for providing false information about the
accused.134
Yet the revised release system proved effective at controlling the unrestrained growth
of the detainee population, which peaked at 25,600 in October. It also drove down the
average rates of detention to 333 days, with only 5 percent of the population having
been interned over 3 years.135 At the same time, the changes proved to be controversial,
reigniting many of the disputes that existed between the detention command and tactical
commanders in 2005.
Detainees nominated for release first went through a screening process at TF 134,
which then sent the multinational divisions a list of those nominated for release. In
theory, detainees were released only when there was no longer any reason to believe
they posed a security threat and only after pledging before an Iraqi judge not to participate in insurgent or criminal activity. Released detainees also required a guarantor who
could be held responsible if the released detainee returned to violence.136 In practice, the
process did not always run smoothly, as pressure to reduce the number of detainees was
intense. MNF-W deputy commander Brigadier General John R. Allen recalled that, upon
receiving a proposed list of detainee releases, MNF-W would circulate the names among
local sheikhs and tactical commanders to ensure they were not “introducing cancerous
cells back into the living organism of Anbar Province.” MNF-W’s refusal to take some of
the detainees back into Anbar because of suspected insurgent ties created tension with
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TF 134, particularly after some of the detainees that MNF-W wanted to remain in TF 134
custody were released anyway. “We know who ought to come back and who shouldn’t,”
Allen told an MNC-I counterpart in January 2008, adding:
Sometimes they get released anyway and that’s where the rub is. It’s causing hate and discontent
for the Iraqis . . . we want to not create a situation where the Iraqis have become convinced that
our rule of law has failed them and they’re going to have to take their own measures to protect
themselves from detainees being cancerous cells being injected back into their neighborhoods and
lives. We want a say in who comes back, and we want that say to be a veto, not a request.137

Like Allen, many tactical commanders believed that the release program not only allowed
the enemy to reconstitute, but it also psychologically emboldened them as it communicated a lack of will and determination on the part of the coalition. This psychological
impact also affected the coalition’s soldiers and Iraqi allies—especially informants—who
could be put at risk if hardened fighters were released mistakenly.
Large-scale political releases also continued, to the chagrin of some unit leaders who
believed MNF-I pushed to release too many detainees too soon. In September 2007,
MNF-I approved the release of 50 to 80 prisoners per day during the month-long Ramadan holiday to show goodwill and deter high-profile mass casualty attacks that could
derail political support for the surge. MNF-I released 847 detainees in the first 3 weeks
of Ramadan alone.138 By the end of 2007, MNF-I had released a total of 7,510 detainees
for that calendar year.139 In October 2007, TF 134 reported only 70 recaptures of 4,865
former prisoners, a 1.4 percent recidivism rate that was significantly lower than the 6 to
8 percent recidivism rates reported in January 2007 by Gardner.140 Gardner’s estimation
itself was far lower than the rate approximated by tactical commanders across the MNDs,
and the issue of recidivism became a highly controversial topic that created a wedge of
disagreement between tactical and operational commanders. Yet despite the controversy,
Petraeus judged the reduction in reported recidivism rates allowed MNF-I to “take more
risk in exchange for the payoff of putting Iraqi citizens back in their neighborhoods rather
than holding them in detention.”141

General Petraeus (left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

General David Petraeus and Colonel James Brown at Camp Bucca.142
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The overall impact of TF 134’s “COIN inside the wire” initiatives on the insurgency
was mixed. When coupled with increases in detainee capacity, they helped end the chaos
that had prevailed in the detention centers before summer 2007. By the beginning of
August 2007, theater detention facilities reported zero incidents among the 23,000 detainees in coalition custody, a marked improvement from the period leading up to the Bucca
riots several months earlier.143 Stone also reported an incident in October 2007, in which
detainees in one of the Camp Bucca compounds presented the guards with a letter declaring an internal Bucca “Awakening” during which a compound of reformed moderates
overtook takfiri extremists. “It’s never happened before,” Stone noted. “Found them
[extremists], identified them, threw them up against the fence, and shaved the frickin’
beards off of them.”144 Yet MNC-I was skeptical about TF 134’s reported rates of recidivism for released detainees, which, Odierno and other senior officers judged, might
simply be a recapture rate. In Odierno’s view, Stone also seemed to underestimate the
possibility that radicalism was still going on inside the wire, however calm TF 134’s compounds appeared.145
Rule of Law “Green Zones”
In April 2004, the CPA finalized Order 13 that established the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq in an effort to create an independent Iraqi judiciary system. In the absence of a
secure and stable environment, however, several years passed before the Central Court
and the subsidiary provincial courts could operate effectively across the country. Standing up the judicial system in a post-dictatorial state was a significant task further complicated by the murder and intimidation of judges, investigators, and witnesses. By 2007,
the court system struggled to make a dent in the growing detention population and was
a long way from administering routine civil and criminal case law. To try to reduce the
vulnerability of judges and investigators, MNF-I established a secure Rule of Law “Green
Zone” in the Rusafa District of east Baghdad that would contain a court, detention facility, and training academy as well as house judges and investigators along with their
families.146
The Rule of Law Green Zone began to operate on April 2, 2007, after Prime Minister
Maliki agreed to support its $50 million annual operating expenses.147 Petraeus informed
Gates, “the investments we’ve made in it should help improve the institutional legitimacy and effectiveness of the Iraqi judiciary branch,” and that “provincial rule of law
complexes are being built in Salah ad Din, Mosul, and Ramadi” in the hopes that the judicial system could operate effectively beyond Baghdad as well. By mid-July, the Court had
received over 1,900 cases, and its anticipated demand increased as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation continued to train more Iraqi investigators.148 Between April and November, the number of judges across Iraq increased from 570 to 1,160 as well. The infusion
of attention and funds from the Iraqi Government along with the protection provided
within the system seemed to be having a positive effect.
The Iraqi judicial system’s first real test came in February 2008 with the prosecution
of former Deputy Minister of Health Hakim Zamili and former Ministry of Health Facilities Protection Service Chief Hamid al-Shammari, two senior Sadrists accused of masterminding sectarian killings across Baghdad in 2006-2007.149 During the men’s tenure at
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the Health Ministry, officials and security guards had used their identification credentials
and medical vehicles, including ambulances, to move freely across Baghdad and operate
as death squads against Sunnis.150 They had also allegedly ordered the killing of Sunni
patients in government hospitals in Baghdad.151 Finally, when their activities had been
uncovered by Deputy Health Minister Ammar Saffar, a Da’wa Party official, they had
abducted and murdered Saffar as well.
As Zamili and Shammari’s trial neared, the coalition took precautions to shield witnesses and judges from intimidation to include having some witnesses temporarily
moved out of the country. For some Iraqis, the trial was more important than Saddam’s,
because it would signal whether or not Iraqi Government officials were above the law,
and whether Shi’a militants could behave with impunity. As the trial approached, Petraeus related to Gates:
This is the first trial in which high-ranking Iraqi officials of a post-Saddam government will be
tried for offenses against the Iraqi people, and it promises to set an extremely important precedent.
Unfortunately, the FBI has picked up intelligence that there may have been such severe intimidation
(despite our detentions of some of the intimidators) that an acquittal may be the outcome. Ryan
[Crocker] will meet with the Chief Judge [Medhat al-Mahmoud] to convey concerns that this might
be the case. Nothing is easy.152

The following week, officials uncovered even more evidence that the trial appeared
to be “fixed to assure acquittal” for Zamili and Shammari. Although Iraqi Chief Judge
Medhat al-Mahmood initiated an investigation and replaced the judge, on March 3, 2008,
both Zamili and Shammari were acquitted of all charges.153 Prime Minister Maliki, who
had asked MNF-I to arrest Zamili in the first place the previous year, “expressed his personal conviction that witnesses had refused to testify or changed their testimony due to
intimidation and death threats” and “lamented that the trial meant the entire Iraqi judicial system was in danger.”154 The Rule of Law Green Zones had succeeded in securing
Iraq’s judicial system and judges from the physical threat of terrorism, but they could
not shield the Iraqi courts from political intimidation, casting doubt on Iraq’s long-term
ability to administer the rule of law.
***
The operations of the surge campaign benefited from a number of enabling activities
and capabilities that had matured or evolved since the beginning of the war. Many of
these, such as the counter-IED effort, reflected advances made by trial and error as the
U.S. military adapted to the character of the Iraq conflict over time. Others reflected the
decisions by senior U.S. officials in Washington to commit their organizations more fully
to supporting the coalition campaign, such as the forward deployment of the U.S. intelligence community or the expansion of the provincial reconstruction team program. Still
others were initiatives that arose in response to requirements that were unusual for a
military campaign, such as the Energy Fusion Cell or the TFBSO. A few of these enabling
activities had a clear, significantly positive impact on operations. The dramatic increase
in ISR available for tactical units, the fielding of MRAPs, and the integration of special
and conventional operations stand out in this respect. For some other initiatives, the
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picture was mixed. For example, it is difficult to judge in retrospect whether the TFBSO
contributed to economic stabilization or whether TF 134’s deradicalization programs had
any effect on Sunni militancy. What can be said for certain is that the military commands
in the Iraq campaign had to adapt to address problems that few U.S. leaders, including
those who formulated the surge strategy, had foreseen. As they adapted, the military
commands developed new capabilities, organizations, and ways of operating not anticipated in U.S. doctrine before their employment or, in most cases, captured in U.S. doctrine after. By early 2008, these adaptations made coalition units and headquarters look
and behave very differently than they had in 2005-2006. They would need every new
capability at their disposal in order to get through the bloody spring of 2008, when the
coalition unexpectedly would have to fight its largest battles since 2004.
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CHAPTER 8
CRESCENDO: MALIKI AGAINST THE SADRISTS
On January 11, 2008, 3 days after the launch of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX,
snow fell on Baghdad for the first time in a century. Iraqis took it as a felicitous omen after
the war’s most violent 2 years. The following day, President George W. Bush traveled to
Kuwait for meetings with General David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker.
While there, the President announced publicly that he had decided to end the surge
by midsummer, by which time 20,000 U.S. troops would have returned home without
replacement. After a year of intensified operations mainly against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
and other Sunni insurgent groups, the surge was on its downward slope.
Yet, some of the most intense fighting of the Iraq War was in the offing. After 2 months
of clearing operations in northern Iraq designed to push AQI ever farther from Baghdad
and other Iraqi population centers, the coalition in spring 2008 would find its campaign
plan against the Sunni insurgency thrown off course by a high-stakes war between the
Nuri al-Maliki government and Iraq’s Shi’a militias. The long-simmering confrontation between the Iraqi state and the Iranian regime’s Iraqi militant proxies was about to
explode into a Shi’a civil war.
OPERATION PHANTOM PHOENIX
On January 8, 4 days before Bush’s announcement, Lieutenant General Raymond
T. Odierno and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) launched Operation PHANTOM
PHOENIX, the final corps-level operation employing all of the surge brigades before
the first of them departed Iraq in February. In Operations PHANTOM THUNDER and
PHANTOM STRIKE, MNC- I’s units had pushed AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups
out of Baghdad and much of the surrounding belts. Odierno’s specific intent for PHANTOM PHOENIX was to push AQI even farther from Baghdad and to pursue them up the
Diyala and Tigris River Valleys, clearing the insurgent support zones in eastern Diyala,
Mosul, and the area south of Baghdad known as Arab Jabour. He then intended that
MNC-I’s units should hold those formerly insurgent-held areas by establishing new
combat outposts and joint security stations “to ensure that AQI does not return . . . thereby
further denying AQI from reestablishing staging areas throughout the Baghdad Belts.”1
As with the preceding PHANTOM operations, PHANTOM PHOENIX involved all four
U.S. division-level commands. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) led the main
effort, conducting large-scale clearing operations in the upper Diyala River Valley and
the Mosul area. Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) conducted a supporting operation to clear AQI from the troublesome Tigris River areas of Arab Jabour and Salman Pak
south of Baghdad. Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) focused on clearing the Jazeera
desert and the vicinity of Lake Tharthar, the area that had for several years been a seam
among MNF-W, MND-N, and Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), where those
units’ boundaries met. In the Baghdad area, MND-B continued operations to root out carbomb networks.2 Finally, the coalition launched a supporting effort, Operation HYDRA,
in which a joint interagency task force made up of intelligence analysts, law enforcement
experts, and even oil sector economists tracked down AQI’s financing networks at the
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Bayji oil refinery in order to starve the group of the cash it normally generated from black
market oil and gasoline.3
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Map 17. Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, January-March 2008.
Many of the U.S. units that conducted PHANTOM PHOENIX were newly arrived in
Iraq, as some of the brigades that had shouldered the burden of the hard fighting of 2007
rotated home. Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, handed
responsibility for Hillah, Najaf, and Karbala to Colonel Thomas James’s 4th Brigade, 3d
Infantry Division, in early December. In Baghdad, Colonel Jeffrey Bannister’s 2d Brigade,
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2d Infantry Division, handed control of the restive southeast Baghdad districts to Colonel
Mark Dewhurst’s 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in late December. In January, the
first surge brigade, Colonel Billy Don Farris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, handed
control of Adhamiyah to Colonel John H. Hort’s 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, while
Colonel Paul Funk’s 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, transferred control of Taji and the
northern Baghdad belt to Colonel Todd McCaffrey’s 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.4
To support MNC-I’s main effort, Odierno deployed his operational reserve, a Stryker
squadron of the 2d Cavalry Regiment, to eastern Diyala to take part in the clearing operations there.5 Iraqi reinforcements moved to MND-N as well, with the 3d Brigade, 1st
Iraqi Army Division, deploying from Anbar to eastern Diyala with less than a week’s
notice to take part in the operation.6 For his part, MND-N commander Major General
Mark P. Hertling was not satisfied with the provision of corps-level reinforcements for
what he anticipated would be difficult fights in both Diyala and Mosul and asked MNC-I
for another U.S. battalion for Mosul. Eventually, a squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment (ACR) joined MND-N in the middle of the operation as 3d ACR units began to
arrive.
For MND-N’s portion of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, Hertling had decided
that his division would focus on Diyala rather than Ninawa, although Ninawa stood
out as the most violent province in the country once the violence in central Iraq waned
in late 2007. Hertling believed another major operation would be required in Diyala to
flush AQI and its allies out of the province’s agricultural areas before MND-N could turn
its full attention to Mosul. He also believed that AQI would try to reestablish itself in
the Za’ab Triangle rather than Mosul, and that the Za’ab area was where the final battle
against AQI would take place.7
The focus of the clearing operations in Diyala was a 285-square-kilometer area north
of Muqdadiyah that U.S. Soldiers nicknamed “the Breadbasket” for its agricultural terrain. For several years, the towns in the Breadbasket had seen almost no coalition presence, and AQI fighters had used them as staging areas for attacks against Muqdadiyah
and Baqubah with impunity. On January 8, troops from Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Brigade,
2d Infantry Division, and troops of the Diyala-based 5th Iraqi Army Division entered the
area to hunt for an estimated 200 AQI fighters.8 The fight was difficult for Lehr’s Stryker
units. Crisscrossed with irrigation canals, the Breadbasket was an ideal insurgent sanctuary, hard for armored vehicles to access, and covered by dense palm groves and marshes
in which enemy fighters could easily hide. The insurgents also had had time to prepare
their defenses. On the second day of the operation, January 9, six of Lehr’s men were
killed and nine wounded when a local Iraqi led them into a house that AQI fighters had
rigged to explode. This house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) slowed clearing
operations by forcing U.S. units to enter every structure more cautiously and to be more
careful about acting on tips from locals. “There is obviously a tradeoff between working
with the local population to garner information and being set up by the enemy,” Petraeus noted a few days later.9 In other places, U.S. troops found that inventive insurgents
had even rigged date palm treetops with explosives to target U.S. patrols as they passed
underneath. By January 20, U.S. and Iraqi troops were uncovering AQI bunkers, tunnel
complexes, and weapons caches hidden among “eight-foot-high reeds” and date palms,
Petraeus reported.10
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Source: DoD photo by Private 1st Class Kirby Rider (Released).

Soldiers From the 3d ACR Search for Weapon Caches in Canal Walls of
“The Breadbasket.”11
However, MND-N’s clearing operations in the Breadbasket had meager results: only
4 AQI fighters killed and another 30 detained or wounded, although coalition troops did
manage an important raid that killed the Syrian AQI leader Abu Layla al-Suri on January 16 near Muqdadiyah.12 The small number of enemy fighters killed or captured indicated, contrary to MND-N’s expectations, that AQI groups already had relocated from
the Breadbasket to other areas farther north, such as the Hamrin mountains and Mosul.13
MND-N’s main effort appeared to have gone into an area that AQI’s commanders and
fighters had already abandoned.
While the MND-N troops cleared the Breadbasket, MND-C troops focused on Arab
Jabour a few kilometers south of Baghdad. Despite a nascent Awakening group in the
area, Arab Jabour had long been an insurgent support zone used by AQI and other militants to infiltrate fighters and car bombs into Baghdad. Colonel Terry R. Ferrell’s 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, oversaw the operations there, reinforced by the 5th Battalion,
7th Cavalry sent from Anbar to give Ferrell three U.S. battalions for the task.14 Among the
Iraqi forces present, Brigadier General Ali Freiji’s brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division
received an additional Iraqi infantry battalion for the operation as well.15 Under the plans
drawn up by MND-C commander Major General Rick Lynch, the clearing of Arab Jabour
relied on intense firepower. On January 10, MND-C called in air strikes that dropped 20
tons of munitions on suspected AQI targets in just 10 minutes in an effort to destroy AQI
weapons caches and to reduce a defensive belt of IEDs that blocked important roads.16
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A local Awakening leader estimated that the air strikes killed 20 AQI fighters, including
a senior AQI commander.17 As the MND-C troops progressed deeper into AQI’s Arab
Jabour sanctuary, they carried out similarly intense air strikes on January 16 and 20.18 On
January 19, however, Ferrell’s brigade suffered the first battle death in an MRAP when a
3,000-pound IED flipped over one of the mine-resistant vehicles and killed the gunner.19
Farther to the northwest, the Marine and Army troops that had massed to clear the
area that MNC-I called area of operation (AO) Bedrock found extensive insurgent outposts in the remote areas east of Lake Tharthar. West of Samarra, the U.S. troops discovered 10 car bombs at a large explosive production facility. On January 17, they also
discovered a foreign fighter base camp that had a 300-meter tunnel system with multiple
entrances and fighting positions hidden by reeds, all of which the U.S. troops destroyed
with incendiary munitions.20

Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Jonathan J. Springer (Released).

Soldiers From 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Fire Artillery During Operation
PHANTOM PHOENIX.21
Mosul was even more challenging. As clearing operations began with the arrival of
1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, from Baghdad, the AQI fighters who had begun to gather
in the Mosul area in fall 2007 repeatedly attacked the tightening ring of Iraqi-manned
checkpoints and obstacles that locals dubbed the “Riyadh Line” after the new Ninawa
Operations Commander, Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq. The Ninawa Operations Command began operating on January 15, bringing a much-needed layer of command and control to the city’s army and police forces. Still, even with a better command
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structure, the city of two million was difficult to clear, especially its older west-side neighborhoods with their narrow medieval streets that could not accommodate vehicles. On
January 23, Iraqi troops investigating a tip in an apartment building in northwest Mosul
found an insurgent cache of at least 20,000 pounds of explosives that detonated when an
Iraqi soldier improperly probed the charge. The explosion leveled the entire building,
killing 34 Iraqis and wounding 138 more, and leaving an enormous crater. The following morning, when the newly appointed Ninawa police chief, Brigadier General Saleh
Jabouri, arrived to investigate the site, he was killed by an AQI suicide bomber dressed
as a policeman who wrestled him into a nearby vehicle before detonating a suicide vest.22

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Kieran Cuddihy (Released).

Soldiers From the 3d ACR During Combat in Mosul.23
The assassination was a serious setback for the new joint Iraqi Army and police campaign to secure the city and, in Petraeus’s words, showed that “AQI still has the ability to
strike.”24 It also caused a shift in priorities for both the coalition and the Iraqis. Angered
by the attack, Prime Minister Maliki dispatched an Iraqi battalion from Baghdad to reinforce the 2d Iraqi Army Division in Mosul, while Hertling responded by changing his
division’s main effort from Diyala to Mosul and employing the 3d Squadron, 3d ACR,
in the city. The arrival of the additional troops was timely. On February 11, the Badush
prison outside Mosul, whose inmate population included an AQI command and control
node, erupted into a riot that required the quick intervention of the 3d Squadron and 2d
Iraqi Army Division to suppress the violent prisoners and prevent a jailbreak.25
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Farther south of Mosul, MND-N made better progress. In the long-time insurgent
stronghold of Hawijah, Sunni insurgents felt increasing pressure from Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX and from the newly formed 6,000-man Awakening group in the area.
As a result, insurgent fighters began to come forward seeking amnesty from local Iraqi
officials and Colonel David Paschal’s 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Throughout
February and subsequent months, Paschal’s units publicized a program called “Restore
Peace” in which insurgents who turned themselves in could register with the brigade
and go through a 6-month reintegration process. A few insurgents turned themselves in
during the first weeks of February, but on February 24, more than 100 insurgents walked
into Forward Operating Base McHenry in Hawijah to seek amnesty. “I’m tired of being
a target and running,” one insurgent explained to U.S. troops, while another testified, “I
have not slept in my house for a year.”26
Back in Diyala, sectarian political tensions complicated the operation. On February 8, thousands of Sunni Awakening members, now renamed Sons of Iraq by MNF-I
planners, abandoned their checkpoints to join in demonstrations against Diyala police
chief Ghanem al-Qureishi, who they accused of sponsoring Shi’a death squads that targeted Awakening members. For several weeks, U.S. commanders in Diyala were forced
to scramble to mediate between the Awakening and the Shi’a-dominated Diyala police
forces, showing that the province’s difficult sectarian politics meant that it was far from
stabilized, even if AQI had lost its grip on most of its former territory there.27

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Russell Bassett (Released).

Sons of Iraq Staff a Checkpoint in Himbus.28
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Diyala was not the only PHANTOM PHOENIX operational area in which the Awakening groups felt themselves under pressure. In January, MNF-I had recorded at least
100 attacks against Awakening groups, almost four times as many as were recorded
in December. In Baghdad on February 11, two car bombs had unsuccessfully targeted
Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, one of the Awakening leaders from Ramadi. Elsewhere, in
separate incidents in Jurf al-Sukhr south of Baghdad and in the Za’ab Triangle in northern Iraqi, U.S. troops mistakenly raided Awakening members, although it was possible
the targeted men had in fact been insurgents using the Awakening as a cover.29
The stabilization phases of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX continued until July,
but large-scale clearing operations began to wind down in February with coalition and
Iraqi troops in possession of large swathes of formerly AQI-held territory. For the whole
of the operation, the coalition lost 60 troops killed and the Iraqi security forces more
than 500 killed. Meanwhile, the Sunni insurgent groups lost an estimated 900 killed and
approximately 2,500 captured.30 By the end of PHANTOM PHOENIX’s clearing operations, most of AQI’s networks had been pushed beyond striking distance of Baghdad,
although they could still carry out large attacks in the cities of Diyala and maintain a formidable clandestine presence in Mosul, where attack levels remained high. By February
15, MND-C had completed the clearing of Arab Jabour and shifted focus to the clearing
of Salman Pak on the opposite side of the Tigris, farther south.31 After 5 weeks of PHANTOM PHOENIX’s clearing and holding operations, insurgent activity had diminished
significantly, especially in Baghdad, where AQI no longer had freedom of movement
in its traditional support zones around the city. By February, Baghdad had an average
of just 11 attacks per day, down from 46 per day in June 2007. On February 17, MNF-I
announced that insurgent attacks across Iraq had fallen sharply to an average of 82 per
day, down from a daily average of 205 exactly 1 year before.32

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Nicholas A. Hernandez (Released).

Soldiers Meet With Iraqi National Policemen During a Patrol in Baghdad.33
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Political Progress and the Departure of III Corps
The theory behind the surge was that improvements in the security situation and
the tamping down of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian civil war would give the Iraqi political factions breathing space in which to make progress toward political reconciliation. After a
politically turbulent December, the Iraqi Parliament took steps that seemed to lend some
credence to the theory. In January and February 2008, the Iraqi political parties began
serious negotiations concerning a series of difficult political and security issues. In early
February, Maliki began to include his main Sunni rival, Vice President Tariq Hashimi, in
cabinet consultations on how to counter AQI’s resurgence in Mosul and to give Hashimi
the floor in discussions with the Ninawa operations commander and the Ninawa provincial governor.34 Meanwhile, the Parliament began negotiating the passage of several laws
that the coalition considered essential for political reconciliation. These included a law
defining the powers of the Iraqi provinces and the central government; a law establishing
an amnesty process for those who had decided to abandon resistance against the government; and a 2008 budget that divided oil revenues between the Iraqi Government and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On February 13, the Parliament passed all three
laws at once. Petraeus received the news of the laws’ passage while walking through a
west Baghdad neighborhood where attacks had fallen to almost zero after 2 years of sectarian violence. “[Parliament speaker Mahmud] Mashadani had threatened the Council
of Representatives with dissolution,” Petraeus reported, “and then he came right back on
Wednesday with a savvy bundling of the three laws that gave everyone something they
were looking for—that’s politics!”35
The legislative breakthrough also came the day before Odierno and the III Corps
headquarters handed over the reins of MNC-I to Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and
his XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, which had returned to Iraq for its second tour as
the coalition’s operational headquarters. The timing was fitting. In his departing remarks
the following day, Odierno noted that the Iraqis’ legislative successes were “the best gift
[I] could have received.”36
The change in security conditions from the time of III Corps’ arrival in December
2006 was stunning. Odierno and III Corps had taken up their responsibilities at a time
when Iraqi civilian deaths averaged 3,500 per month, enemy attacks averaged 1,200 per
week, and U.S. military deaths averaged more than 100 per month. By February 2008,
those numbers had dropped to fewer than 600 Iraqi civilian deaths per month and fewer
than 600 attacks per week, and only 29 U.S. troops had been killed in January 2008. The
ethno-sectarian war had lost much of its energy as well: Iraq had witnessed about 2,000
ethno-sectarian killings in December 2006, but that number dropped to just 100 in February 2008.37
The dramatic changes were due in large part to III Corps’ intense operations against
AQI, which by the time of Odierno’s departure in February 2008 was a mere shadow of
what it had been in late 2006. By attacking AQI’s support zones and safe havens around
Baghdad, and by synchronizing the operations of the divisions in central and northern
Iraq, Odierno and his command had enabled the coalition to retake the initiative for the
first time since 2004. Odierno’s operations had succeeded in depleting AQI’s ranks, decimating the group’s leadership, and pushing its fighters into far northern Iraq or into
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remote areas of the Diyala River Valley far from Iraq’s population centers. What remained
was to finish the Sunni insurgency in Mosul.
Denouement of the Turkey-Kurdistan Workers’ Party War
As Odierno departed Iraq, however, the campaign for Mosul competed with other
problems for the coalition’s attention. The situation between Turkey and the insurgents
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) remained critical in early 2008. As the Turks continued their air strikes against PKK bases inside Iraq without a decisive result, the PKK
continued to hit back inside Turkey, including a bombing attack against a Turkish patrol
in Diyarbakir that killed 5 Turks and wounded 110. In early January, the Turkish general
staff began to plan a ground incursion into Iraq to wipe out the PKK and requested U.S.
intelligence support for their operations. U.S. military leaders outside Iraq were willing
to provide this support, but Petraeus advised U.S. leaders “a kinetic-only approach to
dealing with the PKK . . . especially with US ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] support to their operations, will only make matters more difficult in Iraq. Our
forces don’t need another enemy and we certainly do not want to get into a situation
where Iraq raises [United Nations] protection from Turkish action.”38 Petraeus also had
doubts about the Turkish operational plan, which Turkish military officers briefed to U.S.
counterparts in advance. “The snow depth, the altitude, the vertical feet up [and] down,
the distance planned for travel, and the very difficult terrain” all indicated that “no one
who planned that operation had been under a rucksack in recent years,” Petraeus later
recalled.39
On February 21, 2008, the Turks launched a ground operation into Iraq with about 800
troops, though the Turkish media outraged the Kurdish public by claiming 10,000 troops
had crossed the border. As Petraeus had warned, the Turkish maneuvers immediately
bogged down, indicating the Turkish commanders had not prepared well for the harsh
winter conditions and the tough resistance from PKK fighters. After a week, the inconclusive operation ended as Turkish units withdrew into Turkey leaving the PKK intact,
though the Turks claimed to have killed more than 200 PKK fighters.40
In the postmortem analysis of the operation, Petraeus wrote to Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Robert M. Gates, “We hope that all parties can now move toward political
solutions and that we can avoid another large-scale Turkish military intervention that
would further endanger the nascent political progress in Iraq.”41 The entire episode, however, demonstrated that there were regional problems affecting the Iraq campaign that
only U.S. policymakers in Washington, not U.S. commanders on the ground, had the
means to address. If Washington could not formulate a policy to stave off spoiler events
such as the Turkish incursion, U.S. units in Iraq would pay the price.
THE BATTLE FOR BASRAH
The Arrival of Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps
Austin’s first challenge after he assumed command of MNC-I from Odierno on February 14, 2008, was to continue to keep pressure on AQI and other militant groups as all
five of the surge brigades began redeploying. To overcome a looming deficit of combat
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forces, the 15 remaining brigades needed to expand their areas of operations once again.
As Austin took command, he still had seven division-level headquarters with which to
work. Major General Jeffery W. Hammond commanded MND-B, the 4th Infantry Division; Lynch headed MND-C and the 3d Infantry Division; and Hertling led MND-N and
the 1st Armored Division. Major General Graham Binns, General Officer Commanding
the 1st (United Kingdom [UK]) Armoured Division, remained in control of Multi-National
Division-Southeast (MND-SE) in Basrah, while Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W)
continued in its final year under the U.S. Marines, and a South Korean brigade remained
in control of Multi-National Division-Northeast (MND-NE) in Kurdistan. Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS), led by a Polish brigade at their headquarters in
Diwaniyah, also contained a Georgian brigade and several smaller coalition contingents.

Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Laura M. Bigenho (Released).

General David Petraeus Supervising the Change of Command Between Lieutenant
General Raymond Odierno and Lieutenant General Lloyd J. Austin III.42
When Austin assumed command of MNC-I, he saw his immediate objectives as
holding the line in Baghdad and Anbar, completing the defeat of AQI in Mosul and the
Diyala River Valley, and, when he could gather the capacity, gaining greater control of
the south, where he believed the coalition had limited situational awareness.43 Austin
believed that to accomplish these objectives, he needed to reapportion his forces significantly across the country. Although the security situation in Baghdad had improved dramatically since early 2007, MND-B in February 2008 remained at peak strength, still in
control of 6 brigade combat teams and 44 U.S. combat battalions, far more than either
MND-N or MND-C.44 Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps knew that the security situation in Basrah was deteriorating—although the province recently had been transferred
to Iraqi control—and the new MNC-I leaders were determined to turn south to secure
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the city once AQI had been finished off in the north. This was the coalition’s planned
campaign sequence as Austin arrived. The new corps commander had little warning that
his priorities in the coming months were about to be turned upside down by a massive,
unexpected clash between the government of Nuri al-Maliki and the Sadrist militias in
Basrah and Baghdad that would bring some of the most intense fighting of the war.
The Rush to Provincial Iraqi Control in Basrah
The spring 2008 war between the Maliki government and the Sadr movement had
been coming for a long while. The situation in Basrah had slipped out of control of both
the coalition and the government in 2007. When Binns took command of MND-SE in
August 2007, he came with strict orders from his British superiors at the UK Permanent
Joint Headquarters to follow through on the transition plans begun by Major General
Jonathan Shaw, his predecessor. Binns was to complete the withdrawal of British troops
from bases inside the city to the Basrah Air Station outside the town, while handing the
security portfolios for all of Basrah Province to the Iraqis so British forces could then
withdraw from the country. “The UK had indicated that it had no long-term intention
to remain in Iraq, and, therefore, exit was inevitable,” Binns recalled, “but the strategy,
as I was delivering it, was one of transition increasingly to Iraqi security forces, and as
a result, we would [drawdown] our presence. . . . I had been told to deliver a transition,
and that’s what I was doing.”45
The British Government had been eager to transfer Basrah Province to the Iraqis for
some time. Shaw had suggested moving the province to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
in April 2007, because British planners were counting on shifting troops from Iraq to
Afghanistan even as the U.S. surge into Iraq was getting underway.46 Like Shaw, Binns
also sought an early handover of security responsibility, preferably immediately after
UK forces moved out of Basrah city in September to their main base at the Basrah Air
Station. The move out of the city would result in provincial control in all but name. After
all, British forces were no longer patrolling the streets of Basrah due to the summer 2007
truce with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) leader Ahmed al-Fartusi, and the UK’s position was that
the Iraqis would never take charge of their own affairs unless the British left.47 Therefore,
Binns pushed to “reduce the gap between leaving the palace and going to PIC.”48
Earlier proposals to speed up Basrah’s transfer to PIC had met with skepticism at
coalition headquarters in Baghdad. MNC-I had determined that the Iraqi security forces
in the province were not ready, a position generally shared by the central Iraqi Government. In January 2007, Odierno had written to General George Casey, Jr., “the MND-SE
[commander] now projects Basra to meet conditions for transfer of security to PIC in
April 2007 (previously March 2007). I assess that more time is needed.”49 Petraeus, too,
had urged the British Government on at least one occasion not to withdraw its troops
too precipitously, and American officers in Baghdad raised doubts that conditions in the
province merited a handover of security.50 It was doubtful that any of the four criteria for
transferring to PIC—the level of the threat, the capability of the Iraqi security forces, the
capability of the national and provincial governments, and the ability of coalition forces
to re-intervene—had been met by the latter half of 2007. However, the temporary reduction in attacks on MND-SE after the truce with JAM may have created that impression.51
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The summer 2007 truce also had led to a drastic reduction in British operations
against Sadrist militias, as the MND-SE headquarters developed highly restrictive rules
of engagement to prevent their forces from upsetting the tenuous agreement. American
forces in the sector, made up almost exclusively of elements of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), were expected to follow the same rules—a situation
that led to some frustrating episodes from the American perspective. On one occasion in
2008, CJSOTF commander Colonel Christopher Conner requested permission for an air
strike against militiamen setting up a rail system frequently used to launch rockets, but
MND-SE denied the strike because, as Conner recounted, there was nothing loaded on
the rails. When the militiamen began loading a rocket onto the rail, the CJSOTF asked
for permission again, but were denied because the rocketeers had not demonstrated hostile intent. As the special operators watched, the militiamen launched the rocket and
began breaking down the launch system, but when the CJSOTF Soldiers made one final
entreaty, their British counterparts denied the strike with the explanation that since the
militiamen had no rockets left, they were not demonstrating hostile intent.52
On the streets of Basrah, however, it was clear that militias terrorized the city with
impunity, while the city’s police were either infiltrated by militiamen or cowed by militia threats. Coalition commanders had deemed the 10th Iraqi Army Division so widely
infiltrated by militants that the entire division was transferred north to Maysan and Dhi
Qar Provinces. The fledgling 14th Iraqi Army Division that had been created to replace
the 10th in Basrah was still being formed and trained. Neither the police nor the army
were trustworthy or capable of enforcing the rule of law. On a political level, the provincial council was riven by warring factions incapable of providing public services. Prime
Minister Maliki was openly hostile to the Fadhila Party Governor Mohammed Musbeh
al-Waeli, who seemed mainly occupied by a scheme to turn the province into a federal
region under his rule and keep its massive oil revenues for his party rather than for the
government in Baghdad. It was doubtful that MND-SE, with only 4,500 British troops
available and an operating posture constrained by JAM accommodation, would be able
to re-intervene to help resolve these conflicts.53
Despite these dynamics, Binns and MND-SE continued to press for PIC for Basrah
Province, pointing to the trend of fewer militia attacks against the British base. In fall
2007, Odierno and Petraeus finally acceded to a policy they believed originated in Whitehall and that they had no hope of altering. On December 16, MND-SE transferred control of the province to Iraqi authorities at a ceremony on Basrah Air Station attended by
senior Iraqi officials and UK Foreign Secretary David W. Miliband. The speeches were
upbeat about Basrah’s future, but hinted that the security environment was dangerous.
Miliband admitted that Basrah was not “a land of milk and honey,” and Iraqi National
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie stressed that “the rule of law needed to be upheld,
only the government should have weapons, and that political parties needed to unite and
‘crack down on militias and religious extremists’.”54 Meanwhile, coalition officers judged
downtown Basrah too dangerous for Miliband to visit.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Nicole Dykstra (Released).

Major General Graham Binns, Governor Mohammed Musbeh al-Waeli, National
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie, and Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji During
the Basrah Transfer Ceremony.55
Because of Maliki’s ongoing dispute with Governor Waeli, the Prime Minister was
loath to give Waeli control of the province’s security affairs, which complicated the terms
of the PIC agreement. Waeli assumed responsibility for civil affairs, but he was forced
to sign a letter of understanding that security matters were to be handled by the chief of
the Basrah Operations Center, Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji. U.S. commanders had
blocked Freiji from becoming the Baghdad operations commander just months before
because he was both sectarian and tyrannical.56 UK forces formally agreed to continue to
provide training to Iraqi security forces, assist Freiji at the Basrah Operations Command,
and re-intervene only in extremis and only with Maliki’s approval. The latter condition
was unlike other PIC agreements, which allowed American troops to re-intervene based
on a local Iraqi commander’s request.
British forces also assured MNC-I that they would continue to patrol the Iranian
border and secure key supply routes.57 Nonetheless, with provincial Iraqi control came a
shift for the British from “tactical overwatch” to “operational overwatch,” which Whitehall intended to trigger the long-planned drawdown of troops from 4,500 at the end of
2007 to 2,500 by the spring of 2008.58
Iraqi Security Forces in Basrah
Part of the UK leaders’ eagerness to leave Basrah was that, throughout 2007, British
officials increasingly came to believe that the primary cause of violence in Basrah was the
presence of UK forces. “Ninety percent of the violence was directed against us,” Binns
argued. “If we didn’t present the target, then the figures would reduce, and coming out of
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the city had a dramatic effect on the metrics that we used to measure the violence. I’m not
pretending that the security situation significantly improved for Basrawis; it wouldn’t,
and I knew it wouldn’t until the Iraqi security forces got back in there.”59 By this logic, a
reduced British presence ostensibly would force the Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for security. Echoing SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld’s ideas about the Iraqis’ military
capacity, Binns also believed the Iraqi security forces “wouldn’t get better until they were
given responsibility, and it was a bit like . . . taking the stabilisers off a child’s bike. They
were going to wobble for a while and I was there to make sure they didn’t fall over.”60
In the new post-PIC arrangement, MND-SE would rely heavily on the strength, capabilities, and loyalty of the Iraqi security forces in Basrah, which had been judged thoroughly infiltrated by militias. By September, when the British moved out of Basrah Palace,
the new 14th Iraqi Army Division, created to compensate for the corruption of the 10th
Iraqi Army Division, was only at half strength and suffering serious equipment shortfalls. Beyond the Iraqi Army, nearly every law enforcement unit in Basrah was under
the influence of some political party’s militia. JAM had overwhelmingly infiltrated the
Iraqi police, the port authority, and the Facilities Protection Service. The Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Badr Corps also had infiltrated some of the police units and
controlled the National Intelligence Service bureau in the city. Fadhila had firm control
over the Oil Protection Force, and Iraqi Hizballah controlled the Customs Police Force.61
While provincial police Chief Major General Mohammed Jalil Khalaf Shuwayl was
regarded favorably by coalition officials in Basrah, his force was heavily infiltrated and
corrupt.62 Jalil’s predecessor had said in 2005 that he trusted only a quarter of his officers,
a figure Jalil frequently repeated to coalition counterparts.63 Given the circumstances,
Basrah’s “good cops” felt outnumbered and intimidated into submission, with much of
the militia-infiltrated police effectively a part of a power struggle among militant groups
rather than protectors of the population. The day after PIC, Jalil criticized the departing
British, declaring to a reporter: “They left me militia, they left me gangsters, and they left
me all the troubles in the world.”64
Basrah’s Descent into Chaos
Despite Shaw’s and Binns’s theory about the proximate cause of Basrah’s unrest, violence and crime skyrocketed within the city shortly after the British pullout. With the
Iraqi forces too weak and unwilling to confront the militias alone, Basrah’s militias had
free rein to compete violently for political control, to access economic resources and oil,
and to control the security forces especially in neighborhoods such as Qibla and Hayaniyah, Sadr City-like slums developed to accommodate rural migration to the city in the
1970s and 1980s.65 Kidnapping, murder, extortion, rape, torture, and intimidation became
commonplace in a city once a popular vacation destination on the Persian Gulf. On February 11, 2008, CBS reporter Richard Butler was kidnapped from his hotel by JAM members wearing police uniforms.66 The same month the director of the Basrah Electricity
Department was kidnapped. Violence became so prevalent that Basrawis held a protest
on March 8 to criticize the security forces for failing to protect the city, while local politicians began calling contacts in the central government for help.67
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Basrah’s intellectuals, doctors, security officials, and former Ba’athists increasingly
were targeted as Shi’a militias implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic law, purged
secular thinking, and sought revenge against the Ba’ath. Barbers were also singled out
for their willingness to commit the heretical crime of shaving beards. Attacks against
women, usually carried out by militiamen bent on punishing “prostitutes” (women who
were simply not dressed conservatively enough in public), became a focal point for the
violence, making international headlines. According to the provincial council, 133 Basrawi women were murdered in 2007, though unofficial numbers were much higher.68 In
late November 2007, police chief Jalil handed coalition officials folders with photographs
detailing the murders of 45 women, the majority of them executed in the preceding 3
months for purportedly violating the militia’s strict interpretation of Sharia law. Most
of the women were shot in the face, two were beheaded, and some tortured to death.
Another 35 women reportedly were murdered in the first quarter of 2008.69
One of the unintended consequences of repositioning British forces outside the city
was the loss of MND-SE’s situational awareness inside Basrah. Binns noted that, “coming
out of the city did have an impact on my situational awareness. I found it difficult to keep
track of what was going on in the city,” a factor that made it hard for MND-SE to gauge
the downward spiral of the security environment inside the city, 6 kilometers away.70
Even the British truce with JAM leader Ahmen al-Fartusi began to break down by January 2008. Once MND-SE released Fartusi in December 2007 and the last remaining JAM
prisoner in January 2008, the British no longer had any leverage over the militia. While
indirect-fire attacks onto the MND-SE bases had dropped significantly after the accommodation with JAM, they continued nonetheless, with 5 in September, 9 in October, 11 in
November, and 12 in December. In January and February 2008, rocket attacks on Basrah
Air Station reached levels similar to the previous summer, before the truce with Fartusi.71
When pressed by MND-SE, Fartusi claimed that rogue or non-JAM affiliated groups
were responsible for the renewed attacks.72 While Fartusi was likely duplicitous, there
were doubtless some JAM Special Groups commanders ignoring him, and other militias,
like Thar Allah and Sayyed al-Shahadda, who were not beholden to the Fartusi deal or to
the mainstream JAM groups.
Eventually word began to reach Baghdad that Basrah was in crisis. Although MND-SE
lacked adequate information to report to MNC-I on the security situation inside the city,
Iraqi authorities and politicians in Basrah reported independently to Maliki and the Iraqi
cabinet on the dire state of affairs. Alarmed by these reports, Maliki dispatched Iraqi
vice Chief of Defense General Nasier Abadi from Baghdad in early January to investigate conditions in Basrah, and Abadi returned with a grim report of a city in chaos, with
beleaguered Iraqi security forces (ISF) units outgunned and outnumbered by militants.
In February 2008, Binns’s newly arrived replacement, Major General Barney White-Spunner, General Officer Commanding the 3d (UK) Mechanized Division, quickly reached a
similar conclusion. “[I]t was absolutely clear that we needed an operation to clear the
Shi’a militias out of the city,” White- Spunner later recalled, though for such an operation
to be effective, he believed it “really had to be Iraqi-led with us in support.”73 U.S. officials
stationed with MND-SE in Basrah also frequently reported on the downward trend in
the city in early 2008. “At some point in the very near future coalition forces will need to
go kinetic in Basrah—the situation has gotten that bad,” one U.S. official told the visiting
Odierno in early 2008.74 Odierno was highly sympathetic to the arguments, but stressed
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the difficult balance between pushing the British to be more forward leaning and the
political imperative to keep them in the coalition. Once MNC-I had dealt with Mosul, it
could then turn its attention to Basrah, Odierno said.

Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 3d Class Jannine Hartmann (Released).

Major General Barney White-Spunner.75
General Freiji’s Plan to Regain Government Control over Basrah
As the security situation in Basrah worsened, Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji
formed a plan to regain control of the city, loosely based on the security framework
for Belfast in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as on recent U.S. successes in other parts of
Iraq.76 British forces continued to train Iraqi security forces, which would later establish
checkpoints and outposts across the city. Over several months, more Iraqi troops became
available as they completed their training, and the Iraqi security forces would build
new outposts before finally confronting the militias. The plan also called for increased
patrols along the border to prevent Iranian assistance to the Shi’a militias. Beginning in
the summer of 2008, Freiji envisioned that Iraqi troops would commence a 6-week weapons amnesty and buy-back program, followed by house-to-house clearing operations.77
Unlike Operation SINBAD, Freiji’s plan would put Iraqi troops in the operational lead for
the first time, and add sufficient numbers of troops to clear and hold territory.
On March 4 and 5, Freiji briefed his plan to Iraqi and coalition leaders in Baghdad,
including Maliki, Petraeus, Austin, White-Spunner, and the Iraqi security ministers.78 The
U.S. officers were not impressed with Freiji’s concept or his presentation of it. “Mohan’s
plan is not fully resourced, and his timeline is overly optimistic,” Petraeus reported
to Gates.79 With the total number of U.S. brigades dropping to pre-surge levels by the
summer, MNC-I would only be able to tackle one problem at a time and was necessarily
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focused on finishing the campaign against AQI in Mosul. U.S. commanders also saw some
inherent problems with the plan, particularly Freiji’s desire to fall back on the Saddam
Hussein-era tactics of cordoning and bombarding populated areas, not accounting for
the use of special operations, and not having a reconstruction plan. Petraeus directed the
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) commander, Lieutenant
General James M. Dubik, to help improve Freiji’s plan and suggested reconvening on
March 21, with coalition plans for the northern offensive against AQI proceeding in the
meantime.80
As the coalition looked toward Mosul, however, Maliki became more focused on
Basrah. The Prime Minister raised the subject during the March 16 Ministerial Committee on National Security, arguing that the lawlessness in the southern city presented
a greater problem than Mosul. Maliki and several of his ministers seemed genuinely
concerned about Basrah’s security. As the U.S.-led surge had begun to quell the Sunni
insurgency in late 2007, Maliki could afford to start looking at other areas that posed
a threat to his government, and Basrah clearly stood out. Furthermore, Maliki increasingly saw Moqtada Sadr and JAM as his primary political competition. In April 2007,
the Sadrists had pulled their six ministers from Maliki’s cabinet over their demand for a
timeline forcing the departure of U.S. troops, and in September, the Sadrists quit Maliki’s
United Iraqi Alliance bloc in the Council of Representatives, leaving him to govern with
a narrow majority.81 Maliki also was upset that Basrah’s economically vital port of Umm
Qasr was entirely under Sadrist control.82 For Maliki, Sadr was no longer a Shi’a ally of
convenience, but a political rival to be eliminated. By breaking the Sadrist grip on Basrah,
restoring order, and delivering on economic growth, Maliki likely believed he could set
up his Da’wa Party to win the south in the provincial elections scheduled for late 2008.

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie Informs General David Petraeus
on March 21, 2008, of Prime Minister Maliki’s Intention to Initiate
an Offensive in Basrah.83
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At the scheduled March 21 meeting to review Freiji’s plan, Rubaie pulled Petraeus
aside and informed him that Maliki had decided to accelerate plans for a security operation in Basrah and wanted to meet Petraeus the following day to discuss the matter.
When Petraeus met Maliki, the Prime Minister blamed the British for Basrah’s faltering security, announced he was deploying additional Iraqi security forces to the city,
and revealed that he would travel to Basrah the following day with his own AK47 to
deal with the situation. Stunned by Maliki’s plans, Petraeus argued vehemently that the
government’s forces were not ready to execute the operation. If Maliki insisted on an
operation in Basrah, Petraeus advised, the Iraqi leader should wait for more deliberate
preparations to be made. When Maliki made it clear that he intended to go south immediately, a chagrined Petraeus advised him to “take lots of money to Basra to help with
inevitable logistical difficulties.” Petraeus offered to provide “movement support, intelligence support, aviation-related maintenance and logistics support, and liaison teams to
work with Iraqi special operations forces and to assist with close air support and attack
helicopters, should they prove necessary.”84
The Prime Minister’s decision took MND-SE by surprise as well. Having seen at the
early March plan briefings in Baghdad that Lieutenant General Freiji’s operation was
not imminent, White- Spunner had departed on leave to Germany, where he planned to
brief the soon-to-arrive British 7th Brigade on the additional resources needed to support
Freiji’s plan, though the British commander quickly returned on learning of Maliki’s new
intentions.85 Sitting in for White-Spunner at a conference with Austin and the coalition
division commanders in Baghdad on March 21, the same day Petraeus learned of Maliki’s
Basrah plans, Brigadier Julian Free, Commander, 4th (UK) Infantry Brigade, had listened
to Austin describe the impending MNC-I operation against AQI in the north. “All I need
from you, Julian,” Austin said, “is to avoid opening a second front for us.”86 The Iraqi
Prime Minister’s surprise move, however, caused Free to return immediately to Basrah,
where the British brigadier found himself reporting to Austin that a second front was
indeed opening, less than 24 hours after the MNC-I commander’s injunction.87
“Maliki Has Bit Off More Than He Can Chew”
Despite their determination to restore Basrah to government control, Maliki and several of his advisers clearly misunderstood the scale of the problem. During the March
meetings in Baghdad, Rubaie had charged that Freiji was exaggerating the extent of the
problem and characterized it, as former MND-SE commanders Shaw and Binns had
done, as a criminal problem rather than an insurgent one.88 Even Maliki said the problem was caused by “criminals and gang leaders” in his March 22 meeting with Petraeus.
Failing to understand how deeply the militias had become entrenched as they vied to
take control of Basrah, the Iraqi leaders underestimated how fierce the militia resistance
would be.89 This misperception was likely compounded by Maliki’s quick success in leading Iraqi forces to stop the intra-Shi’a violence in Karbala in August 2007. On March 24,
Maliki, Minister of Defense Abdel Qader al-Obeidi, Minister of National Security Affairs
Shirwan al-Waeli, and military advisers from MNF-I and the CJSOTF arrived at Basrah
Palace, where they planned to direct Iraqi operations to retake the city.90 Interior Minister
Jawad Bolani, who feared flying, drove down separately in an armored convoy. Angry
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with the British for having made an accommodation with Fartusi to cede the city to militia
control, Maliki did not consult with MND-SE about the impending operation and even
ejected British officers from meetings that day. Despite Maliki’s hostility, Brigadier Free
took the precautionary step of sending the commander of the Royal Dragoon Guards to
help advise Freiji at the Basrah Operations Command in the Shatt al-Arab Hotel.91
Confident of an easy victory, Maliki ordered Freiji to execute Operation CHARGE OF
THE KNIGHTS (or SAWLAT AL-FORSAN) the next morning, despite the fact that Iraqi
reinforcing units, including the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, with its U.S. Marine
military transition teams (MiTTs) were still en route. At dawn on March 25, nearly 10,000
Iraqi police and soldiers of the newly formed 14th Iraqi Army Division convoyed into
militia-controlled districts to cordon them off and search suspected militia locations.
They were driving into a trap. Because of militia infiltration in the police and army,
JAM commanders had plenty of time to mobilize their estimated 6,000 fighters and prepare complex small arms and IED ambushes for the government convoys. Once the Iraqi
columns entered militia neighborhoods and met stiff resistance, their advance immediately halted and their units fell into disarray. Without U.S. or British advisers embedded in the Iraqi brigades, coalition aircraft could not engage militia targets or evacuate
wounded Iraqi soldiers, leaving U.S. F-16s on station merely to fly extremely low in a
show of force.
At the Basrah Operations Command, General Freiji seemed to have lost control of the
operation. Lacking communications equipment, Freiji relied on several mobile phones
and a map to issue orders.92 The bifurcation of command between Freiji at the operations
center and Maliki at Basrah Palace further complicated coordination. Freiji had failed to
impress coalition counterparts in his planning, and he did the same when the fighting
began. At one point, Freiji asked his British counterparts for air or artillery strikes to take
out militia positions. When asked to point out specific locations, he shouted, “Here!”
as he waved his arm across the entire map of the city.93 More importantly, Freiji, under
pressure from Maliki, scrapped the methodical plan he had developed with coalition
assistance to retake Basrah district by district, and instead began to conduct hasty attacks
with little thought for logistics or troop strength.
As Maliki’s and Freiji’s plans began to break down, JAM indirect-fire teams launched
repeated rocket and mortar salvos at Basrah Palace, killing the head of Maliki’s security
detail and forcing the Prime Minister to seek cover for hours. Frustrated with the ISFs’
poor performance and eager to deflect blame, Maliki announced that he was relieving
Freiji of command in favor of Major General Abdel Aziz al-Ubaydi, although to everyone’s confusion, Freiji remained in his headquarters and continued to issue orders after
this edict.94 Conditions were not any better for Freiji at his operations center in the Shatt
al-Arab Hotel, which also was targeted by heavy mortar, rocket-propelled grenades, and
sniper fire throughout the day.
By the end of the first day of Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, it was clear
the militias were winning. JAM ambushes had killed about 50 Iraqi soldiers, wounded
another 120, and destroyed dozens of vehicles, while the militia groups had lost approximately 40 fighters.95 Not only did the militiamen prevent the Iraqi Army from achieving
any of its objectives, but they also seized some provincial government buildings overnight. The 14th Iraqi Army Division’s 52d Brigade, full of new recruits, had fallen into
360

CRESCENDO: MALIKI AGAINST THE SADRISTS

disarray on the first day, with some of its soldiers beginning to desert as the fighting
turned to their enemies’ advantage.
Similarly, nearly two-thirds of the Iraqi police either deserted or discarded their uniforms to fight alongside the militiamen.96 Only after Iraqi troops began to stream back
into Shaibah Logistics Base west of the city did the 1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment
of Scotland (The Royal Scots Borderers), and MND-SE learn how poorly the attack had
gone.97
U.S. leaders in Baghdad soon realized that Maliki had precipitated a crisis that could
derail the entire coalition campaign in Iraq. Conferring among themselves, Petraeus
and Crocker concluded that they could not allow the Prime Minister to fail and give the
Sadrists a major military and political victory. Even as Maliki’s troops reeled from the
first day’s fighting, Petraeus and Austin quickly shifted resources and key personnel to
Basrah, making the Prime Minister’s operation the MNC-I main effort. At Tallil Airfield
in Dhi Qar Province, four AH-64 Apaches and two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were
dispatched to provide attack and medevac support. Elements of the Iraqi special operations forces (ISOF) Brigade with their CJSOTF advisers were flown from Baghdad on
multiple lifts of MC-130 aircraft, joining the regional ISOF Battalion already stationed in
Basrah. The Baghdad Emergency Response Unit and Hillah Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), two elite Interior Ministry units similarly advised by CJSOTF operational
detachment alpha (ODA) units, also rushed to Basrah.98 At MND-SE, Brigadier Free also
issued a “be-prepared” order for the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, to reenter Basrah if necessary with 14 Challenger II tanks and 40 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, a maneuver
that Whitehall had expressly forbidden before the battle.99 On the same night of March
25, special operators from CJSOTF that MND-SE previously had prohibited from entering the city due to the Fartusi truce were able to make their way to Freiji’s headquarters,
while Rear Admiral Edward G. Winters III, a U.S. Navy SEAL in charge of Iraqi special
operations training, went to Basrah Palace by vehicle convoy. Army Colonel James H.
Coffman arrived at Basrah Palace to advise Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, and reported
to Petraeus that the operation stood a 50-50 chance of success.100
Despite the bad turn of events on March 25, the next day Maliki publicly demanded
that the militias lay down their arms and hand over their leaders within 72 hours. Fighting continued on March 26 and spread beyond Basrah to the southern Iraqi cities of Kut,
Diwaniya, and Hillah, as well as to Zubayr, about 8 kilometers southwest of Basrah, where
militiamen overran two police stations. The next day, the fighting spread to Nasiriyah,
where the local Iraqi SWAT unit and its CJSOTF advisers fought off JAM militants in a
56-hour battle.101 The Basrah confrontation was escalating into a war between the Sadrists
and the government across the entire south.
On March 27, Austin and U.S. Embassy’s political-military counselor Marcie Ries flew
to Basrah and then to the Basrah Palace to meet with Maliki. Still upset with the British,
Maliki embarrassed Brigadier Free by ejecting him from the meeting, after which the
Iraqi leader criticized the United Kingdom for letting militias take control of Basrah and
MNF-I for not doing enough to help in the present crisis, before demanding more coalition air support. Providing close air support was problematic, because the forward air
controllers in the military transition teams were still en route and the Iraqi units in the
city seemed neither to understand fully the rules of engagement nor to be able to provide
MND-SE with accurate coordinates. Calming down Maliki, Austin convinced the Iraqi
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leader to allow coalition advisers, including the British, to integrate more closely with
Iraqi units to help provide the air support he requested. Maliki also ordered additional
Iraqi units to deploy to Basrah, including the 1st Iraqi Army Division’s headquarters and
the rest of its 1st Brigade, as well as alerting four other divisions to be prepared to offer
support.102
Meanwhile, JAM groups launched a counterattack throughout Basrah, in what was
to become the militia’s high-water mark during the operation. Police chief Jalil’s convoy
was hit by an IED that killed 3 of his guards, after which Jalil reported that 28 police stations and army strong points had been simultaneously attacked at dawn. Hundreds of
police officers were still defecting to the militias, and in the city’s Maqil District, militiamen who had overrun a police station and checkpoint and blocked an ISF relief column
trying to reach beleaguered troops at the Camp Apache ammunition depot. This time,
the inexperienced 52d Brigade, 14th Iraqi Army Division, located in positions close to the
JAM stronghold neighborhoods of Hayaniyah and Qibla, faced the worst of the fighting
and simply disintegrated, with half of its 3,000 soldiers deserting.103
The Iraqi Army in Basrah, already demoralized by its defeats at the hands of the
Sadrists, began to come apart as the weakness of the Iraqi logistics system derailed the
Prime Minister’s offensive operations. A CJSOTF adviser who observed Iraqi planning
efforts in Basrah Palace noted in a March 28 report: “There is no logistical resupply or
support plan. The majority, if not all Iraqi forces are critically short of food, fuel, water,
and ammunition. In several cases, units have none of the previous supply items mentioned. The reported average ammunition stores in the IA [Iraqi Army] are 4 magazines
per man, but it is likely less than that. All of the commanders appear to understand that
they are being led to disaster.”104 Without their own combat service support units, Iraqi
Army units had been relying on privately owned gas stations to refuel their vehicles and
local markets to purchase food, but when these closed down due to fighting, the Iraqis
had no alternatives.105 Iraqi forces requested U.S. and British air support to stem the rout
of their forces, but as before, the Iraqis’ lack of situational awareness and disinclination
to mitigate civilian casualties sometimes led the coalition representatives to refrain from
conducting the strikes. On one occasion, Iraqi commanders handed American advisers a
napkin with numbers on it and instructed them to “bomb here.” When the advisers could
not translate the numbers into grid coordinates, the Iraqis explained that the numbers
were, in fact, a phone number, and that the man who answered the phone would know
the location to bomb. When the Americans called the number, they were told to “bomb
the white truck in the intersection . . . we know you can see the truck,” with no other
explanation.106
As these actions unfolded in Basrah, the fighting also intensified in Baghdad, where
JAM fighters from Sadr City and other militia-dominated neighbors had begun coordinated attacks against the coalition and the Iraqi Government. What had begun as a shortterm security operation in one city was becoming a full-blown Shi’a civil war, with the
Maliki government’s fate in the balance. Writing to Gates on March 30, Petraeus reported
“at this point, my assessment is that Prime Minister Maliki has bit off more than he can
chew in Basra.”
Maliki “remains in his own world,” Petraeus judged, and the Iraqi leader had “put the
credibility of his government on the line in Basra.”107 The biggest problem, in Petraeus’s
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view, was the mismatch between Maliki’s “publicly stated objectives,” essentially to eliminate the militias, and the actual capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to do it. Petraeus
noted that the coalition was trying to provide Maliki with as much advice as possible “to
improve planning and to help the Iraqis establish a battle rhythm” and provide essential enablers such as attack aviation, ISR coverage, and logistics. Such enablers, Petraeus
said, could “put Maliki in an advantageous position for future negotiations” based on
Ambassador Crocker’s recommendation to Maliki to “think hard about a political agreement to enable this to come to as good a conclusion as possible.”108 However, the MNF-I
commander appeared to have little faith that Maliki could actually win outright the civil
war he had inadvertently entered.
Reinforcements Arrive
The situation in Basrah remained tense on March 28. Realizing that something needed
to be done to repair Maliki’s relationship with the British and to provide more coalition
surveillance and air support to the Iraqis, Austin had dispatched his MNC-I deputy commander, U.S. Marine Major General George J. Flynn, and several hundred U.S. personnel
to Basrah, including a 120-member Marine Corps tactical operations center to integrate
into the MND-SE headquarters and the Basrah Operations Center. The arrival of so many
Americans at the British headquarters was awkward. On one hand, many on the British
staff realized that the truce with Fartusi, the British drawdown, and a lack of political will
were some of the root causes for the violence in Basrah and they welcomed the U.S. assistance. Others saw it as an American takeover of MND-SE. For White-Spunner and Free,
however, the open fighting in Basrah meant that the truce was no longer in effect, the
gloves needed to come off, and U.S. involvement was needed to stave off disaster. In any
case, the arrival of the MNC-I contingent and the Marine Corps’ aviation assets suddenly
gave MND-SE a capacity and combat power the British had not had in Basrah since 2003.
Flying immediately into Basrah, Flynn and Free met with Lieutenant General Freiji
(who continued in his job thanks to his decades-long relationship with Defense Minister
Abdel Qader) and the newly appointed 14th Iraqi Army Division commander, Major
General Aziz Swaidy, to advise the Iraqis on how to salvage the situation. At the same
time, U.S. F-16s, F/A-18s, Predators, and AH-64 Apaches began to hunt down the JAM
rocket teams attacking Iraqi and MND-SE bases, while the first U.S. MiTT with the lead
battalion of the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, arrived and immediately called in
air strikes to relieve 14th Division troops pinned down near Basrah University. “Once we
had forward air controllers on the ground to verify targets, it really made a difference,”
Free reported later.109 Help had finally arrived.
Between March 29 and 30, the rest of the Iraqi reinforcements trickled into the city.
Troops from Colonel Charles A. Flynn’s 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, also arrived
from Tallil to embed with the Iraqis and to help MND-SE coordinate fires. Meanwhile, on
March 29, Iraqi special operations forces and their CJSOTF mentors commenced Operation LIGHTNING ANVIL, a series of nightly raids into the city with the support of the
Scots Guards’ Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles that would kill 75 militia fighters over
the following month.110 The British Task Force SPARTAN also would assist, conducting
covert surveillance on targets for the strike teams.111
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As White-Spunner returned to Basrah on March 30, the reinforced Iraqi units and their
coalition enablers were finally massing to retake the city. White-Spunner and Free agreed
to insert British MiTTs with the 14th Iraqi Division and then retroactively requested permission from London the next day, though given that the United Kingdom’s reputation
was on the line, there was little chance of the request being denied. Rhine Company, 1st
Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, and D Squadron, Royal Dragoon Guards,
were assigned to the 14th Iraqi Army Division’s three brigades, as well as to Freiji’s
headquarters. The decision to embed British advisers marked a major shift in the British
approach to Basrah. By April 1, 14 of the 38 Iraqi units in the city had coalition MiTTs
attached to them.112
The Tide Turns
Despite the coalition and Iraqi reinforcements, the situation remained fragile, and to
some Iraqi leaders in Baghdad seemed on the point of failure. With Maliki away from
Baghdad and disheartening reports coming out of Basrah, some of Maliki’s political
opponents sought to take advantage of what they perceived to be the Prime Minister’s
misstep. Expectedly, the Sadrists, with help from former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari and Ahmad Chalabi, began an attempt to engineer a no-confidence vote against
Maliki, while an Iraqi Parliamentary delegation flew to Tehran to consult with the Iranians about the crisis. Under Iranian pressure to negotiate, Moqtada Sadr issued a ninepoint cease-fire letter on that day, instructing his followers to cooperate with the Iraqi
Government and labeling those who publicly displayed their weapons as criminals, even
though his steps fell short of the Iraqi Government demand that the Sadrists lay down
their arms. In exchange for the Sadrists’ disarmament, Maliki’s government promised to
leave the rest of the Sadrists alone and allow them to participate in the next elections.113
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The political situation in Baghdad looked grim for the Prime Minister, whose allies
found themselves on the defensive as the Sadrists attempted to organize a no-confidence
vote in the Iraqi Parliament. Back in Basrah, however, events outpaced the political negotiations in Baghdad and continued to turn in the Prime Minister’s favor. At noon on
March 30, Royal Dragoon Guards’ tanks crashed through blockades in Hayaniyah to
allow the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, to fight the militia for an hour before pulling back. Simultaneously, Interior Minister Bolani and a force of 300 men advanced to
the port at Umm Qasr and found that militia groups had already abandoned it and had
unwisely all gone to Basrah to take part in the battle there.114 Having achieved a symbolic
victory and survived a week of militia bombardment, Maliki flew back to Baghdad on
April 1 to deal with the political crisis that had arisen in his absence.
As the Prime Minister departed Basrah, beleaguered Basrawis, ready for change after
months of being terrorized by the militias and angry at JAM for turning its weapons on
the Iraqi security forces, began reporting the names and locations of hundreds of militia members on anonymous tip lines set up by MND-SE. Basrah’s Shi’a citizenry, fed
up with the militias’ criminal behavior and religious extremism, welcomed the arrival
of the mostly Sunni Iraqi Army reinforcements, who had deployed from the 1st Iraqi
Army Division in Anbar Province. The integration of the MiTTs with Iraqi units also had
increased the effectiveness of coalition air strikes and restored confidence to the Iraqi
troops. Coalition staff support at Iraqi headquarters improved coordination between the
disparate Iraqi security forces. More importantly, it allowed Flynn, White-Spunner, and
Free to help Lieutenant General Freiji develop a more coherent plan to clear Basrah’s districts systematically, instead of Freiji’s erratic headlong rushes into the city. While Freiji
preferred to conduct yet another hasty attack on the JAM stronghold of Hayaniyah, Flynn
and MND-SE convinced him to establish freedom of maneuver by first regaining control
of the city’s main arteries. On April 2, Iraqi troops successfully cleared militia roadblocks
and seized key intersections, while coalition air support easily destroyed militia fighters
defending in the open.115

Source: DoD photo by Corporal Daniel Angel (Released).

Marines and Iraqi Forces During Fighting in the Latif District of Basrah on
May 3, 2008.116
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The same evening, Maliki announced a 7-day cease-fire (eventually extended to 11
days), though militia elements continued heavy indirect-fire attacks against Iraqi and
MND-SE bases. The next day, the Prime Minister also announced plans to create 25,000
jobs for Basrah and to spend $100 million for reconstruction.117 The lull allowed Iraqi
Government officials to implement a modestly successful weapons buy-back program,
reestablish logistics, receive additional reinforcements (including the 7th Iraqi Army
Division’s 26th Brigade with its U.S. Army MiTTs), and organize for future clearing operations as MND-SE gathered vital targeting information.118 With the arrival of the 26th
Brigade, Maliki’s forces in Basrah now included two Sunni-majority brigades from Anbar
whose soldiers and officers had no qualms about fighting against Basrah’s Shi’a militias,
a dramatic change from the militia-influenced local Iraqi Army and police units.
Determined to press his advantage against the Sadrists, Prime Minister Maliki used
the terms of the cease-fire to continue operations by relabeling Operation CHARGE OF
THE KNIGHTS a law-enforcement operation focused on arresting criminals based on
warrants, and not directed against any particular group.119 Mainstream JAM members
generally upheld the cease-fire, though some Special Groups ignored it and continued to
fight. With these initiatives in motion, Maliki won a political victory when, at an April 5
meeting of Iraq’s major political parties, the mainstream Shi’a, Kurdish, and Sunni parties unanimously sided with the Prime Minister rather than with the Sadrists. Reporting
to Gates on April 6, a cautiously optimistic Petraeus noted that JAM had been “bruised
during the last couple of weeks” and their “supplies fairly exhausted.” “Overall, it
appears that Prime Minister Maliki’s government is emerging from this crisis on a fairly
solid basis,” the MNF-I commander assessed, an outcome he had not contemplated when
Maliki began his ill-advised expedition 2 weeks earlier.120
SINBAD Redux
When Maliki’s cease-fire ended on April 12, Iraqi security forces spent the next 2
days isolating the militia strongholds in the Qibla, Hayaniyah, Timinyah, and Five-Mile
Districts, the same restive neighborhoods Operation SINBAD had failed to bring under
control 15 months before. The Sunni-majority 26th Brigade also successfully cleared the
Qibla area with little opposition, a fact that MND-SE leaders took as a sign of weakening
militia resistance. As the Iraqi troops swept through Qibla, they found large stockpiles of
abandoned arms collected on sidewalks, while local residents welcomed the Iraqi troops
and pointed out militia hideouts.121 Learning from the key mistake of Operation SINBAD,
Iraqi engineers constructed strongpoints at strategic sites after clearing these areas so
they could then be held. By chance, on April 14, soldiers from the 14th Iraqi Army Division’s 51st Brigade engaged a JAM cell firing from a house in the Jubailah District and
discovered the kidnapped CBS journalist Richard Butler inside.122
The same aspects of the Qibla clearing were repeated over the next 2 months as the
Iraqi brigades and their coalition advisers cleared other areas of the city. Seeing the ominous signs, large numbers of JAM members began to flee, many of them to the town
of Qurnah 70 kilometers to the northwest, or across the border to Iran. Most of their
senior leaders had already left. After being released by the British in December 2007,
Ahmed al-Fartusi had been recaptured in Baghdad on March 4—before CHARGE OF
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THE KNIGHTS began—in a coalition operation to capture Special Groups leader Hajji
Shibl, a member of Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous). Fartusi was meeting with Shibl ostensibly on behalf of the United Kingdom to negotiate the
release of the British hostages taken from the Finance Ministry in 2007, and was re-released by MNF-I shortly after his capture.123 When CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS began,
Fartusi fled to Beirut, where he issued threats against the British forces for breaking the
truce, an absurd accusation, considering the heavy JAM bombardment against British
and Iraqi Government troops.124 The notorious militia-linked Captain Jaffar of Basrah’s
Special Crimes Unit, who had been responsible for the 2005 abduction of two UK soldiers, escaped to Iran in the midst of the fighting, as did a number of other JAM leaders.125
The departure of JAM’s senior leaders after the first week of fighting significantly weakened the resolve of the remaining militiamen and resulted in an uncoordinated insurgent
defense of their districts, leading White-Spunner and others in MND-SE to express surprise at “how quickly the Shi’a militias crumbled.”126
From the early days of the operation, however, there had been signs that the Sadrist
militiamen in Basrah were not used to the kind of hard fighting against coalition troops
that the Shi’a militants of Baghdad had become accustomed to by 2008. As the Marine
Corps’ aviation assets arrived in Basrah during the weekend of March 28-29, for example, MND-SE and MNC-I officers had watched night-vision video feeds of militiamen
milling about the streets seemingly unaware that coalition sensors could detect them in
the dark. As a result, the clearing of JAM’s main base in the Hayaniyah District on April
19 turned out to be anticlimactic. MND-SE’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) identified
militia fighting positions and IED emplacements for the Iraqis days before the assault.
On the morning of the attack, British artillery fired a large number of flares and noise
rounds to frighten the remaining militiamen before eight Iraqi Army battalions moved in
against little resistance. Flynn advised General Freiji to attack the district north to south
to ensure that units did not get too far ahead of their line of advance, while Freiji wanted
to conduct multiple attacks at different entry points. Freiji agreed to Flynn’s suggestion,
but changed plans the morning of the attack by rushing into the heart of the district with
only his personal security detail and four tanks, luckily finding no resistance. Iraqi forces
discovered over the next 2 days an estimated 50 caches with approximately 150 IEDs, 200
rockets, and 300 mortars.127
The remaining clearing operations in Basrah city followed a similar pattern as in Qibla
and Hayaniyah, and finally ended on May 6 in the Latif District. General Freiji left Basrah
the next day, replaced by the able Major General Mohammed Jawad al-Hawadi, who had
been present and performed well throughout the operation. Freiji returned to Baghdad
to become an adviser to his old friend, Minister of Defense Abdel Qader, while Basrah’s
police chief, General Jalil, was reassigned to a staff position in Baghdad.
Hawadi’s first test as Freiji’s successor was to clear the town of Qurnah on May 13.
Freiji, who had planned the operation before his departure, was insistent on clearing the
town despite Flynn’s warnings that coalition air support was in short supply, having since
been reallocated to support operations in Baghdad and northern Iraq.128 Even without
extensive air support, however, the operation went smoothly, highlighting that Sadrist
resistance had completely collapsed and marking the close of Operation CHARGE OF
THE KNIGHTS.
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For JAM, the battlefield defeat in Basrah had been severe. Interior Minister Bolani estimated that 210 Sadrist militiamen had been killed, 600 wounded, and 155 captured, numbers that represented about one-sixth of JAM’s original fighting strength in Basrah.129 The
coalition had 4 killed and 15 wounded. The result of the 50-day operation was unchallenged Iraqi Government control of Basrah, which was now occupied by about 20,000
Iraqi soldiers loyal to the Maliki government to ensure that the city did not fall back into
Sadrist hands.130
THE BATTLE FOR SADR CITY
By the time the battle in Basrah had shifted in favor of Maliki and the coalition, a
new and even bigger battle had opened in Baghdad, where the Sadrists and their allies
undertook a large-scale attack against the Green Zone, the site of the U.S. Embassy and
MNF-I headquarters and the seat of government for the absent Prime Minister Maliki.
The Sadrist offensive prompted, in turn, a fierce battle for Sadr City that had been years
in the making.
The Quintessential Safe Haven
Sadr City had been a thorn in the side of the coalition for years and had only grown
more dangerous for coalition units over time. Since the deadly April 2004 ambush that
killed eight 1st Cavalry Division Soldiers at the outset of the April uprisings, the coalition
had had only a limited presence in and around the Sadrist-dominated neighborhood.
Within Sadr City, roughly three categories of insurgent fighters enjoyed a safe haven. JAM
fighters loyal to Moqtada Sadr concentrated on defending the Shi’a population in Sadr
City and other Shi’a enclaves under the authority of the Office of the Martyr Sadr. The
Shi’a militant Special Groups, meanwhile, received specialized training in Iran and were
employed throughout the capital in a more offensive role under the authority of Iranian-sponsored militias such as Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq or Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis’ Kata’ib Hizballah. The third element was a criminal component that exploited
the lawlessness and violence in the city, operating much like a mafia organization but
invoking the name of JAM to cover its activities. Together, these militants totaled an
estimated 1,000-2,000 active fighters in Sadr City, but coalition officials believed Moqtada
Sadr could mobilize as many as 20,000 for a larger uprising.131

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Jason Bailey, Joint Combat Camera Center, (Released).

A View of the Sadr City Area of Baghdad, March 29, 2008.132
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The isolation of Sadr City from the rest of Baghdad had begun with the onset of the
surge in early 2007. Colonel Billy Don Farris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the first
surge brigade, was assigned much of east Baghdad, including the restive Adhamiyah
and Sadr City, two districts with a combined population approaching 3 million people,
approximately 40 percent of Baghdad’s total. “We occupied a piece of terrain that had
turned south and had one company living in it . . . and we didn’t know who was who
when we started. It was time to start over,” Farris later recalled.133 Before the surge and
Farris’s arrival, northeast Baghdad had been assigned to a U.S. battalion headquartered
40 kilometers away on the large U.S. forward-operating base near Taji, but once given
responsibility for the area, Farris’s brigade began to erect massive 4-meter-high concrete
walls to control population flow across east Baghdad. At the same time, the paratroopers
set about targeting and dismantling insurgent networks and installing joint security stations and combat outposts to keep a closer watch on the neighborhoods alongside local
Iraqi units.
Unlike the rest of his area of operations, however, Farris was not able to move directly
against militants inside Sadr City. The coalition’s agreement with Maliki to restrict operations in the politically sensitive Shi’a neighborhood meant Farris was limited to isolating
the enclave and conducting occasional targeted strikes against JAM and Special Groups
leaders.134 Moqtada Sadr had declared a 6-month cease-fire after the Karbala fiasco in
August, but the cleric’s subtle wording essentially authorized the Special Groups to continue attacking coalition forces. A number of militia leaders disregarded Sadr’s orders in
any case—a fact that enabled the coalition to better distinguish Special Groups leaders
from the more loyal JAM commanders who observed Sadr’s directive.135
One raid against JAM leaders in fall 2007 illustrated the difficulty of operating against
the militants who used Sadr City as a base. A U.S. detachment making a nighttime raid
on October 20 to capture a lieutenant of militia leader Abu Dura was surprised by dozens
of militiamen and forced to call for close air support. According to MNF-I estimates, the
ensuing air strikes killed more than 40 JAM fighters, but the Sadrists were quick to claim
that the coalition had killed dozens of civilians, including worshippers at a Shi’a mosque.
The controversy over collateral damage immediately became a political crisis. Clearly
under pressure from the Sadrists, Maliki demanded that MNF-I seek his approval for any
future coalition activities in and around Sadr City.136 Petraeus reported to Gates that “we
thus find ourselves walking a fine line between conducting aggressive operations against
Shi’a extremists (particularly targets in Sadr City) and keeping the GOI [Government of
Iraq] on board to negotiate the UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] and
Strategic Partnership Declaration.”137 Concerned that the incident could push Maliki and
other Shi’a parties into opposing the renewal of the soon-to-expire UNSCR that authorized the coalition’s presence in the country, Petraeus agreed that any further action in
Sadr City would require joint approval from Maliki and MNF-I.
While Farris’s freedom of action was further curtailed following the controversial
October raid, he insisted that much more needed to be done in Sadr City, which had
become an even more dangerous insurgent safe haven after the raid.138 Farris had a point.
The cohesion of the Sadrist movement had been strained for years, but the ability to
retain the Sadr City sanctuary allowed JAM and the Iranian-backed Special Groups freedom of movement the ability to project power against the coalition and Maliki’s Iraqi
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Government forces throughout Baghdad.139 By the time Farris handed over his area to
Colonel Hort’s 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on March 10, 2008, Farris’s brigade had
constricted Sadr City by encircling it with checkpoints and joint security stations.140 Farris
remained frustrated because he could not do more directly, as did Hammond, who told
his staff at MND-B that “sooner or later we are going to have to deal with Sadr City. It just
can’t sit there. It just can’t be a haven.”141

Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Luis Orengo (Released).

Major General Jeffery Hammond, Commander of MND-B, Greets Baghdad’s
Governor Tah’an.142
Nevertheless, Hammond’s clear priority for MND-B operations was AQI, which he
believed remained the “greatest threat to sustainable security” in Baghdad. Upon taking
command of MND-B in December 2007, Hammond had requested that the coalition’s
special operations forces reduce its focus on Shi’a militant targets in order to apply more
resources to pursuing AQI.143 The MND-B commander’s judgment put him somewhat
at odds with both Hort and Austin, who shared the view by spring 2008 that JAM and
the Special Groups, by virtue of their Iranian-supported explosively formed penetrators
(EFPs) network, posed the greatest danger to coalition troops in central Iraq.144
Fissures within the Sadr Movement
The political constraints on coalition actions against the Sadr City militants began to
loosen in January 2008 when the Sadrists sharpened their opposition to the Maliki government in Parliament and JAM groups precipitated a clash with Maliki’s closest advisers. On January 18, hundreds of JAM and Special Groups fighters surrounded a mosque
in the Shu’la neighborhood of northwest Baghdad, where Iraqi national security adviser
Mowaffaq Rubaie had gone to attend Ashura services. Demanding Rubaie’s surrender,
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the Sadrist fighters had only been thwarted by the timely arrival of an armored convoy
led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, which had enabled Rubaie’s escape through a hail
of stones and Molotov cocktails. The action did not lead to a wider clash but made the
Maliki government look weak and vulnerable in its own capital.145
In these actions, the Sadrists had begun to remove the political buffer between the
JAM/Special Groups sanctuary and a coalition intent on eliminating it.146 Targeting the
Sadr movement militants in the Baghdad region was complicated because it was unclear
who comprised the Special Groups and who really controlled JAM in Baghdad. To begin
with, opinions differed within the coalition and the Iraqi Government over which Shi’a
militant groups to target. For almost 2 years, MNF-I and its commands had considered
the Special Groups to be “Shi’a extremists” that were “irreconcilable” and under heavy
Iranian influence, and would have to be targeted by coalition units and special operators.
By contrast, coalition officials considered “mainstream JAM” groups—many of them
loyal to Moqtada Sadr—to be more nationalist and “reconcilable,” and better approached
by pressuring or enticing them to seek political avenues rather than violence to advance
their interests. Prime Minister Maliki and his advisers, however, took precisely the
opposite view. They believed that Moqtada Sadr was the one who had become extremist and irreconcilable, while the Special Groups—especially those under Qais al-Khazali
and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq—had more mature leaders who could be “reconciled” and persuaded to lay down their arms in favor of entering the political process. In political terms,
Maliki also continued to view Khazali as a preferred alternative to the troublesome Sadr,
one who could potentially split Sadr’s grassroots base and deliver some of it to Maliki’s Da’wa Party. To explore Maliki’s idea, coalition officials held discussions with the
captive Khazali in late 2007 and early 2008, during which Khazali spoke of wanting to
transform his militant group into a political party and sever ties with the Iranian regime.
It was unclear if he was sincere or if the Iran-based militant leaders running his organization, Akram Kabi and Mohammed Tabatabai, were interested in such ideas in any case.147
Indeed, similar “heretical” ideas on Sadr’s part had caused Khazali himself and others to
split from mainstream JAM.
The situation was further complicated by other Shi’a parties that tended to use nominal JAM groups to mask their own militant activities. This was particularly true of what
the Shi’a militants referred to as the “Khamenei groups,” former JAM fighters who had
been coopted by deputies of the Quds Force. Evidence also began to emerge in January 2008 that some Special Groups members were, in fact, Badr Corps members and
that some violence previously attributed to JAM actually originated from ISCI and Badr
operatives.148
Coalition officials were well aware of the troubled relationship between Moqtada
Sadr’s loyalists and the Special Groups. The attack on Rubaie in Shu’la had almost turned
into a clash between JAM militants loyal to Sadr and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq fighters loyal
to Khazali, who had quarreled outside Rubaie’s mosque over which group had the right
to take Rubaie prisoner. Sadr also had been harsh against “rogue JAM” commanders in
2007, sending “noble JAM” or “golden JAM” tribunals from Najaf and Karbala to enforce
discipline by expelling or even executing JAM commanders deemed to be disobedient
to Sadr’s leadership. These fractures had been exacerbated by disagreements within the
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Sadr movement over Sadr’s August 2007 freeze on JAM operations—disputes that began
to mount again as the expiration of the 6-month moratorium in late February approached.
As the freeze was set to expire, Sadr decided, with a dramatic flourish, to extend
JAM’s 6-month cease-fire by sending sealed envelopes to be opened by all of his clerics
at Friday sermons, where his decision was publicly announced in mosques across Iraq.
Because the movement was already fracturing, the renewed cease-fire did little to allay
concerns over Sadr’s ability to control whether it would be followed. Petraeus remained
hopeful that the splintering offered opportunities to accommodate the reconcilable element in the Sadr movement, but he cautioned Gates by stating that “we fully anticipate
that Iran will continue to pursue ways to exploit the Special Groups and other elements
and parties for their purposes as the Sadr movement fractures.”149 Two weeks later, in
early March, further signs of the disarray among JAM’s top ranks came when Sadr suddenly declared that he was temporarily withdrawing from his leadership responsibilities
to further his religious education.
The Sadrist Attack on the Green Zone
Coalition officials in Iraq at the time of the Basrah and Sadr City battles assumed
that the Sadrist attack against the coalition and the Iraqi Government in Baghdad in late
March was a response to Maliki’s operation against Sadrist militias in Basrah. In retrospect, however, signs appeared that the Sadrist offensive in Baghdad was a preplanned
operation whose start actually preceded the CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS. For instance,
Sadr’s extension of the freeze on JAM operations in late February exempted the Special
Groups, whom he authorized to resume attacks against the coalition. This was an important change in light of Sadr’s crackdown on rogue violators of the freeze order in late 2007
and early 2008. One likely sign of the resumption of Special Groups operations was that
EFP attacks and other violent incidents significantly increased in the week before Maliki
went to Basrah. In the week after Farris and Hort’s transfer of authority, violent incidents
in the city almost tripled from the previous week.150
Furthermore, the Shi’a militants’ indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone, which
marked the beginning of the Sadrist offensive, began 1 day before Maliki went to Basrah,
not after. On March 23, the militias began raining rockets—most of them fired from Sadr
City—at the Green Zone after a 6-month period in which indirect-fire attacks against the
zone had been almost nonexistent.
As the barrage of rockets fell on the seat of the Iraqi Government, the scale of the
Sadrist offensive was not immediately apparent. Rockets had fallen on the Green Zone
often, but this latest wave emerged as something new. Indirect-fire attacks gradually
escalated in the first 5 days of the Sadrist offensive (March 23-28), during which militants
launched 91 separate barrages that dropped a total of 344 rockets and mortar rounds on
the Green Zone, opening what became the most intense insurgent bombardment of the
entire war.151 These indirect-fire attacks coincided with a coordinated JAM assault against
all 11 ISF checkpoints around Sadr City belonging to the 11th Iraqi Army Division and
the 1st National Police Division. During the attacks, JAM gunmen abducted 14 Iraqi soldiers in Kadhimiyah District and kidnapped General Secretary of the Council of Ministers Tasheen al-Shaikhli from his home.
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Initially, the Sadrists were aided in late March and early April by extensive seasonal
sandstorms that hampered the coalition’s ability to use sensors and air weapons teams to
detect the militias’ indirect-fire teams. A curfew imposed on Baghdad’s neighborhoods
usually kept the Sadrists from operating at night for fear of being spotted on Baghdad’s
deserted streets. Under cover of the sandstorms, Sadrist rocket and mortar teams were
able to bombard the Green Zone and its environs during daylight hours when the militiamen could blend into the dense populations of Sadr City and other Shi’a neighborhoods.152
As the bombardment continued, the U.S. Embassy compound and military headquarters in the Green Zone frequently came under fire. In one incident, a rocket landing
on the MNSTC-I gym killed several troops inside. By the second week of April, Petraeus and Crocker’s headquarters began to resemble a refugee camp as more than 1,000
embassy and MNF-I personnel sought shelter in the hardened embassy building rather
than remain in the poorly shielded trailers and sleeping huts outside.153
The coordinated assault demonstrated Sadr’s operational reach to express his displeasure with the coalition’s presence and Maliki’s government. As Maliki’s surprising
Basrah offensive began on March 25, Sadr continued his own offensive in Baghdad with
calls for a “civil disobedience protest” and declared an end to the 6-month cease-fire
that he had recently extended in February. The day before, in a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) interview, Petraeus had publicly implicated the Iranian regime, stating
“the rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example . . . were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets.”154 Sadr City in effect had become not only a Shi’a
militia safe haven but also an instrumental staging area for an Iranian proxy war against
the coalition. Considering the dramatic change in events, Petraeus informed Gates “this
week we have shifted our stance from nation-building back to warfighting.”155
Route Gold
The intense indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone—originating mainly from
Sadr City and other areas east of the Tigris, though a few attacks originated from Jihad
and Shu’ala/Hurriyah in west Baghdad—led coalition commanders to decide to seize
the lower portion of Sadr City to deny its use as a militia firing point and to push JAM
and the Special Groups northeast so they could not bombard the Green Zone with mortars and rockets. The coordinated rocket and checkpoint assault also encouraged Maliki
to remove most of the restrictions that had stymied anti-militia efforts for years. With
Maliki’s permission on March 25, the same day Maliki’s Basrah offensive began, Hort’s
brigade launched an operation to reclaim the checkpoints the militias had seized and
establish a foothold in the southern sections of Sadr City, objectives that Hort’s troops
and their partnered Iraqi units accomplished quickly.
The next phase to gain control of Sadr City entirely, however, would take an additional 45 days and would also strain the Iraqi Army and National Police in Baghdad to
the breaking point. Maliki had given permission for coalition and Iraqi forces to enter the
Ishibiliya and Habbibiya neighborhoods south of Route Gold—the name coalition troops
gave to Quds Street, which ran east-west across the lower quarter of Sadr City—but had
ordered that only indirect strikes would be allowed into portions of Sadr City to the north
of Route Gold. Typically, JAM and Special Groups rocket teams would cross to the south
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Colonel John Hort (left). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Zachary Mott (Released).

Colonel John Hort, Commander of the 3d BCT, 4th Infantry Division, With Admiral
Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.156
of Route Gold, launch rockets west across the Tigris River, and then move back north to
fade into the depths of Sadr City. To eliminate the rocket firing points in Ishibiliya and
Habbibiya, Hort’s brigade launched another operation to seize the one-third of Sadr City
south of Route Gold.
The operation was the first major coalition move into Sadr City since the 1st Cavalry
Division’s operations there in 2004. It was also an existential threat to the Sadrists’ power
base in Baghdad. In addition to serving as the most effective launching point for JAM
rocket attacks in the city, Ishibiliya and Habbibiya contained the Jamila market, the country’s largest shopping district and, as Hammond referred to it, a “cash cow” for JAM’s
racketeering networks.157 For both its indirect-fire utility and its sources of cash, Sadr City
south of Route Gold was key terrain that the Sadrists would fight hard to keep, resulting in 40 days of the most intense urban fighting in Iraq since the Fallujah operations of
2004. Hort originally had allocated just a Stryker cavalry squadron—the 1st Squadron,
2d Cavalry Regiment—to seize the neighborhoods south of Route Gold, but after EFPs
destroyed six Stryker vehicles in the first week, it became clear that more U.S. troops
would be required. A combined arms battalion, the 1st Battalion, 68th Armored Regiment, soon joined the operation along with additional tank companies. The battalion’s
M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradleys proved to be of high value during the urban fighting
because of their armor protection and firepower. Eventually, Hort would commit almost
an entire brigade’s worth of combat power to gain control of the rocket launch sites.
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The plan also called for a significant role for the Iraqi Army in what coalition commanders hoped would be a validation of their capability. However, as both the 1st Battalion, 68th Armored Regiment, and the 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment, pushed
northeast, they found it difficult to keep their Iraqi counterparts in the fight for several
reasons. Since the launch of the Baghdad Security Plan, the Iraqi Army in Baghdad had
been mainly a checkpoint-oriented army—comfortable with static security positions, but
reluctant and incapable of conducting coordinated maneuver and offensive operations.158
The Iraqi Army division assigned to Sadr City was manned by many east Baghdad residents who were well aware of JAM and the Special Groups’ ability to threaten their families.159 As a result, up to 700 Iraqi soldiers, many of whom were thought to have families
in Sadr City, deserted in the first 2 days of fighting. Those units that remained intact did
so mainly because of the influence of their embedded American advisers.160
Observing the difficulty of keeping the Iraqi units committed to the tough fighting,
a frustrated Hammond suggested in an update briefing to Petraeus that the coalition
should allow the Iraqi units and leaders involved in the operation against Baghdad’s
militias to fail. Only by failing and taking losses, Hammond reasoned, would the Iraqi
security forces learn their lesson the hard way and realize the need to improve. For Petraeus, Hammond’s recommendation was detached from the gravity of the situation. The
fighting in Baghdad was not a training exercise, but a pivotal battle of the war, the MNF-I
commander replied, one that neither the coalition nor the Iraqi Government could afford
to lose. Petraeus also judged that the battle had unexpectedly presented the coalition and
the Iraqi security forces the chance, finally, to destroy the Shi’a militias, and that MND-B
needed to seize that opportunity.161
Maliki already had come to a similar conclusion, and the political battle between the
Prime Minister and the Sadrists in Baghdad continued to escalate in the first days of
April. With operations against JAM now in full swing across Baghdad and the entire
south, Maliki took steps to remove the JAM problem permanently, declaring that the
Sadrists “would lose the right to participate in the political process” if JAM was not disbanded.162 Moqtada Sadr responded by declaring that JAM would disband only if directly
ordered to do so by Grand Ayatollah Sistani—a political intervention that Sistani was
highly unlikely to make—and by calling for a “million-man march” in Baghdad on April
9, the 5-year anniversary of Saddam’s fall. Sadr’s call for an April 9 protest appeared to
be a scheme to have tens of thousands of Sadrists march through Baghdad toward the
Green Zone. With this in mind, MNF-I planners began to consider the danger that mobs
of angry Sadr followers could penetrate the Green Zone perimeter—something similar to
the overrunning of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979. This would create a no-win situation in which either the coalition’s headquarters might be overrun or coalition troops
might be forced to fire heavy weapons on Sadr’s followers. With the situation in Basrah
turning against him, however, Sadr abruptly canceled the march the day before it was to
occur likely over fears of violence against JAM and a low turnout, either of which could
further weaken his position.163
Two days later, on April 11, the Sadrists were dealt another blow when assassins
killed senior Sadrist leader Riyad al-Nuri in Najaf. The murder hit close to home: Nuri
was Sadr’s brother-in-law and had been one of the Sadr lieutenants, along with Qais
al-Khazali, suspected of murdering Abdul Majid al-Khoei in Najaf in April 2003.
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The Battle of the “Gold Wall”
While the coalition and Iraqi attack into Ishibiliya and Habbibiya drew a fierce
response from JAM and Special Groups, the next phase would draw an even greater one.
The 11th Iraqi Army Division and the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division,
had established themselves firmly in outposts south of Route Gold, but JAM and Special
Groups still had freedom of movement throughout the warren of alleyways and streets
that connected northern and southern Sadr City. With the area south of Route Gold tenuously secured, on April 15 Hort and the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division,
began building a concrete wall the length of the sector to partition Sadr City and separate
Ishibiliya and Habbibiya from the northern two-thirds of the Sadrist enclave.164

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Joseph Rivera Rebolledo (Released).

Soldiers Emplace Concrete Barriers Across Route Gold in Sadr City.165
The appearance of Hort’s units erecting enormous concrete barriers across Route
Gold brought the Sadrist militiamen into the open as JAM and Special Groups commanders realized the wall would permanently separate them from their rocket-launch areas
and the Jamila market. The militia commanders began to hurl their fighters at the wall
builders to try to prevent this outcome. In Hammond’s words, “JAM impaled itself on
the wall,” losing hundreds of fighters in an unequal fight against coalition units whose
capabilities had evolved significantly since the grinding fight on the same streets 4 years
earlier.
As the battle along the wall unfolded, the ground fight in Ishibiliya and Habbibiya
and the air strikes in Sadr City looked old and new. The ground fight brought to bear the
fundamentals of armored and dismounted combat in an urban environment. The precision air war, however, demonstrated an unprecedented level of technology that changed
how the coalition could lethally engage a safe haven and support the ground war. Within
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days, Hort controlled or directly accessed national-, theater-, division-, and brigade-level
ISR assets that included Global Hawk, Predator, and Shadow UAVs; close air support
and air weapons teams of AH-64 Apaches; aerostat balloons; guided multiple-launch
rocket systems (GMLRS); and large numbers of coalition snipers.166 Although the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, was still restricted from maneuvering north of
Route Gold, these multiple layers of surveillance and strike capabilities had a devastating
effect on the thousands of militiamen attacking the brigade combat team and its Iraqi
partner units. Hundreds of JAM fighters died in fruitless assaults on the wall. The militiamen’s indirect-fire attackers suffered as well: coalition air weapons teams launched 85
attacks (with a total of 200 Hellfire missiles) that destroyed many of the militias’ Iranian-trained 107-mm rocket teams.167
In the week that began on May 7, the coalition dealt what amounted to knockout
blows to JAM and its leaders in Baghdad. Hort received from the CJSOTF a 30-man Navy
SEAL sniper platoon with experience in Fallujah and Ramadi and deployed them just
beyond the leading edge of the wall construction. From there, with the added protection of Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks, their deadly fire could reach a mile
into Sadr City’s grid-like streets. The snipers quickly made an impact. Shortly after their
arrival, a sandstorm grounded all coalition air assets, slackening the pressure the air
weapons teams could place on the militia enemy. As JAM attempted to exploit the dropoff in coalition air support during the sandstorm, the Navy snipers were not affected,
registering kills of 46 fighters in 1 day. By May 15, after 8 days on the wall, Navy snipers had killed 67 militiamen.168 Meanwhile, the ISOF Brigade and their CJSOTF advisers
launched nightly dismounted assaults into Sadr City and conducted heliborne-targeted
raids against Sadrist leaders.169 These missions, combined with targeted raids launched by
the counter malign Iranian influence special operations task force, ground down JAM’s
fighting capabilities and gave them no respite during the hours of darkness.

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Adrian Cadiz (Released).

A Massive Sandstorm Affected the Battle of Sadr City.170
378

CRESCENDO: MALIKI AGAINST THE SADRISTS

The coalition also had been tracking JAM and Special Groups leaders who were meeting in trailers adjacent to Sadr City’s Imam Ali Hospital, where the militia commanders
believed their proximity to a protected site would shield them from attack. Hort and
MND-B had other ideas. After MND-B made targeting calculations to limit collateral
damage, MNF-I and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) gave permission for a GMLRS
strike on the militia meeting place. On April 29, 2 days after the sandstorm subsided, the
GMLRS struck the trailers precisely, killing several top militia leaders while causing no
damage to the nearby hospital. With JAM and Special Groups leaders and fighters dying
at an alarming rate, most of the remaining leaders fled to Iran to escape the coalition’s
increasingly lethal reach.171
The End of the Sadr City Battle
On May 10, Moqtada Sadr and the Government of Iraq agreed to a cease-fire. The
14-point agreement required JAM to end all armed activities, accede to government control of Sadr City, and agree not to carry weapons in public. In return, the Maliki government agreed to limit raids against JAM and to reopen the roads into Sadr City.172
As the Route Gold wall neared completion and with renewed confidence in the ISF’s
capability, Maliki urged General Aboud Qanbar and other ISF commanders to move Iraqi
troops quickly into northern Sadr City to exploit the militias’ tactical defeat. Hammond
and Petraeus, less confident about ISF’s abilities, cautioned General Aboud to act more
deliberately than Maliki wished, but as had been the case in Basrah, the Prime Minister
and his advisers were intent on attacking much more quickly than their coalition counterparts thought wise.173
The Route Gold wall was completed in a little over a week after the cease-fire agreement on May 18, and 2 days later two Iraqi brigades moved north across Route Gold and
occupied Sadr City without a fight. After 4 years during which both the coalition and the
ISF had avoided major operations in Sadr City out of dread of a large-scale confrontation
with the Sadrists, the Iraqi Army and its coalition advisers had walked into the Sadrists’
largest stronghold unopposed, just as they had done in Basrah. Rather than turning either
Basrah or Sadr City into an Iraqi Stalingrad, as many analysts believed they could do, the
militias had turned and fled, proving they were no military match for the ISF and coalition forces together.
The Shi’a militias’ losses in Baghdad were severe and unsustainable. The coalition
commands estimated that between March 23 and May 10, coalition troops killed 700 militia fighters in the battle for Sadr City, with an unknown number of additional militiamen
wounded. The Sadrists publicly announced they had lost at least 1,000 killed.174 Coalition
casualties in April had been high as well, with 41 troops killed in that month. After the
seizure of Sadr City, May 2008 was a different story: the 19 deaths during the month were
the fewest for the coalition since the 2003 invasion.175
Nor had the fight gone against the Shi’a militias just in Sadr City. In other parts of
the Iraqi capital that had been militia strongholds, U.S. units and their partnered ISF
units had been able to seize territory from JAM and other Shi’a militant groups as well.
In the Rashid neighborhood, for example, Colonel Theodore Martin’s 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division, was in the midst of taking over control from Colonel Ricky D. Gibbs’s
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4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, when the militia uprising began. Though the local
5th National Police Brigade had withered under attacks from JAM, Martin’s and Gibbs’s
brigades had been able to strengthen the two other National Police brigades and the 43d
Iraqi Army Brigade in southwest Baghdad and to establish new joint security stations to
control the former JAM-dominated territory.176
The end of the Sadr City militia safe haven brought with it a sharp decrease in the militias’ ability to deploy EFPs in the Baghdad region. After May 2008, increased surveillance
and coalition activity decreased the militias’ freedom of movement and made it harder
for insurgents to emplace larger arrays of EFPs. Instead, militia groups were forced to
emplace single EFPs that were significantly less effective against coalition forces. Beyond
Baghdad, Shi’a militants were still able to emplace larger arrays of EFPs and maintain
their level of lethality, but overall, the Sadr City battle permanently reduced EFP effectiveness across Iraq, and showed how important a safe haven the slum had been.177
***
In Basrah and Sadr City, MNF-I was compelled to commit to a battle it had not anticipated and to draw its attention away from a final showdown with the Sunni insurgency
in Mosul. Even so, Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS was a milestone in the Iraq
War. After 5 years of campaigning, it was nearly unimaginable that such a large-scale
operation would be necessary in what many coalition leaders had considered the sleepy
backwater of the south, among a supposedly homogeneous Shi’a population. However,
unchecked intra-Shi’a competition for influence, control, and resources proved to be
just as destabilizing as the sectarian conflict roiling central Iraq. The operation in Basrah
also dispelled the fallacy that a smaller British troop presence hunkered down at Basrah
Air Station and the accommodation with a militia leader had reduced violence and had
prompted the Iraqis to resolve their own problems. While MND-SE’s withdrawal from
Basrah city had temporarily lowered attacks against British forces, it had ceded the city
to militias and left the population without protection. The repositioning to Basrah Air
Station removed British combat power from the equation when neither the Iraqi police
nor Army was ready to secure the city. When militia forces filled the security vacuum,
they made Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS an inevitability, even if it was inconvenient for the coalition at the time. General Freiji’s UK adviser, Colonel Richard Iron,
later explained to the press:
We have made some terrible mistakes in Iraq. . . . We released 120 of their prisoners and withdrew
out of town, but when we moved out, lawlessness took over. As 90 percent of the attacks were
against us, we thought that if we moved out we would remove the source of the problem. But
actually Jaish al-Mahdi had been fighting us because we were the only obstacle to their total
control.178

The Iraqi security forces’ poor performance during the first 3 days of Operation CHARGE
OF THE KNIGHTS exposed a critical flaw in the British approach to training, advising,
and assisting the Iraqi security forces. Colonel Iron later noted that the United Kingdom
decided early in the war not to embed MiTTs with the Iraqi Army. “The argument against
MiTTs at the time was that we could not guarantee their protection; since we were so
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short of troops we could not provide them dedicated support at the same time as running
our own operations. In retrospect, this was a poor decision: resourcing MiTTs should
have been the first use of our troops, before our own operations.”179 Instead, the British
had followed a concept of monitoring, mentoring, and training only at the training center
at Shaibah, west of Basrah, but did not conduct partnered operations with the Iraqi units
they had trained.
After the 10th and 14th Iraqi Army Division troops completed their training at Shaibah, Binns noted, “We didn’t then mentor them when they deployed on operation, and
that was the significant difference between the way that we approached support and the
way that the Americans approached support in Basra.”180 The difference between the U.S.
and British approach to mentoring was not lost on several British commanders, who recognized the missing critical component. Whenever raising the issue from the field, British
officers faced resistance from the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters in London, England,
where British leaders deemed embedding too dangerous as well as contrary to British
plans for troop reductions.181
With JAM and Special Groups hold over Basrah and Sadr City and with Amarah
broken, several conclusions emerged. The militia groups that had defied the Iraqi Government since fall 2003 had lost at least 2,000 fighters killed, half of them in Baghdad
alone. Ultimately, after 4 years of recoiling from operations against the militants in Sadr
City and Basrah, the coalition had seen JAM and Special Groups resistance crumble more
quickly than anyone had predicted, indicating perhaps that the militia threat had been
overstated for at least 3 years. JAM was rendered operationally ineffective for more than
a year, and even then, it would likely not return in the same form. The coalition and
Iraqi troops conducting the March-June 2008 operations had overmatched the militias
and come close to destroying them. Conversely, the Iranian regime had nearly lost its
proxy militias altogether. The various Iranian attempts to broker cease-fires between the
militias and the government were not intended to stabilize Iraq, but to rescue the Iranians’ most important militant proxies from extinction.
In political terms, the civil war between the Iranian-backed Shi’a militant groups
and the Shi’a-led Maliki government had ended in a clear victory for the Prime Minister
who, by summer 2008, was unquestionably Iraq’s most powerful politician and bore little
resemblance to the weak Maliki that Stephen J. Hadley had described to the National
Security Council principals in November 2006. For the 5 years since the collapse of the
Iraqi Ba’athist state in April 2003, nonstate factions and militant groups had appeared
to be stronger than the new Iraqi state, but with the defeat of the Shi’a militant groups,
the Maliki-led Iraqi state had retaken control of most of the country’s territory. With the
Prime Minister strengthened politically and his most troublesome Shi’a political rivals
swept from the field, coalition leaders now anticipated Maliki would be free to sign the
U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement without impediment—an expectation that Maliki
soon frustrated.
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CHAPTER 9
THE SURGE CULMINATES, SUMMER 2008
The coalition commanders faced a situation in spring 2008 they had not anticipated.
Since formulating the surge campaign plan during spring 2007, General David Petraeus
and other senior coalition leaders had expected to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to the
finish before shifting their main effort to the Shi’a militant groups at some point in late
2008, by which time the surge brigades would have left Iraq. Instead, the coalition had
defeated the Shi’a militants by May 2008, far sooner than anyone thought possible. The
coalition commanders now had to shift back to defeating AQI in northern Iraq with fewer
troops at their disposal.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had complicated Petraeus’s “north first” strategy with
Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, but the Prime Minister’s gambit had several
strategic benefits. By the operation’s end, the fighting had routed Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM),
the Iraqi Government had defeated Iran’s militant proxies, and the Sadrists had lost any
hope of ousting Maliki from power. With JAM and other Shi’a militias at a much-diminished capacity, there were fewer explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks, U.S.
casualty rates dropped and criticism of the campaign in the United States slackened. U.S.
commanders hoped this would allow them to resume the fight against AQI with fewer
distractions.1
Still, the situation posed a conundrum for Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, the
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander, who was fighting different enemies
at opposite ends of the country during the summer of 2008. He had to consolidate the
gains his troops and the Iraqi security forces had won against the Sadrists in Baghdad
and the south while dealing a knockout blow to AQI in the far north. These objectives
would require increased reliance on the Iraqi security forces (ISF). The operations of
summer 2008 also unfolded against the backdrop of changing political dynamics in Iraq
that would make it increasingly difficult for U.S. leaders who hoped to put the U.S.-Iraqi
security relationship on a stable long-term footing.
THE END OF THE SURGE
By July 2008, the last of the five surge brigades that had helped secure Baghdad
and its surrounding belts had redeployed, requiring MNC-I to reallocate forces to fill
the gaps. All told, the loss of the surge brigades, when combined with the drawdown
of support personnel, resulted in a reduction of 22,000 troops, roughly one-seventh of
the U.S. military strength at the peak of the surge.2 MNC-I also faced the drawdown of
international forces throughout 2008. Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) felt the
losses most acutely. By December 2008, Major General Michael L. Oates’s 10th Mountain
Division would be responsible for every province south of Baghdad except Basrah, an
area about the size of California.3 After the June 2008 departure of the last 550 Australian
combat troops from Dhi Qar Province, Oates moved Colonel Philip Battaglia’s 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, from the northern reaches of MND-C’s
area of operations to fill the gap.4
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Similar moves took place in August after the nation of Georgia recalled its 2,000-man
1st Georgian Brigade from Kut when fighting broke out with Russia back at home. The
rapid withdrawal of the brigade, which departed Iraq on U.S. Air Force C-17s only 72
hours after the Russian invasion, forced MNC-I to shift an artillery brigade quickly to
their sector.5 The Georgian withdrawal also had larger international implications. The
United States considered Russia the aggressor in its invasion of Georgia, assisted in
returning Georgian units home, and issued stern diplomatic condemnations, raising concerns about the future of any United Nations (UN)-approved security agreements in Iraq
given Russia’s veto on the UN Security Council. Approximately 900 Polish troops redeployed from Diwaniya in October 2008 as well.6 In total, 16 coalition partners withdrew
from Iraq during 2008.7
Because of the reduction in U.S. and coalition forces, the remaining 15 U.S. combat
brigades would have to cover more ground with fewer resources, and often single brigades were responsible for entire provinces. This left few U.S. forces with which to reinforce Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), where the 2d Cavalry Regiment occupied
all Diyala Province; the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, covered Kirkuk Province; 1st
BCT, 101st Airborne Division, oversaw Salahadin as well as some northwestern portions
of Baghdad; and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had the largest territorial
responsibility, covering Ninawa Province, including Mosul and a large portion of the
Jazeera desert.8
The smaller U.S. force would encounter a much-improved security situation throughout much of the country. In Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), where the Sunni Awakening had been underway for more than a year, the Marines maintained security despite
losing 8 of 14 infantry battalions as part of the post-surge drawdown. Levels of violence
continued to fall in Baghdad and Diyala as well. In June 2007, Iraq had experienced an
average of 180 attacks of all kinds per day, but by mid-July 2008, attacks numbered fewer
than 21 per day, a level not seen since January 2004.9
Only in Ninawa Province was there a marked deterioration in security. By late spring,
one-third of all violent incidents in Iraq took place there, especially in the long-suffering
provincial capital city of Mosul. This is where the coalition and the Iraqi Government
turned their attention in mid-2008.
OPERATION DEFEAT AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH
Prime Minister Maliki’s decision to conduct a large-scale operation in Basrah had
derailed Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plans to conduct a U.S.-Iraqi offensive in
Mosul during March 2008. However, even as the coalition focused on battling the Shi’a
militants in southern Iraq and Baghdad, MNC-I planned to return the coalition’s main
effort to Mosul at some point. In early February, following the disappointing results
of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX in Diyala, General Raymond Odierno and Petraeus already had pressed Major General Mark Hertling to shift Multi-National Division-North’s (MND-N) manpower and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
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(ISR) focus to Ninawa.10 In late March 2008, Austin and MNC-I began Operation DEFEAT
AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH (OPDAN), a synchronization of the division-level operations in northern Iraq that would last for the entirety of XVIII Airborne Corps’ rotation as
MNC-I. OPDAN focused on Mosul and its surrounding regions. The city’s importance to
AQI’s strength elsewhere in Iraq had become clearer as the group lost its grip in western
and central Iraq. Forced out of Baghdad and denied access to Anbar, AQI had no choice
but to regroup in the far north and fight to retain a foothold in the country. Petraeus told
reporters in early March that, while Baghdad was crucial for al-Qaeda to win in Iraq,
Mosul and its surrounding areas were vital for the terrorist group’s survival. One senior
MNC-I officer agreed, later commenting, “If AQI had a Pentagon, it would be in Mosul.”11
During the months that the coalition and the Iraqi Army fought Shi’a militias in the
south, Mosul’s security situation continued to deteriorate. Between February and April
2008, AQI attacked nine coalition and ISF combat outposts in the city with large suicide
car or truck bombs smuggled from Syria, destroying several of the compounds. The influence of Ba’athist insurgent organizations—the Awda (“Return”) Party and the Naqshbandi Army—had grown as well.12
The departure of the surge brigades between February and July, however, meant that
the coalition would have fewer resources for the operation than coalition commanders
had hoped. In late March, when the coalition had planned for the Mosul operation to
begin, Austin and MNC-I still had 19 U.S. brigades at their disposal, with Colonel Billy
Don Ferris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the only one of the 5 surge brigades
already redeployed. By the time the unplanned fighting against the Shi’a militias wound
down in May 2008, MNC-I had redeployed a division’s worth of combat power and stood
weaker than it had been in March. MNC-I would have to conduct its northern operations with only 16 U.S. brigades. Austin had no spare brigades with which to reinforce
Hertling’s MND-N.
Austin took several steps to compensate for the loss of combat power for the north.
He encouraged his Iraqi counterparts to shift ISF units from relatively quiet areas to reinforce Iraqi divisions engaged in intense fighting in hot spots in northern Iraq. He also
began to expand some of his own units’ areas of responsibility. On April 11, to relieve
some of the pressure on Hertling’s stretched force, Austin moved the boundary between
MNF-W and MND-N some 80 kilometers north, giving the Marines in the somewhat pacified Anbar Province responsibility for portions of Ninawa and Salahadin Provinces that
Hertling’s units could not adequately cover. The additional territory, designated Temporary Area of Operations Mameluke, was an 80-mile wide strip of the Jazeera desert that
ran from the Syrian border to just north of Lake Tharthar. In this area, the Marines of I
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) would interdict foreign fighters along the southern
infiltration routes from Syria before they could reach Baghdad or other major population
centers.13 The shrinking of MND-N’s area of operations enabled the 3d ACR to focus its
combat power on Mosul and enabled 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to focus on
Salahadin’s populated areas.14
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Margaret Nelson (Released).

Kirkuk Governor Abdul-Rahman Mostafa, Major General Mark Hertling,
and Colonel David Paschal.15
In another measure to mitigate the dearth of maneuver brigades for OPDAN, MNC-I
gave responsibility for the vast western Ninawa Province—the northern Jazeera area
where AQI had previously stationed its “border emir” in Sinjar and where the 3d ACR
had created a U.S.-Iraqi light reconnaissance troop to cover the border zone in 2005—
to an ad hoc interdiction force comprised of the corps military intelligence brigade and
special operations forces (SOF). Colonel Robert Ashley’s 525th Battlefield Surveillance
Brigade (BfSB), which MNC-I moved from the Iranian border in Diyala Province to Tal
Afar in early April, would use its ISR assets to watch for foreign fighter crossings from
Syria. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) provided a battalion
tactical command post and advanced operational base to be the 525th BfSB’s action arm,
with the CJSOTF element and the 525th BfSB collocating their headquarters to ensure
tight coordination.16
The battlefield surveillance brigade’s umanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), joint surveillance target attack radar systems (JSTARs) downlinks, and long-range reconnaissance
capabilities helped locate AQI elements for targeting by the CJSOTF and by some elements of the 3d ACR. For their part, the CJSOTF detachments used armed Toyota HiLux
trucks and stripped their High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
of improvised explosive device (IED) armor protection, doors, and even windows to be
able to conduct long-range desert interdiction missions.17 These patrols found that the
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border area again had become an insurgent sanctuary. The special operators engaged in
running gun battles with AQI technical vehicles and discovered abandoned AQI training
compounds as well as mammoth caches of arms and supplies. One such location in western Ninawa stretched across a 19-structure compound and had weapons and explosives
hidden in the walls of buildings, where, among other items, the U.S. commandos found
M–16 rifles that had been provided to Lebanon as part of the foreign military sales program.18 The cache also contained so many IED-making materials that it exceeded the ability of the green berets to destroy it with their own explosives. A B–52 strike completed
the job.19 In another instance, a Special Forces team discovered a well-kept and expansive
house in the middle of the desert, miles from the nearest settlement, where they captured
a one-legged man whom they later determined to be AQI’s third in command.20
Despite discoveries like these, the BfSB, CJSOTF, and 3d ACR lacked sufficient maneuver and aviation assets to cover the massive area they were assigned, which was larger
than the state of Massachusetts. Despite its designation as a battlefield surveillance brigade, the 525th BfSB had deployed to Iraq in September 2007 without fully changing
from a standard military intelligence brigade to a BfSB. Most significantly, it lacked its
authorized cavalry squadron that would have given it a way to attack the targets generated by the brigade’s ISR assets.21 As a result, the BfSB often detected foreign fighter
crossings but could not do anything about it. This frustrated both 3d ACR commander
Colonel Michael A. Bills and 525th commander Ashley. “The sheer distance involved was
very problematic,” Ashley said later. “[T]here were occasions that we could see things
coming over the border and we were not able to react to them.”22
Closer to Mosul, Iraqi commanders repositioned their units to operate in zones that
the coalition could not cover. The 3d Iraqi Division, normally responsible for western
Ninawa Province, assumed responsibility for the AQI-dominated towns on Mosul’s
western outskirts, placing nine Iraqi battalions there to free the 2d Iraqi Division to focus
on the city itself. On May 1, General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq’s Ninawa Operations Command
became fully operational, ready to oversee both Iraqi divisions in the impending Mosul
operation.23 With clearing operations inside the city planned for mid-May, Tawfiq’s Iraqi
units created a cordon of checkpoints and combat outposts around the city and gathered
intelligence indicating that AQI’s ranks in Ninawa included a large number of foreign
fighters who had traveled from Syria.24 Many of these foreign fighters had come to Mosul
via Abu Ghadiyah’s Syria-based facilitation network, including AQI fighters who killed
13 Iraqi police officers on May 2, in an attack that Petraeus judged “could not have been
carried out without the acquiescence of Syrian officials at some level.”25
Mosul: Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS
On May 10, 2008, the day after the Iraqi Government and the Sadrists agreed to a
cease-fire in Baghdad, Tawfiq launched the long-anticipated operation to clear AQI from
Mosul’s neighborhoods. As Bills’s 3d ACR cut off insurgent supply routes into the city,
including the major route from Tel Afar to Mosul, the Iraqi 2d Division and Iraqi special operations forces (ISOF) conducted 17 cordon and search operations inside the city
along with targeted raids to round up high-value individuals from AQI and other Sunni
militant groups.26 As he had done in Basrah, Prime Minister Maliki arrived soon after
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the operation began with his interior minister and defense ministers in tow to take command and turn the security operation into a political initiative. Reaching Mosul on May
14, Maliki named the Iraqi-led Operation UMM AL-RABIYAIN (MOTHER OF TWO
SPRINGS) and began to assert Baghdad’s authority over the local government and security forces.
Unlike their counterparts in Basrah, the Iraqi units in Mosul did not suffer desertions in
the early days of fighting, and AQI did not attempt to challenge the government forces in
direct firefights. During the first week, Iraqi forces detained over 1,000 suspects, of which
just under 200 had known connections to either AQI or its political front, the Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI).27 At the same time, coalition special operators stepped up operations against
AQI in northern Iraq, carrying out 69 raids against the group between May 12 and 18 that
yielded 117 AQI-linked detainees, including 2 senior AQI commanders. On May 14, U.S.
special operators in western Ninawa managed to capture Abu Umar al-Tunisi, one of
AQI’s most senior Syria-based facilitators, generating additional targets by keeping news
of the capture quiet and exploiting information obtained from his hideout.28
The Iraqi-led clearing of Mosul continued to the end of May, by which time General
Tawfiq’s troops had conducted 177 battalion-level operations. One Iraqi raid uncovered
what was probably AQI’s main distribution hub for IEDs and car bombs in Mosul: a
building in east Mosul that contained more than 11 tons of homemade explosives and
other bomb-making materials.29 At the same time, the U.S. special operators in western
Ninawa exacted a heavy toll, detaining 32 AQI members in intelligence-driven raids on
foreign-fighter facilitation networks in the 4 weeks following the launch of Operation
MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS.30 The intense operations had a noticeable effect on the
group’s ability to move freely and pay its operatives. “Some low-level AQI fighters are
abandoning the organization due to lack of pay, and . . . the head of AQI, Abu Ayyub
al-Masri, may have ordered a month-long halt of the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq,”
Petraeus reported to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates on May 25.31 With the
security operations proceeding smoothly, coalition and Iraqi officials turned their attention to reconstruction projects. Maliki allocated $100 million for that purpose, just as he
had for Basrah and Sadr City.32
It was not yet clear if AQI had been defeated in Ninawa. Near the end of May, Iraqi
Minister of Defense Abdel Qader reported that he considered the clearing of Mosul only
40 percent complete, prompting Petraeus to conclude that the joint U.S.-Iraqi operation would not reach the “hold” phase of “clear, hold, and build” until the end of July.33
Appearing to confirm this assessment, by early July MNF-I reported that 68 percent of
all attacks in Iraq took place in the Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) area of
operations.
Although AQI could not control territory, it mounted a counterattack of assassinations and intimidation against Iraqi officials and civilians. On June 6, insurgent gunmen
nearly killed Ninawa Governor Duraid Kashmoula as he traveled through a formerly
AQI-held neighborhood, and on June 27, the governor had another near miss when an
AQI car-bomb attack on his office killed 18 people and wounded another 80.34 On July
9, insurgents attacked a Kurdistan Democratic Party compound in Mosul during a visit
by General Tawfiq, killing eight people in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against
the Iraqi commander. The car bombing came the same week Petraeus reported that
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insurgents had assassinated 16 Mosul police officers in the space of 30 days, including a
police brigadier responsible for issuing identification badges in the city.35 The following
week, MNF-I recorded a 20 percent increase in attacks in Ninawa, a disheartening trend
that led Austin and MNC-I to deploy an additional Stryker battalion from Baghdad to
Mosul to reinforce the 3d ACR.36
The persistence of the insurgent groups in the Mosul area was caused by several complex problems. Without a large and capable border force, northwestern Iraq remained
a porous throughway for foreign fighters and for AQI members. Economic conditions
made it difficult for the Iraqi Government to enlist local tribes to help cut down the foreign fighter flow. An ongoing drought in the Jazeera desert limited Ninawa’s agricultural
output and led some sheikhs to smuggle goods, arms, and foreign fighters.37 The many
small towns west and north of Mosul were difficult to secure and remained important
safe havens for AQI and other militant groups. Some of the towns between Tel Afar
and Mosul, such as Muhallabiyah and Sheikh Ibrahim, were under the near-complete
control of the extremists—some captured by the 3d ACR in 2005 but later released—and
would later function as important bases for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Hertling’s subordinates identified no fewer than 22 different militant groups operating
in the MND-N area of operations, many with facilitation networks extending into Syria.38
Whenever the coalition and ISF pushed AQI away from Ninawa’s populations, other
groups, such as the Ba’athist Naqshbandi Army, filled the void and continued attacks
against coalition troops and Iraqi officials.39
Finally, the ethnic fault lines running through Ninawa Province challenged the coalition as well as the Iraqi Government. Most of the Iraqi troops who conducted Operation
MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS were Kurdish. In discussions with American officials, the
citizens of Mosul often referred to the Iraqi Army units in their city as peshmerga.40 In
addition, the Sh’ia-majority 6th Brigade, 2d National Police Division, which had deployed
from Baghdad for the operation, often dealt with Mosul’s population in a heavy-handed
manner that Bills described as “pretty cruel.” The police brigade’s presence in the city
grew so counterproductive that Bills persuaded General Tawfiq to redeploy it to Ninawa’s desert areas to search for enemy fighters.41 As Bills and the 3d ACR observed, the
people of Mosul remained wary of the ISF and felt they were being policed by Shi’a and
Kurdish troops with an anti-Sunni agenda.
These ethnic fissures made Hertling and Bills skeptical about the idea of creating
large Sons of Iraq groups in Ninawa Province—and, in Hertling’s view, in Diyala as well.
Both feared AQI would infiltrate any Awakening groups in Ninawa. Bills believed the
diverse demographics of Ninawa meant that Sons of Iraq groups would make the province even more volatile.42 Having been involved in the early days of the ineffective Iraqi
Civil Defense Corps in 2003–2004, Hertling also saw limited utility in creating what he
called a “highly paid neighborhood watch program” and was concerned about dissolving such groups once they had been created. He also believed they would drain human
capital from more crucial areas. “Once you pay an Iraqi to stand around with a gun they
are not going to want to do a whole lot of other things,” he later said. “We had doctors,
lawyers, and teachers all joining the Sons of Iraq, even [some of] the police, because they
were assured payment from the Americans and usually the payment for the doctors and
lawyers was higher than they were getting as a doctor or lawyer.”43
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Because of these concerns, Hertling and MND-N decided not to create an Awakening
movement on the scale that had taken place in MNF-W, MND-C, and Multi-National
Division-Baghdad (MND-B). Instead, U.S. commanders in the north pressed their Iraqi
counterparts to recruit new ISF battalions from the local Ninawa population, including
Yezidis and Sunnis from western Ninawa, but the ethnic and sectarian fissures in the
province and its capital remained a persistent problem.44
CONSOLIDATING VICTORY AGAINST THE SHI’A MILITANT GROUPS
As Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS proceeded in Mosul, coalition and ISF
units in southern Iraq and Baghdad attempted to consolidate the gains made against
the Shi’a militant groups from March to May, especially against the Sadrists. The defeat
of the Shi’a militants in Iraq’s southern cities created an opportunity for the coalition to
extend its presence to areas that had been dangerous territory for it since 2004. On May
24, just 4 days after Prime Minister Maliki sent Iraqi Army troops to occupy Sadr City,
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker visited Karbala and Najaf to mark the arrival of new provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). This was a significant step since violence had kept
the PRTs for most southern provinces on protected compounds in Hillah or Basrah for
almost 2 years.45 Having PRTs in the Shi’a shrine cities expanded the coalition’s political
and diplomatic role in the critically important religious hub of the south.
In Baghdad, coalition and Iraqi forces continued clearing operations in neighborhoods that had long been militia strongholds, confiscating large quantities of weapons
and explosives. U.S. troops maintained their presence in Sadr City south of Route Gold,
while the Iraqi Army and police with a few coalition advisers occupied Sadr City’s northern neighborhoods. In the 3 weeks following the Iraqi Army’s May 20 entry into Sadr
City, Iraqi troops seized 118 weapons caches, including 90 EFPs and “enough rifles to
equip nearly three battalions,” Petraeus reported on June 8.46
Coalition troops also conducted targeted raids against some of the militia-affiliated
Iraqi officials whose political top cover waned once the Prime Minister turned against
the militias. In one high-profile case on May 24, coalition special operators and the Iraqi
National Police Emergency Response Unit arrested the director general of the Iraqi corrections system, who had used his position to torture prisoners, extort money from families, and back death squad killings by Shi’a militants.47
Though most militia leaders had fled and their foot soldiers had dispersed, a few Shi’a
militant cells in Baghdad continued attacks against American troops and other Iraqis. On
June 4, as Shi’a militants prepared to fire improvised rocket-assisted munitions against
a U.S. patrol base near Sadr City, a rocket detonated prematurely, killing the militants
and some bystanders. The explosion left 18 Iraqis dead, 30 wounded, and destroyed 15
houses.48 Two weeks later, a car bomb at a busy bus stop in the Shi’a-majority Hurriyah
neighborhood killed at least 27 civilians and wounded 50. Responding to the attack, the
local coalition unit, Colonel William B. Hickman’s 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division,
quickly discovered that the bombing against mostly Shi’a civilians had not been the work
of AQI, but of a local Special Groups commander who wanted the Shi’a civilians of Hurriyah to believe there was still a Sunni terrorist threat in the neighborhood to justify his
militia. As Petraeus put it, the attack was meant “to reduce perceptions of security in
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the neighborhood, justify Shi’a militia presence, and discourage the return of displaced
Sunni families. We have presented evidence to the Iraqi Government in an effort to get
them to publicly identify Special Groups (SG) as being responsible for the attack.”49
The Transformation of JAM
The defeat of JAM did not end the threat of Shi’a insurgency. However, it did force
the largest of the Shi’a militant groups to change. In the wake of his militia’s operational
downfall, on June 13, Moqtada Sadr announced that he intended to reorganize the Mahdi
Army into two components: the Mumahidun, a civic and humanitarian organization, and
a specialized militant wing that would operate secretly. According to the Mumahidun
project guide, its members would be unarmed and strictly disciplined, and any violation
of this policy would be dealt with harshly.50 The Baghdad-based Hazem al-Araji and nine
other Sadrist clerics would lead this reformed movement.51
In July, Sadr followed up his earlier announcement by proclaiming the formation of
the Promised Day Brigade, an organization of Sadrist militants authorized to continue
resistance against U.S. troops. In Petraeus’s view, this was “not an entirely deft move,”
because by announcing the creation of a new militia, Sadr ran the risk of having the
Maliki government exclude his candidates from the upcoming provincial elections since,
by law, no illegal militia could participate. Petraeus also noted that because “Sadr and
most senior SG leaders are now in Iran, this action may increase perceptions that the Sadr
Trend’s militia is beholden to and responds to direction from Iran. Sadr’s statement also
exposes Iran’s role in facilitating violence in Iraq, thereby giving lie to Iran’s repeated
commitments to stop lethal aid and support the Iraqi government.”52
Ultimately, however, these changes aided Sadr because Maliki, anticipating a political
showdown with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in
the upcoming provincial elections, had reached out to his defeated Sadrist foes to negotiate a Da’wa-Sadrist reconciliation prior to the elections, something that Petraeus and
other coalition leaders did not anticipate.53 Reconciliation with Maliki meant the new
incarnations of the Mahdi Army could work largely unmolested by the Iraqi Government. The flight of the militia commanders to Iran had left a new political power vacuum
in east Baghdad and the southern provinces, one that Maliki’s Da’wa Party and Hakim’s
ISCI hastened to fill prior to the provincial elections scheduled for late 2008.
Ali Faisal al-Lami and the Sadr City Assassinations
As Sadr attempted to revamp his militia, many Special Groups members and JAM
fighters opposed the truce Sadr had declared and were reluctant to stop fighting coalition forces. Some had left JAM to join Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) or Kata’ib Hizballah.54
Evidence that other Special Groups were filling the void after JAM’s defeat was evident
in Baghdad in the summer of 2008. In June, MND-B moved troops and other support
elements into Sadr City to follow up May’s military victory with civic action against the
militia-affiliated politicians who had controlled the district. Because the militia loyalists
who held the formal district council leadership had fled when the Shi’a militant groups
left, U.S. officials hoped to establish a provincial reconstruction team in Sadr City and
empower a new, anti-Sadrist chairman of the district council. AAH, however, did not
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intend to let this happen. On June 24, 2008, a bomb detonated in a Sadr City District Advisory Council meeting, killing six Iraqis, two American Soldiers, and two State Department officials, including 57-year-old Deputy PRT Chief Stephen Farley. Another U.S.
official, who stepped out of the room moments before the blast, survived. The sophisticated bomb plot involved explosives packed in the headrest of an office chair that the
attackers knew the meeting attendees would use.55
U.S. troops quickly uncovered a trail of evidence that led back to Ali Faisal al-Lami, a
longtime aide to Iraqi politician Ahmad Chalabi. A senior official on Chalabi’s de-Ba’athification committee, Lami was closely allied with AAH and apparently had helped plan
the assassination of Farley and other officials, intending to kill the new anti-Sadrist
district council head. He also had long been suspected by other Iraqi officials of using
the de-Ba’athification committee’s security details as death squads against Sunnis and
Ba’athists, especially in west Baghdad. After the Sadr City bombing, Lami traveled to
Beirut for consultations with Lebanese Hizballah, likely in connection with his mission
to “unify Shi’a extremists throughout the region,” as Petraeus described it.56 He also had
probably intended to wait there until the investigation of the bombing had passed. On
August 27, however, Lami unwisely flew back to Iraq, where U.S. troops arrested him
as he arrived at the Baghdad International Airport and moved him to the U.S. detention
center at Camp Cropper, where he would remain for a year. “We believe Ali Faisal was
directly involved in the 24 June attack in Sadr City against the District Advisory Council
that killed two State Department employees, two Coalition Soldiers, and members of
the council,” Petraeus reported to Gates on August 31.57 Petraeus also revealed to Gates
that Lami was a member of the militant group headed by Akram al-Ka’abi, a reference to
AAH. At Camp Cropper, Lami admitted to knowledge of sectarian death squad killings
against former Ba’athists. He also asserted that Chalabi had been involved in the killings of former regime members, Iraqi Members of Parliament, and journalists, and that
Chalabi had shared information on 450 former Ba’athists with Shi’a death squads so the
Ba’athists could be targeted.58 Perhaps not coincidentally, unknown assailants tried but
failed to assassinate Chalabi in Baghdad on September 5, just days after Lami’s capture,
killing two bodyguards but missing Chalabi himself.59
Attacks like those in Hurriyah and the Sadr City District Council tempered the sense
that the coalition and the Maliki government had won a decisive victory against the Shi’a
militants. The day after the Sadr City bombing, Iraqi police liaison to Sadr City, Ferat
Attriyeh, claimed that although the Iraqi Government had forced JAM and the Special
Groups to give up their overt control over the slum, the militant groups remained present
in the shadows. “They are still working inside the city. There are killings, lootings, they
come and go in unmarked cars. They threaten anyone who works with U.S. forces. Outside the wall, they are still in control.”60
Amarah and Operation LOOK SOUTH
Farther south, the Shi’a militants suffered another significant defeat as the coalition
and Maliki government turned to the longtime militia stronghold of Amarah, the capital
of Maysan Province. While Basrah and Sadr City represented endpoints of a sophisticated
and deadly Iranian smuggling network, Maysan and Amarah were the network’s hub.61
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Under Major General Jonathan Shaw, MND-SE left Maysan in April 2007 and transferred
responsibility to the Iraqis.62 With no coalition military presence, the province’s importance as a transit and supply point from Iran increased throughout 2007 and early 2008 as
some of the militia commanders and fighters who fled Baghdad in the early days of the
surge moved into Amarah.63
As the Sadr City battle wound down in May 2008, Austin asked the CJSOTF, MND-C,
and other special operations forces (SOF) to develop plans to address the Amarah problem. Austin selected the CJSOTF plan, Operation YARBOROUGH, because it offered
operational effects with minimal forces, allowing MNC-I to focus on Mosul. After the
success of Iraqi security forces and the coalition in Basrah and Sadr City, the CJSOTF plan
played on the Sadrist fears that a large-scale coalition offensive was imminent. Rather
than follow through with YARBOROUGH, the CJSOTF hit the militias with a series of
deception operations and raids designed to convince them to abandon Maysan before
sustaining what could be heavy losses.
To prepare for the action, the CJSOTF moved a company of the ISOF brigade, an additional operational detachment, and the majority of its special operations aviation contingent, which included helicopters, an MC-130 transport capable of leaflet drops, and an
AC-130 gunship to Tallil Airfield in neighboring Dhi Qar Province. The operation began
on May 9 when an armed Predator UAV killed JAM fighters on a major road to Amarah.
Over the next several days, ISOF troops and their CJSOTF advisers launched raids into
Amarah and established temporary checkpoints on roads surrounding the town, capturing militiamen and telling the local population that the coalition was preparing for a
major offensive. At the same time, the MC-130 dropped leaflets announcing that civilians
should consider evacuating the city ahead of the impending operation. Overflights by
F-16s and Predator UAVs increased, some of which bombed uninhabited desert areas to
create the perception that the coalition was conducting air strikes against remote militia
hideouts. As early as May 15, the operations began having an effect, as reports emerged
that local militants were stockpiling weapons and emplacing IEDs. The raids, checkpoints,
overflights, and leaflet drops continued for several weeks, with the addition of a feigned
ground assault and the airdrop of humanitarian aid supplies to “refugees” from an imaginary attack, all designed to further fray the militia leaders’ nerves. When CJSOTF operators learned that militia leaders had ordered civilians to pick up and destroy the coalition
leaflets, they printed new “wanted poster” leaflets with photographs of those responsible
for the order, dropping 10,000 on Amarah the following night. As some JAM and Special
Groups leaders fled to Iran, the CJSOTF dropped additional leaflets that listed those who
had fled and warned those staying behind that they had been abandoned and left to die.
By early June, the operation had achieved its desired effect: the majority of Maysan’s
militia leaders had panicked and escaped to Iran rather than stay and face what they
expected would be a Fallujah-style coalition attack.64
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Source: U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2d Class Jack G. Georges (Released).

Air Force Loadmasters Prepare to Drop Pallets of Humanitarian Aid During
Operation YARBOROUGH.65
The operation in Amarah was part of a broader MNC-I approach to defeat the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant networks in southern Iraq. Even before Operation YARBOROUGH, Austin had decided the time was right to accept risk in the southern Baghdad
belts and push toward the Iranian border region.66 Securing Baghdad and Basrah had
not solved the problem of the rampant Iranian smuggling network through Maysan, Dhi
Qar, and Muthanna Provinces. Ten days after the fighting ended in Sadr City, MNC-I
issued the order for Operation LOOK SOUTH to snuff out the networks and directly
counter malign Iranian influence. However, much of this area fell within the British MultiNational Division-Southeast (MND-SE) area of operations. Operation LOOK SOUTH
creatively avoided the politically charged question of changing the British boundaries
by establishing a temporary area of operations on May 30 that effectively carved out
Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna Provinces from MND-SE for MND-C to control indefinitely.67 Officially, the multinational division boundaries had not changed, but the reality on the ground told another story. The British readily accepted the unofficial and
unconventional change in responsibility across much of MND-SE and would see their
area gradually shrink throughout the summer.68 The newly arrived U.S. 10th Mountain
Division, which replaced Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Division as MND-C
at the end of May 2008, had four brigades to cover this vast expanse of southern Iraq.
Under the command of Oates, the 10th Mountain Division further expanded MND-C’s
area of responsibility following the scheduled departure of the Polish-led Multi-National
Division-Central South (MND-CS) in October.69
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Major General Michael Oates (left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Michel Sauret (Released).

Major General Michael Oates, With Major General Othman Ali Farhood al-Ghanimi,
8th Iraqi Army Division Commander.70
The day after Oates took command of MND-C and Operation LOOK SOUTH kicked
off, Prime Minister Maliki ordered Iraqi forces in Maysan Province to clear Amarah. The
operation differed from those in Sadr City and Basrah since the 10th Iraqi Army Division
planned it with American support. It was also to be Oates’s first operation. After hearing his counterparts’ overcomplicated plan that called for several uncoordinated axes of
advance that would lead to violent engagements inside the city, Oates gently suggested
changes that simplified the operation and spared Amarah’s population. In the revised
plan, the Iraqi Army would deploy a brigade to clear the capital from west to east toward
the Iranian border, while Oates would position SOF east of the capital to interdict fighters
attempting to flee toward the border.71
On June 19, troops from the 10th Iraqi Division and their U.S. advisers entered Amarah
unopposed, an achievement born from the success of Operation YARBOROUGH. As the
soldiers began to clear the city, they discovered large weapons and munitions caches that
included almost 500 mortar rounds and 700 antitank mines.72 Over the course of a week,
the ISF detained 65 suspected insurgents and found 52 weapons caches, some containing
EFPs.73 Along with the dozens of militiamen, the Iraqi troops detained several senior
local officials with Sadrist militant ties, including both the provincial governor and the
provincial chief of police. Iraqi leaders in Baghdad also replaced the brigade responsible
for the Iraq-Iran border in Maysan Province that had been ineffective for several years.74
On June 2, Prime Minister Maliki flew to Amarah, continuing his practice of being
personally present for large-scale ISF operations. He arrived to find Iraqi Army units
increasingly confident as they witnessed the defeat of the Shi’a militants in a third major
militia stronghold city. “We saw a positive indicator of the growing confidence of the
ISF in a bit of graffiti seen on the Yugoslav Bridge in the vicinity of Amarah last week,”
Petraeus reported to Gates. “Presumably a JAM/SG member had scrawled on the bridge,
‘We’ll be back.’ Below it, someone from the ISF responded with, ‘We’ll be waiting for
you’.”75
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As had happened in Basrah and Baghdad after extensive shaping operations, another
Shi’a insurgent base had fallen with relative ease into ISF and coalition hands. For the
first time since 2003, the Iraqi Government controlled the entire lower Tigris River Valley
from Baghdad to the sea, unvexed.
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF THE SURGE
Return to Normality in Baghdad
As the clearing operations in militia-dominated neighborhoods continued, the
once-extreme violence in Iraq’s capital dropped to levels experienced in other capitals
of the developing world. In early July, MNF-I’s spokesmen announced that the violence
was at its lowest level since the war began. Economic activity had improved as well. On
July 11, official Iraqi and U.S. economic reports calculated that the Iraqi economy was
growing at an annual rate of between 8 and 9 percent. At the same time, the Gulf Region
Division of the Army Corps of Engineers—Iraq’s largest employer—reported that only 3
percent of its active projects faced security-related delays, down from more than 20 percent in fall 2007.76
By midsummer 2008, life in Baghdad had returned to normal, something that Petraeus and MNF-I looked to encourage. In one example, Petraeus had MNF-I assist farmers in the lower Diyala Valley near Baghdad with the crop dusting of 159,000 acres of
date palms to increase the yield of one of Iraq’s most important agricultural exports. Petraeus also worked to reopen Baghdad’s public swimming pools (nicknamed “Operation
SPEEDO”), calculating that this would give idle young men something to do and offer
respite from the summer heat and sporadic electricity.77
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Baghdadis who had shunned public places at night in 2006 and 2007 now filled restaurants and shops. Commercial areas such as the city’s famous riverside Abu Nuwas Street
reopened. In late August, a crowd of about 50,000 attended a soccer match in Baghdad,
the largest sporting event since the 2003 invasion, with no security problems marring the
occasion.78 To capitalize on the growing sense of improvement among Iraqis, Petraeus
ordered U.S. military vehicles to “adhere to Iraqi traffic patterns and assume a lower
profile with less aggressive and provocative security procedures” of the sort that had
long raised Iraqis’ ire. Petraeus also directed U.S. units to begin removing what he called
“detritus of war” from the streets of Baghdad and other cities, including the vast mass
of concertina wire, sandbags, and construction material that had accumulated over 5½
years of violence.79

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Ian M. Terry (Released).

Iraqis Celebrate the Removal of Concrete Barriers From a Marketplace in Samarra.80
A more complicated problem arose in the resettlement of those Iraqis who had been
forced to flee their homes during years of sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad and
other parts of central Iraq. An estimated 5 million refugees and internally displaced persons, or roughly 17 percent of the Iraqi population, had not returned home following
the sectarian cleansings of 2005–2007.81 This had far-reaching political implications, especially with provincial elections scheduled to take place in late 2008. According to one U.S.
Government report, of those displaced persons who attempted to return to Baghdad,
“up to 70% . . . could not resettle in their own homes, either because someone else was
living there or because the ethnic composition of the neighborhood made it unsafe.”82 The
lack of a uniform procedure for adjudicating property disputes between squatters and
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displaced persons had destabilizing potential, possibly encouraging both sides to elicit
support from local militias.83
Nevertheless, Petraeus considered the situation promising as the summer ended.
Reporting to Gates in the first week of September, he noted that almost 50,000 displaced
Iraqi families had returned to Baghdad since December 2007, a figure that represented
about a quarter of a million people. The U.S. brigade in the Rashid District reported almost
1,500 families returned home in the last week of August alone.84 To help matters, the government announced that Iraqi troops would evict squatters from illegal residences; and
Iraqi ministries would disburse compensation payments to squatters forced to move.85
It surprised U.S. commanders that “Sunni and Shi’a alike seem generally receptive to
the resettlement process,” though Iraqi media reports made it clear that the return of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) was popular and a welcome sign that the civil war
was ending.86
Still, the return of IDPs was not entirely peaceful. Two Members of Parliament who
attempted to organize the return of hundreds of mostly Sunni families to west Baghdad had their homes blown up. One of the Parliamentarians, Mithal al-Alusi, accused
Baghdad Operations Commander General Abud Qanbar of blocking the return of Sunni
families, since bombers destroyed Alusi’s empty home, even though an Iraqi military
checkpoint was just a few meters away.87 Nevertheless, by summer’s end such attacks
were rare with an average of only four violent incidents per week across all of Baghdad
Province.88
Petraeus Promoted, Odierno Returns
Petraeus oversaw these changes in Baghdad with the knowledge that his tenure as
MNF-I commander was almost over. Spring 2008 saw an unexpected shuffle among
senior U.S. commanders in the Middle East. In early March, Admiral William “Fox”
Fallon suddenly resigned his post as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander
after allowing scholar-journalist Thomas Barnett to quote him in unguarded moments
and cast him as a lone figure opposing the White House’s supposed drive toward war
with Iran.89
With Fallon gone, CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Martin
Dempsey filled the position temporarily. This led to an immediate change in the rapport
between CENTCOM and MNF-I, which had been troubled during Fallon’s tenure. The
relationship changed further in April 2008 when President George W. Bush nominated
Petraeus as CENTCOM’s next permanent commander beginning in the fall. At the same
time, Bush nominated Odierno, who had only left Baghdad in February and had been
preparing to become Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, to succeed Petraeus as MNF-I commander. The two generals underwent a Senate confirmation hearing together in late May
and were confirmed a few days later. The Department of Defense (DoD) scheduled the
MNF-I change of command for mid-September.
As a result of the impending promotion to command of CENTCOM, Petraeus began
to look beyond the Iraq theater. With Fallon out of the picture, Petraeus took on some of
the regional military diplomacy that normally would fall to the CENTCOM commander.
Both with and without Crocker, Petraeus made visits in spring and summer 2008 to Saudi
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Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Jordan, meeting with heads of state and senior security
officials in each country to press them to improve their relations with the Iraqi Government and to crack down on foreign fighters and terrorist financiers. However, circumstances forced him to increasingly turn his attention to the deteriorating situation
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Odierno, meanwhile, faced the prospect of returning for a
third command tour in Iraq, but this time with a break of only 7 months. He was slated to
become the first U.S. officer since General Lucian Truscott to command at division, corps,
and army levels in the same theater of war.
Questioning the Coalition Force Presence
The change in security conditions shifted attitudes toward the U.S. military presence
in the country among both Iraqis and some coalition leaders. Even before the spring campaign against the Shi’a militants had played out, some senior U.S. leaders had begun to
indicate that security conditions in Iraq warranted shifting military resources to Afghanistan where security had deteriorated. In early April, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, said that troop commitments in Iraq prevented the
United States from meeting force requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere.90 The following week, Bush announced that he would suspend the drawdown of U.S. troops in
Iraq after the departure of the last of the surge brigades in July, but on the same day,
he instructed the U.S. military to begin planning for “conditions-based reductions” in
Iraq to free up forces for Afghanistan. At the same time, the Army announced an end to
15-month deployments for units going to Iraq: after August 1, Army units would serve
12-month rotations.91
As the signs of a U.S. withdrawal mounted, the continued U.S. presence in Iraq became
a major political issue among the Iraqi parties competing in the country’s provincial elections. The UN Security Council resolution that provided the legal justification for U.S.
military involvement expired at the end of 2008, so Washington pursued a bilateral status
of forces agreement (SOFA) that would allow a continued American presence. In midMarch, Ambassador Robert Loftis, a State Department expert on status of forces agreements, arrived in Baghdad with a team of technical experts to negotiate a new agreement.
White House staffer Brett McGurk accompanied Loftis to negotiate a parallel strategic
framework agreement (SFA) covering the broader U.S.-Iraqi relationship in economic
and diplomatic matters.
By mid-May, the talks bogged down. The Maliki government was not keen on separating the SOFA from the broader SFA, preferring one comprehensive document that
defined all future U.S.-Iraq relations. Petraeus also reported that Maliki hesitated to use
“his political capital to urge the Council of Representatives to support the SFA” because
he feared it might hurt his Da’wa Party and fracture his political coalition.92 The Prime
Minister’s concern reflected changing public attitudes. The improved security situation
in central and southern Iraq had increased the Iraqi public’s confidence in their government security forces and led them to question the need for a continued coalition military
presence. National polls of Iraqis in spring 2008 found that about two-thirds of Iraqis
disapproved of the presence of coalition troops in the country, while a similar portion of
Iraqis expressed confidence in the Iraqi Army and National Police. In keeping with these
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polled attitudes, 144 of the 275 members of the Iraqi Parliament signed a letter on May 11
calling for a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces.93
A few high-profile incidents by U.S. troops did not help the situation. On May 9, a
U.S. Soldier in MND-B used a Koran for target practice at a firing range near the Baghdad
Airport. Local Iraqis quickly learned of the event, forcing MND-B Commander Major
General Jeffery Hammond to issue a formal apology and meet with local Iraqi leaders to
soothe their anger.94 Nevertheless, the incident made national news in Iraq and helped
fuel anti-coalition sentiment. Three weeks later, a committee of the Iraqi Parliamentary
parties called for the Iraqi Government to reject the draft statement of principles for the
U.S.-Iraqi relationship, increasing the pressure on Maliki to drive a hard bargain in the
SOFA negotiations.95
At the same time, Moqtada Sadr organized a series of protests in Baghdad, the first
of which drew 10,000 participants just a week after the Iraqi Army occupied Sadr City.
“Although the demonstrations were fairly small compared to those in the past, basically
representing the size of Friday congregations, they indicate the need for Iraqi leaders
to begin to make the case for these accords,” Petraeus noted.96 In public statements, the
Sadrists and their Iranian allies began drawing parallels between the draft U.S.-Iraq
SOFA and the 1964 U.S.-Iran SOFA, a military agreement between the U.S. Government
and the Shah that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had used to build opposition to the
Shah’s rule. Other Iraqis also drew parallels with the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 between
the Iraqi monarchy and Great Britain, a highly unpopular agreement that had led to a
near-revolt in Baghdad. At the time, the significance of these previous agreements was
lost on the U.S. officials negotiating the SOFA and SFA, but for Iraqis and Iranians they
were full of historical meaning. MNF-I noted that Iraqi political factions were particularly
sensitive to questions about whether U.S. forces would continue to have the authority
to detain Iraqis, conduct unilateral operations, and maintain bases in the country. The
question of legal immunity for contractors and third-country nationals employed by the
United States was also a sensitive one on which many Iraqi politicians were not inclined
to give the United States a great deal of leeway.97
The Iranian regime also exerted significant behind-the-scenes influence. Though the
Iranians had suffered a setback with the operational defeat of their Iraqi militia proxies,
they retained enough influence with the Iraqi political parties to obstruct the U.S.-Iraqi
negotiations. On June 7, Maliki traveled to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
and Qassem Soleimani, ostensibly to confront the Iranian leaders with evidence of their
destabilizing activities in Iraq, but in reality, the discussions revolved around Iranian
opposition to the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. The Iranian leaders denied that any high-level Iranian authorities had been involved in arming the Iraqi Shi’a militias and told Maliki that
the SOFA and SFA were “unacceptable” and constituted a “new occupation of Iraq.”98
“Given the Supreme Leader’s strident language about the United States during the visit,
we can expect the Iranians to continue their strategic communications campaign against
U.S.-Iraq SF/SOFA negotiations inside Iraq and in the regional media,” Petraeus reported
after Maliki’s trip.99
With political conditions making the SOFA negotiations difficult, Crocker proposed
to Maliki on June 26 that the two governments should sign a temporary “bridging agreement” that would allow U.S. forces to operate in Iraq until they could reach a longer-term
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SOFA.100 Two days later, however, a single incident by U.S. special operators almost
derailed the entire SOFA process. On June 28, the special operations task force conducted
a raid in a small town near Karbala that targeted the wrong house in a search for a Shi’a
militant. Unfortunately, the targeted house belonged to Prime Minister Maliki’s sister,
and in the course of the raid, the special operators killed one of her bodyguards, a young
man who was one of Maliki’s relatives.101
The raid infuriated Prime Minister Maliki, who, like many Iraqi leaders, found it
impossible to believe that the coalition had raided his family and killed one of his relatives by mistake. In addition, the raid had taken place in one of the nine provinces supposedly under full Iraqi control, but local Iraqi security officials asserted the coalition
had conducted the operation without their knowledge. The incident was a clear setback
for the United States, coming at the worst possible time in the stormy negotiations over
unilateral U.S. military operations and immunity from Iraqi law for U.S. Government
personnel and contractors.102
Allegations in the same week that the United States was using Iraq as a base to conduct operations inside Iran compounded the problem. In late June, The New Yorker magazine published an article by journalist Seymour Hersh that claimed U.S. SOF had been
sending operatives into Iran to prepare the way for an American war against the Iranian
regime. The story raised Iraqi ire and lent credence to the Iranian regime’s claims that the
United States wanted to retain bases in Iraq for the precise purpose that Hersh claimed.
Partly to contain the damage from the Hersh story and from the raid in Karbala, Petraeus took Prime Minister Maliki and Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie
to visit the special operations headquarters in Iraq, the first time senior Iraqi officials
were briefed there.103 Maliki’s past opposition toward special operations raids against
Shi’a militant targets and the recent killing of his relative at the hands of U.S. commandos added tension to the visit. The trip was intended to provide the Iraqi leaders the
most up-to-date operational picture as well as to make the special operations activities
more transparent. At the headquarters, Maliki and Rubaie visited an operations center,
inspected the elite commandos’ high-tech equipment, and received assurances that U.S.
special operators were neither slackening their efforts against AQI nor using Iraq as a
platform to make raids into Iran. The special operations commanders “gave a terrific presentation that clearly impressed and moved the PM [Prime Minister],” Petraeus reported
afterward, adding that Maliki “addressed our troops in the most complimentary terms
and stressed again the importance of the U.S. to the fate of a free Iraq.”104 For his part, Petraeus hoped that the visit had watered down some of Maliki’s opposition to a SOFA.105
Senator Barack Obama in Baghdad
The day after Maliki’s visit to Balad, another factor injected itself into the U.S.-Iraq
SOFA negotiations. In the ongoing U.S. Presidential election campaign, Democratic candidate Barack Obama called for the United States to set a fixed timetable for withdrawal
from Iraq. On July 4, Obama expanded on his plans, indicating that, if elected, he would
withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq within 16 months. Just days later, on July 19, Prime
Minister Maliki told German journalists that he too believed American forces could
safely be withdrawn from Iraq over a 16-month period, apparently endorsing Obama’s
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campaign platform with a statement that Petraeus described as “a politically incautious
remark.” The Iraqi Prime Minister mentioned the same 16-month withdrawal timetable in a videoconference with Bush, in which Maliki also said he saw no need for any
non-American coalition forces beyond 2009.106
On July 21, 2 days after Maliki’s public remarks, Senator Obama met with Petraeus
and Crocker in Baghdad as part of a visiting congressional delegation that also included
future SECDEF Charles Hagel and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island. In the course of a
long briefing on the situation in Iraq, Obama laid out several arguments for withdrawing
U.S. troops.

(Seated left to right) Senator Charles Hagel, General David Petraeus, Senator Barack Obama, Ambassador
Ryan Crocker, and Senator Jack Reed. Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).

Tense Discussions on Iraq War Strategy During a Congressional Delegation Visit on
July 21, 2008.107
The meeting was collegial, but tense. Petraeus and Crocker argued that sectarian violence had slowed, but political progress had not yet matched the security gains. It was
thus premature to assume Iraq could remain stable without U.S. troops. Much of the discussion between Obama and Petraeus dealt with shifting responsibility to Iraqi security
forces, with Obama arguing that the United States needed to force the Iraqi Government
to assume the lead in providing security, an idea Obama’s advisers labeled “conditional
engagement.” Petraeus, however, noted that that approach had failed in 2006 and warned
against handing the ISF more than they could handle. Obama also argued that the Iraq
campaign was a distraction from the fight against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Petraeus replied that al-Qaeda itself had declared Iraq the central front in its war against the West. The general also noted that calls to shift troops from
Iraq to use them against bin Laden would require the United States to invade Pakistan—
bin Laden’s likely location. Obama and Hagel argued that Petraeus’s recommendations
to maintain a large U.S. force in Iraq were infeasible, given the strain the Iraq War was
placing on the U.S. Government, especially with an expanding financial crisis. Petraeus
410

THE SURGE CULMINATES, SUMMER 2008

replied that he understood that, in setting Iraq policy, U.S. leaders had to consider the
larger strategic picture, but as the MNF-I commander his duty was to give his best military advice on accomplishing the mission in his theater of operations. He indicated that
it was up to his political superiors to accept his recommendations or change his mission.
The visiting senators seemed to be pressing Petraeus to preclude that process by tailoring
his military advice to a policy, Petraeus said.
After the contentious meeting, Petraeus and Obama met one-on-one, with the senator
inquiring if there was anything additional that the general wanted to offer privately. Petraeus responded by asking Obama to maintain his flexibility on Iraq and suggested that
withdrawal within 16 months of taking office would too rapid and might jeopardize the
progress made during the surge. It would be a suggestion that eventually bore fruit, as
the 16-month timetable stretched to almost 3 years, with the last U.S. forces withdrawing
December 2011.108 Other voices in Iraq amplified the arguments Petraeus and Crocker
had made. Later in their visit, for example, the senators met Sunni Awakening leaders
who warned that a hasty U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq would likely lead to a return
to violence.109 After the July 21 discussions, it seemed clear that if Senator Obama became
President, then an expedited U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was likely.
MALIKI’S WARNING SIGNS: DIYALA, THE ISOF, AND THE SOFA
Diyala: Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE, July–August 2008
As coalition leaders focused on completing the campaign against AQI in Mosul and
institutionalizing the long-term U.S.-Iraq military relationship, the Prime Minister’s
attention was on a different agenda. In the wake of his victory over his Sadrist rivals in
Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, Maliki increasingly structured Iraqi security
operations toward his personal objectives. U.S. troops had conducted three large-scale
operations in Diyala since summer 2007; the most recent in January 2008 found little
evidence of a large AQI presence in the province’s populated areas. However, Maliki’s
priorities differed from those of the coalition, and the Prime Minister decided in late July
to conduct another large operation in Diyala. This one, which the Prime Minister named
Operation BASHIR AL-KHAIR (GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE), was ISF-led.
To oversee the Iraqi part of the operation, Maliki ordered Iraqi Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan to take charge of the newly created Diyala
Operations Command, another regional command like those the Iraqis had in Baghdad,
Basrah, and Ninawa.110 Ghaidan brought most of the 1st Iraqi Division and a brigade of
the 9th Iraqi Mechanized Division to reinforce the 5th Iraqi Division already stationed in
Diyala. For Hertling and MND-N, the lead U.S. units in the operation would be Colonel
John RisCassi’s 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment, which deployed to Diyala in July to replace
Colonel Jon Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, and Colonel Patrick White’s 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division. RisCassi’s troops would focus on Baqubah and on the seam
between Diyala and Salahadin Provinces, while White would focus on the rural areas
near Balad Ruz.
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Petraeus reported to U.S. leaders that Maliki indicated that he intended to begin a
Diyala operation in July.111 Maliki’s decision to shift the focus of the ISF from Mosul to
Diyala surprised Hertling and other MND-N leaders. They believed their forces in Diyala
had almost completed the necessary clearing operations in the province and were ready
to enter the hold and build phase.112 For his part, Petraeus was pleased to see the Iraqis
taking the initiative, reporting to Gates that ISF planning and preparation “demonstrates
that they have learned a great deal since the start of the Basrah operation in March.”113
This optimism did not last long as Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE
quickly derailed. Petraeus cautioned that in Diyala the ISF would operate along sensitive
ethnic and sectarian fault lines. “Unlike the situation in predominantly Shi’a Amarah
and Basrah, this offensive [would] have to deal with a mixed population of Shi’a Arabs,
Sunni Arabs and Kurds, plus the presence of peshmerga forces from the KRG [Kurdistan
Regional Government],” he observed on July 20.114 As 50,000 Iraqi and U.S. troops began
new clearing operations during the last week of July, Iraqi commanders seemed more
interested in establishing an ISF presence in the province’s mixed-sect and mixed-ethnicity areas than in pursuing AQI. The Iraqi Army and police activities in the province
seemed particularly focused on slowing Diyala’s Sunni Awakening groups, which had
grown rapidly since fall 2007. Sunni distrust grew quickly as ISF began setting up checkpoints to control the movement of Diyala’s population.115 In the first 2 weeks of the operation, the ISF arrested more than 1,100 Sunnis, many of whom were members of the Sons
of Iraq. The arrests created the impression that Maliki was employing the ISF to combat
the perceived political threat of the Awakening, which looked poised to dominate the
upcoming provincial elections, rather than the security threat of AQI.116 In response, on
August 11, the Sunni-led Diyala provincial council voted to sack Major General Ghanem
al-Qureishi, the Diyala provincial police chief who had pressured the Sons of Iraq for
months. This led to a confrontation with Maliki, who had consistently backed Qureishi.
The following day, tensions worsened when Iraqi Army troops and Kurdish peshmerga came close to an armed clash in the upper Diyala Valley. The Iraqi Army units
pushing north in Diyala arrived on the outskirts of Khanaqin, a Kurdish-majority town
guarded by the 34th Peshmerga Brigade since 2003, and ordered the peshmerga to depart
within 24 hours. This confrontation quickly escalated to a national political crisis as the
peshmerga troops refused to leave. Khanaqin was on the de facto dividing line between
territory controlled by the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) in Erbil, and the demand for the peshmerga to withdraw equated to
a demand by Baghdad for the KRG to cede territory that Kurdish leaders considered part
of Kurdistan.
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Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 2d Class Paul Seeber (Released).

Diyala Provincial Police Chief Major General Ghanem al-Qureishi Converses
With a Colleague.117
The Khanaqin confrontation came 2 months after the Iraqi and Kurdistan Governments had rejected a recommendation by UN Envoy Staffan DeMistura to designate several of the disputed territories along the Green Line—including upper Diyala—under the
control of one government or the other.118 The tense tactical standoff surprised the Kurdish political leaders, who began to question the reliability of their political alliance with
the major Shi’a parties in Baghdad, an agreement that had dominated Iraqi politics since
2003.119 The standoff also shocked coalition leaders, because it represented an unexpected
Shi’a-Kurdish dispute rather than the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian conflict that had dominated
the 2005–2007 period. To avoid the outbreak of a Shi’a-Kurdish war that would serve no
one’s interest but AQI’s, Hertling and MNF-I J–3 Major General Michael Barbero began
intense shuttle diplomacy between ISF and peshmerga commanders, making clear to
each side that the other was prepared to fight. Meanwhile in Baghdad and Erbil, senior
U.S. generals and diplomats encouraged Prime Minister Maliki and KRG leaders to reach
a political solution. Nevertheless, as U.S. commanders in Diyala discovered, the Shi’a
Arab ISF commanders along the Green Line were just as eager for a fight against the
Kurds as the Sunni Arabs had been.
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The ISOF Diyala Raid
With the standoff in Khanaqin still unresolved, Sunni-Shi’a sectarian tensions boiled
over when Prime Minister Maliki employed Iraqi troops against the Diyala provincial
government that had sacked police chief General Qureishi. One week after Qureishi’s
firing, the Prime Minister’s office—through counterterrorism service chief, General Talib
Kenani—ordered the ISOF to arrest Hussein al-Zubaidi, Diyala’s Sunni governor. The
ISOF raid, which the CJSOTF refused to support because of the lack of evidence linking
any of the targets to insurgent activity, turned into a fiasco. On the night of August 18,
ISOF elements raided the governor’s office in Baqubah, arresting two prominent local
Sunni politicians, killing the governor’s secretary, and wounding four Iraqis in a clear
attempt at political intimidation.120 As the Iraqi commandos left, they became involved in
a firefight with local police and fired on American forces assisting the police. It took the
personal intervention of General Ali Ghaidan to untangle the mess. The incident infuriated Petraeus, who “condemned the operation in the strongest terms” and “emphasized
to the [Iraqi Government] that Coalition support for the ISF is dependent upon their
adherence to the rule of law.” “PM [Prime Minister] Maliki has ordered an investigation,
but this incident is lamentable (especially as the PM ordered it),” Petraeus wrote to Gates
a few days after the raid.121
These politicized ISF activities and the battle for political control in the province overshadowed the fact that in remote parts of Diyala, U.S. units were still working to track
down AQI’s top leaders and prevent the group from retaining sanctuaries. White’s troops
focused on Balad Ruz, where coalition commanders believed AQI leader Abu Ayyub
al-Masri might be.122 Making contact with the enemy proved difficult, especially in the
area that U.S. troops called the “Turki Bowl” south of Balad Ruz. In the first 2 weeks of
operations in the Turki Bowl, White’s brigade experienced no direct firefights, but lost
more than 30 vehicles to IEDs. It was unclear whether the IEDs were part of an active
enemy defense or merely part of an abandoned defensive belt network. Either way, in
the dry, reed-choked irrigation canals that crisscrossed the area, White’s troops found
hundreds of ammunition caches before withdrawing in late August.123 Meanwhile, in the
Baqubah area, RisCassi’s cavalry troopers found the security situation much-improved
from the previous fall, but they still encountered occasional booby-trapped houses and a
new type of threat—female suicide bombers. By the late summer of 2008, female bombers wearing suicide vests had become a persistent danger in Baqubah and Muqdadiyah,
where they often passed through security checkpoints without being fully searched by
male Iraqi troops used to avoiding public contact with women.124
Despite these activities, the ISOF raid in Baqubah and the ISF-peshmerga tensions in
Khanaqin cast a pall over Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE and diminished its tactical gains. The politically motivated clearing and checkpoint operations
stoked ethno-sectarian tensions in the province but did little damage to AQI’s residual
capability. The operation “really spiked the sectarian violence in Diyala,” Hertling later
conceded, adding that the operation “almost had a complete falling apart of what we had
established over 9 months.” Rather than being a culminating victory against Sunni terrorists in Diyala, the operation had become, in Hertling’s estimation, “one of the biggest
downers of our time over there.”125
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The ISOF Under Maliki: The “Dirty Brigade”
The disturbing ISOF raid in Baqubah was the culmination of a year-and-a-half-long
effort by Prime Minister Maliki to take full control of the ISOF, Iraq’s premier counterterrorism force, and use it against his rivals. From 2008 onward, Iraqis increasingly saw
the ISOF as Maliki’s political tool. That commando force, hailed as heroes for its role in
the 2004 battles in Najaf and Fallujah, became known in popular parlance as the “dirty
brigade” or, in a throwback to the days of Saddam Hussein, the “Fedayeen Maliki.”

Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel Mennuto (Released).

ISOF Commandos Conduct Night Missions Near Amarah With a CJSOTF Adviser.126
This was a significant shift from early 2007 when the ISOF brigade was considered
the crown jewel of the ISF. Originally created in late 2003 as the 36th Commando Battalion and continuously mentored and advised by the CJSOTF, the unit had grown in size
and capability to the point that it could conduct short-notice heliborne assaults and integrate information received by its human intelligence networks into operations. The ISOF
were under the operational control of the coalition, but having seen the organization’s
performance against AQI and Sadrist militias, Maliki had long sought more authority
over the unit. Unable to convince coalition leaders to permit substantive changes to the
ISOF’s command control arrangement, Maliki opted for a fait accompli in January 2007
by issuing an executive order removing the brigade and its parent headquarters, the Iraqi
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Counterterrorism Command, from the Ministry of Defense and placing it under his own
Office of the Commander in Chief.127
The CJSOTF, which had considerable influence over the brigade because of its authority to approve leadership changes and its control over the unit’s pay and finances, resisted
Maliki’s politicization of the ISOF.128 CJSOTF leaders argued to MNF-I that if the ISOF brigade was beholden solely to the Prime Minister, it would become his Praetorian Guard,
and political or sectarian targeting would undoubtedly follow. Removing the brigade
from the Ministry of Defense also would upend the basic institutional services needed to
keep the ISOF brigade functioning, such as recruiting, pay, logistics, medical care, and
intelligence.129
With the Counterterrorism Command an unstaffed shell incapable of operating as a
higher headquarters and MNF-I siding with the CJSOTF, Maliki’s executive order initially had little impact. However, the coalition’s unified opposition to Maliki’s moves
changed in the summer of 2007 when Navy SEAL Rear Admiral Edward G. Winters III
took command of the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force Transition Team, a special
operations organization created to help the ISOF brigade shift to full Iraqi control. Winters was convinced that the unit could not reach its full potential under the Ministry
of Defense where bureaucratic infighting made funding, logistics, and maintenance a
perennial headache.130 Winters also believed sectarian officers in the Ministry of Defense
subverted the ISOF brigade mission against insurgents and militias.131 Over CJSOTF’s
objections, Winters and other senior special operations leaders in Iraq recommended that
the Iraqis create an organization similar to United States Special Operations Command
(SOCOM)—an independent entity to control the country’s special operations budget
and act as its own armed service, representing ISOF interests at the ministerial level. In
Winters’s view, the proposed SOCOM-like counterterrorism organization should report
directly to the chief executive, thereby removing layers of bureaucracy that slowed
responses to national-level terrorist incidents.132 Because this idea mirrored Maliki’s executive order and a transition to Iraqi control would have to happen at some point, Winters
asked Petraeus to endorse Maliki’s proposal. Petraeus was initially noncommittal in part
due to the CJSOTF’s opposition to the plan, but after Winters enlisted the support of a
senior special operations commander in summer 2007, Petraeus relented and endorsed
the proposal.133
The decision slowly changed the nature of the ISOF as Maliki loyalists moved into
key leadership positions and the Counterterrorism Command grew from a shell to a
functioning headquarters. Lieutenant General Taleb Dhia Kanani and Lieutenant General Abdul Ghani al-Asadi, two officers with a history of service in Saddam’s Army but
no special operations experience, received top positions in the Counterterrorism Command and Service, prompting concern among CJSOTF officers and senior ISOF leaders.
Kanani, a Maliki loyalist, previously had angered ISOF members when he investigated
unfounded allegations that the Iraqi commandos had executed civilians during a March
2006 raid of a JAM compound in Adhamiyah. Many ISOF commandos “were convinced
that Kenani was the devil incarnate,” recalled a CJSOTF commander.134 Iraqi leaders also
resisted the move. “[Maliki] just put two Iranians in charge of the ISOF brigade,” Colonel Fadhil Jamil al Barwari, the brigade’s Kurdish commander, told a CJSOTF adviser
upon hearing of the appointments.135 Under Kanani’s oversight, Shi’a officers with ties to
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Maliki but little or no special operations experience began to replace experienced ISOF
officers. CJSOTF advisers noticed alarming trends, “witnessing punitive reassignments
of officers [and] ethnically oriented organizational changes,” and concluded that Maliki
was cementing personal control of the brigade with these actions.136 These changes, combined with other officer reassignments, amounted to placing “Shi’a sectarian commissars
meant to watch over and make sure the ISOF does only the bidding of the Shi’a government,” according to one CJSOTF commander.137 When Winters confronted Kenani about
the personnel changes, the Iraqi general claimed the increase in Shi’a ISOF officers was
the result of Kurds and Sunnis not wanting to leave their homes and move to the ISOF
headquarters in Baghdad.138
As the leadership of the brigade changed, the CJSOTF struggled to keep the unit
nonsectarian, insisting on maintaining ethnic quotas among the ISOF’s enlisted recruits
to preserve the brigade’s original balanced composition of 61 percent Shi’a, 24 percent
Sunni, and 12 percent Kurdish.139 Recruits submitted to polygraphs and counterintelligence interviews to confirm they were not members of militias. Strict entry requirements
also helped maintain the brigade’s makeup, with only 42 percent of applicants passing
the unit’s selection course during 2008.140 On several occasions, these entry requirements
blocked large groups of Shi’a soldiers that arrived without warning, alleging their assignment to the brigade as replacements.141
Nevertheless, the purge of the brigade’s leadership and infiltration of its commanding
headquarters had a sectarian impact. By early 2008, CJSOTF advisers noticed a higher
failure rate when the brigade struck politically sensitive Shi’a targets and concluded that
the new leadership was tipping off the targets or steering the raids toward token, lowlevel Shi’a militants.142 Testing their theory, CJSOTF advisers helped loyal ISOF soldiers
submit lengthy, “near perfect” target packages against Shi’a targets, but they were rejected
without explanation every time, while similar packages for Sunni targets received easy
approval.143 At the same time, CJSOTF leaders concluded that Iraqi leaders had begun to
give the ISOF sectarian missions or to dispatch them against Maliki’s political opponents.
When such missions occurred, the CJSOTF advisers refused to accompany the ISOF commandos and notified MNC-I, who in turn worked with MNF-I to lodge formal protests.144
On some occasions, the ISOF brigade conducted operations at the behest of Prime Minister Maliki and only informed the CJSOTF after the missions were concluded.
The August 2008 ISOF raid against the Diyala governor’s office was a turning point
for CJSOTF leaders, who began to question their continued collaboration with the organization they had created. Concluding that the sectarian influence ran too deep to repair,
CJSOTF advisers began to distance themselves from any ISOF operations that resembled
sectarian intimidation and instead began to work more closely with the Ministry of the
Interior’s Emergency Response Units, six elite special weapons and tactics battalions patterned after the FBI’s hostage rescue teams and national counterterrorism teams.145 The
CJSOTF’s separation from the ISOF was jarring to the many U.S. and Iraqi special operators who had worked closely in combat for almost 5 years. Many of the rank-and-file
ISOF members recognized the sectarian change to their unit, but were powerless to stop
it. “You taught us about being Iraqis . . . You taught us that our ethnicity is not part of it,
[that it should be] Iraq first,” one saddened ISOF leader told a CJSOTF commander. “You
taught us better than this.”146
417

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

Maliki and the SOFA
During the summer of 2008, U.S. leaders began to realize that the biggest impediment to a status of forces agreement was Maliki himself. U.S. leaders had believed that
what held the Prime Minister from reaching a long-term military relationship with the
United States was opposition from Shi’a militant factions and the Iranian regime, so if
those two groups were neutralized, Maliki could sign a binding agreement. The American leaders initially believed that the military victory over Iran’s proxies in spring 2008
had removed the SOFA’s biggest impediment, but they soon realized they were wrong.
From his espousal of Senator Obama’s 16-month withdrawal timeline to his misuse of the
ISF in Diyala, Maliki demonstrated that he viewed the continued U.S. military presence
as an obstacle to his personal objectives. He was also reluctant to be, as Petraeus put it,
“the first Iraqi leader to legitimize a foreign military presence in Iraq.”147
Nevertheless, Bush and other senior U.S. leaders pressed the Iraqi leader to finalize the U.S.-Iraqi agreement in August. Realizing the U.S. approach needed a reboot,
Bush instructed White House official Brett McGurk, Ambassador David Satterfield, and
Pentagon official Mark Kimmitt to take over the SOFA negotiations from Ambassador
Loftis and his team. To give his new negotiators greater leeway, Bush authorized them
to offer the Maliki government a specific timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal, something
the President previously refused to consider. As the new talks got underway, Maliki and
his advisers pressed the American team for a general withdrawal of U.S. combat forces
by December 31, 2010, but conceded a need for a residual force beyond that date to train
the Iraqi security forces.148
On August 4, the two sides agreed that the final U.S.-Iraq security accord would specify a departure date between 2010 and 2011, an understanding that led the U.S. negotiators to assume Maliki had accepted the terms of the SOFA. However, they were wrong.149
As days passed, it became clear that Maliki had not agreed with his own negotiators and
had developed “cold feet” about the agreement, perhaps out of concern that Ayatollah
Ali Husayni Sistani would oppose it, as Petraeus reported on August 10.150
On August 21, the negotiators finally agreed that U.S. combat troops would leave Iraq
by the end of 2011, a concession that U.S. officials hoped would finally secure Maliki’s
backing for the SOFA.151 Even with the specified departure date, however, the negotiators on both sides understood that the agreement could be extended or rolled over later,
meaning that a full U.S. military departure would not be set in stone. To close the deal,
U.S. officials arranged a videoconference between Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on
August 22, in which the American President made a personal entreaty to Maliki to sign
the SOFA and settle the two countries’ military relationship. To the dismay of Petraeus
and senior U.S. leaders, the Iraqi Prime Minister appeared nervous and noncommittal,
declining Bush’s entreaty and claiming the matter needed more study and consideration.
The inconclusive meeting left U.S. leaders to question whether the events of 2008, in
which Maliki had effectively overpowered his strongest political rivals, left the Prime
Minister less inclined to strike an agreement with the United States rather than more.
Commenting on the episode to Gates, Petraeus wrote that, in front of the President,
Maliki had “delayed and dissembled, generally demonstrating considerable vacillation
and lack of confidence.”152 Recounting the details of the videoconference to his senior
418

THE SURGE CULMINATES, SUMMER 2008

general officers the following morning, a frustrated Petraeus concluded that Maliki had
failed an important test of statesmanship. “There was just no leadership in that room,”
Petraeus said.153
In retrospect, what appeared to Petraeus and others as Maliki’s lack of confidence
may simply have been the Prime Minister’s effort to stave off an agreement he saw as
unnecessary. Maliki’s opposition to the SOFA may have reflected his growing confidence, because of his successes in Basrah, Sadr City, Amarah, and his takeover of the
ISOF brigade. In the days following the inconclusive videoconference, Maliki surprised
his U.S. counterparts again by dismissing the Iraqi negotiating team led by a senior foreign ministry official and replacing it with the same group of Da’wa Party advisers who
had negotiated the UNSCR rollover in late 2007. Led by Mowaffaq Rubaie, the new negotiating team emphasized that any U.S.-Iraqi agreement would have to stipulate that apart
from advisory teams and PRTs, U.S. troops would withdraw from all Iraqi cities by June
30, 2009. To senior U.S. leaders, this withdrawal would happen over time anyway and
thus be accepted with little cost.154 Nevertheless, the unresolved negotiations meant that
Petraeus would be leave command in Iraq without a settled legal justification for his
forces to remain beyond the end of the year.
***
Summer 2008 found the situation in Iraq much changed in the space of a year. Violence in Baghdad almost had ceased, the Shi’a militants had been routed, and AQI had
been forced into the far north of the country. As large numbers of U.S. troops redeployed
outside Iraq, the coalition’s morale was high. An impressive display of U.S. military commitment came at Camp Victory on July 4 when Petraeus presided over a reenlistment
ceremony for 1,215 U.S. service members in the ornate rotunda of Faw Palace, an event
that MNF-I considered the largest mass reenlistment ever held.155 A week later, when Petraeus and Crocker presided over their last Campaign Assessment and Synchronization
Board together, the coalition leaders concluded that the coalition already had achieved
the near-term security objectives of the 2007 joint campaign plan. In their estimation,
the time had come to shift “from directly protecting the population to jointly achieving
a level of security that can be maintained by Iraqi security and civil institutions with
reduced Coalition involvement.”156
Petraeus himself spent his last weeks in Iraq shifting focus from Iraq to Afghanistan and other pressing problems he would soon be responsible for as CENTCOM
commander. In early August, while U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted Operation GLAD
TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE in Diyala, the MNF-I commander traveled to Afghanistan
to assess what he anticipated would be a challenge rivaling that of Iraq and a major issue
during the next Presidential administration.157 On August 17, Petraeus reported to Gates
that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating and would require “‘thickening the
force,’ both by generating more Afghan forces and by creating ‘Awakening’ style security
arrangements wherever possible—in addition to increasing the Coalition forces there.”158
Petraeus’s solution for Afghanistan would thus be to take pages from the Iraq playbook
that had worked for him.
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In operational terms, the surge had indeed achieved most of its objectives by summer
2008. The populations of central, southern, and western Iraq in particular were returning to a normal way of life. But the events of the summer showed that political objectives would be more difficult. As the pressure of violence decreased, Iraqis had begun
to assert their sovereignty both in seeking to take over the leadership role in security
operations and in driving a hard bargain for a long-term U.S.-Iraqi security agreement.
The uncertainty of the U.S. Presidential election campaign affected the situation as well,
given Obama’s well-publicized plans to withdraw from Iraq.
The continuing ethno-sectarian conflict in Diyala disappointed U.S. commanders in
the north who had hoped to deal AQI a knockout blow and stabilize the restive province.
Prime Minister Maliki’s refusal to sign a U.S.-Iraq SOFA struck a major blow to senior
U.S. leaders in Baghdad and Washington, casting doubt on whether the strategic gains
of the Iraq War could be consolidated. The problematic role of the Iraqi security forces in
ethno-sectarian political disputes and the emerging tendency of Prime Minister Maliki to
consolidate power were ominous signs of future instability. The Prime Minister’s actions
made it unclear whether the coalition could accomplish its goals of good governance and
national reconciliation—goals that coalition leaders believed necessary to ensure Iraq’s
long-term stability. Finally, the campaign in Mosul remained unfinished. Though U.S.
and Iraqi troops had pursued AQI to remote corners of the country, the extremists still
could conduct limited but complex attacks in the north. As Petraeus prepared to leave
Baghdad, all of this unfinished business would fall to his successor, General Odierno.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: THE SURGE, 2007-2008
The change in the operational situation in Iraq from the beginning of the surge to its
end was sweeping. By mid-2008, most of the Sunni insurgents that had threatened the
Iraqi state’s very existence in 2006 had either switched sides or fled to remote areas where
they posed little danger to Iraq’s heartland. The Iraqi security forces that had struggled
to function in 2006 had grown by more than 140,000 troops and operated throughout the
country. The Iranian-backed Shi’a militias that had dominated large swaths of Baghdad
and southern Iraq had been defeated. The Syria-based foreign fighter network that had
funneled thousands of terrorists into Iraq was neutralized. Life in Baghdad had returned
to normality just 2 years after the carnage of 2006. Anbar, Iraq’s most restive province in
2006, was now at its most peaceful. For the first time since 2003, the Iraqi Government
controlled the lower Tigris and Euphrates River valleys from Baghdad to the sea, and
pacification of the upper Tigris and upper Diyala valleys seemed within reach.
All this seemed unlikely after Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) failed transition
campaign in late 2006 when its internal strategic review acknowledged both a deteriorating security situation and a joint campaign plan with misaligned ends, ways, and means.
General George W. Casey, Jr., sought to correct this and check the descent into sectarian
civil war by accelerating the transition to Iraqi control and prodding the Nuri al-Maliki
government into confronting the Shi’a militias and reconciling with the Sunnis. Casey
had believed that drawing down was the surest way of maintaining an extended—albeit
reduced—U.S. presence in Iraq, thus achieving the nation’s objectives. By the end of 2006,
President George W. Bush no longer found this persuasive. The White House strategy
review that had begun in the summer gathered steam in the fall and finally culminated
in January 2007 with the announcement of the “new way forward” that included a surge
of U.S. troops and a new commander. Replacing Casey as MNF-I commander 1 month
later, General David Petraeus developed and implemented a strategy, distinct in many
respects from its predecessor but most markedly so in its intentional realignment of ends,
ways, and means.
The surge, of course, provided the coalition with additional means, chiefly the 5 U.S.
brigade combat teams (BCTs) that arrived between January and May 2007 to raise the
total number of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq to 20—the highest it had been since the
invasion. Two more Marine rifle battalions and a regimental-sized expeditionary unit
also deployed as part of the surge, joining with forces already on the ground to expand
MNF-I’s operational reach into enemy sanctuaries throughout central Iraq. The commitment of an additional division headquarters and its combat aviation brigade facilitated
this geographical expansion by providing focused command and control—particularly
across Baghdad’s southern “belts.” In 2007, the arrival of several additional provincial
reconstruction teams extended the coalition’s reach, capitalizing on security gains to
improve local governance and economic development. A surge of enablers gave BCT
commanders capabilities that dramatically increased intelligence collection and analysis,
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force protection, and population control. For example, full-motion video, document
exploitation, and signals intelligence gave tactical leaders increased targeting proficiency
and precision.
Time remained a finite resource, though. Frequently mentioning the tyranny of the
“Washington and Baghdad clocks,” Petraeus sought to buy time in the United States by
emphasizing the need for patience and promising to report on the effects of the surge
to Congress in September 2007. In Iraq, Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker
pursued reconciliation and capacity building as U.S. forces refocused on the reduction
of sectarian violence. Even so, political progress came haltingly as Iraqi factions resisted
compromise in the complex communal struggle for power and the Iranian and Syrian
regimes intervened in the process.
The “new way forward” ushered in no sweeping change of the Iraq War’s desired
end state, but Petraeus described his objectives differently, making protecting the civilian population preeminent and setting a goal of a “baseline of security” by mid-2008 and
“sustainable stability” by the spring of 2009. Neither Petraeus nor Lieutenant General
Raymond Odierno believed quickly shifting to Iraqi control made sense so long as the
Iraqi Government and its security forces were complicit in sectarian violence. As MNF-I’s
emphasis on “Iraqi Army lead” and “provincial Iraqi control” receded, the reduction of
violence emerged as the key measure of success, encouraging coalition units to concentrate on resolving the internecine struggle and allowing reconciliation at the local level.
The coalition’s new metrics reflected Petraeus and Odierno’s judgment that transition
could not precede reconciliation.
At the tactical level, Petraeus and Odierno pressed U.S. commanders to establish a
persistent presence among the population. In Baghdad, this led to the creation or expansion of dozens of joint security stations and combat outposts. The decision to maximize
forward presence allowed a tactical change that eventually had a remarkable operational
impact. BCT commanders positioning their battalions forward reported a sharp rise in
intelligence tips that often blossomed into targetable information. As units successfully
prosecuted those targets, killing or arresting insurgents and sectarians, more Iraqis came
forward with information, confident their tips would be heeded. As the cycle continued,
its effects compounded and expanded, dealing both insurgents and militias punishing
blows that shifted the initiative to the coalition for the first time since 2004.
This same virtuous cycle enabled the spread of the Awakening that had begun in
Ramadi in 2006. The spread of combat outposts facilitated engagement opportunities
with local leaders that, at times, led to accommodations or cease-fires with former insurgents. As U.S. forces expanded their presence throughout western and central Iraq, Sunni
tribes and insurgent groups fighting a desperate multi-front war against al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI), the coalition, and—especially in mixed-sect areas—Shi’a militias and the Iraqi
security forces sought truces with their American foes. At the same time, U.S. commanders exploited this opportunity to persuade their erstwhile Sunni opponents to turn their
guns against their common enemies, namely AQI and its extremist allies. Seizing such
an opportunity often entailed tremendous risk for U.S. commanders, since Sunni fighters
did not fall neatly and consistently into the categories of “reconcilable” and “irreconcilable.” While the Awakening was unquestionably an organic movement borne of Sunni
discontent and an acknowledgment of their perilous prospects, there is likewise little
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doubt that the actions taken by senior coalition leaders helped nurture and spread the
budding movement.
Lines formed by tribal loyalties and insurgent affiliations with AQI blurred within
the slightly broader context of a war within a war as clans and houses struggled for
dominance in a local area. Odierno considered accepting the risk associated with this
bottom-up reconciliation one of his most important decisions as Multi-National CorpsIraq (MNC-I) commander. To ease the Maliki government’s fears of a Ba’athist resurgence and to solidify the security gains of the Awakening as it spread from Anbar into
Baghdad, the “belts,” and beyond, the coalition created organizations and processes to
link these bottom-up efforts with the central government. Sectarian biases and suspicions were difficult to overcome, and—though the ranks of the Sons of Iraq steadily grew
well into 2008—the idea that a loose patchwork of local accommodations with U.S. units
would eventually lead to a broad interconnected “quilt” knit together by national reconciliation proved difficult to fulfill. Nonetheless, in the near term, employing forward-positioned American forces as a means of brokering ceasefires and enlisting Sunni fighters
in the struggle against AQI threatened Sunni extremists by denying AQI its long-term
safe havens and restricting its freedom of action.
Additional U.S. forces did not obviate the need for operational art. Commanders had
to employ combat units in relation to key terrain and adaptive enemies. Not unlike the
Sunni and Shi’a militants battling for control of Baghdad, coalition commanders made
Iraq’s capital their main effort. As surge BCTs flowed into Iraq during the first half of
2007, Odierno placed them in the city, but he also distributed headquarters and battalions in the “belts” arcing north and south, where they began to push into sanctuaries that
had long been without coalition presence. In June, with all of his forces in place, Odierno
launched simultaneous operations across Baghdad and the “belts” even as MNC-I continued to exploit the Awakening in Anbar. Odierno’s innovation was to use four U.S.
division-sized units in and around Baghdad for synchronized operations to secure the
population and interdict “accelerants” that infiltrated the city from safe havens—many
in the “belts.” With the arrival of “accelerants” halted, AQI and Shi’a militias were unable
to stoke the sectarian fires through high-profile attacks.
By the fall of 2007, MNF-I had retaken the initiative, and AQI was reeling. Still, in spite
of the surge, the coalition had to rely on economy-of-force efforts in Mosul and Basra. As
the pressure increased in Baghdad and Anbar became more inhospitable to AQI fighters,
the group’s leadership in Iraq retreated up the Diyala and Tigris River Valleys, regrouping in Mosul. A battle for that city loomed in early 2008, but Prime Minister Maliki had
other plans, launching an offensive against the Sadrists in Basra and Sadr City. Significant security gains in Baghdad and the impending drawdown of coalition forces did
not eliminate the challenge Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin faced when he succeeded
Odierno as MNC-I commander in early 2008. Thanks to an AQI stronghold in Mosul and
Maliki’s unexpected decision to fight the Sadrists, MNC-I had to expand its operational
footprint even as its troop levels steadily fell. Furthermore, Iraq’s factions continued to
posture for advantage in the ongoing communal struggle for power, particularly as the
various parties prepared for provincial elections.
The successes and disappointments of the surge had much to do with unity and disunity of effort. A close, cooperative relationship between Petraeus and Crocker enhanced
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the joint campaign and amplified the surge’s military effects. In mid-2007, the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) modified its approach under a
new commander, General James Dubik, and synchronized its support to the Iraqi security
forces with MNC-I. By contrast, Multi-National Division-Southeast’s (MND-SE) deviation from the MNF-I campaign plan in 2007 brought the British and American divergence
to a head in 2008 and sowed the seeds for the crisis that precipitated Operation CHARGE
OF THE KNIGHTS. Most notably, the Maliki government sought different end states
than those of the United States—a point that became more prominent during the negotiations over a U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement.
With the departure of the last surge BCT in the summer of 2008 and provincial elections set for early 2009, the surge had culminated. The coalition’s military gains were
indisputable, setting the stage for a steady yet unprecedented drop in attacks soon after
Petraeus departed for U.S. Central Command and Odierno returned to Baghdad to take
his place. What remained to be seen was whether the U.S.-led coalition could translate
the surge’s hard-fought operational gains into a stable and secure Iraq.
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CHAPTER 11
ZERO ATTACKS, SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
ODIERNO TAKES COMMAND
General Raymond T. Odierno assumed command from General David H. Petraeus on
September 16 in Faw Palace at Camp Victory during a ceremony presided over by Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates. Odierno’s respite from Iraq had lasted barely
7 months, but the character of the conflict had changed dramatically in his absence. The
combined coalition-Iraqi offensive against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Basrah and Baghdad
in the spring, along with renewed operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Diyala
and Mosul in the late summer, had reduced the level of violence to near-record lows by
the time Odierno took command. Territory that had been in enemy hands in 2006 and
2007 was largely under Iraqi Government control by the fall of 2008, and the Sunni and
Shi’a militant groups that had appeared on the verge of overwhelming the Iraqi Government in 2006 were in retreat nearly everywhere. After a year and a half of intense combat
operations under the surge, Odierno’s first task as Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
commander would be to shift the coalition’s focus onto the many noncombat activities
and nontraditional missions needed to complete the operational victory the coalition
troops, Iraqi security forces (ISF), and Sons of Iraq had won in 2007-2008.

Source: DoD photo by Jerry Morrison (Released).

General Raymond Odierno With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates During the
MNF-I Change of Command Ceremony.1
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Since giving up command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) to Lieutenant General Lloyd J. Austin in February, Odierno had spent almost all of the intervening months
preparing to return to Baghdad. In the weeks before he took charge of MNF-I, he and
his close advisers pondered how they might need to adapt the campaign plan. In Odierno’s view, by late summer 2008 the coalition needed to “shift from security primacy to
political primacy” and focus on supporting Iraqi political actions rather than conducting major security operations. Odierno still believed that fully defeating AQI and Iranian-sponsored militant groups required intense military operations. But, if mainstream
Iraqi political groups would use the constitutional process, the coalition could support
the governance and economic reforms needed to make a lasting political reconciliation.
Overall, Odierno expected that MNF-I’s mission was to be stability and support operations, as well as peacekeeping.
Accordingly, Odierno planned to update the Joint Campaign Plan to reflect the new
priorities and invited a team of external experts to Baghdad to assist with this update.
He also reorganized MNF-I’s intelligence resources and directed them toward political
issues, social movements, and broader regional dynamics, leaving MNC-I’s intelligence
units to handle tactical and security-related matters. Odierno expected that support for
the impending Iraqi provincial elections of January 2009 would be among the coalition’s
top priorities once he took command, and that the subsequent 1-year period between
provincial and national elections would be decisive for achieving the end state of the
campaign. Above all, Odierno anticipated that the not-yet-finalized U.S.-Iraq security
agreement would significantly alter the conditions under which his forces operated, as
the Iraqi Government continued to assert greater independence and more control over
the coalition’s activities. With the changed security environment and the likely expiration
of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) under which the coalition
had operated, Odierno believed the Iraqi Government would press for visible changes in
the coalition’s mode of operations. This would include a reduction in his forces’ footprint
in Baghdad and other cities and the return of the Republican Palace to Iraqi control.
Of course, MNF-I’s troop strength had already diminished by the time Odierno took
command. As the 15-month tours of the surge brigades ended, the U.S. force in Iraq
had returned to its late-2006 size of 15 brigades. Odierno and his advisers believed that
political pressures both in Iraq and in the United States eventually would dictate further
force reductions with the brigades that remained gradually assuming a training, advisory, and overwatch role, leaving Iraqi forces responsible for security operations. As he
left for Baghdad in early September, Odierno speculated that within 24 months MNF-I
might evolve into an Office of Military Cooperation (OMC)—an “OMC-Egypt on steroids”—with five U.S. brigades, which he considered “the minimum amount in case it
goes south.”2
Zero Attacks
On September 19, 3 days after Odierno took command of MNF-I, there were no
civilian casualties in the entire country for a 24-hour period. This was only the fourth
occurrence since the 2003 invasion.3 October saw only 983 security incidents of all kinds,
the lowest total since January 2004. On October 31, there was another 24-hour period
without any civilian casualties.4 In the last week of November, there were 111 security
incidents, the lowest weekly total since the end of 2003. In December, there were fewer
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than 600.5 High-profile attacks such as car bombings fell to their lowest levels since 2004,
though they still accounted for almost half of the casualties. The change was unmistakable: in 2007, an average of 124 coalition troops, Iraqi troops, and civilians were killed or
wounded each day, but for 2008, the average was 47 per day.6

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant J. B. Jaso (Released).

A U.S. Soldier Plays Foosball With Children in Husseniyah Nahia.7
Although the ISF continued to lose more than 100 soldiers or police each month, especially in areas such as Mosul, life for civilians in central and southern Iraq returned to
what Iraqis considered normal. Baghdad residents encountered a new problem with the
volume of traffic on its streets, similar to other Arab capitals, and Iraqi officials began
exploring options for mass transit projects.8 In a symbolic move, the famous Mutanabi
book market reopened in December, 21 months after it had been destroyed by an AQI car
bomb in March 2007.9

Source: DoD photo by Specialist Grant Okubo (Released).

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki at a Ceremony Reopening Baghdad’s
Historic Mutanabi Book Market.10
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The Push for Improved Governance
With the improved security conditions, however, came heightened expectations
among Iraqi civilians of a “peace dividend” with restored essential services and economic activity. As violence receded in central and southern Iraq, the long-standing shortage of electricity became the public’s top concern, one that threatened to undermine the
government’s legitimacy. The Ba’athist regime provided unlimited free electricity, and
the new Iraqi Government sought to follow that policy. Fall 2008 saw occasional angry
protests by thousands of Baghdadis against the Minister of Electricity. Coalition leaders
noted with worry that a large portion of Iraqi civilians believed public services had been
better under Saddam Hussein, a perception that militants might exploit to inflame the
security situation. In his third week in command, Odierno reported to Washington that
electricity had become “the number one problem in Iraq.”11 However, the Iraqi ministries
typically lacked the will or capacity to follow suit, leaving the Maliki government dogged
by public dissatisfaction.
While the surge provided Maliki the breathing space needed to address the country’s
thorny political challenges, U.S. leaders in the Green Zone feared that he could not or
would not do so, particularly in parts of Iraq that had been under militant control. Even
though Iraqi security forces were mostly able to establish a presence in liberated areas, the
restoration of other government functions and essential services often lagged far behind.
To better assess the Government of Iraq’s performance and institutional capacity,
MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy commissioned a Governance Assessment Team (GAT)
under Colonel H. R. McMaster and Ambassador Larry C. Napper. Over several weeks
in 2008, the team of civilian and military experts, many of whom had served on the Joint
Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) in 2007, investigated Iraq’s ministerial capacity, provincial administration, economic development, and political progress to determine how
to help the Iraqi Government to reestablish the level of governance demanded by its
population. The GAT validated what many coalition units had seen at the local level:
corrupt and often sectarian state institutions, a shortage of quality mid-level officials, and
the legacy of an overly complex Ba’athist bureaucratic system diminished government
capacity and impeded political progress.12
The GAT found that money was not the problem: the Iraqi Government was not poor.
Oil revenues increased by almost 10 percent from 2007 to 2008, spurred by the improved
security situation in the north and anti-corruption measures at the Bayji refinery. By mid2008, the Iraqi Government was exporting about 1.8 million barrels per day at export
prices of roughly $83 per barrel.13 The Iraqi economy was growing at a rate of about 7
percent, and the government budget grew a whopping 22 percent from 2007 to 2008.
The result was a government that had vast oil wealth at its disposal but little capacity to
spend it effectively. The Maliki government “had more money than it knew what to do
with,” observed Colonel Rick L. Waddell, a senior economist on the GAT.14
The problem, the GAT found, was that Iraqi civil servants responsible for finances
were incapable of executing the government budget. In many ministries, senior civil servants had been purged as Ba’athists in 2003-2004, leaving only inexperienced junior officials or incompetent political appointees. Meanwhile, those professional civil servants
who remained went about their duties as though they were still in the sanctions-era
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bureaucracy of Saddam Hussein, when the goal had been to hoard resources rather than
spend them and even minor decisions were made at the highest possible level.15 Risk
aversion was still prevalent in early 2008, when most decisions were made by ministers
selected for political loyalty rather than for professional competence.
Because the central Iraqi Government lacked the capacity to spend its budget, the
GAT recommended that local agencies be given more spending authority. Doing so
would require political changes. Public finance management experts brought in by the
coalition to analyze the convoluted process by which funds flowed from Baghdad to the
provinces found that the central government did not distribute resources equitably to
Sunni and Kurdish provinces.16 When the ministries allocated money or resources to the
provinces, it was usually in a halting, unpredictable manner under the close control of
ministerial officials using an antiquated paper-and-courier-based distribution system.17
Similarly, without a modern banking system that facilitated electronic funds transfers,
cash payments were the norm, facilitating corruption.
To help overcome this lack of government capacity, the GAT recommended that the
coalition increase its advisory effort to the Iraqi ministries. The GAT found that, despite
spending tens of billions of dollars on reconstruction through the Iraqi Reconstruction
Management Office and other agencies, the U.S. Embassy was ineffective in improving
the ministries, partly because it lacked sufficient advisory personnel and access to the
Iraqi ministries. The GAT recommended that MNF-I use military officers to augment the
Embassy’s advisers and military resources to ensure that coalition officials could travel
to the ministries.18
The next major recommendation from the GAT involved connecting improvements
in governance and economic development at the local or provincial level to the ministries in Baghdad. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the embedded provincial reconstruction teams (EPRTs) worked together with the brigades at the local
level striving to encourage this connection and good governance within their areas of
operations. However, there was only so much they could accomplish on their own. In
Diyala Province, for example, Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(BCT), 2d Infantry Division, discovered that the province’s budget, consisting of billions
of Iraqi dinars, was managed by “an elderly woman in the basement of the provincial
center using a ledger pad, straight ruler, and a pencil.”19 In Mosul, officials were unable
to establish a municipal garbage collection program. Under Iraq’s centralized system of
government, responsibility for trash collection fell under the Ministry of Public Works
in Baghdad, which Michael Ensch of the Army Corps of Engineers described as “absolutely dysfunctional.”20 Local EPRTs spent significant time and resources attempting to
resolve these types of problems, but any improvement was short-lived if not sustained
with assistance from the ministries in Baghdad.
Connecting the Iraqi provinces to the central government was not a straightforward
matter. During years of insurgency, large swaths of the country had fallen out of contact
with Baghdad. At the same time, the ministries had been a literal battlefield during the
violence of 2006-2007, and ministerial officials had often lived and worked under siege,
hunkering down and unable to attend to the business of governance. U.S. units and diplomats in 2007-2008 often found themselves trying to reestablish a working relationship
between the central government and its outlying territories. To forge connections across
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the levels of government, U.S. forces frequently used “helicopter diplomacy” in which
U.S. helicopters ferried provincial and central government officials between the capital
and provinces.21 In many cases, the U.S. commanders and diplomats who transported
senior ministerial officials to the provinces found that their Iraqi counterparts were visiting the provinces for the first time and had never met their branch staffs there. This
improved communication in the short term, but systemic changes were needed to ensure
cooperation endured after the coalition left.
THE NORTHERN IRAQ PROBLEM
The Arab-Kurd Conflict
Among the problems Odierno faced was the worsening territorial dispute between
Arabs and Kurds over the fate of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. As Odierno took command
in mid-September, Arab-Kurd tensions threatened to fracture Iraq’s governing coalition
and reignite the civil war—albeit along a different axis. In August, Iraqi Army troops and
Kurdish peshmerga had come close to blows in the town of Khanaqin. That town and
other parts of northern Diyala had been under peshmerga control since the early days
of the war, but as the Iraqi security forces (ISF) proceeded up the Diyala Valley to clear
AQI support zones during Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE, they had
aggressively entered areas the Kurdish Government considered under its control. The
34th Peshmerga Brigade, which had occupied and worked to pacify Khanaqin since 2003,
in turn defied orders from the Maliki government to withdraw and give way to Iraqi
Army troops. Instead, the peshmerga had dug in, and both sides braced themselves for a
possible civil war. U.S. military advisers in the area had worked to defuse the confrontation, but commanders on both sides, Arab and Kurdish, seemed eager to fight.22
The armed standoff had grown serious enough that Major General Mark P. Hertling
and his Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) hastily deployed additional troops and
advisers to the Khanaqin area to separate the Arab and Kurdish units and prevent a
costly battle between Iraqi forces that were supposed to be on the same side. “It was
one of my three worst days in Iraq,” Hertling would later recall.23 For his part, Hertling
was determined not to become embroiled in this Iraqi-Kurdish brinksmanship, telling all
involved that in the event of ISF-peshmerga fighting, U.S. forces would support neither
side. “I would pull back all my advisors,” Hertling told them. “I would tell all my other
forces to return to their [bases]. I wasn’t going to take sides on this, and [they] would
be responsible for any bloodshed.”24 Defusing the situation ultimately required Prime
Minister Maliki and President Jalal Talabani to order their respective ISF and peshmerga
commanders to stand down, after which leaders in Baghdad and Erbil negotiated a deal
under which Kurdish police patrolled the city and the peshmerga withdrew.25
In one of his first acts as MNF-I commander, Odierno instructed MNC-I Commander
General Austin to increase the number of U.S. advisers with all Iraqi units in eastern
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Diyala to prevent further Arab-Kurd confrontations.26 The narrow escape in Khanaqin
showed that a conflict that had largely pitted Sunnis and Arabs against one another
before 2008 had the potential to develop into a full-scale Arab-Kurd fight as well. It also
showed that the Shi’a-Kurdish political coalition, which dominated Iraqi politics since
Maliki’s rise to power in 2006, was beginning to falter under the weight of competing
claims over disputed territories and the broader implementation of Article 140 of the
2005 Iraqi Constitution, which called for a referendum on Kirkuk’s future status and a
de-Arabization of the city. The war against AQI and other Sunni terrorist groups had
united the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad
against a common enemy, but as the AQI threat receded, the unresolved question of the
relationship between Kurdistan and the central government remained, with the potential to cause conflict. If the Kurdish and Arab parties that made up Iraq’s national unity
government began warring among themselves, the political implications would be “catastrophic,” a visiting White House official warned Odierno in Baghdad. The fighting
would be viewed externally as a sign that “the progress was not real.”27
Operations to Finish AQI in Mosul: Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS II
The dispute in Khanaqin was particularly costly because it was a distraction from
the ongoing operations in Mosul, where, since late spring 2008, the coalition and ISF had
been attempting finally to destroy AQI in the city. In the early fall, Operation MOTHER
OF TWO SPRINGS II was a three-phased effort to target important AQI figures, clear the
remaining neighborhoods where AQI enjoyed support zones, and then restore Mosul’s
civilian governance capacity.28 Throughout the early fall, coalition and Iraqi special operators carried out targeted raids against AQI leaders in Mosul in advance of large-scale
operations by U.S. and Iraqi conventional forces planned for mid-October. Some of these
shaping operations yielded significant results. On October 5, special operators in Mosul
cornered and killed Abu Qaswarah, a Swedish militant who had been among AQI’s most
prominent field commanders and its northern emir before becoming overall deputy to
AQI commander Abu Ayyub al-Masri.29 The materials found with Abu Qaswarah were
a treasure trove of records rivaling the Sinjar records in scale and detailing hundreds of
AQI attacks over time.30 The files also revealed the organization’s financial networks,
operational guidance, line and block charts, and even guidance on operational security.31
These records yielded strategic insights about AQI’s inner workings and led to further
raids that netted dozens of other AQI members.
At the same time, a series of raids against AQI’s “Finance Emirs” constricted the organization’s cash flow. AQI fighters received little or no pay for several weeks, forcing them
to rely on crime, extorting payments from businesses such as the Northern Oil Company,
the AsiaCell phone company, and the state-owned Northern Cement Company.32 AQI
leaders also demanded money from government employees and small businesses such
as neighborhood pharmacies, a practice that eroded the group’s support.33
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant JoAnn Makinano (Released).

A Soldier From 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment Conducts a Patrol in Mosul.34
In a desperate bid to polarize Ninawa Province and attract local Sunni Islamist support, AQI tried to incite sectarian war against Ninawa’s Christian population. In early
October, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of AQI’s political front, the Islamic State of Iraq,
declared war on Christians, directing assassinations, bombings, and threats that eventually caused 13,000 of the city’s Christians to flee their homes—more than half of Mosul’s
Christian population.35 Meeting on October 12, Maliki and the Iraqi National Security
Council concluded that AQI and other insurgents had infiltrated Mosul’s police force
and were undermining the city’s security from within.36 The impending coalition-ISF
operations would therefore include two additional National Police brigades to replace or
reinforce Mosul’s local policemen.37 Maliki and other ministers also decided to remove
Ninawa Operations Commander Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq, a Sunni officer
who had previously commanded the 9th Division in eastern Baghdad, and replace him
with Major General Hassan Kareem Khudeir, a Shi’a officer who had also served in Baghdad and was believed to have close ties to Maliki’s Da’wa Party. Maliki and other Iraqi
leaders were concerned that the instability in Mosul could disrupt the provincial elections
scheduled for January 2009 just as it had in January 2005. Odierno believed the coalition
itself might have to stop the intimidation of Mosul voters.38 Iraqi leaders believed that the
outcome of Ninawa’s provincial elections would have national significance and would
shape the elections scheduled for 2010.39 These political concerns heightened the stakes
for the impending security operations in the province.
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Source: DoD photo courtesy Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq (Released).

U.S. Soldiers Intercept a Vehicle Whose Occupants Had Been Observed
Emplacing a Roadside Bomb in Mosul.40
On October 15, Iraqi Army and police forces working with MND-N units began
clearing Mosul of suspected insurgent cells and recovering buildings that had fallen into
insurgent hands.41 MNF-I had expected the Mosul operations to last until mid-January,
but AQI’s operational tempo and leadership had been so disrupted that resistance faded
quickly, especially as additional Iraqi National Police, Iraqi Army, and coalition troops
flowed into the city.42 By October 26, Odierno reported to Gates that the city was stabilized and insurgent attacks across Iraq were slackening.43 Whether these security gains
would last depended on political reform and improved governance.
The Abu Ghadiyah Raid and the Disruption of the Foreign Fighter Network
In addition to its losses in Mosul, AQI suffered another major setback on October 26
after a daytime raid struck the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal, opposite the Iraqi town
of Al Qa’im on the Euphrates River. Abu Ghadiyah, the young Iraqi militant who was
the long-time head of AQI’s vast foreign fighter facilitation network in Syria, was killed
during the operation. For at least 3 years, the majority of al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters had
been funneled into Iraq by Abu Ghadiyah and his network of facilitators, including most
AQI suicide bombers. The Albu Kamal raid was a significant blow to the extremist organization, hindering foreign fighter flow for months while temporarily severing the connection between the jihadist organization and its regional supporters. MNF-I concluded
that this reduced the number of non-Iraqi suicide bombers available to AQI commanders
in Mosul and forced them to adjust and appoint new field emirs.44 Syrian officials publicly denounced the raid and claimed to have no knowledge of Abu Ghadiyah’s activities,
but evidence of the Assad regime’s direct support for AQI’s foreign fighter network indicated that the regime’s protests were disingenuous.
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With their lead border facilitator dead and with clearing operations in Mosul gaining
momentum, some remaining AQI leaders fled to western Ninawa and the Jazeera desert,
the same area where Abu Ghadiyah’s foreign fighters had long made their way toward
Mosul and the Tigris Valley.45 Since 2004, the western Ninawa city of Tel Afar had been
a favored staging base for AQI and its foreign fighters, and in fall 2008, Odierno noted
the need to deploy additional Iraqi and coalition troops there to prevent AQI from again
reestablishing it as an insurgent stronghold.46 Much of the responsibility for stepping up
the coalition presence in the Tel Afar and Jazeera area would fall to Multi-National ForceWest (MNF-W) because MNC-I had reassigned western Ninawa and the Syrian border
zone in the Jazeera desert to MNF-W earlier in the year in order to free MND-N to focus
on Mosul.47 By early December, MNF-W’s operations near the border made it difficult
for AQI leaders and fighters to move along the Jazeera infiltration routes through which
they had once traveled freely; and the Syrian-based network Abu Ghadiyah had headed
struggled to send more than a trickle of foreign fighters into Iraq.48
Aftermath of the Mosul Operations
By early November, the ISF-led operations in Mosul had driven most AQI fighters
from the city. Violence dropped to near zero, and the Christian families who had fled in
October began returning.49 AQI’s previously powerful Mosul networks were in disarray,
forced to forgo their usual distributions of cash to allies and clients in other provinces
during October and November. Captured AQI members reported they had not been paid
in many months.50
Resolving the longer-term causes of violence in Ninawa would take more than clearing operations and the sustained disruption of AQI’s terrorist operations. Despite the
heavy presence of Iraqi forces, MND-N believed that there was no rule of law in the
city.51 For years, it had been difficult to get terrorists and insurgents convicted in Mosul’s
courts, where AQI and other groups were able to intimidate or bribe Iraqi officials and
even occasionally break prisoners out of jail. In addition, Mosul’s unemployment rate was
70 percent, making the city’s residents vulnerable to criminal and insurgent influence.52
The fighting across Ninawa also created thousands of long-term displaced persons (2,500
in Tel Afar alone) who could be radicalized. The province was divided ethnically and
politically, creating fissures that AQI and others exploited. MND-N believed Ninawa’s
Kurdish deputy governor and local Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) chief, Kesro Goran,
was locked in a power struggle with Arab parties ahead of the 2009 provincial elections
that Arabs who had boycotted the January 2005 elections hoped to use to retake control
of the provincial government.53
There were also questions of the reliability of ISF in the province. As AQI lost its grip
on Mosul and western Ninawa, the group offered large cash rewards to Iraqi soldiers or
police who assassinated American troops, a move that probably caused two incidents in
November during which rogue Iraqi soldiers killed U.S. troops in Mosul and Biaj. In the
Biaj killings, fellow Iraqi soldiers helped the assassin flee toward the Syrian border before
loyal Iraqi border troops caught him.54
The task of tackling these issues would fall to new MND-N leadership. On December 9, General Mark Hertling and his 1st Armored Division handed responsibility for
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northern Iraq to Major General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., and the 25th Infantry Division, the
same division that the 1st Armored had replaced as MND-N only a year before.
THE QUEST FOR STABILIZATION
The Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team
Improvements in security came much faster than MNF-I leaders had anticipated,
leading them to seek parallel economic and political progress.55 To identify such opportunities, Odierno and Ambassador Ryan Crocker formed a Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team (JCPAT), bringing in a wide range of experts to “review the ways in which
we promote reform without undermining the GoI’s [Government of Iraq’s] exercise of
sovereignty and how we must operationalize our procedures in response to the changing
strategic environment.”56
Led by retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, the JCPAT included Ambassador
Ronald Neumann, Ambassador Robin Raphel, future Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Michelle Flournoy, historian Kimberly Kagan, future White House official Colin
Kahl, and Brookings Institution scholar Kenneth Pollack.57 After weeks of inquiry in Iraq,
the team determined in late October that “the positive developments in Iraq were very
real, but very fragile.”58 Making the gains of the surge last would take political reconciliation. The Iraqi Government would need to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the ISF, continue
political engagement with the Sunni Awakening, and build government capacity.59 However, the JCPAT noted that the necessary shift from security operations to stabilization
would reduce coalition advantage.60 The team warned that Prime Minister Maliki was
becoming less interested in a sustained U.S. military presence in Iraq, especially if he
concluded that withdrawal offered him an opportunity to consolidate power further.61
The JCPAT cautioned against direct action against the Iranian regime and argued that a
“strong, unified Iraqi polity” was the best way to minimize Tehran’s influence.62
Like the earlier JSAT, the JCPAT gave MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy an analytical basis
for a new campaign plan to reflect changing conditions.63 Most of its conclusions and
warnings would prove accurate, but in 2008 MNF-I found remedies increasingly difficult
to implement, especially where Iraqi political reconciliation was concerned.
Transition of the Sons of Iraq
Operations between May and November 2008 brought Mosul firmly under government control and pushed AQI and other northern insurgent groups farther away from the
population centers of the upper Tigris Valley. Like the JCPAT experts, coalition leaders
believed the Sunni insurgency’s future strength depended on nonmilitary variables. The
most important was the future of the Sons of Iraq, the armed manifestation of the Sunni
Awakening that had done so much damage to AQI in Anbar and the Baghdad region
since late 2006. Having recruited and paid more than 100,000 Sons of Iraq, MNF-I agreed
to transfer them to the government’s payroll by the end of 2008, in exchange for Maliki’s
acceptance of the program. MNC-I began the transfer in early October 2008, starting with
the 51,000 in the Baghdad region, the majority of whom received their monthly salary of
$300 from a special government committee without incident.64
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Source: DoD photo by Specialist Chuck Gill (Released).

Members of the Gazaliyah Guardians, a West Baghdad Awakening Group,
Register for Payment From the Iraqi Government.65

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Hunter (Released).

An Iraqi Army Officer Pays a Sons of Iraq Member in Ameriyah.66
Beyond Baghdad, however, the transition was less smooth. MNF-I and Maliki agreed
to shift all Sons of Iraq to official government employment in 2009, with 20 percent of
them to be absorbed into the ISF, but there were early signs that it would be difficult
to hold the Maliki government to this pledge. As preparations began in November to
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transfer the 8,000 Sons of Iraq in Diyala to government control, coalition leaders became
alarmed by continued sectarian tension between the Shi’a-led ISF and the largely Sunni
Sons of Iraq that had emerged during security operations in Diyala in July and August. In
the space of a few weeks, government forces detained several Sons of Iraq leaders, with
one, Sheikh Bashir al-Judani, dying in the custody of the Interior Ministry’s Major Crimes
Unit. Confronting Maliki on the matter on October 23, Odierno warned that the ISF’s
behavior would undermine the government’s legitimacy and create instability as the
important January provincial elections approached. Maliki defended the raids against
Sunni leaders that he considered to be “Ba’athists” and claimed that one Sunni detainee
in Diyala was suspected of carrying out the 1999 assassination of Ayatollah Muhammad
Sadiq Sadr, Moqtada Sadr’s father.67
The dispute over the Diyala Sons of Iraq illustrated the problems in the broader relationship between the Sunni Awakening and the Maliki government. In Sunni-dominated
Anbar, the Maliki government had been relatively quick to endorse the Awakening and
accept a paid security role for thousands of local Sons of Iraq. However, in the mixed-sect
Baghdad belts, Maliki and his Shi’a colleagues had been much more skeptical of the Sons
of Iraq, demanding a long vetting process especially in the areas that had seen the most
sectarian violence and displacement before 2008. In mixed-sect Diyala, where Sunnis
were a demographic plurality but where the balance of power among the ethno-sectarian
communities was still in question, government skepticism of the Awakening and the
Sons of Iraq hardened into recalcitrance. The Sunni election boycott of January 2005 had
allowed Shi’a and Kurdish minorities to control Diyala’s police and provincial government, but the Sunni Sons of Iraq could potentially reverse that if mobilized for the January 2009 provincial elections. Maliki and other Shi’a government leaders also believed
many of the Sons of Iraq were simply Sunni insurgents who had made a temporary pact
with the coalition but would eventually return to warfare against the Shi’a-led government.68 Their fears were not unfounded: coalition officials saw multiple signs of AQI and
other Sunni insurgent groups attempting to recruit Sons of Iraq members back into the
insurgent camp.69
There were other reasons for government officials to distance themselves from the
Sons of Iraq as well. Senior Iraqis assigned by the Prime Minister to manage the Sons of
Iraq portfolio faced frequent pressure from Shi’a parties and Iranian-sponsored militants,
accusing them of empowering Sunni militants. Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri, the Maliki
loyalist who headed the Iraqi Government committee overseeing Sons of Iraq integration, became the subject of a criminal investigation along with her military deputy, while
another committee member, Major General Mudher al-Mawla, was wounded in an early
December assassination attempt.70
The success of transferring the Sons of Iraq to the government would determine
whether the Sunni Awakening would endure and would act as a bellwether of the Maliki
government’s support of broader reconciliation efforts. The events of late 2008, however,
demonstrated that the Maliki government did not share MNF-I’s sense of urgency or the
coalition’s belief that the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq were the key to preventing a
badly damaged AQI from regaining a foothold in Iraq’s Sunni areas.
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Diminishing American Casualties
American casualties dropped dramatically in summer 2008. U.S. units had suffered 961
fatalities in 2007, making it the costliest year of the war.71 In 2008, U.S. fatalities dropped to
322, even with the large-scale offensives of the surge campaign, and weekly battle casualties dropped 57.8 percent between 2007 and 2008.72 By the summer of 2008, U.S. casualties
from non-battle incidents such as electrocution, fires, mine resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) rollovers, and suicides began to approach the number of combat casualties. In
both September and November 2008, U.S. non-battle deaths (15 in September and 10 in
November) exceeded those killed in action (8 in September and 6 in November).73
To cut down on fatal accidents, MNF-I assigned Task Force SAFE, a group Petraeus
had originally created to investigate deadly electrocutions in troop buildings, to assess
vehicle rollovers and other accidents and then suggest preventive measures.74 The investigation paid particular attention to MRAP accidents, with good reason. The MNF-I
investigators discovered that 51 percent of MRAP accidents were due to vehicle rollovers, incidents that well-trained drivers knew how to avoid. MNF-I leaders endorsed
the investigators’ conclusion that “the MRAP must be treated in training as a combat
vehicle, hence requiring crews to undergo the same level of comprehensive training we
provide to crewmen for all other weapons systems.”75
The U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement
Even though coalition commanders expected to have 15 brigades in 2009, they knew
that the United States and its partners might be forced to withdraw all troops by the
end of 2008. As the months passed, the yet-unsigned U.S.-Iraqi security agreement came
to occupy a large portion of MNF-I’s attention. Before taking command, Odierno had
learned from counterparts in the White House that Maliki was “getting cold feet” about
the draft U.S.-Iraq agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in the country after 2008.
With elections on the horizon in both 2009 and 2010, the Iraqi Prime Minister was reluctant to expend the political capital necessary to finalize the deal.76 Meeting with White
House official John Hannah in Baghdad the day before his change of command, Odierno
learned that the negotiations were proving deeply divisive for the Iraqi political leadership. The religious parties in particular were publicly against the agreement, though
behind closed doors most Iraqi political leaders acknowledged that the sudden departure
of U.S. troops at year’s end would be disastrous. Addressing rumors that the George
W. Bush administration was thinking through a “Plan B” in case the negotiations collapsed—such as returning to the UN to ask for an extension of the UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1790—Hannah revealed to Odierno that “there is no Plan B.” Either
the two sides would finalize the agreement or U.S. and other coalition troops would leave
by the end of December.77
For his part, Odierno believed the security agreement would require extensive MNF-I
planning and would likely change the way that U.S. troops operated inside Iraq.78 It was
unclear, for example, whether and how the tens of thousands of contractors working for
MNF-I would function and whether they would remain immune from Iraqi laws. Planning for the contractors’ possible departure was complicated by a Defense Department
order that prevented MNF-I from holding discussions with contractors about post-2008
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arrangements.79 The delay in signing the U.S.-Iraq agreement also put other coalition
countries in limbo, because most governments were waiting for the United States to conclude its bilateral agreement with the Maliki government before pursuing their own.80
Inside Iraq, the security agreement quickly became the most polarizing domestic political issue as the provincial election season began. Sharp disagreements among the major
Iraqi parties paralleled ethnic and sectarian rifts. Among the Shi’a parties, the Sadrists and
their allies demanded the immediate expulsion of U.S. troops and organized numerous
public protests against the agreement. They prevented Maliki from publicly embracing
the agreement out of fear of losing ground to Iranian-backed parties in the January 2009
provincial elections—though both Maliki and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq privately
supported a continued strategic relationship with the United States. Among the Sunni
parties, leaders such as Vice President Tariq Hashimi publicly argued against an indefinite American military presence, demanded restraints on U.S. operations against Sunni
targets, and pressed for the release of Sunni detainees. Privately, however, most Sunni
leaders expressed fears that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a Shi’a campaign of violence
against the Sunni population. Only the Iraqi Kurds publicly expressed full support for
a continued U.S. presence, and some Kurdish leaders even suggested that U.S. troops
could remain in Kurdistan if the government in Baghdad did not ultimately approve a
status of forces agreement. Addressing the Council of Representatives, Speaker of Parliament Mahmud Mashadani wryly observed that where the U.S.-Iraq security agreement
was concerned, Iraq’s Sunni politicians opposed it in public but supported it in private,
Shi’a politicians supported it in public but opposed it in private, and Kurdish politicians
supported it in both public and private.
In addition to the Sadrists, some other parties saw opposing the security agreement
as a way to weaken Maliki, whom they felt was concentrating too much power in Baghdad. Odierno observed that some Iraqi leaders considered constraining Maliki a higher
priority than legalizing the U.S. military presence, which many Iraqis assumed would
continue with or without an agreement. “Our assessment is that some Iraqi leaders have
mistakenly concluded that the U.S. is not sincere about the necessity of a SOFA [status
of forces agreement] and we will continue to operate in Iraq without an agreement when
the UNSCR expires,” Odierno observed in his first weekly report to Gates in September.81
Iranian pressure was a significant factor as well. Upon returning to Baghdad in midSeptember, Odierno reported to Gates that he was surprised by “the constant negative
drumbeat regarding the SOFA” coming from Iran and was concerned that “Iran has
seized the messaging initiative” with “an effective and wide-ranging” propaganda campaign.82 By late October, Odierno concluded that Maliki had been swayed by Iranian
influence and was delaying the agreement to drive a harder bargain with the United
States.83 To counter the Iranian regime’s influence, Odierno directed MNF-I leaders to
brief their Iraqi counterparts on the numerous security activities that would immediately
cease and the vast capabilities that would no longer be at the Iraqi Government’s disposal
if the coalition suddenly departed. He also advised MNF-I planners to quietly conduct
“prudent planning should we be absent a legal framework” when the UNSCR expired.84
Nevertheless, on November 27, the Iraqi Parliament approved the security agreement,
though Sunni support only came after making the pact subject to a nationwide referendum. Passage followed a series of heated Parliamentary sessions with walkouts by the
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Sadrists and other anti-American parties and the sudden resignation of the notoriously
erratic Speaker Mashadani. The raucous scenes on the floor of the Parliament did not
bode well for future U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Among other stipulations, the final agreement required U.S. combat forces to redeploy
outside of Iraq’s cities, villages, and localities by June 30, 2009. Complete withdrawal of
all U.S. forces from Iraq would follow by December 31, 2011. In the interval, the agreement would place further constraints on U.S. operations: searching households would
require a warrant, and arrests or detention of Iraqis would require prior approval from
an Iraqi court. Finally, as residual damage from the Nisour Square incident, most of the
U.S. military’s contractors would lose their immunity to Iraqi law.

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Derren Mazza (Released).

President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Sign
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.85
The Departure of the Coalition and Redrawing of Battle Space
Dragging out the negotiations led several smaller coalition members to withdraw. In
October, the Polish contingent that had long served as the Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) headquarters left, handing Forward Operating Base Echo in
Diwaniyah over to a U.S. battalion. The South Korean troops in Iraqi Kurdistan withdrew
from Erbil in early December, ending the mission of Multi-National Division-North East
(MND-NE). Ten other smaller coalition contingents also left by the end of the year, forcing significant tactical changes. “We cannot underestimate the effect of losing our coalition partners,” Odierno wrote to Gates on October 5. “In many cases, they relieved U.S.
forces from internal security requirements as well as occupying key battle space. This will
cause us to expand U.S. responsibilities as we reduce our footprint.”86 It was essential that
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MNF-I maintain a forward presence in each province, Odierno judged, and to cover the
new gaps MNC-I would have to make boundary and battle space changes for the remaining units just 9 months after Austin had redrawn unit boundaries following the departure of the surge brigades.87 In November, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B)
took control of the southern portions of Baghdad province previously held by Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C). MND-C, meanwhile, extended its battle space south to
encompass the provinces of Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna. It also prepared to assume
oversight of Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) following the planned 2009
withdrawal of British troops from Basrah. MND-N expanded its battle space to Erbil to
cover the territory previously overseen by the South Korean headquarters of MND-NE.88

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Creighton Holub (Released).

U.S. and Romanian Army Soldiers Review Plans During an
Observation Mission Near Nasiriyah.89
The departure of coalition partners affected the various headquarters in Baghdad as
well. Since 2003, the United Kingdom and Australia had provided up to 20 flag officers
to the staffs of the theater and operational commands; their impending absence would
leave a gap that Odierno believed would require 12 additional U.S. generals to fill.90 Even
harder to replace would be Task Force KNIGHT, the British special operations contingent that had played an important role in the campaigns against AQI and other extremist groups and had an especially significant effect against AQI’s car-bomb networks in
Baghdad. But with the expiration of the UNSCR, the British were reluctant to leave their
special operators open to charges of violating European Union human rights legislation,
illustrating one of the complexities of coalition warfare in the 21st century.91

451

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

***
For the coalition, the situation on the ground in Iraq felt like a military victory by late
2008. With only a handful of violent incidents on most days, Iraq had begun to resemble
other countries in the Middle East. AQI, which once had seemed capable of causing the
collapse of the Iraqi state, was on the run in a shrinking corner of northwest Iraq, with
its most important Syria-based kingpin dead and its foreign fighter networks in disarray.
With the security situation improving to a degree that would have been unthinkable at
the beginning of the year, MNF-I’s intent to shift to a stabilization mission seemed timely
and necessary to cement the security gains.
However, warning signs abounded. The incapacity of the government meant that
Iraqi leadership in stabilization tasks such as governance and economic development
would come slowly. The receding of AQI in northern Iraq gave way to a potential ArabKurd war in which the governments in Baghdad and Erbil would be on opposite sides.
Finally, there was the turbulent way in which the U.S.-Iraqi SOFA had been reached. The
Sadrists and the Iranian regime had been able to use the issue to regain some of the political advantage they had lost during the spring of 2008. At the same time, Prime Minister
Maliki had proved to be a reluctant signer, leading some coalition leaders to question
whether he intended to maintain a long-term security relationship with the United States.
As if to illustrate the difficulty of the situation for the United States, the December
14 ceremony in Baghdad to mark the passage of the security agreement ended in chaos
when an Iraqi journalist threw his shoes at President Bush in protest during a joint press
conference with Maliki. It was Bush’s final public act related to the Iraq War. Barely a
month later, the United States would have a new President and a dramatically different
Iraq policy.
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CHAPTER 12
OUT OF THE CITIES, JANUARY-JUNE 2009
A NEW IRAQ POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES
The arrival of the Barack Obama administration in January 2009 brought a dramatic
change in the American policy and posture in Iraq. As a candidate, then-Senator Obama
had advocated a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, and upon taking office, he moved
quickly to implement this plan.
In late October 2008, before the Presidential election, General Raymond Odierno
approved the early departure of one brigade based on Iraq’s improving security conditions, but in early December he recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U.S. forces
remain in Iraq for the full 3 years specified in the December 2008 Security Agreement, at
levels based on local conditions.1 Odierno envisioned a “flexible plan” that would include
deliberate decision points at which commanders in Iraq would have the latitude to make
“careful transitions” in U.S. troop levels.2
However, the new administration’s policy guidance ran counter to Odierno’s recommendation. On President Obama’s first day in office, the National Security Council (NSC)
tasked Odierno and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to develop three different options for the
timed drawdown of U.S. troops in a fixed period of either 23 months, 19 months, or 16
months. The last of these reflected the time that Obama had pledged to withdraw American forces. The NSC specified that none of these options was to be conditions-based.
On January 28, 2009, Odierno and Crocker told Washington that the 23-month withdrawal timeline offered the least risk to security and political gains, but the President
chose the 19-month timeline. The specifics of the drawdown were important: Obama
directed that the U.S. “combat mission” should end within the 19-month period, after
which no U.S. “combat troops” could remain in Iraq. However, an undetermined residual force could remain beyond the expiration of the “combat mission” to lend military
assistance. The NSC left Odierno and Crocker to determine the exact purpose and size
of the military assistance mission while also instructing Crocker to define the size of the
U.S. diplomatic mission.3
As they highlighted the risks of rapid withdrawal, Odierno and Crocker ran into resistance. When the National Intelligence Council prepared a draft national intelligence estimate on Iraq in February 2009, Odierno and Crocker objected to what they believed was
an overly optimistic assessment of the security situation both considered unsustainable
without a major U.S. military presence. Odierno and Crocker were concerned that a toorosy intelligence estimate would encourage policymakers to disengage without considering the negative consequences.4 It was also the third year in a row that Multi-National
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had disagreed with a national intelligence estimate on Iraq.
At the same time, MNF-I hosted a RAND Corporation team conducting a congressionally mandated “withdrawal study” to assess whether U.S. troops should stay in the
country through 2011 or withdraw sooner.5 The options that the study team was asked
to consider, which were potentially faster than those the President envisioned, illustrated
the mounting political pressure to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Iraq.
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POLITICAL CULMINATION OF THE SURGE: THE JANUARY 2009
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
By early 2009, Washington was more optimistic about Iraq than those struggling with
the obstacles on the ground. Certainly, the January 2009 Iraqi provincial elections had
gone well. Many Sunnis had boycotted the previous provincial elections in 2005, as had
the Sadrists, and both groups had thus been frozen out of local government for the 4 years
that followed. During that time, the Sadrists and Sunni rejectionist groups had conducted
separate, multi-year insurgencies against the Iraqi Government and the coalition. The
January 2009 elections provided an opportunity to redress local political imbalances that
had been one of the most important drivers of conflict. The incumbents who had won
power in the boycotted January 2005 election were reluctant to hold provincial elections
in 2009, fearing they would lose some local power. However, pressure from the Awakening, the Sadrists, the Iraqi Shi’a clerical leaders in Najaf, and the United States forced
the issue. The voting took place January 31 except in the three predominantly Kurdish
provinces, which planned to vote later, and in Kirkuk, where the Arab-Kurd political
deadlock made voting impossible.
The 2009 provincial vote was the most peaceful election Iraq had experienced since the
2003 invasion. During the 2005 elections, there were more than 400 attacks per week. To
prevent similar events in 2009, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Iraqi security
forces (ISF) carried out a series of spoiling attacks, supported by a surge of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) resources from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).6 With 750,000 Iraqi soldiers, police, and other government officials deployed, the
2009 elections saw less than a quarter of the attacks that had taken place in 2005, though
five Sunni candidates in Mosul were assassinated before the voting.7
The January 2009 elections brought sweeping change to Iraq’s local governments. The
Iraqi electorate penalized the incumbent parties, whom Iraqis blamed for the sectarian
warfare of 2006-2008, voting them out of power in each of the 14 provinces that held
an election.8 MNF-I found the results encouraging on several levels. The Sunni communities that had boycotted the election 4 years earlier turned out to vote in large numbers in Anbar, Ninawa, Salahadin, and Diyala. In many cases, they voted for candidates
associated with the Awakening who had advocated national reconciliation, factors that
Odierno and MNF-I believed would begin to reverse the broader Sunni community’s
perception of its own marginalization.9 Parties that ran on secular nationalist platforms
polled significantly better than Islamist parties, reversing the trend of the 2005 national
elections. Parties associated with Iran polled most poorly of all—especially the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which lost control of seven southern governorships.
Most significant in Odierno’s view was that the Sunni “Hadba Gathering” bloc headed
by Osama Nujaifi, Sheikh Abdullah al Yawar, and other Ninawa notables took control of
the Ninawa provincial council from the Kurdish parties that had won it in 2005. MNF-I
hoped the transfer of power in Mosul from Kurdish politicians to Sunni ones would rob
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other rejectionist groups of their remaining political support
in the province that was AQI’s sole remaining sanctuary.10 These political trends seemed
to bode well for the national elections scheduled for late 2009 or early 2010, and seemed
to indicate that the surge campaign of 2007-2008 might have set the stage for a stable Iraq.
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DRAWDOWN AND CHANGE OF OPERATING POSTURE FOR MNF-I
After the January elections, MNF-I turned its full attention to implementing Obama’s
new drawdown policy and implementing the security agreement that the George W.
Bush administration had finalized in late 2008. Under Obama’s directive, MNF-I would
need to reduce U.S. troop levels from 142,000 in February 2009 to about 50,000 at the
end of summer 2010, a reduction that would require a near-continual redeployment of
troops, redrawing of unit boundaries and transfer of responsibilities across the country. The diminishing force also would have to change the way it operated. The U.S.-Iraq
security agreement specified that U.S. troops would leave Iraq’s cities by June 30, 2009,
after which American units could no longer conduct unilateral operations or raids but
would have to work through their ISF counterparts to obtain warrants from Iraqi courts
ahead of any operation. They would also be required to coordinate their movements and
operations with their ISF counterparts—with the Iraqis having the power to veto U.S.
operations.
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Map 21. MNF-I Unit Disposition, June 2009.
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Most of the units that would have to adopt this different way of operating were newly
arrived. The annual turnover of coalition units that had taken place between February
and April in each year since 2004 occurred again in 2009. The number of U.S. brigades in
Iraq held steady at 15, but the overall troop strength had decreased. By February, MNFI’s total strength was down to 147,000, from a high of 182,000 at the height of the surge
in October 2007.11 It would continue to fall through the summer. In early March, Odierno
announced that MNF-I would shrink by another 12,000 American and 4,000 international
troops by September. As the drawdown progressed, MNF-I would lose most of its multinational character, becoming almost a solely American force. Most of the foreign contingents already had departed Iraq with the expiration of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution at the end of 2008.
On March 31, the British Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) departed Iraq
as well, ending Great Britain’s 6-year deployment in southern Iraq. During that time,
British units had suffered 179 troops killed and more than 5,000 wounded. In a ceremony
at the Basrah airfield, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband watched as MND-SE
handed control of its area of operations to Major General Michael Oates’s Multi-National
Division-Center (MND-C), which had been gradually expanding its battle space southward from Baghdad since June 2008 and would be renamed MND-South after the British
departure.

Source: DoD photo by Specialist Darryl Montgomery (Released).

British Major General Andrew Salmon, Commander of MND-SE,
Hands Responsibility for Southern Iraq to U.S. Major General Michael Oates,
Commander of MND-C.12
The withdrawal of MND-SE left Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) with four U.S.led division headquarters. In addition to Oates’s MND-C headquarters in the south, Major
General Robert Caslen’s 25th Infantry Division remained in control of Multi-National
Division-North (MND-N), with about 23,000 troops spread among its 4 brigade combat
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teams (BCTs). In March, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) arrived to assume duties
as Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) in Anbar, replacing I MEF. In the same month,
Major General Daniel Bolger’s 1st Cavalry Division arrived to become Multi-National
Division-Baghdad (MND-B), replacing Major General Jeffery Hammond’s 4th Infantry
Division in command of 35,000 U.S. troops and 6 BCTs in the Baghdad region. These four
divisions would fall under a new corps command. A few days after the British departure,
Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps departed as well, replaced
by Lieutenant General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.’s I Corps in early April. The XVIII Airborne
Corps’ year in Iraq had opened with the unexpected war against the Shi’a militant groups
across central and southern Iraq but had ended with Iraq at its calmest since the 2003
invasion. Whereas Austin had assumed command of 20 U.S. brigades and more than
10,000 international troops in early 2008, Jacoby took command of a force that by September would consist of only 12 U.S. brigades covering the entire country. Jacoby also
inherited a shrinking support structure. By the end of March, the coalition had 133,000
contractors supporting its operations, a decrease of 18,000 since the beginning of 2009.13
With this smaller operating force and fewer enablers, Odierno and his senior commanders had 5 months, February through June, to make as much progress as possible.
During these last months of relatively unconstrained operations, MNF-I worked to accelerate the development of the ISF that would have to take full responsibility for their
nation’s security by midsummer. Odierno’s units also intended to maintain pressure on
AQI in northern Iraq with a final U.S.-Iraqi offensive against the extremist group in its
remote sanctuaries. MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy hoped to continue reconciliation initiatives such as the Sons of Iraq and to fragment further the Sunni insurgency, bringing
additional portions of it to the negotiating table. At the same time, MNF-I intended to
neutralize the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies and prevent their resurgence in
Iraqi cities. Above all, MNF-I would have to vacate its many bases, outposts, and joint
security stations in the Iraqi cities without allowing enemy forces to exploit them. This
was a tall order.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENT
The Iraqi Army and Iraqi National Police, which would have to fill the gap as the
coalition’s troops diminished, had come a long way since the civil war of 2006, when
Sunni and Shi’a militants had outmatched an ISF riddled with sectarianism and corruption. The ISF’s overall strength had grown rapidly, reaching 565,000 soldiers and police
by the end of 2008, compared to 323,000 2 years earlier.14 At the time of Obama’s policy
change in January 2009, the Iraqi Army had 175 combat battalions along with 5 special
operations battalions and 5 infrastructure security battalions.15 These units and the Iraqi
police had taken the lead role in securing the January 31 provincial elections, splitting
duties between them so that an inner ring of police guarded polling sites while the Iraqi
Army secured an outer perimeter, with coalition troops in an overwatch role. The Interior
Ministry had even deployed 500 female police officers to search and counter the threat
of female suicide bombers as the voting took place.16 With roughly 750,000 Iraqi soldiers,
Iraqi police, and coalition troops on duty election day, the voting occurred without incident. After passing the test of election security, in February and March the ISF displayed
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a growing capability to conduct population security when it deployed more than 40,000
soldiers and police to secure the Arba’een pilgrimage route to Karbala in response to a
wave of attacks against Shi’a pilgrims. The following month, the ISF secured more than a
million pilgrims as they gathered for a Shi’a religious holiday in Samarra.17
However, beyond these relatively simple infantry- and police-based security activities, MNF-I found it difficult to develop the Iraqi military’s more advanced capabilities.
In early 2009, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense established a program to oversee the purchase
and fielding of M1A1 tanks from the United States, an addition that would finally give
Iraq’s ground forces an offensive capability.18 The new tanks would be a critical capability in an Iraqi military that the coalition and Minister of Defense Abdel Qader intended
to grow to a strength of 352,000, with 14 army divisions. But in spring 2009, coalition and
Iraqi military leaders learned that the rest of the Iraqi Government and Parliament was
willing to fund only 253,000 Ministry of Defense forces, far fewer than Qader and MNF-I
expected and believed the security situation required as U.S. forces withdrew. Finding
ways to overcome the shortfalls in funding and manpower fell to Lieutenant General
Frank Helmick’s Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).19
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Air Force, which once was one of the most capable in the Middle
East, lagged far behind the army. Though the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was moving ahead
with plans to expand its air force personnel to about 6,000 and to open a training center
at Tikrit air base, the air force lacked a modern jet fighter. Plans for Iraq to buy F-16s and
their accompanying training aircraft from the United States moved slowly because of the
same budget shortfall that cut the Ministry of Defense’s overall troop strength. The Iraqi
Air Force had an air operations center capable of overseeing 350 sorties per week, but it
lacked the broader air traffic control capability needed to control Iraq’s airspace.20
Development of the small Iraqi Navy outpaced the air force. It operated 40 or more
patrols each week in the Persian Gulf, where about 90 percent of Iraq’s oil exports flowed
through vulnerable terminals. The Iraqi Navy also was building a new pier and seawall
at the country’s only port of Umm Qasr, where the Navy would station a fleet of newly
purchased Italian patrol boats.21 Despite these positive developments, the coalition’s program to train the Iraqi Navy fell victim to politics in 2009. Odierno and other U.S. leaders hoped to maintain as large a force of trainers and advisers from other countries as
possible, particularly from Great Britain. The Nuri al-Maliki government, unfortunately,
did not share MNF-I’s sentiment. After the departure of MND-SE, MNF-I and its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) counterparts hoped to quickly negotiate an agreement with the Iraqi Government under which a British military assistance mission could
remain in the country, including the naval contingent training the Iraqi Navy in Umm
Qasr.
In late 2008, the United Kingdom (UK) and Iraq agreed that British troops could
remain in the country until May 31, 2009, while the two countries negotiated a longer-term arrangement. However, as the deadline approached, Maliki seemed to view
British training with ambivalence and sought only to limit the legal immunities for UK
forces. At times, the Iraqi officials seemed driven by their long-standing resentment of
their former British colonial masters. Iraqi politics played a role in the rocky negotiations
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as well. “[T]he PM [Prime Minister] sees a UK agreement as a political vulnerability
exploitable by his political rivals,” Odierno reported to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
Robert Gates after the Anglo-Iraqi negotiations stalled in mid-May.22 In the meantime,
with no settled UK-Iraq agreement, other NATO countries were reluctant to deploy their
own contingents of trainers and advisers, leaving NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),
the multinational training arm of MNSTC-I, at just two-thirds of its required strength.23
In the last days of May, with no legal basis for staying in the country, the remaining British contingent, including the entire UK naval training mission, left for Kuwait to await
news of whether the Iraqi Government would allow them to return. At the 11th hour,
Maliki and the UK Government reached an agreement that would permit British forces to
remain in Iraq for an additional year, but Maliki limited the British contingent to just five
ships and 100 troops ashore, far fewer British troops than MNF-I had hoped to include in
the NATO training mission.24
That Maliki was willing to allow a severe disruption in the training and advisory program for one of Iraq’s military services surprised and dismayed coalition commanders,
but it was a sign of things to come. Within days of the UK-Iraq agreement, Maliki and
Qader began pressing U.S. leaders to change the name of MNF-I to U.S. Forces-Iraq to
reflect the departure of the other national contingents.25
THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF AQI
Back to Diyala and Mosul
As the coalition withdrawal from the Iraqi cities drew closer, MNF-I leaders and
their Iraqi counterparts decided to conduct additional combined operations in northern
Iraq where AQI still had sanctuaries and support. Despite a series of four large-scale
security operations in Diyala in 2007-2008, the province remained unstable. Diyala was
“a microcosm of the nation’s political challenges, with its Shi’a population maintaining
close ties across the Iranian border via the Old Silk Road, its Ba’athist enclave serving as
a key Sunni buffer zone, AQI attempting to hang on, and Arabs and Kurds disputing the
status of northeastern parts of the province,” Odierno wrote to Gates in March.26 Some
AQI commanders and fighters fleeing the fall 2008 operations in Mosul had been able to
make their way back to their old sanctuaries in the sparsely populated badlands east of
the Diyala River and in the Hamrin Mountains to the west, where they were beyond the
reach of coalition and Iraqi troops but close enough to populated areas to launch attacks,
especially against the Sons of Iraq. The Diyala Operations Command was created in 2008
to partner with MND-N and coordinate ISF activities against this threat, but by early
2009, Prime Minister Maliki had grown frustrated with its performance and sacked its
commander. The residual AQI presence in Diyala was both a security and political threat,
because AQI attacks had the potential to cause Sunni-Shi’a or Arab-Kurd strife as the
newly elected provincial council parties attempted to form a local government in which
Sunnis were likely to have the leading role.27
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Source: DoD photo courtesy U.S. Navy (Released).

An Explosive Ordnance Technician Prepares to Destroy a Bunker
During Operations in Diyala Province.28
MNC-I and Iraqi forces launched a series of operations in spring 2009 to push AQI
out of its remote sanctuaries and prevent the group from launching attacks into the cities
of the Diyala Valley as coalition troops prepared to leave. In early March, a large operation involving the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and the 21st Iraqi Army Brigade
took aim at AQI in the countryside near Balad Ruz, especially in the area coalition troops
called the Turki Bowl, which had been difficult for U.S. units to clear in 2008. As U.S. and
Iraqi soldiers pushed into parts of the Turki Bowl that were inaccessible except on foot or
motorcycle, they uncovered extensive AQI bunker complexes, some of which had to be
reduced by air strikes after firefights with the extremists.29 A second phase of the operation in late March uncovered large remote weapons and ammunition caches that AQI
had abandoned.30
Meanwhile, farther north, U.S. and Iraqi troops cleared the areas around Hamrin Lake
between Muqdadiyah and Khanaqin, another hard-to-access area where AQI groups
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had a safe haven for several years.31 AQI responded by showing it could attack larger
nearby towns. A late March suicide bombing killed 26 civilians in Jalawla near the shores
of Hamrin Lake, and 2 deadlier bombings the following month in Baqubah killed 80
people.32
The operations near Khanaqin risked rekindling the political crisis that had taken
place when Iraqi Army troops and peshmerga faced off against each other the previous
fall. Arab-Kurd tensions already had been stoked again in February when Prime Minister Maliki decided to deploy the 12th Iraqi Division to the vicinity of Kurdish-controlled
Kirkuk, ostensibly to protect oil infrastructure in the area but in actuality to assert political advantage over Iraq’s Kurdish parties.33 When Iraqi troops began to push toward
Khanaqin again in April, the Iraqi Army, the peshmerga, and MNC-I exchanged liaison
officers and conducted a combined rehearsal of the operation in order to avoid another
confrontation.34 It was a cooperative model that Odierno would apply along the entire
Green Line in 2010.
U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted further clearing operations in Mosul at the same time.
As had been the case in Diyala, the late 2008 operations in Mosul had disrupted AQI but
not fully dislodged the group from its long-term support zones in and around the city.
Part of the problem was the ISF’s inability to hold neighborhoods once they were cleared.
“In the past, the ISF in Mosul have been reluctant to maintain a presence in cleared neighborhoods, favoring raids and checkpoints instead,” Odierno explained to Gates in February 2009.35 This assessment followed a difficult week during which four AQI suicide
car bombs targeted Iraqi and coalition troops, with one of them killing 3d Battalion, 8th
Cavalry Regiment, commander Lieutenant Colonel Gary Derby and his three-man personal security detail.36

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant JoAnn S. Makinano (Released).

U.S. Army Soldiers and Iraqi Police Search Houses in West Mosul
During Operation NEW HOPE.37
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On February 20, MNC-I and the ISF launched Operation NEW HOPE, which Odierno
described as a “comprehensive COIN [counterinsurgency] operation” involving six
additional U.S. battalions, as well as forces from both the 2d and 3d Iraqi Divisions in
Ninawa.38 By the beginning of March, the combined U.S.-Iraqi troops had established a
presence in AQI’s former neighborhoods and appeared to have disrupted the extremists’
operations, especially its ability to collect funds through extortion.39 Within days of entering the neighborhoods, Iraqi and coalition units began to report a significant increase in
tips from the local population. The increased tips drove targeted operations against AQI
leaders such as the Islamic State of Iraq’s “Minister of Oil,” who was captured in the first
week of March.40 A few weeks later, coalition special operators apprehended a series of
senior terrorist leaders in the area, including Ahmad Mohammed Ali al-Tai, the AQI
“Wali” (governor or guardian) of the entire Mosul region.41
Yet the sprawling metropolis of 2 million people was not wholly under coalition-ISF
control, especially the city’s old quarter, where a maze of narrow streets and passageways made clearing and holding operations difficult. In the medieval neighborhoods of
Old Mosul, AQI maintained a presence that it used to launch an average of 35 attacks
per week across Mosul in April and May, far higher than the weekly average in any
other province.42 On April 9, an AQI suicide bomber drove a dump truck packed with
10,000 pounds of explosives into an Iraqi police compound in south Mosul just as a U.S.
patrol entered. The attack killed 5 U.S. Soldiers and 3 Iraqis while wounding more than
60 people. It was the largest U.S. death toll from a single attack in more than a year.
To combat the AQI threat in Old Mosul, a combined force of the 1st Iraqi National
Police Brigade, a local police battalion, and U.S. forces systematically cleared the thousands of buildings. By late May, an Iraqi emergency response battalion had arrived to
become the hold force.43 The operations appeared to have significant results: MNF-I
observed in late May that AQI’s improvised explosive device (IED) and indirect fire
attacks in Mosul had become largely ineffective.44 MNF-I also learned that AQI financiers
had lost the ability to extort funds from their richest targets in the north, including the
AsiaCell phone company, Bayji oil refinery, and Badush cement factory, leading to an
assessment of a 50 percent drop in income.45
Despite the progress, both coalition and Iraqi commanders felt that fully securing
Mosul would require several more months beyond the June 30 deadline for withdrawing U.S. forces from the cities. After patrolling the city himself, Odierno believed MNF-I
needed 4 to 6 additional months, in part, because AQI leaders were desperate to maintain a foothold in the city and were committing resources from across Iraq to the fight. In
April, Ahmad Zayd, one of AQI’s captured Mosul emirs, had told coalition officials that
AQI considered Mosul “its last opportunity at retaining viability in the country of Iraq,”
indicating that the group would invest heavily in regenerating its presence in the city if
coalition-ISF military pressure were relieved.46
Rampant corruption in Mosul’s courts worried coalition leaders as well. Hundreds
of AQI and other insurgent detainees captured during the springtime operations were
freed by intimidating or bribing judges and other Iraqi officials.47 Similarly, AQI and
other insurgent groups infiltrated the Mosul police forces. To counteract the penetration,
the coalition and the Interior Ministry opened a new police college with a vetted training
cadre that could screen recruits to keep out AQI sympathizers, but this process of generating trusted police would take time.48
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Source: DoD photo by Specialist Daniel Nelson (Released).

General Raymond Odierno Meets With MNC-I Commander Lieutenant General
Charles Jacoby and MND-N Commander Major General Robert Caslen, Jr.,
in Mosul.49
In response to these concerns, Ninawah Operations Commander Major General
Hassan Karim and MND-N commander Caslen provided a joint assessment to their
chains of command in which they recommended that coalition troops remain inside the
city until October 31. Even though Odierno doubted Maliki would accept the 4-month
extension beyond the June 30 deadline, he was able to convince the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense to dispatch two additional army brigades to the city later in the month.50 Nevertheless, in mid-June, Odierno reported to Gates that “our commanders remain uneasy
about our reduced presence in Mosul,” just days before the withdrawal deadline.51
AQI’s Resilience
AQI had staying power in Ninawa Province because its Syria-based foreign-fighter
network had been rebuilt after the raid that killed Abu Ghadiyah in October 2008. Under
the leadership of a new kingpin called Abu Khalaf, the former Ghadiyah network pushed
North African AQI operatives from Syria into Mosul to carry out suicide attacks. Working through CENTCOM, MNF-I provided the Tunisian Government with information to
interdict the jihadi network, but not before the Tunisian terrorists had carried out several
major attacks in Mosul. On March 31, a Tunisian suicide truck bomber attacked a police
headquarters next to Mosul’s main train station, and on April 9, another Tunisian drove
the explosive-laden truck that killed five U.S. Soldiers and three Iraqis.52 As AQI’s Mosul
networks came under intense pressure during Operation NEW HOPE in March and
April, AQI leaders apparently requested a surge of suicide bombers from the Syria-based
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facilitation network, which helped the terrorist group maintain its operations in Mosul
even as its local networks were dismantled.53
The reemergence of the Syria facilitation network forced MNC-I to position additional
ISR resources in western Ninawa where AQI’s “Border Emir” had operated earlier, and
to conduct additional spoiling raids on the infiltration routes across the Jazeera desert.54
The problem was not just a Syria-based one, however. In early May, MNF-I reported
the discovery of a Kurdish AQI “battalion” that pushed fighters and weapons into the
Mosul area from the east. Meanwhile, far to the south, some AQI operatives rousted from
Ninawa Province returned to the seam between the northern Baghdad belts and eastern
Anbar. Those who migrated back to the Abu Ghraib and Karmah areas attempted to
reconstitute support bases in areas from which the Sons of Iraq had driven them during
2007-2008.55 Within Baghdad itself, AQI’s car bomb network was being rebuilt after a
long period of near-dormancy.56
As these AQI networks began to reactivate, they benefited from complacency in Baghdad. In early March 2009, AQI struck the Interior Ministry in east Baghdad and killed or
wounded 71 job applicants who were queued there. On March 10, an AQI suicide bomber
penetrated a government-sponsored reconciliation conference in Abu Ghraib, killing 33,
including an Iraqi Army battalion commander.57 In both cases, MNF-I found that the
ISF had experienced a breakdown in discipline and situational awareness, a problem
that later allowed AQI to conduct 7 coordinated car bombings against Shi’a neighborhoods that killed and wounded more than 100 civilians.58 These vulnerabilities in the ISF
defenses indicated to coalition commanders that AQI could exploit the impending departure of U.S. troops from the city. MNF-I also noted that AQI had stepped up attempts to
regain freedom of movement in the western Baghdad belts and in Ramadi by striking
agreements with other local insurgent groups, thereby positioning themselves to respond
to coalition and ISF countermeasures as well as take advantage of the coalition departure
on June 30.
To counter the increase in ISF checkpoints in central Iraq in 2008, AQI began using
large numbers of female suicide bombers, whom Iraqi police and soldiers tended not to
check closely. In 2008, there were 36 attacks by female suicide bombers, compared to just
7 for all of 2007.59 In late November, a Sunni cleric in Dhuluiyah helped coalition and
Iraqi troops uncover a ring of 21 AQI women.60 Three months later, in February 2009,
Iraqi forces arrested Samira Ahmed Jassim, a woman from Diyala known as the Mother
of Believers, who had orchestrated 28 female suicide bombings in the previous 18 months
and was suspected of recruiting more than 80 female suicide bombers on behalf of the
AQI-allied group Ansar al Sunna. Once detained, the Mother of Believers revealed that
she specifically targeted rape victims for recruitment, capitalizing on their sense of shame
in Iraqi society, and that Ansar al Sunna sometimes organized the rapes in the first place
in order to create recruitment opportunities.61 AQI and Ansar al Sunna’s female suicide
bombers were particularly effective at penetrating security for large gatherings such as
Awakening meetings or pilgrimages.
Having suffered from a loss of public support in 2007-2008 because of its brutal practices in Sunni areas, AQI adjusted its tactics in early 2009 to lessen collateral damage
from its attacks against coalition targets. AQI fighters began using Russian-made RKG-3
armor-piercing grenades to attack coalition-armored vehicles, which did not cause the
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level of civilian casualties that large IEDs tended to do. In the 6-week period coinciding with Operation NEW HOPE during March-April 2009, there were 46 RKG-3 attacks
against coalition targets, and the throwers detained were often youths paid to conduct
the attacks, rather than hardened AQI members.62

Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal James F. Cline III (Released).

RKG-3 Grenades.63
As the late spring operations to clear Old Mosul began, premeditated “green on blue”
attacks reappeared, something that was difficult to counter or predict. On May 2 at a combined U.S.-Iraqi outpost south of Mosul, two Iraqi soldiers opened fire on U.S. Soldiers,
killing two Americans and wounding three. One shooter was killed, while the second
was captured along with an Iraqi police captain who had facilitated the attack. The incident, the fourth of its kind since late 2008, illustrated AQI’s continued ability to attack
vulnerable U.S. troops in a partnership role.64
While seeking to limit civilian casualties in Sunni areas, AQI sought to cause more of
them in Shi’a areas. The first half of 2009 saw an expansion in AQI’s use of suicide vest
(SVEST) attacks to infiltrate through checkpoints and carry out high-profile bombings in
gatherings and crowded areas. In mid-April, SVEST attacks killed more than 400 civilians
in 1 week, with significant attacks taking place in Diyala just as Iraqi and coalition troops
were clearing AQI caches and hideouts there. In one attack in Muqdadiyah, a suicide
bomber killed 57 Iranian pilgrims in a restaurant, while another SVEST attacker killed 53
Iraqis at the Kadhimiyah shrine in Baghdad. At the end of the bloody week, special operators traced the SVEST operation to a cell near Balad, and, as the operators closed in on
the target, seven of the cell members detonated their SVESTs, killing themselves before
capture.65 The following week, police in Kirkuk caught a would-be SVEST attacker and
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made an important tactical discovery. The bomber was so heavily drugged that he almost
died from the narcotic, suggesting that in some cases AQI might manipulate unwilling
bombers.66
In another important aspect, however, AQI’s early 2009 adaptations were less successful: the VBIED network struggling to reestablish itself in Baghdad proved far less
effective than its 2006-2007 predecessors. On April 29, for example, of 12 coordinated
AQI car bombs, only half detonated; coalition forces found that the other 6 had been
packed with simplistic, low-yield munitions that lacked the sophistication and size of
previous AQI VBIEDs.67
At the same time as AQI’s botched car bombs, the group benefited from an Iraqi Government failure in information operations during a bizarre, high-profile incident spearheaded by Maliki’s office. In late April, Maliki and his spokesmen announced that Iraqi
troops had captured Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, AQI’s
political organization. Strangely, however, the Iraqi officials detaining the man did not
grant MNF-I access to “Baghdadi” or immediately share information from his interrogations, and based on multiple sources, MNF-I confidently judged that the Iraqis had not in
fact captured Baghdadi. Nevertheless, for almost a month, Maliki and Iraqi Government
spokesmen continued to declare that “Baghdadi” had been captured and was making
“confessions” that implicated a large number of prominent Sunni politicians and Sons of
Iraq leaders in acts of terrorism. Despite MNF-I’s warnings that the captured man was
an impostor, the Maliki government used the information to issue arrest warrants for
several Sunni leaders, including some associated with the Iraqi Islamic Party.68 Not until
June 2009 did the Maliki government admit its mistake, which had already done serious
damage to its credibility on counterterrorism just days before the June 30 transition to
Iraqi security lead in Iraqi cities. In retrospect, the incident represented another warning
sign of Maliki’s tendency to issue specious claims in order to centralize his power base
further and to seek retribution against Sunni politicians and leaders.
THE CHALLENGE OF RECONCILIATION
Problems With the Sons of Iraq: The Adel Mashhadani Affair
By late April 2009, MNF-I reported that 18,000 Sons of Iraq had been absorbed into
Iraqi Government jobs, but there were signs that the overall reconciliation initiative was
in danger as U.S. troops prepared to leave some of the key urban areas where the Awakening had flourished during the surge.69 The Baghdadi hoax and the political fallout from
the Maliki government’s actions against Sunni leaders came at a sensitive time for the
Sons of Iraq program, which had been transferred to the Iraqi Government just weeks
beforehand. Many Sons of Iraq leaders distrusted the Maliki government’s intentions
and considered slow salary payments and arrests of the group’s members evidence of the
Prime Minister’s ill will toward the program. MNF-I and MNC-I acted as a buffer between
government and Sons of Iraq, often protecting the group’s leaders from arrest. However,
on March 28, 2009, MNF-I sent special operators with Ministry of Interior forces to arrest
a prominent Sons of Iraq leader in Baghdad.
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Adel al-Mashhadani headed a large Sons of Iraq group in the east Baghdad neighborhood of Fadhil and was closely associated with senior political leaders such as Ayad
Allawi. After having originally helped to quell the Sunni insurgency in east Baghdad,
Mashhadani had become a local mafia boss. “We have known for months that Mashhadani was extorting store owners, setting up illegal checkpoints, and refusing to cooperate
with ISF, and a warrant was issued for his arrest,” Odierno explained to Gates the day
after the arrest, while describing Mashhadani as “a charismatic leader whose brutality
led to his arrest.”70 Mashhadani was taken into custody without incident, but in the hours
after his capture, his Sons of Iraq followers fought Iraqi troops and U.S. Soldiers from 5th
Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, part of General Bolger’s MND-B. About 15 of Mashhadani’s men were killed, and the situation turned into an all-night standoff after Baghdad
Operations Commander General Abud Qanbar deployed 3 Iraqi battalions to surround
Fadhil. At dawn, more than 100 of the remaining Mashhadani followers surrendered,
ending the crisis.71

Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Selesnick (Released).

Troops of 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Rush to the Scene of Fighting Between
Iraqi Security Forces and Adel al-Mashhadani’s Sons of Iraq Group.72
The public outcry from Iraq’s Sunni community led MNF-I to expect widespread Sons
of Iraq desertions. However, few of the 92,000 Sons of Iraq left their positions in the
aftermath of the Mashhadani arrest, though slow salary payments stemming from the
early 2009 budget cuts fueled Sunni perceptions of government bias against them.73 To
alleviate these concerns, MNF-I and Iraqi Government officials convened a conference of
Sons of Iraq leaders from around the country in Baghdad in mid-May and assured them
continued U.S. and Iraqi Government support.74 In the coming years, however, these
assurances would mean little. An Iraqi court eventually sentenced Mashhadani to death,
and the Maliki government executed him in January 2014.
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Reconciliation With the Iraqi Ba’athists in Syria
The Baghdadi and Mashhadani affairs also came at a bad time for the coalition’s effort
to reconcile with former Iraqi military officers and Ba’athist officials living in Syria and
Jordan who supported the insurgency. Maliki had used the fictional Baghdadi confessions to allege a vast Sunni terrorist conspiracy against his government involving AQI,
the Ba’ath Party, and the Sunni parties in the Iraqi Parliament, all with the complicity
of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Maliki’s claims came just weeks after MNFI’s Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) had opened negotiating channels with the
Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance. This umbrella group included Jaysh al-Islami,
and Syria-based New Ba’ath Party leader Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, who had long
been associated with the Sunni insurgency in Ninawa and was a rival to Izzat Ibrahim
al-Douri among the remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime. The FSEC’s objective had
been to get these insurgent groups to declare and enforce cease-fires inside Iraq. FSEC
had opened these channels in December 2008 via former republican Guard General Raad
Hamdani, who had connections with former military officers living outside Iraq. He and
FSEC had encouraged those officers to apply for reinstatement of their jobs or pensions
under the 2008 Iraqi Government law that had revised Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) Order No. 2.75
In both the cease-fire discussions and the reintegration of former military officers,
MNF-I stressed to interlocutors that Sunni insurgent and Ba’athist leaders would have
to reconcile with the government. However, Maliki’s anti-Ba’athist stance threatened
the FSEC’s outreach efforts. The same week that the FSEC made contact with Ahmad,
the Maliki government angered Sunnis by demanding that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
approve the execution of General Sultan Hashem, Iraq’s former Minister of Defense, who
had been sentenced to death for his part in the anti-Kurdish Anfal campaign of the late
1980s.76 Hashem was reviled by Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds but remained popular in his native
Mosul, leading coalition officials to fear that his execution would destabilize the north.
Ultimately, Talabani stood firm and denied Maliki’s request, temporarily subduing the
sectarian sparring.
The coalition differed in 2009 from Maliki and his allies on the prospect of reconciliation with former regime officers and officials based in Syria and Jordan. Maliki was
skeptical, believing that the Ba’athists were behind most of the insurgent and terrorist
violence and were determined to overthrow the democratic government. Maliki also disagreed with the United States as to whether Bashar al-Assad could be persuaded to crack
down on the Syrian-based terrorist and insurgent networks. Engaging Assad on this was
a centerpiece of the new Obama administration’s Middle East policy, so U.S. delegations
quickly began visiting Damascus, Syria. For his part, Odierno worked in spring 2009 to
operationalize the Obama administration’s new Syria policy by brokering security talks
among Iraq, Syria, and the United States to secure the porous Syria-Iraq border. In initial bilateral talks with the Iraqis, however, Syrian representatives rebuffed Baghdad’s
concerns about Iraqi Ba’ath Party members in Damascus and instead protested the raid
against Abu Ghadiyah the previous October.77 Despite these inauspicious beginnings,
U.S. leaders in Washington instructed MNF-I to conduct bilateral military-to-military
talks with the Assad regime and share information on foreign fighter networks operating
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in Syria. Leading the U.S. delegation, the MNF-I chief of staff, Major General Guy Swan,
proposed a trilateral assessment of Syria-Iraq border crossings to curtail terrorist and
criminal activities there. The Assad regime responded by pressing for a broader discussion on economic and political issues, essentially seeking to end the U.S.-led isolation of
Syria.78 For their part, MNF-I leaders believed that the United States could pressure the
Syrian regime to crack down on terrorist networks. MNF-I officers reported that Assad
was worried that the future drawdown of U.S. troops could lead to the fragmentation of
Iraq and a spillover of unrest to Syria.79
Back in Baghdad, however, Maliki and other Iraqi leaders were convinced of the
Assad regime’s bad faith and declined to participate in the trilateral initiative. In retrospect, the Iraqis had good reason for this view. Throughout the spring and summer, the
Syrian regime’s provocative actions on the border and tolerance of AQI undercut the idea
of shared security interests with either Iraq or the United States.80
The Rise of Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi
Some of Maliki’s concerns about a Ba’athist resurgence inside Iraq were justified. As
AQI struggled to maintain its presence in the upper Tigris Valley and Mosul in the face of
U.S.-Iraqi security operations, another insurgent organization began to take over the militant leadership role that AQI had held since 2005. The Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi (JRTN), or Naqshbandi Army, was a militant group associated with Douri’s wing
of the Ba’ath Party and ideologically founded on a curious mixture of Ba’athism and
Sufi Islamism. JRTN had grown out of a Sufi order of Iraqi military officers led by Douri
during Saddam’s “Faith Campaign” of the 1990s, but after the fall of Saddam’s regime,
it had become a potent militant group enjoying a base of support in Hawijah, eastern
Anbar, and Mosul.81 While AQI sought headlines with its operations, JRTN preferred to
work behind the scenes.82 Though Douri and some other JRTN leaders were themselves
Sufi, the group tended to be associated with Sunni nationalist interests, and its main political cause was to prevent the Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and other disputed territories of
the north. By late spring 2009, MNF-I noted JRTN’s increasing militant activities in Mosul
where AQI had once held sway and considered them a threat to long-term stability.83
MNF-I observers also noted that JRTN seemed well funded but carefully masked its role
in terrorism. JRTN leaders seemed willing to enter into tactical alliances with AQI and
other terrorist groups hoping to claim credit for driving coalition troops out of northern
cities after the June 30 withdrawal deadline.84 Though the Ba’athists and Douri appeared
in 2009 to be far from power and out of the Iraqi political mainstream, the local strength
of JRTN indicated that Douri’s loyalists would remain a force capable of influencing politics and potentially destabilizing areas of northern Iraq in the future.
THE IRAN PROBLEM
As MNF-I formulated its plans to withdraw from Iraqi cities and drawdown U.S.
forces in the country, its commanders grappled with the difficult problem of ensuring
that Iran’s militant proxies did not regain their former strength in central and southern
Iraq. The military defeat of Shi’a militants in 2008 led to more than half a year of subdued
activity on their part, but, during the first weeks of 2009, they increased their attacks
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against U.S. units and the ISF with assistance from the Iranian regime. In mid-January,
Shi’a militants in west Baghdad launched the first rocket attacks against Camp Victory in
more than a month, and U.S. and Iraqi troops investigating the firing points found ammunition manufactured in Iran. The use of explosively formed penetrators (EFP) increased,
killing three U.S. Soldiers in January. Late in the month, U.S. troops captured a five-man,
Iranian-trained EFP cell.85
These and other attacks against coalition units elsewhere in southern Iraq were the
work of the same three major Shi’a militant groups that had fought the coalition in 2008:
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and the remnants of Jaysh al-Mahdi,
now renamed the Promised Day Brigade. MNF-I adopted different approaches toward
each group. MNF-I sought to neutralize Moqtada Sadr’s newly reorganized Promised
Day Brigade before it reached maturity by disrupting its activities, fracturing its existing
networks, and deterring it recruitment. Against KH, the militant group created by Quds
Force proxy Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, MNF-I destroyed its cells wherever they could be
found. Throughout the first weeks of 2009, the coalition carried out intelligence-driven
raids against both the Promised Day Brigade and KH, including operations that led to
the capture of one of Abu Dura’s senior lieutenants and that disrupted KH’s indirect fire
teams in Basrah.86
MNF-I’s strategy for AAH, the group commanded by the imprisoned Qais al-Khazali,
was similarly adjusted toward reconciliation rather than conflict. In late 2008, Odierno
agreed to support the Maliki government’s negotiations with Khazali and his followers,
by which Maliki hoped to persuade the group to disarm and become a political party.
The decision brought an end to the conflicting positions that the Maliki government and
MNF-I had held since 2006, during which time the coalition had targeted AAH while
Maliki had attempted sporadic political reconciliation talks with the group. In return
for ceasing its targeting of AAH, MNF-I required that the group end all acts of violence,
decommission its weapons, stop accepting support from the Iranian regime, and no
longer take or hold hostages. When both Prime Minister Maliki and AAH representatives agreed that their negotiations would include a “roadmap” toward these points and
that AAH members would observe a cease-fire with the coalition, MNF-I agreed in early
January to stop targeting AAH and to release four imprisoned members.87 MNF-I also
demanded that AAH provide proof of life for U.S. Army Sergeant Ahmed al-Taie whom
it kidnapped in November 2006, and for the five British citizens AAH had abducted from
the Iraqi Ministry of Finance in 2007.88
Odierno and other senior U.S. commanders were not sanguine about the reconciliation with AAH, especially as they learned more about its commanders’ deep connections
to other irreconcilable Shi’a militants.89 Unfortunately, however, the 2008 security agreement required the United States to turn over all its detainees to the Iraqi Government.
Odierno believed MNF-I needed to get as much as possible for releasing Khazali and the
hundreds of AAH members in U.S. detention centers rather than eventually setting them
free with no quid pro quo.90
Through February, AAH members appeared to abide by the cease-fire, but there
were signs the cease-fire would not last. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran
(IRGC) Quds Force continued to train and equip Iraqi militants at camps in Iran, and EFP
strikes against U.S. troops began to rise in the latter half of the month, with eight EFP
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attacks taking place in a 6-day period. From his base in Iran, AAH deputy commander
Mohammed Tabatabai began recruiting militants willing to conduct attacks that could
not be traced back to AAH, probably to circumvent the cease-fire.91
Iran’s military posture indicated that it considered it important to maintain proxies
inside Iraq for use against the United States in the event of a larger regional conflict.
Throughout March 2009, MNF-I observed the Iranian regime continuing to train, equip,
and direct Iraqi Shi’a militant groups—including Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade—to
attack the coalition. MNF-I also saw indications that KH might ramp up attacks against
U.S. troops as they withdrew from the Iraqi cities, and that KH continued to receive support from Lebanese Hizballah. Coalition analysts also tracked KH’s attempts to construct
“mega-IRAMs” carrying a 1,000-kilogram warhead that could be used in a mass-casualty
attack against U.S. facilities, something KH had repeatedly tried to do since 2007.92
Against this backdrop, MNF-I’s negotiations with AAH began to break down.
Although the MNF-I FSEC met with 250 Baghdad-based Special Groups members
in March hoping to reach an agreement, by April it was clear that AAH members no
longer accepted the January cease-fire.93 With the suspension of reconciliation talks, AAH
stepped up its indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone, targeting the U.S. Embassy,
and MNF-I prepared to resume operations against the militant group.94
Ironically, as AAH walked away from the talks, Sadr reached out to MNF-I himself.
After months of special operations raids against his Promised Day Brigade, Sadr sent an
intermediary to Odierno to request the release of a Sadrist prisoner. Judging the prisoner
to be relatively low threat, Odierno agreed, telling Gates on May 3 that he would “see if
this leads to anything.”95
With targeting restrictions against AAH lifted, the coalition and ISF resumed raids
against the group with mixed results. On April 27, a coalition raid in Kut went awry and
resulted in the death of an Iraqi woman with connections to local Shi’a politicians. The
incident, which quickly made national news in Iraq, led an outraged Maliki to demand
that coalition special operators cease all raids. To get the Prime Minister to back off this
demand, Odierno agreed that all future counterterrorism raids would be cleared through
the Iraqi Government. The following week, on May 5, Iraqi troops captured a large weapons cache at the Amarah home of Hayder Gharrawi, an AAH affiliate and longtime IRGC
Quds Force associate. The cache included, among other munitions, 50 rocket rails and 151
EFP plates. Along with the weapons, the Iraqi troops also discovered letters dating from
November 2007 written by Jason Creswell, one of the British citizens AAH abducted from
the Ministry of Finance in 2007. The find indicated that Creswell had been alive months
after the abduction and that he had been in the hands of an Iraqi militant with long-time
connections to the Iranian regime.96
Less than 2 weeks after the Gharrawi raid, MNF-I reported that AAH and other Quds
Force proxies had stepped up their indirect fire against the Green Zone by 125 percent
since April, and that the 27 EFP attacks in the first half of May already exceeded the total
of 25 for the month of April.97 A few days later, MNF-I noted that senior AAH members
had returned from Iran to the west Baghdad neighborhoods of Hurriyah and Sh’ula,
apparently to prepare for a summer offensive against the coalition.98
Odierno and newly arrived U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill were incensed to learn in
late May that IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani planned to visit Erbil in
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the Kurdistan Region on June 6. Confronting Iraqi President Talabani, Odierno and Hill
protested that “Soleimani’s presence inside of Iraq would send the wrong message” at a
time when his militant proxies were intensifying their war against the U.S. presence in
the country.99 The same week that Soleimani intended to be in Erbil, Iraqi troops captured
a truckload of 59 improvised rockets being moved by a Shi’a militant group through
Maysan Province near the Iranian border, along the same route from the Shalamcheh
border crossing point that Soleimani’s subordinates used to move weapons to central
Iraq to attack U.S. troops and facilities.100
Despite the resumption of attacks by the Quds Force’s Iraqi proxies, in early June
MNF-I agreed to a proposal by the Maliki government to reopen reconciliation talks with
AAH. At the Iraqi Government’s request, Odierno agreed to release Laith al-Khazali,
the younger of the Khazali brothers who had been captured with Qais al-Khazali and
Ali Mussa Daqduq in Basrah in 2007. Under the deal worked out among the Khazalis,
the Maliki government, and MNF-I, Laith al-Khazali would travel to Iran to persuade
Akram al-Kabi and other AAH commanders to enforce the cease-fire agreed to by Qais
al-Khazali. The Maliki government hoped these arrangements would convince AAH to
disarm itself in time to participate in the 2010 Parliamentary elections as a political party.
Odierno hoped that Laith al-Khazali’s entreaties to AAH commanders would “further
split AAH into reconcilables and non-reconcilables.”101 After 2 weeks of freedom, MNF-I
officials noted that Laith al-Khazali was keeping his end of the bargain by pressing AAH
members to agree to the cease-fire. In a grim show of good faith, on June 21 AAH turned
over to the Iraqi Government the remains of two of the five British citizens taken from
the Ministry of Finance. One of the dead was Jason Creswell, whose letters soldiers had
found in Amarah just weeks before.102
As the June 30 deadline approached, MNF-I’s work to neutralize the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militants remained far from complete, and the withdrawal from the cities
would make it difficult for U.S. units to maintain contact with the enemy. A further difficulty was that the U.S. units in southern Iraq in spring 2009 were operating in that region
for the first time and had little local knowledge or understanding of the enemy there. For
6 years, the four southernmost provinces had been the responsibility of the British units
of MND-SE, which had extensive local information, long-standing relationships, and
human intelligence networks. However, much of the British knowledge did not transfer
in the transition between MND-SE and the 10th Mountain Division in March. This loss of
operational understanding was compounded when the 34th Infantry Division of the U.S.
Army National Guard, deploying to Iraq for the first time, replaced the 10th Mountain
Division just 7 weeks later. At that point, MNF-I’s understanding of the operating environment in the far south was significantly degraded.
The Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK) Conundrum
MNF-I’s problem with Iranian proxies was linked to the continuing challenge of the
MeK, an Iranian opposition group that Tehran wanted to see expelled from Iraq. In the
early days of the Iraq War, the Iranian regime had enlisted the help of the Badr Corps
to pressure and occasionally attack the MeK at its base at Camp Ashraf in Diyala, and
encouraged the Iraqi Government to take diplomatic actions against it.
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The MeK problem was complicated. Its members were protected by UN authority,
but many countries designated it a terrorist organization. As a result, few countries
were willing to accept MeK members as refugees. In any case, its cult-like leadership
prevented many of them from leaving. In private conversations in late 2008, Maliki had
assured MNF-I leaders that his government would not forcibly deport MeK members to
Iran. However, other Iraqi officials had told U.S. counterparts that the Iraqi Government
would require Camp Ashraf residents to return to Iran or move to a third country and
would deal with any MeK political activities through the Iraqi judicial system.103 MNF-I
and the U.S. Embassy were caught between their obligation to protect the MeK under
international law and the requirement eventually to cede control of Camp Ashraf to the
sovereign Iraqi Government. Turning the MeK camp over to Iraqi control appeared to
U.S. officials to be certain to doom the residents to abuses or to forced repatriation to Iran,
where death sentences awaited many of them.
As June 30, 2009, approached, it appeared that elements of the Iraqi Government
intended to expel MeK from Camp Ashraf, which U.S. troops had turned over to Iraqi
control. Fearing the MeK members would seek asylum in Europe and escape prosecution,
the Iranian regime increased pressure on Maliki to extradite them.104 In response, Iraqi
leaders planned to conduct a census of the camp and issue arrest warrants for MeK leaders—a move with international implications.105 On February 20, the Iraqi Government
assumed full authority over Camp Ashraf, with U.S. forces providing overwatch from
nearby Forward Operating Base Grizzly. Shortly after assuming control, Iraqi officials
initiated their census of the Camp Ashraf population, though they refrained from executing arrest warrants.106 During the following weeks, Iranian pressure became more evident. On February 25, an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entered Iraqi airspace
and overflew the Camp Ashraf area, nearly 129 kilometers from the Iranian border, for
more than an hour before U.S. troops shot it down.107 Days later, in a meeting with President Talabani, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei demanded “the implementation
of our agreement regarding the expulsion of the [MeK] hypocrites.” Talabani reportedly
replied that the Iraqi Government would expel the group.108 During a trip to Iran during
the same period, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie announced that the
camp would close within 2 months.109
In a public relations move during mid-March, the MeK claimed Iraqi troops had beaten
its members when entering the camp in an attempt to expel some of them.110 Meanwhile,
the Iranian regime continued to accuse the United States of training the MeK to conduct
operations in Iran, an accusation perhaps meant to justify the Iranians’ own surrogate
activities in Iraq.111 Tensions over MeK and Camp Ashraf would continue through the
spring and summer, with no resolution in sight.
LEAVING THE CITIES
The Departure From Baghdad
By June 2009, U.S. troops already had left most Iraqi cities. Among the urban centers
that still had U.S. garrisons, MNF-I leaders found Mosul to be the most worrisome, given
the continuing presence of AQI. The most complicated and largest withdrawal, however,
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would take place in Baghdad, where, by the end of the surge, U.S. troops maintained
more than 80 forward operating bases, combat outposts, and joint security stations. These
would have to be reduced to one-sixth that number by June 30.

General Abud Qanbar Hashim al-Maliki (left). Source: DoD photo by
Sergeant Travis Zielinski (Released).

Major General Daniel Bolger, Commander of MND-B, Greets General Abud Qanbar
Hashim al-Maliki, CG, Baghdad Operations Command (BOC).112
U.S. units required several months to prepare for the departure from the city. In February, when Bolger’s 1st Cavalry Division succeeded Hammond’s 4th Infantry Division
as MND-B, the division controlled 6 BCTs and 35,000 troops across its area of operations.
Several of the BCTs were still based within the city on large urban forward operating
bases such as Loyalty, Rustamiyah, and Justice. To move out on schedule without disrupting Baghdad’s security, Bolger decided to shift his units into “belt posture.”113 MNDB’s brigades and battalions would move their command posts and support bases to the
belts outside the city while shrinking their presence inside it. From their new bases in
the belts, MND-B’s units would remain close enough to respond to ISF requests for help
if necessary. As Bolger put it, after June 30, the division would focus on securing the
“doughnut” around Baghdad and would leave the ISF to secure “the hole in the doughnut”—the city itself.114 The approach amounted to a return to the operating posture that
MND-B had taken in 2005-2006, with U.S. units distancing themselves from populated
areas and consolidating on large bases on the outskirts of the city.
Combined operations and planning continued despite the shift. After June 30, U.S.
units still partnered with Iraqi brigades and divisions, and maintained an extensive advisory presence in Baghdad. However, there were no unilateral U.S. operations. In anticipation of the day when Iraqi units would plan and lead their own operations in the city,
some U.S. units began merging their operations centers with those of their Iraqi partners.
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Colonel Joseph Martin’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, for example, relocated its command post inside the west Baghdad headquarters of the Iraqi 6th Division, the brigade’s
partner unit.115 Elsewhere in Baghdad, Bolger and MND-B agreed with their Iraqi counterparts to maintain a U.S. presence at key joint security stations (JSS) across the city. The
process of selecting which stations would remain in operation proved difficult. Bolger
urged General Qanbar and his BOC to keep 17 of Baghdad’s 55 joint security stations
open, but Qanbar and the BOC agreed only to 14. To Bolger’s disappointment, the BOC
insisted on closing three joint security stations in sensitive Shi’a-majority neighborhoods,
including JSS Sadr City—the outpost that U.S. troops had fought hard to create during
the campaign against Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2008. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Government agreed
that after June 30, 1,000 U.S. troops would remain as advisors at the 14 remaining urban
JSS.116
By mid-June, U.S. units were making their final moves out of Baghdad and other
cities. The operations against AQI in Diyala and Ninawa had ended, and U.S. troops had
turned over their final base in Mosul.117 To reduce the visible presence of U.S. troops in
the Baghdad area and reinforce Iraqis’ perception that MND-B was leaving the city as the
U.S.-Iraq security agreement required, Bolger ordered his units to move to reverse cycle
operations, making routine movements such as logistical resupply convoys only during
nighttime hours.118
Militant groups marked the approaching withdrawal deadline with significant attacks
that were likely meant to assert that the U.S. withdrawal amounted to an insurgent victory. On June 24, a massive car bomb in Sadr City killed 69 Iraqis and wounded more
than 100 in an all-too-familiar scene in the Shi’a slum neighborhood. On June 28, troops
from the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, were traveling near Sadr City when their convoy was
hit by a series of EFPs, severing both legs of battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel
Timothy Karcher. Immediately after evacuating their commander to the military hospital
in the Green Zone, Karcher’s men suffered another EFP attack that killed Sergeant Timothy David.119 David was the last U.S. Soldier killed in Baghdad ahead of the withdrawal.
On July 1, MND-B, which at its peak during the surge had controlled 9 U.S. brigades, now
commanded 4 brigades and 20,000 U.S. Soldiers, and the Iraqi capital was without U.S.
operating units for the first time since April 2003.
***
The days immediately following the withdrawal from the cities were calm, but there
were some warning signs. Although the U.S.-Iraqi committees had worked out detailed
coordination guidelines for how U.S. forces would function after June 30, Iraqi officials in
Baghdad initially refused to allow American troops to provide security for U.S.-funded
governance and economic development projects. This decision delayed some key projects for several weeks. Although the Iraqi Government eventually reversed this decision,
there was a sharp drop-off in U.S.-ISF combined patrols in July. Senior U.S. commanders worried the decline in combined operational tempo would allow militant groups
to become active again.120 The new requirement for a warrant from an Iraqi judge for
all counterterrorism raids also constrained U.S. military operations at first, although
Bolger and MND-B later realized that, because Iraqi courts had very broad jurisdiction,
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a cooperative judge in Baghdad could authorize raids “practically unlimited in time or
space.”121 Judicial warrants for military operations proved awkward for U.S. units. As
Bolger later described, “War is not police work, and the entire idea of searching for terrorists with a warrant sure seemed to mix the two.”122
In their first days of planning and executing operations on their own, ISF commanders
impressed MNF-I leaders by completing complex security missions in Anbar and central
Iraq. In one instance, the Interior Ministry was able to coordinate multiple ISF agencies
during a targeted counterterrorism raid near Rutbah.123 In another, the ISF managed to
plan and provide security for 2 million pilgrims traveling to the Kadhimiyah shrine in
northwest Baghdad.124 In mid-July, Odierno reported that coordination among the Iraqi
Army, Interior Ministry, and Sons of Iraq in Anbar had enabled the Iraqis to respond to
car-bomb attacks and increase the frequency of patrols and searches.125
Yet, there were a few ominous signs of what some ISF leaders intended to do with
their new autonomy. In late July, Iraqi Army and police forces carried out an operation
at the MeK compound at Camp Ashraf that turned deadly. The Maliki government had
deployed police to the MeK compound, but its residents blocked the camp entrance and
initiated a standoff. On July 28, Iraqi police and army forces forced the issue, using bulldozers and tanks to break through the gates and enter the compound to establish a police
station there.126 To the Iraqi troops’ surprise, MeK members blocked the Iraqi vehicles’
advance with their bodies. The ensuing violence left 9 dead and more than 200 wounded
before the Iraqi troops halted their attempt.127 In Odierno’s view, the Iraqi Government
had overestimated its forces’ capabilities, while the MeK had miscalculated that the Iraqis
would refrain from using force.128
Meanwhile, a series of events in Mosul indicated that as Generals Karim and Caslen
had feared, AQI was taking advantage of the U.S. forces’ absence in the city to pressure
the ISF leaders who were now responsible for Ninawa’s security. In a 6-day period in
early July alone, AQI carried out seven attacks against ISF leaders in the city, prompting
Odierno to warn that the group was repeating the tactics that had “effectively broke[n]
the IA and IP [Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police]” in Mosul in 2004 and 2006.129 In the weeks to
come, AQI would exploit the coalition’s departure from the cities by launching an offensive not just in Mosul, but also in Baghdad, where AQI bombers would carry out some of
the war’s largest attacks at the very edge of the Green Zone.
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CHAPTER 13
TOWARD THE DEFEAT OF AQI, AUGUST 2009-JULY 2010
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other leaders hailed Multi-National Force-Iraq’s
(MNF-I) June 30, 2009, withdrawal from Iraqi cities as a significant Iraqi achievement.
However, with U.S. troops leaving the population centers, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
other insurgent groups tried to show that the government could not secure Iraq’s cities
on its own. Although it had lost the ability to operate openly and hold territory, AQI
lashed out in late 2009 in a series of attacks in Baghdad that shook the Maliki government.
In the months that followed, MNF-I and the Iraqi Government fought back and
regained ground lost to AQI. Together, they mounted operations that dealt the group a
near-fatal blow in spring 2010. They did so against a difficult backdrop of changing U.S.
strategic guidance, the Arab-Kurdish political conflict, a protracted Iraqi election crisis,
and a creeping consolidation of power by Maliki. These factors combined to dim hopes
for Iraq’s future stability.
THE AUTUMN 2009 BOMBINGS
AQI Shifts its Strategy
As MNF-I planned its move away from Iraqi cities during 2009, its leaders expected
that AQI would intensify its attacks to discredit the Iraqi security forces. Even ahead
of the June 30 withdrawal deadline, MNF-I believed that AQI was shifting its strategy.
Under constant pressure from both coalition brigade combat teams (BCTs) and special
operations forces, and having lost much of its popular support, AQI refocused its attacks
on MNF-I and Iraqi Government targets to avoid civilian casualties.
AQI’s capacity had plummeted from its high during 2006-2007, when the organization had controlled large swaths of northern and central Iraq and seemed on its way to
creating a bona fide “Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).” By mid-July 2009, MNF-I estimated that
the combined strength of all Sunni Arab resistance groups in the country, including AQI,
had fallen to between 1,450 and 3,550 fighters, too few to operate as an insurgent army.1
Likewise, across the country, the number of security incidents hovered around 200 per
week, a rate consistent with summer 2003 levels.2
Only in Ninawa Province could AQI carry out a high rate of attacks and infiltrate Iraqi
Government ranks to strike from within those ranks. During the winter of 2008-2009,
AQI operatives and their contacts within the Iraqi Army and National Police carried out
several insider or “green on blue” attacks against U.S. military detachments in the Mosul
area. The attackers usually were Iraqi security force (ISF) members recruited or coerced
by AQI or other insurgents, and they principally targeted coalition advisers embedded
in ISF units. One such attack in February 2009 killed members of a U.S. police transition
team in Mosul and proved that AQI and other groups continued to be able to penetrate
the Mosul police force.3
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The Mosul police themselves were hit even harder as violent incidents nearly doubled
after the coalition’s departure from the city. In the first week after the withdrawal of U.S.
combat units, AQI and its allies carried out seven assassination attempts against senior
ISF leaders in Mosul. During the first 6 weeks after the withdrawal, they killed at least
68 policemen in the Mosul area.4 General Raymond T. Odierno reported to Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates that the intensified pressure against Mosul’s security
forces resembled the insurgent campaigns that had led to the collapse of the city’s police
force in 2004.5 A shortage of more than 5,000 policemen and 1,300 investigating officers
in the undermanned Ninawa police force made the situation worse.6
Despite its continued activities against the ISF in Mosul, AQI suffered serious setbacks in far northern Iraq. It faced constant pressure from the extensive system created
to target the group’s foreign fighter networks. For almost 6 years, AQI and its allies had
been reinforced by Salafi militants from throughout the Arab world, most entering via
Syria. During 2009, that system broke down as the United States and other countries
made a concerted effort to disrupt them.
While the group facilitating the flow of foreign fighters had regenerated somewhat
in early 2009, it had never fully recovered from the 2008 raid that killed Abu Ghadiyah.
On the heels of the loss of Abu Ghadiyah, the network suffered another blow when Lebanese authorities arrested a major Kuwaiti AQI facilitator with the nom de guerre “Al
Hajj.”7 By mid-2009, Abu Khalaf, Abu Ghadiyah’s successor, fled Syria under pressure
from Bashar al-Assad’s security forces, relocating into the Iraqi border area.8 Within Iraq,
MNF-I had begun shifting some coalition troops to the Syrian border zones as coalition
units left the cities in late spring, a move that MNF-I judged had reduced the foreign
fighter flow even further, to an estimated rate of only five per month.9 The wider network
of AQI’s Salafi militant allies suffered another setback in July when coalition special operations forces (SOF) and Iraqi troops captured four top leaders of Ansar al Islam during a
24-hour period in Mosul, including Mullah Halgurd, a Kurdish militant who served as
the group’s deputy leader.10
Since late 2008, the coalition had sought to limit AQI’s local financing in Ninawa.
For several years before 2009, AQI had extorted large sums of money from the AsiaCell
phone company, Iraq’s second-largest mobile phone provider. However, when AsiaCell
stopped payments in mid-2009, AQI blew up three of the company’s cell towers and
attacked the company’s headquarters building in Baghdad.11 Ninawa Governor Atheel
Nujaifi also asked for coalition help to rein in corruption within his provincial government, which he believed was providing cash to AQI. Multi-National Division-North
(MND-N) responded by forming a joint interagency task force in Mosul to address both
government corruption and AQI financing.12
These and other initiatives against AQI made it nearly impossible for the group to
operate openly. Reviewing AQI’s mid-2009 operations, Odierno noted that the organization had reverted to its earlier terrorist tactics. Where it once had been able to control terrain and carry out a wide variety of attacks that included improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and complex ambushes, pressure now limited the group to high-profile bombings
about once every 3 weeks—a 70 percent reduction since the dark days of 2007-2008. On
July 6, Odierno fatefully predicted to his staff that AQI would increasingly have to rely
on high-profile car bombings.13
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“Bloody Wednesday,” August 19, 2009
Odierno’s prediction came true the following month as AQI began a string of bombings in Baghdad that were among the deadliest of the entire war. On the morning of
August 19, two large truck bombs struck Iraq’s Finance Ministry and Foreign Ministry
just a few minutes apart. The bombs devastated the buildings as well as the lines of
employee cars queued to enter the ministry compounds for the start of the workday. Two
more blasts followed in commercial districts elsewhere in the city. The day’s final death
toll listed 75 killed with another 749 injured.14
The bombings stunned the Iraqi population and the government, which had seen
Baghdad settle in a relatively safe pattern after the summer 2008 end of the Sadrist uprising. The attacks also undermined the Maliki government’s assertion that the ISF could
secure Iraq’s cities after the departure of coalition troops. Under intense public scrutiny,
Prime Minister Maliki immediately blamed the Syrian regime and Syrian-based “Saddam
loyalists.” The Prime Minister had visited Damascus only 1 day before the bombings
expressly to reestablish Iraq-Syria relations after a long rupture, but in the wake of the
bombings, he broke off relations once again. Within days, the Iraqi Interior Ministry
began to arrest suspects associated with the Ba’ath Party. On August 23, the government
broadcast a confession by one suspect who said that he acted under orders from Iraqi
Ba’athists in Syria, after which Iraq expelled the Syrian ambassador in Baghdad, an act
that the Syrian regime reciprocated in Damascus.15 Maliki also declared that Iraq would
not participate in the nascent trilateral talks on counterterrorism and border security by
the United States, Iraq, and Syria.
Despite the Iraqi Government’s insistence on Syrian involvement, MNF-I saw no evidence that anyone other than AQI had planned and executed the August 19 bombings.
For Odierno and other coalition leaders, the main failing had been the lax security measures of a complacent ISF, a factor that MNF-I leaders had been concerned about since
beginning the transition out of the cities in the spring. “[O]ur joint, interagency assessment is that AQI is responsible for the bombings. We have no evidence directly linking
any foreign entities,” Odierno reported in early September.16 Nevertheless, Odierno signaled his support for the international pressure Maliki was putting on Syria, given the
Assad regime’s long-standing support for AQI facilitators.17
As conflict with the Assad regime intensified, the Iraqi Government took steps to
address some of its security problems. Eleven ISF commanders were arrested for negligence in allowing the August attacks and Iraqi police and Army units were placed on
alert, with all leave canceled. The operational pace of coalition special operations forces
units returned to pre-June 30 levels, indicating that the Iraqi Government was willing to
drop many of its reservations about coalition counterterrorism raids.18 This showed quick
results: by late September, AQI had compartmentalized its operations, tasking individuals rather than cells, a security measure that made complex operations more difficult.19
Within MNF-I, coalition leaders hoped the bombings had been a “wakeup call” or an
“Iraqi 9/11” for ISF leaders who underestimated the continuing terrorist threat.20
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The October 25th Bombings
Within weeks, further attacks in Baghdad proved these speculations premature. On
October 25, AQI operatives based in the western Baghdad belt struck the Ministry of
Justice and the nearby Ministry of Public Works in two coordinated vehicle bombings.
The attacks caused more than 800 casualties, a higher toll than the August 19 attacks, and
showed that the increased security measures were insufficient.
AQI’s political front, the ISI, immediately claimed responsibility in an online statement declaring that “suicide bombers targeted the dens of infidelity and pillars of the
rejectionist Shi’ite state in the land of the caliphate.”21 Nevertheless, as he had done in
August, Maliki again blamed the Syria-based Iraqi Ba’ath for the bombings. The continued difference of opinion between U.S. commanders and Maliki was significant. U.S.
leaders insisted the Iraqi Government still faced an AQI problem and should not have
relaxed internal security measures. Maliki claimed the security problem originated outside Iraq, and that the coalition forces drew violence to the Iraqi cities by their presence.
The October 25 attack showed that AQI had made inroads in the western belt between
Baghdad and Anbar, including the former AQI safe havens near Lake Tharthar. “It is clear
to me that AQI is trying to reestablish itself along the seam between Anbar and Baghdad
provinces,” Odierno had written in mid-September. A few weeks later MNF-I had noted
that AQI high-profile bombings in eastern Anbar were damaging the credibility of the
ISF and the provincial government.22 A Mercedes bus used as a vehicle bomb on October
25 resembled a similar bomb found 2 weeks before in an AQI car-bomb factory in Abu
Ghraib, just west of Baghdad. In response, MNF-I and Iraqi troops increased their patrols
in the “seam” area to an average of 27 per day by the beginning of November.23 MNF-I
found that the October 25 suicide bombers had probably been detainees in either the U.S.
or Iraqi systems, leading Odierno to halt all releases of AQI-affiliated prisoners and slow
down transfers of MNF-I’s remaining 7,000 detainees to Iraqi Government custody.24
In Baghdad itself, the October 25 bombing led to tighter ISF physical security measures, especially regarding traffic congestion which the attackers had used to move
through the city undetected.25 The bombings showed that the Iraqi security forces relied
on fake bomb detection wands that soldiers and police uselessly waved around vehicles
at checkpoints—phony equipment a British businessman had sold to Baghdad for tens of
millions of dollars with the collusion of corrupt Iraqi officials.
Beyond the security shortfalls in Baghdad and eastern Anbar, broader dynamics
made central Iraq less secure than it had been since late 2007. The initial transfer of the
Sons of Iraq to Iraqi Government payrolls had gone relatively smoothly in late 2008 and
early 2009. Within 6 months, however, the government had become chronically late
paying the Sunni militias and had begun arresting their leaders, rounding up 25 from
July to September 2009.26 Much of the government’s hostility stemmed directly from
Prime Minister Maliki, who “considered some of these Sons of Iraq groups to be nothing
more than terrorists who were now getting paid for operating checkpoints,” according
to Ambassador Christopher Hill.27 By fall 2009, Odierno was deeply concerned that the
Iraqi Government’s failure to embrace the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq was creating
an opening for AQI.28 AQI’s attempted resurgence took place in the cyber realm as well.
Though it enjoyed less popular support than ever inside Iraq, the group continued to use
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its sophisticated media outlets to broadcast propaganda throughout the region, claiming
to be regaining its former strength. The coalition’s seeming inability to counter AQI and
ISI propaganda—as well as that from Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi and Shi’a
militant groups—frustrated MNF-I leaders, who had sought but not received authority
to shut down AQI-affiliated media outlets.29
The December 8th Bombings
Despite the Iraqi Government’s tighter security measures, the MNF-I J-2 predicted
in mid-November that another major attack was likely to occur around December 15.30
The estimate would prove to be prescient. On December 8, suicide car bombers targeted
the Ministry of Finance, a major Iraqi courthouse, and a busy overpass near the Ministry
of Labor. AQI immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks that killed 50 Iraqis
and wounded more than 200.31 The combined ISF-coalition response to the attacks was
quicker and more thorough than in August and October, when the ISF had waited to ask
for coalition help. Coalition technicians determined that the same bombing ring had carried out the October and December attacks.32
The attacks did less damage than the earlier ones mainly because of the ISF’s improved
operational procedures, but evidence that AQI could still penetrate into the heart of Baghdad shook public confidence in the Maliki government. The day after the bombings, the
Iraqi Parliament summoned the Prime Minister to an unprecedented 6-hour, closed-door
session to grill him on his handling of Iraq’s security. Partly to deflect blame from himself
and avoid a no-confidence vote, Maliki sacked General Abud Qanbar, the long-time head
of the Baghdad Operations Command.33
According to Gates, the December 8 bombings showed that AQI was “down, but not
out.”34 Two weeks after the attacks, MNF-I reported that some Iraqi civil servants had
stopped going to work in the ministries out of fear.35 With national elections just weeks
away, Iraqi politicians responded by exchanging accusations of blame, including Maliki.
In the days after the attacks, the Prime Minister asserted that the bombings had been the
work of AQI sympathizers who had infiltrated the ISF, an allegation that MNF-I leaders warned Maliki would reinforce Iraqis’ doubts about the ISF’s ability to protect the
population.36
THE “RESPONSIBLE DRAWDOWN”
Despite the AQI offensive, the March 2010 national elections had the potential to produce a national unity government that could help heal Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divisions
and further eclipse Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a militant groups. As a result, U.S. commanders
believed that 2010 would see U.S. forces complete the transition to stability operations. It
would also be a year of troop reductions. Given President Barack Obama’s instructions
to end the U.S. combat mission by September 2010, U.S. forces would have to conduct a
“responsible drawdown,” as the President termed it, from about 100,000 U.S. troops to
50,000 by the end of August.
With U.S. units withdrawing from Iraq’s cities and shifting to stability operations,
Odierno adjusted the joint campaign plan that had governed the coalition’s military and
civil activities. In fall 2009, he enlisted a team of experts led by General (Ret.) Leon LaPorte
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to examine the strategic situation in the country and recommend changes. The Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team (JCPAT) viewed a renewed civil war as more likely than
a return to large-scale insurgency, and recommended that the command concentrate on
preventing civil war. LaPorte’s team also suggested lowering the Iraqi expectation for
continued U.S. military presence and assistance, noting, “Iraqis do not seem to accept
that there will be a major decline in U.S. presence starting in summer 2010.”37 Finally, the
JCPAT noted a disconnect between MNF-I’s conditions-based approach to the impending troop drawdown and the time-based guidance Obama had given earlier in the year
and urged the command to adapt to the political deadlines.38
The JCPAT’s conclusions matched a September 2009 internal strategic risk survey that
asked dozens of senior MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and U.S. Embassy
leaders to identify the most significant risks to U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Two emerged:
the danger of an Arab-Kurd war, and the unwillingness or inability of the Iraqi Government to “balance” against “malign Iranian influence.” The officials surveyed also
identified sectarianism, a lack of economic development, and ineffective governance as
obstacles to stability.
With these recommendations and risks in mind, Odierno decided that U.S. troops
should shift from full-spectrum operations to stabilization operations. As U.S. troops withdrew, MNF-I and MNC-I would transfer their activities to the Iraqis and U.S. Embassy. To
manage their much-reduced forces, MNF-I and its many subordinate commands would
consolidate into one headquarters, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), at the beginning of 2010. The
new USF-I would no longer be a coalition command since other nations had pulled their
forces out of Iraq in 2009, with the exception of small contingents assigned to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Iraq.
The new campaign plan, published November 15, 2009, codified these changes,
which were further detailed in a new operations order, OPORD 10-1, released January
1, 2010. The order laid out how the future USF-I would shift to stability operations while
simultaneously drawing down to a “transition force” by August 30, 2010, the date set
by Obama for the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. The order also directed USF-I’s
subordinate units to focus on three major tasks for 2010: the “responsible drawdown
of forces” to fewer than 50,000 troops by the end of August; support for the conduct of
the March 2010 Parliamentary elections; and the August 2010 transition from Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN, in which new Advise and Assist Brigades
(AABs) would replace the combat brigades that had been deploying to Iraq since 2003.39
After August 2010, the command would continue to perform counterterrorism operations, but the vast majority of its forces would focus on developing Iraqi Government and
security force capacity while completing a full “responsible redeployment” no later than
December 31, 2011, as stipulated in the 2008 Security Agreement. OPORD 10-1’s “end
state” envisioned “an increasingly competent and capable GoI [Government of Iraq], an
ISF capable of maintaining internal security and . . . a foundation for a lasting U.S.-Iraq
security partnership.”40
To oversee the new mission, Odierno reorganized his headquarters for the remainder
of the campaign, merging the three previously independent operational headquarters
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into a single command. MNC-I and MNF-I merged and the Multi-National Security
Transition Command (MNSTC-I) became an Advise and Train directorate within the
new amalgamated headquarters. In the new structure, Odierno would have three deputy
commanders: one each for Advise and Train, Operations, and Support. These changes
shrank the size of the operational headquarters elements to 2,200 personnel by spring
2010, very different from the 7,000-strong headquarters of the surge era.41
Beyond Odierno’s headquarters, MNF-I’s four multinational divisions shifted to
three U.S. divisions—north, center, and south—each with two AABs augmented with
dozens of senior officers and noncommissioned officers to embed with partner ISF units.
OPORD 10-1 envisioned a “transition force” of just more than 53,000, divided between
about 12,000 troops and enablers at the USF-I level; about 18,000 troops and enablers at
the division and theater levels; and about 23,000 troops in the AABs.42 Geographically,
Major General Anthony Cucolo’s 3d Infantry Division was responsible for northern Iraq,
Major General Terry Wolff’s 1st Armor Division focused on Baghdad and Anbar, and
Major General Vincent Brooks’s 1st Infantry Division covered all of southern Iraq. This
transition force was in far fewer locations than in previous years. From a peak of 495
bases and installations at the height of the surge, MNF-I had reduced its presence to just
281 bases by the publication of the new campaign plan on November 15, and decreased
to fewer than 100 by September 2010. The closure of almost 400 bases and installations in
a space of about 2 years proved a vast logistical undertaking, requiring a significant share
of MNF-I/USF-I’s manpower and planning capacity. As the bases closed, USF-I reduced
the large population of support contractors from a high of approximately 160,000 in 2008
to fewer than 60,000 by late 2010.43
Not all of the senior leaders in Baghdad were completely satisfied with the new
campaign plan and OPORD 10-1. USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Operations
Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby had misgivings about the timing of the headquarters
consolidation given the 2010 election season, the drawdown of brigades, and ongoing
security operations in areas such as Ninawa. Jacoby believed these activities still required
a separate corps headquarters to manage. “We should have gotten to 50,000 and gotten
steady before [reorganizing],” Jacoby said later. “Trying to [shift to stability operations]
in the middle of the election . . . where we were trying to get Iraqi units positioned to
replace U.S. units as we were moving chess pieces off the battlefield at a quicker and
quicker pace, was an operationally flawed concept.”44
For Odierno, the changes in the Joint Campaign Plan and OPORD 10-1 were part of the
inevitable U.S. exit from Iraq. He believed the U.S. campaign had always been destined to
end by handing off security responsibilities to the Iraqi Government and its forces, but he
also understood that the earlier transition plan of 2005-2006 was attempted too soon. Surveying the situation in late 2009, Odierno believed that the conditions for a resumption
of the transition plan were now present, with a greatly expanded ISF deployed across the
country and the Iraqi political groups competing far less through violence than through
elections and the government structures.45 If the political progress could continue, then
USF-I could accept the risk involved in drawing down by almost 50 percent to the transition force level of 53,000, Odierno judged.
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Iraqi Security Forces Shortfalls and Competition With Afghanistan
There were risks to the new campaign plan. The continued development of the ISF
was not a sure thing. For U.S. forces to depart without a return of violence and instability
the ISF had to improve its operational capabilities and expand its geographic coverage
while the Iraqi Government took over full responsibility for funding it. By late 2009, the
government’s budget was in crisis. The recession of 2008 and the accompanying drop
in oil prices had created a significant funding shortfall. The Iraqi cabinet responded by
cutting the ISF development budget to half of what was required to produce what USF-I
considered the “minimum essential capability.”46
The financial problems came at a particularly bad time. USF-I had assumed the oilrich Iraqi Government would be able to pay for the many costly capabilities needed for
the country to defend itself without U.S. troops. The slashing of the defense budget risked
the building of an air defense capability and the creation of an Iraqi Air Force. Accordingly, Odierno asked the Pentagon for $3.5 billion in security assistance to make up the
difference. The cash-strapped Pentagon resisted until Odierno warned the Joint Chiefs
that the shortfall threatened the President’s withdrawal timeline.47
The budget crunch was not the only problem. By this point, Afghanistan had become
a higher priority than Iraq for the U.S. Government. When the President ordered the
drawdown of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq, Odierno advised that the mission could be
accomplished with fewer combat troops. However, the scarce “enablers”—combat support systems such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and special operations forces—would need to remain in larger numbers through 2011 so that the combat
units would not lose situational awareness, mobility, and force protection. Odierno also
believed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the congressionally sponsored Iraqi Security Forces Fund would become more important as U.S. units
left.48 Throughout 2009, the U.S. commands in Iraq found themselves competing with
Afghanistan for enablers and funds at every level.
Early in 2009, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General David H.
Petraeus had reapportioned 40 percent of the Iraq theater’s ISR to Afghanistan, a decision
that Odierno believed introduced unnecessary risk to the Iraq mission. Petraeus believed
himself under pressure from senior U.S. leaders to shift assets to Afghanistan, which
the President concluded had long been under-resourced. This pressure mounted after
the President announced on December 1, 2009, that the United States would send an
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an 18-month “surge.” The decision pushed
Petraeus to accelerate the movement of forces into Afghanistan through the U.S. logistics
network in the Middle East, a change in priorities for ports, shipping, and air bases that
restricted the flow of resources into Iraq.49
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Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Alexander Snyder (Released).

Soldiers Load a C-130 Aircraft at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Bound for Bagram Air Base,
Afghanistan.50
OPORD 10-1, USF-I’s plan for a transition force of 53,000 after August 2010, did not
reflect Obama’s intent to leave a “residual force” of between 35,000 and 50,000 in Iraq.
The troop level that MNF-I leaders considered a minimal “floor” exceeded the White
House’s “ceiling” by 18,000. Odierno did not resist making Afghanistan the main U.S.
effort, but he bristled at the idea that additional resources for Afghanistan should come
from Iraq rather than from other theaters.51 Illustrating Odierno’s point, the last Marine
command left Anbar in January 2010, handing over responsibility for the province to the
1st Armored Division. After 6 years in western Iraq, where they had done some of their
hardest fighting since World War II, the Marines shifted to Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. Thereafter, U.S. ground operations in Iraq would fall solely to the U.S. Army.

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Daniel Schneider (Released).

Marines Case the Colors of II Marine Expeditionary Force During a Ceremony
Marking the End of the Marines’ Presence in Anbar Province.52
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The war in Afghanistan also put considerable pressure on the special operations elements in Iraq. While the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) effort
in Iraq remained unchanged, in 2009 the special operations task force shifted its main
effort to Afghanistan. In July, the Ranger elements from the task force departed Iraq,
handing other joint SOF elements responsibility for countering malign Iranian influence.
The next month, the joint task force shifted its forward headquarters to Afghanistan,
leaving a smaller command and control element in Iraq.
Tension in U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Baghdad
The ISF budget shortfall and downgrading of the Iraq theater’s importance in U.S.
strategy came as USF-I and other DoD elements worked to implement the President’s
instructions to hand “lead agency responsibility” to the State Department by September
2010. USF-I leaders identified more than 1,000 functions and missions the U.S. Embassy
would need to take over in 2010 and 2011. But MNF-I representatives learned that their
U.S. Embassy counterparts did not intend to continue some of what USF-I considered
to be core U.S. military functions in the country. For example, the State Department and
other civilian agencies were not equipped to train the Iraqi Army and police in the way
the U.S. military had done since 2005. The very different capabilities of USF-I and the U.S.
Embassy led many senior USF-I leaders to believe the State Department would discontinue—or fumble—many mission-essential tasks once U.S. troops left.
The departure of Ambassador Ryan Crocker in mid-2009 struck a blow to U.S. military and U.S. Embassy relations and made the handover of responsibility more difficult.
The close rapport Odierno and his command enjoyed with Crocker ended when Ambassador Chris Hill arrived in 2009 with what he believed was a Presidential mandate to
“civilianize” the U.S. presence in Iraq and to make the Baghdad Embassy a “normal” U.S.
diplomatic mission in which the ambassador was the President’s personal representative
with final authority over all operations in the country.53

Source: DoD photo courtesy Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq (Released).

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher R. Hill With Iraqi Policemen
in Qadisiyah Province.54
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Hill’s desire to assert embassy control over military activities led to considerable tension. After his first embassy briefing, a joint meeting with MNF-I and Iraqi governors,
Hill fumed at what he perceived to be the Embassy’s subordination to its military counterparts. He asked his staff “whether this was how briefings had always been conducted,
with the commanding general handling 95 percent of it while the ambassador sat like a
bobble head doll, nodding his approval.”55 Afterward, he declared that he would lead
future meetings, which would be attended by equal numbers of soldiers and diplomats.
Hill also reduced the civil-military working groups and asserted embassy authority over
security and administrative functions but later blamed his uniformed counterparts for
any friction. “[T]he military really had some trouble letting go,” he said, because “the
military and its camp followers were used to running everything in Iraq.”56
In addition to differing views on the civil-military relationship, Hill and the U.S. military commanders had differing conceptions of the Iraq conflict. Having just emerged
from the intense operations of the surge, U.S. military leaders regarded the relative stability of 2009 as fragile and dependent on continued security operations and political progress. Hill, by contrast, appeared to believe that Iraq had stabilized, and it was time for
the U.S. military to leave. He pushed back against Odierno’s idea of “drivers of conflict”
that needed to be addressed to consolidate security. Hill also believed the United States
should extricate itself from what he saw as Iraqi business. Toward this end, he began
withdrawing long-standing embassy participation in Iraqi Government security and economic functions, later commenting that he was “appalled by the idea that anyone but
Iraqis should be in attendance at an Iraqi national security meeting.”57 Hill also sought
to extricate the United States from a number of international issues in which MNF-I had
played a leading role, such as the complex matter of the Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK). The
ambassador and his embassy team considered the MeK issue to be a “constant irritant”
that should be left to the Iraqis or an international body such as the United Nations (UN),
and he prohibited U.S. negotiators from interacting with the group.58
These disagreements over strategy soon became clashes of personality. As top leaders
disagreed, relations became tense at lower levels as well. After 5 years of being housed
with MNF-I in the Republican Palace in Iraq’s Green Zone, the U.S. Embassy moved
to its immense new compound in early 2009. Once there, Hill’s staff gradually limited
MNF-I’s presence in the building, severing many of the day-to-day, civil-military working relationships that had existed since the days of the Coalition Provincial Authority
(CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). After half a decade of increasingly
close partnerships, the U.S. diplomats and military officials in Baghdad were returning
to the fractious civil-military relations that had developed between Ambassador Paul
Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. This deterioration would hamper the
U.S. mission in Iraq after 2009, when the country would enter a protracted political crisis
for which the U.S. military and diplomatic representatives in Baghdad would advocate
sharply different responses.
THE COMBINED SECURITY MECHANISM
One major political challenge of early 2010 was the continued Arab-Kurd conflict in
northern Iraq. Having ceded provincial power by their misguided boycott of the January
2005 provincial elections, the Sunnis of northern Iraq voted in large numbers in January
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2009 and won majorities or pluralities in Ninawa, Salahadin, and Diyala. Though the
Sunni vote represented an embrace of the political process and thus a political defeat for
AQI, it also precipitated a political struggle that threatened to spill over into violence and
destabilize the country through the last 3 years of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
The August 2008 confrontation between Arab troops and Kurdish peshmerga in
Khanaqin was just the first in a series of low-level standoffs. Upon assuming command
of MND-N in late 2008, Major General Robert Caslen concluded that “the peace dividend
of the surge was that the Iraqi Army now had the ability to focus on what had previously
been their adversary, the Kurds,” and that the central government in Baghdad was intent
on rolling back the Kurdistan Regional Government’s control of Kirkuk.59 “We quickly
found ourselves in the middle of an ethnic conflict,” Caslen recalled. “There were 12 separate times that there was a standoff between Kurds and Arabs with guns pointed at each
other . . . [and] American soldiers standing in between.”60
Kirkuk and Khanaqin were not the only flashpoints. In Ninawa Province, the Sunni
Hadba Gathering, a party running on an anti-Kurdish platform, won 19 of the provincial
council’s 37 seats in the January 2009 elections and promptly formed a provincial government under Atheel Nujaifi with greatly reduced Kurdish participation.61 In response,
Ninawa’s Kurdish leaders withdrew from their posts and refused to recognize Nujaifi
as governor.62 The situation came to a head in May 2009 when peshmerga forces prevented Nujaifi from traveling to Bashiqa, an oil-rich, Kurdish-administered district east
of Mosul.63 The governor turned back to Mosul before the situation escalated, claiming
Kurdish leaders had issued a “shoot to kill” order if he attempted to enter the town.
These continuing jurisdictional disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government
and its Arab counterparts caused ethnic strains all along the Green Line. By summer
2009, Odierno concluded that tension between Kurds and Arabs was the “No. 1 driver of
instability” in all of Iraq, creating a real threat of ethnic civil war.64

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Christopher Kozloski (Released).

Ninawa Provincial Governor Atheel Nujaifi Addresses Iraqi Police
Academy Graduates in Mosul.65
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Combined Checkpoints and the Golden Lions
One problem was that the Green Line was not an internal boundary, but a demilitarized zone, with peshmerga checkpoints set up to the north, Iraqi Army checkpoints
some distance to the south, and a seam of often populated territory between the two.
AQI and other insurgents used this seam to move with relative ease from the Syrian
border to Mosul, and as far east as Kirkuk.66 All along the Green Line, Sunni insurgent
groups exploited Arab-Kurd tensions and stoked ethnic conflict. In Taza, a majority Turkoman town of 20,000 just south of Kirkuk, an AQI car bomb in June 2009 killed 75 and
wounded 254, leaving locals convinced that AQI had targeted the quiet town to “ignite
the sectarian sedition in Iraq.”67 The attack was just one in a series of provocative bombings made possible by the absence of a security presence within the seam.
Doing away with this causeway of insurgent activity was not a simple matter of
maneuvering troops to establish a security presence. The U.S. forces that traditionally
acted as the neutral security presence for several years continued to drawdown throughout 2009, leaving MND-N without the troops or the time for peacekeeping. In an effort
to establish an effective security presence within the disputed area and build confidence
between Arabs and Kurds, Odierno formulated a tripartite peacekeeping arrangement
known as the Combined Security Mechanism. Odierno and other U.S. commanders recognized that the problem was political. “The problem was not that a Kurdish policeman
and an Iraqi soldier would necessarily go to guns on each other,” one U.S. brigade commander recalled. “It was because their leadership would.”68 The aim of the Combined
Security Mechanism was cooperation between militaries first, and then, in Odierno’s
words, “have the political stuff follow.”69 By October, the concept evolved into a series
of Combined Security Areas with checkpoints reporting to regional Combined Coordination Centers, all jointly manned by peshmerga, ISF, and U.S. troops.70 A committee
comprised of Jacoby, Iraqi Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan, and a senior Kurdish security
official pored over maps to plot the precise locations and boundaries of the security areas
and checkpoints. The meetings were complex, back-and-forth negotiations with U.S. officers mediating between the two Iraqi groups.71 “There were differences in things that
did not seem important to us but were important to them,” said one senior U.S. officer,
and U.S. officials found themselves “moving [checkpoints] sometimes only hundreds of
yards to make people happy.”72
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Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Matthew Leistikow (Released).

An Iraqi Federal Policeman, a U.S. Army Soldier, and a Kurdish Peshmerga Fighter,
Members of the Golden Lions Combined Security Force, on Patrol Near the
Green Line.73
The most innovative security mechanism was a Combined Security Force made up
of equal parts ISF, peshmerga, and U.S. troops who manned the combined checkpoints
and patrolled the security areas together. To bring the three forces together, MND-N set
up joint training schools for platoons of Iraqis, Kurds, and Americans.74 Each squad in
the combined platoons was ethnically mixed, with soldiers from all three armies eating,
sleeping, and training as a cohesive unit. To enforce the single unit identity further, the
mixed force was given the name “Golden Lions” and outfitted in distinctive uniforms
worn by both Kurds and Arabs.75 By summer 2010, the Golden Lions were performing
their mission throughout northern Iraq’s disputed territories, part of the first Arab-Kurd
peacekeeping mechanism along the Green Line in the country’s history.
Still, the combined checkpoints and Arab-Kurd units needed an accompanying political consensus to prevent ethnic conflict, as one incident in early 2010 illustrated. As
the combined checkpoints were erected along the Green Line in January 2010, Odierno
insisted that the peshmerga dismantle their unilateral checkpoints inside the disputed
internal boundaries areas.76 However, the new joint security architecture failed in its first
major test. On February 1, 2010, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninawa, Atheel Nujaifi, set
out from Mosul in a convoy of dozens of vehicles to visit the peshmerga-occupied eastern
districts of the province, but Kurdish leaders in Erbil deployed peshmerga and zerevani
(Kurdish police) to block Nujaifi’s way into the Kurdish-held districts.77 Kurds along the
route assaulted the governor’s convoy and briefly fired at Nujaifi’s vehicles. Nujaifi’s
entourage responded by arresting nine Kurds on the scene and jailing them in Mosul
on “terrorism” charges.78 The situation worsened when Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials, most likely acting on orders from KRG President Massoud Barzani,
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arrested eight Arabs, escalating the affair into a hostage exchange crisis.79 The situation
was finally resolved on February 22, when Deputy Prime Minister Rafe al-Issawi and U.S.
officials arranged the simultaneous release of the hostages from both sides.
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The episode showed the fragility of the peace along the Green Line where U.S. officials had been surprised by what Odierno termed “a complete breakdown within the
peshmerga forces in implementing the agreed-upon joint security architecture.”80 It also
showed that preventing civil war would not be easy, and that the United States played an
essential moderating role among the rival Iraqi political groups.81
THE EVISCERATION OF AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ, JANUARY-MAY 2010
The bombings of autumn 2009 had shown that AQI remained a potent threat despite
having lost almost all its territory during 2008-2009. The group also had succeeded in
sowing discord among the fractious political parties as they prepared for the Parliamentary elections of March 2010. However, within weeks of AQI’s final high-profile attacks
against the Iraqi ministries in Baghdad on December 8, 2009, USF-I, coalition SOF, and
the Iraqi security forces began a series of operations that would bring AQI closer to defeat
than at any point during the long Iraq War. The crushing of AQI in spring 2010 would
change the organization in unanticipated ways, greatly reducing its capacity to harm the
Iraqi population and interrupt the political process. The decimation of AQI would also
lay the groundwork for the terrorist group’s later evolution into the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIS).
Breaking the Bombing String
The autumn 2009 bombings had a significant impact on Iraqis, even though the last of
the three did far less damage than the rest. With Iraq’s March 7, 2010, Parliamentary elections just weeks away, USF-I leaders were concerned that AQI could disrupt the political process or perhaps thwart voting in some areas as it had done in 2005. Accordingly,
U.S. and Iraqi SOF focused on AQI in Mosul and other strongholds ahead of the voting.
Investigations of the autumn bombings had yielded a great deal of intelligence about
AQI’s structure and operations, so that USF-I analysts believed by January that they had
a clearer idea of AQI-ISI’s inner workings than at any other point in the Iraq War.82
This new understanding of AQI’s organization paid off on January 4, when U.S. and
Iraqi troops simultaneously struck 16 targets in Mosul, resulting in several high-profile
captures and the death of several more leaders, including AQI’s “Border Wali” who was
responsible for bringing foreign fighters into the north.83 The following week brought
another significant gain in Baghdad, where on January 12, U.S. and Iraqi SOF foiled a
fourth set of coordinated car bombings, breaking the string of massive attacks against
the Iraqi Government.84 Just 10 days later, on January 22, U.S. SOF conducted a raid that
killed Abu Khalaf, the senior AQI facilitator who had inherited Abu Ghadiyah’s Syria-based foreign fighter network after the latter’s death in October 2008. Though pressure
from the Syrian regime already had marginalized Abu Khalaf, his death still hurt AQI’s
Syria-based network.85
AQI’s setbacks in Mosul and on the border did not prevent the group from attacking
the Arba’een pilgrimage in early February, when AQI suicide bombers and IEDs killed
and wounded more than 500 of the several million pilgrims making their way to Karbala.
The January U.S.-Iraqi operations did appear to break AQI’s momentum in Baghdad
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after the carnage of the fall, and the biggest gains against the extremist group were still
to come.
The Wali of Baghdad
The Maliki government’s erroneous claim to have captured Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
in April 2009 harmed its credibility. Ironically, it proved the first step toward the devastation of AQI’s senior leaders the following year. Ahmad Khamis al-Majma’i, the AQI
detainee that Maliki’s forces mistakenly thought was Baghdadi was, in fact, one of the
AQI leader’s lieutenants who sometimes acted as Baghdadi’s stand-in.86 In the course of
his interrogations, Majma’i explained how Baghdadi and his organization moved and
operated to evade detection, information that allowed the Iraqi Government to begin
infiltrating AQI’s Baghdad networks.87
The first major payoff from Majma’i’s information was the capture of AQI’s so-called
wali (governor or guardian) of Baghdad, a Moscow-born, 35-year-old former Ba’athist
named Manaf al Rawi, whom the Iraqi Government believed had masterminded the
autumn bombings. After Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003, Rawi had been recruited by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and had fought in the first battle of Fallujah before being captured
by coalition troops in June 2004. Task Force 134, the command responsible for coalition
detention operations, had released him in November 2007, after which Zarqawi’s successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri integrated him back into AQI’s operational network, making
him head of AQI’s Baghdad operations by the end of 2008.88 On March 11, 2010, Iraqi
federal police arrested Rawi just 2 miles from Camp Victory, after which ISF interrogators held him for more than a week without informing USF-I.89 For an additional 2 weeks,
Iraqi officials did not allow USF-I access to Rawi, perhaps wary of sharing their detainee
after the embarrassing public disagreement with MNF-I leaders over the falsely identified Abu Omar al Baghdadi the year before. Prime Minister Maliki did not allow USF-I
officers to join Rawi’s interrogation until April 4, the same day a string of AQI car bombs
in Baghdad struck the Iranian, Egyptian, and German Embassies, with another bomb
defused at the French Embassy.90
As USF-I joined the questioning, Rawi gave his captors detailed and extensive information about himself, the AQI leadership network, and the group’s plans.91 According
to Rawi, AQI in Baghdad had been subdivided into three sectors, one encompassing
the east side of the city and two more covering the north and south halves of the west
side. The group’s internal communications were governed by security measures so strict
that Rawi and other AQI sub-leaders never personally met their superiors, but instead
received instructions only by courier or from ISI “minister of war” Abu Ayyub al-Masri—
an arrangement that left Rawi with wide latitude to plan and carry out operations in the
city as he saw fit.92
Among other plots, Rawi explained that Masri had entrusted him with the early planning of a major external operation ordered by AQI senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri—a
high profile attack against the 2010 FIFA World Cup games in South Africa.93 He also
revealed that AQI had hatched a plot to hijack aircraft and fly them into Iraq’s Shi’a
shrines to incite a sectarian war, as their former leader Zarqawi had intended by the
Samarra mosque bombing of 2006.94 The threat to the shrines prompted a rapid response
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from the Iraqi Government, for which such an attack would have spelled disaster. Government ministries scrambled to account for Iraqi planes and examine the backgrounds
of Iraqi pilots, while USF-I moved quickly to deploy an antiaircraft capability to Najaf
and other threatened areas.95 The plot against the shrines did not come to fruition, however, because AQI’s top leaders were about to meet their end.
The Elimination of AQI’s Senior Leadership
In addition to these plots, Rawi provided information that led directly to Masri and
Baghdadi. Along with Rawi’s lengthy confessions, which were later broadcast on Iraqi
and regional television, information released by disgruntled AQI members via social
media in 2013-2014 explained how Rawi’s capture eventually led to the evisceration of
almost the entire AQI/ISI leadership. Masri had instituted extreme operational security
measures in fall 2009 after the death of AQI operations chief Brigadier General Mohammed Nada al-Juburi (also known as al-Ra’i). Both Baghdadi and Masri had remained in a
static location, with the latter only communicating with Rawi by courier and then relying
on Rawi to disseminate his orders to the other provincial walis. Also actively involved
in the dissemination of Masri’s orders was Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i, (also known as
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Ibrahim al-Badri), the future ISIS caliph whose Baghdad home
served as the primary distribution point for AQI senior leaders’ correspondence.96
In an AQI organization whose leadership had been depleted by 6 years of rapid turnover, Masri had come to place great trust in Rawi due to the latter’s long jihadi pedigree
and experience, but this reliance would prove to be the AQI leader’s undoing. Operating on Rawi’s information, ISF troops captured the complete AQI records for Anbar
Province, which included orders from Masri to the AQI walis for Anbar and Ninawa to
supply Rawi with revenue, fighters, and suicide bombers. Taken at face value, the AQI
records showed that as much as 80 percent of AQI’s revenue in Ninawa was being sent to
Rawi to finance operations in Baghdad.97
The captured documents provided an operational and administrative picture so complete that, according to Prime Minister Maliki, gaining corroboration though detainee
interrogations was relatively easy. In effect, the same clandestine bureaucracy that had
served AQI so well in the past, enabling it to remain resilient in the face of severe attrition,
now proved lethal to the group. As part of a combined U.S.-ISF operation that the Iraqis
called LION’S LEAP, the exploitation of the captured AQI documents led to the immediate capture of several senior AQI leaders. They were Abdallah Azzam Misfir al-Qahtani
(also known as Sinan al Saudi), a former Saudi Army officer who was the architect of
the planned World Cup attack; Tariq Hassan Abd al-Qadir (also known as Abu Yasin
al-Jaza’iri), the AQI emir of west Baghdad; and Muzahim al-Janabi, who oversaw AQI’s
operations in southern Baghdad from his base in Lutufiyah.98
These three high profile captures yielded information exposing the hiding place of
Masri and Baghdadi in the Tharthar region approximately 10 kilometers outside the city
of Tikrit, on the edge of the former area of operation (AO) Bedrock and just a short distance west of Major General Anthony Cucolo and MND-N’s headquarters at Camp Speicher.99 In a manner eerily reminiscent of Saddam Hussein, or later, Osama bin Laden, the
two AQI men had lived in a simple mud building since September 2009, communicating
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with AQI senior leaders in Pakistan and a handful of key subordinates through trusted
couriers.100 A measure of how removed Masri had become from the day-to-day administration of his own organization can be seen in one AQI member’s claim that following al-Ra’i’s death, Masri appointed a new operations chief—a former Ba’athist colonel
named Samir Abd Mohammed al-Khlifawi (aka Hajji Bakr)—without having any prior
contact with or knowledge of the man.101 Apart from their wives, the only individuals
present at the house were Baghdadi’s son and Masri’s aide de camp. Masri’s own wife
later claimed to the Arabic press that during her time living near Lake Tharthar she never
saw any trace of the ISI that her husband purportedly led.102
On April 18, 2010, U.S. troops and their counterparts from the Iraqi 54th Brigade
identified Masri’s and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s isolated safe house and set up a cordon
around it to prevent the AQI leaders from escaping.103 Once the American and Iraqi troops
revealed themselves, the women living in the house came outside and, after some initial
denials, admitted that Baghdadi was there. After a failed attempt to persuade Baghdadi
to surrender, the troops raided the house, and after a firefight, Baghdadi, Masri, Baghdadi’s son, and Masri’s aide blew themselves up rather than be captured.104
The seizure of the AQI leaders’ hideout yielded a trove of documents and more than
six terabytes of data that enabled special operations forces to mount a series of assaults
against other AQI leaders. In the days following the April 18 raid, U.S. and Iraqi forces
captured and interrogated 16 AQI senior aides and their bodyguards.105 On April 20, U.S.
and ISF troops killed Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al-Ubayd, AQI’s commander for northern
Iraq, and 3 days later captured Mahmoud Suleiman, a leading AQI operations officer
in Anbar.106 On May 4 in west Baghdad, U.S. troops and ISF counterparts dealt AQI-ISI
another major blow when they captured Abu Abdullah al-Shafi, the head of Ansar al
Islam, who had been one of the few leaders of the jihad to survive 7 years into the war
and had been considered a potential successor to Masri. Coinciding with other AQI losses
and mass surrenders in the Hamrin Mountains of Diyala and Sharqat in Ninawa, these
raids crippled the group.107 By mid-May, Odierno reported that at least 32 of AQI’s top 42
leaders had been killed or captured since the beginning of March, the most severe leadership losses the organization had suffered since beginning operations in Iraq in 2003.
Measuring the Impact on AQI
The thousands of handwritten letters, documents, CDs, computers, and audio recordings captured by coalition troops yielded tremendous insight into AQI’s inner workings, including direct correspondence between Masri and al-Qaeda senior leaders in
Pakistan.108 Among the information recovered was Masri’s last major operational plan
to target a large number of Christian churches in Baghdad. The information also confirmed previous coalition assessments that AQI was suffering from both financial and
manpower shortages, indicating the degree to which the group already had declined
prior to the deaths of its leaders.109
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Source: DoD photo by Private 1st Class Jared Eastman (Released).

Major General Anthony Cucolo, Commander of MND-N.110
While coalition and Iraqi SOF units carried out the raids that destroyed AQI’s operational leadership, Cucolo and MND-N undertook an offensive against AQI’s vast financial empire in northern Iraq. In early 2010, U.S. analysts came to understand the extent to
which Iraq’s northern petroleum industry had become a black market that fed insurgent
groups of all kinds, especially through the trafficking of the gasoline produced at Iraq’s
largest refinery in Bayji.
Smugglers routinely stole gasoline from tankers once they left Bayji and resold the
stolen gas to illegal roadside gas stations that dotted the highways in northern Iraq,
many of them affiliated with AQI. The process involved not just AQI and other insurgent groups, but also a vast network of government officials, trucking outfits, and gas
station owners.111 Cucolo and Major General Nasser Ghanam, commander of the 2d Iraqi
Army Division in Mosul, formulated a combined plan to disrupt this illicit network.
The controversial Ghanam previously served as a brigade commander in Abu Ghraib,
where he notoriously attempted to repress Abu Azzam’s large Awakening group against
MNF-I’s wishes in 2007. In Mosul, however, Ghanam seemed more eager to assist his
U.S. partners.112 Under Ghanam and Cucolo’s combined direction, 3 MND-N battalions
intercepted gasoline smugglers at the Iraq-Syria border north and west of Mosul while
Ghanam’s troops and Iraqi border forces shut down all 117 of the identified illegal gas
stations in the north and arrested the operators at each one.113 The shutdown of the gas
stations disrupted the black market cash flow at precisely the time AQI found itself desperate for money and new leaders.
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The cumulative loss of leadership and finances crippled AQI. Even before the April
18 raid, USF-I had estimated that AQI’s strength had been cut to fewer than 100 fighters
in Mosul and Baghdad and no more than 1,000 in the entire country. The April and May
raids slashed these numbers further.114 In early May, Odierno reported to Gates that AQI
“had never before lost so many key leaders or been tested as they were now.” By June,
both U.S. and Iraqi officials judged that AQI effectively had been cut off from secure
communications with the broader al-Qaeda network.115 The documents captured later
from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in 2011 supported this as bin Laden
was still seeking detailed biographies for the new AQI leadership as late as June 2010.116
Not until mid-July 2010 were al-Qaeda’s senior leaders able to reestablish direct communications with AQI leaders inside Iraq.117 Isolated from their counterparts outside Iraq,
AQI’s remnants inside Iraq fell into disarray during the late spring of 2010 with various
mid-level leaders jockeying to fill the group’s power vacuum. Subsequent AQI insider
accounts painted a picture of the group’s network in chaos.118
Even so, the remaining AQI leaders of Baghdad and Mosul moved quickly to demonstrate that their organization was not extinct. On May 10, 2010, AQI operatives carried out
coordinated attacks against 24 targets in Mosul, Baghdad, Fallujah, Hillah, and Basrah,
killing 119 and wounding more than 350.119 In Tel Afar on May 14, they detonated a truck
bomb on the field during a children’s soccer match and followed with suicide vest bombers amidst the crowd of panicked parents, causing more than 130 casualties.120
Nevertheless, for USF-I leaders the AQI operations of May-June 2010 showed that the
effectiveness and sophistication of the group’s attacks had greatly diminished. To gather
their resources to maintain a presence in Mosul and Baghdad, AQI’s remnants had to
cede many of their former operating areas to other insurgent groups such as the Naqshbandi Army.121 There were still “decentralized cells . . . attempting to continue to execute
the last orders given,” Odierno noted, but these had no hope of disrupting the ongoing
Iraqi election process or achieving AQI’s ultimate goal of destabilizing the Iraqi Government.122 It was an assessment the captured Wali of Baghdad shared. Interviewed in his
captivity on May 18, Manaf al-Rawi told CNN, “It is 80 to 100 percent harder to operate
for al Qaeda these days.”123
THE IRAQI POLITICAL CRISIS
The Disputed 2010 Elections
The rapid U.S.-Iraqi operations that decimated AQI’s leadership in early 2010 had
taken place alongside a protracted political crisis that threatened to undermine the security gains. The Iraqi Parliamentary election of March 2010 was a high-stakes contest for
control of the two traditional pillars of the Iraqi state: vast oil revenues that reached more
than $100 billion in 2010 and a huge security sector of over 900,000 troops and police.
The political battle of 2010-2011 would have profound consequences for the U.S. campaign in Iraq, casting a shadow over USF-I’s plans and initiatives as U.S. forces began to
drawdown.
Four major coalitions competed in the election. As in 2005, the major Kurdish parties
formed a Kurdish Alliance to secure their share of the new Parliament. Iraq’s Sunnis,
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meanwhile, followed the Kurdish example by forming a single electoral list headed by
former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, reversing the fragmentation that had hurt Sunni
prospects in 2005. The country’s Shi’a parties had fragmented into two large coalitions by
2010: Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law coalition, with the Da’wa Party at its center;
and the Iraqi National Alliance comprised of ISCI, Badr, and the Sadrists.
The period prior to the election was volatile. As the parties published their candidate lists in December and January, the Iraqi Parliament’s de-Ba’athification committee—formed under Ahmad Chalabi’s leadership in the early years of the war—threw
the election campaign into disarray. Led by Chalabi’s deputy, Ali Faisal al-Lami—only
recently released from a year of U.S. captivity after his role in the assassinations of U.S.
officials in Sadr City in 2008—the committee used its dubious legal authority to nullify
the candidacy of more than 500 allegedly Ba’athist-linked candidates, including some
who previously had been elected to Parliament.124 The move weakened Allawi’s Sunni-majority Iraqiyah coalition that had a large number of former Ba’athists while helping
the Shi’a-majority coalitions, leaving the Sunni community to conclude that their candidates were being specifically targeted.125
After months of security planning, Iraqi and American officials were pleased when
the elections occurred on March 7 with little violence. From their base in the Green Zone,
Maliki and his State of Law allies believed they would win about 120 seats in the new
325-seat Parliament, a total that would have given them a leading role in forming the next
government.126 However, the results of the vote were a surprise to all involved. As the
tallies came in from Iraq’s provinces in mid-March, Iraqiyah finished first in the voting,
gaining 91 seats to Maliki and State of Law’s 89.127 The unexpected result was due at least
in part to Allawi’s success in attracting secular Shi’a voters, who elected a dozen Shi’a
candidates from Baghdad and the south as part of the Sunni-majority Iraqiyah. Maliki
and State of Law, conversely, did poorly in Sunni-majority areas and lost ground in Shi’a
provinces to the Sadrists, who unexpectedly increased their seat count from 29 to 40.
According to the standard interpretation of the Iraqi constitution and the 2005 precedent, the electoral result meant that Allawi and Iraqiyah should be given the first chance
to form a new government. Maliki and his allies, however, had other plans. As the official
results were announced in late March, Maliki secured a ruling from Iraq’s constitutional
court that whatever parties could form the largest post-electoral bloc would win the right
to form a government, regardless of the election results. The decision was legally questionable and, given Chief Justice Medhat Mahmood’s previous connections to Maliki
during the Site 4 and Jadriyah Bunker scandals, many Sunnis saw the ruling as overt sectarianism and illegitimate. With trust in Iraq’s legal system undermined, the electoral process devolved. Maliki took the matter further by demanding recounts in areas where his
coalition had done poorly and accusing the United States and the UN of undercounting
his coalition’s votes. He publicly denounced Iraq’s electoral commission as complicit and
signaled his intention not to recognize Iraqiyah’s victory. Privately, Maliki sent threatening messages to several members of Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission
before attempting to obtain arrest warrants against them. The matter concerned Odierno
enough for him to consider the possibility of USF-I providing security for the electoral
commission’s headquarters.128 Further complicating the situation, Lami’s de-Ba’athification committee disqualified an additional 52 candidates on April 26—an act applauded
by Maliki as he fought to maintain his hold on power.129
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Maliki’s Consolidation of Control
Signs that Maliki intended to use government institutions to alter the election outcome in his favor worried USF-I leaders, who had already become alarmed by the Prime
Minister’s consolidation of control of Iraq’s security forces and intelligence community
in 2009-2010. Over the course of 2009, Maliki had asserted his power over operational
Iraqi units via the Office of the Commander in Chief, headed by General Faruq al-Araji.
Eventually he circumvented the Ministry of Defense to take control of command appointments and issue tactical orders without using the formal chain of command.
A similar process played out in the Iraqi intelligence community. The United States
had expended great effort professionalizing Iraq’s principal intelligence apparatus, the
Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), under the leadership of the former military officer Mohammed Shahwani, a Sunni Turkoman who opposed Iranian involvement in Iraq.
For 6 years, Shahwani led the INIS in a clandestine war against Iranian-sponsored operatives inside Iraq, including some operatives from the Shi’a-led rival intelligence agency,
the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs. When Shahwani suddenly resigned
in the wake of the autumn 2009 bombings in Baghdad, Maliki seized control of the INIS
and dismissed 376 intelligence officers, often using de-Ba’athification as a justification.
In their place, Maliki appointed political loyalists, many from the Da’wa Party. The new
Da’wa-affiliated intelligence officers had difficulty in penetrating Iraq’s Sunni communities and often focused on regime preservation and the targeting of the Prime Minister’s political opponents rather than on AQI. Some experts, especially those in CJSOTF,
believed this purge of capable Sunni intelligence officers blinded the Maliki government
from observing the resurgence of the ISI and its transformation into ISIS in later years.130
Maliki also obtained control of the Special Tactics Unit (STU), a small INIS paramilitary unit that had been constructed as part of Iraq’s intelligence infrastructure, but had
eventually entered into an advisory relationship with the CJSOTF. Under Maliki’s authority, the STU was removed from the INIS and attached to the Counterterrorism Service,
which was itself under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s office. In the description
by CJSOTF commander Colonel Mark Mitchell, the STU in its new incarnation became
a “hit squad” used to “disappear” Sunni election candidates or to arrest them on vague
corruption charges. The STU often held its detainees without acknowledgement in the
unit’s private detention facilities in Baghdad, where CJSOTF officials who attempted to
inspect the facilities were denied access. In the face of the STU’s behavior, the CJSOTF
withdrew its advisers and severed ties with the unit in March 2010.131
The Election Crisis
As Maliki began a campaign of chicanery to overcome his election loss and hold onto
the premiership, postelection events split the senior U.S. officials. Odierno warned Washington that Iran was trying to block Allawi and Iraqiyah from forming a government and
aimed to assemble Iraq’s Shi’a parties into a governing coalition under Tehran’s domination. In a April 4 memo, Odierno cautioned that Iran’s electoral manipulation could result
in “the worst case scenario for security, stability, and our continued strategic partnership
with Iraq as it excludes significant Sunni participation, potentially causes the Iraqi people
to lose faith in the democratic process, as the leading candidates are excluded from the
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government formation.” The result could be “a compromise Shi’a Prime Minister who is
beholden to Iran.”132
Hill and other senior U.S. Embassy officials disagreed, arguing that there were limits
to Iranian influence that prevented Tehran from becoming as dangerous as Odierno
and USF-I believed. Hill’s political counselor, Gary Grappo, argued, “in many places in
Iraq, the Iranians were doing a great job of wearing out their welcome,” and that while
Iran was trying to “buy off” Iraqi politicians to obtain greater influence, few Iraqis were
cooperating.133 In answer to Odierno’s warnings, on April 20, Hill himself told President
Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that “the risk of Iraq becoming an Iranian
client state was ‘negligible’.”134
Despite Hill’s assurances, days after the vote results were announced in Baghdad,
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani flew to Tehran to broker discussions among the major Shi’a
parties about a consensus Prime Ministerial candidate—and about returning Talabani
himself to the President’s office.135 Though the Shi’a parties did not agree on a candidate—largely because of their collective resolve to deny Maliki’s return to power—the
conference in Tehran appeared to offer the Iranian regime the chance to steer the government formation process. Having expected a chance to form his own government, Allawi
warned in May that the electoral machinations could potentially drive the country back
into a civil war that would “not remain within the borders of Iraq. It will spill over and
has the potential to reach the world at large, not just neighboring countries.”136
As the month of May passed with no new government, and with the Iranian regime
and Maliki blocking Allawi’s path, Odierno expressed reservations about continuing the
“Responsible Drawdown of Forces” to 50,000 Soldiers by the August 2010 deadline.137 The
USF-I commander remained concerned about Maliki’s use of extraconstitutional powers
to usurp the role of the security and intelligence ministries. Odierno and some other U.S.
officials also believed Maliki’s attempt to overturn the election constituted a dangerous
power grab that might eventually destabilize the political situation and return Iraq to
sectarian violence, unraveling the extensive security and political gains the United States
had made. Odierno was so concerned with the direction Maliki seemed to be taking that
he warned Washington that Maliki might stage “a rolling coup d’état of the Iraqi state.”138
Hill agreed with the assessment of Maliki’s intentions, but unlike Odierno, the ambassador believed Maliki’s return to the premiership was the best outcome for U.S. interests. Iraq required a Shi’a leader, Hill told other U.S. officials in Baghdad, and Maliki, as
the strongest of the Shi’a leaders, would be the most reliable U.S. partner. Allawi had,
in Hill’s view, disqualified himself by relying on a mostly Sunni coalition; a situation
that Hill believed was the equivalent of a black South African politician leading a white
Afrikaner political party.139 Echoing this sentiment, political counselor Gary Grappo later
commented, “[R]ealistically speaking there was no chance . . . that Allawi, himself a Shi’a,
would win the election as the leader of a largely Sunni political coalition. . . . 60 to 65
percent of the country was Shi’a, [and] after what they had experienced not only under
Saddam but all previous regimes, they were not about to trust this crowd that was basically the leftovers from the Saddam era.”140 Hill also believed it was not appropriate for
the United States to meddle too deeply in internal Iraqi affairs. Iraq was a sovereign
nation, Hill told Vice President Joseph Biden, and “picking and choosing winners (and
losers) was way beyond anything we could do. . . . Perhaps back in 2004 or 2005, but in
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2010 Iraq was its own country with its own political system, which we would interfere
with at our peril.”141
After discussions with Biden in Washington in the late spring, Odierno had understood that U.S. leaders intended to remain neutral in the government formation negotiations among the Iraqi parties. However, in talks with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad in July,
Biden signaled that the United States would not support Allawi’s candidacy as Prime
Minister and implied that the United States had decided to help Maliki retain the premiership. This change of plan confounded Odierno, who warned Biden that if Maliki
were allowed to prevail over the Iraqiyah coalition that had technically won the elections, the Prime Minister and his allies could be counted on to conduct reprisals against
the Sunni-majority Iraqiyah in order to marginalize them politically, probably reigniting sectarian violence in the process. To answer these concerns, Biden told Odierno and
other U.S. officials in Baghdad that Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds would always detest
one another, just as the Irish and the British had, and implied that trying to construct a
national reconciliation pact among them was futile.142
***
The summer of 2010 found Iraq in a much-improved security condition but a precarious political situation. USF-I and the ISF had rebounded from AQI’s massive autumn
bombings and had pulverized the terrorist group, neutralizing its ability to conduct largescale attacks. In northern Iraq, after fits and starts, USF-I’s combined security initiative
offered a means to keep the peace between Arabs and Kurds along Iraq’s volatile Green
Line. These developments seemed to offer hope that the reduced transition force could
successfully conduct the stabilization operations needed to cement the gains of the surge.
These hopes began to founder, however, as the disputed Iraqi election results dragged
into a political crisis. The Sunni-majority Iraqiyah electoral victory in March 2010 marked
the political culmination of the Sunni Awakening, but the combined efforts of Prime
Minister Maliki, the Shi’a political parties, and the Iranian regime threatened to nullify
Iraqiyah’s victory. The situation caused a split within the U.S. Government that found
USF-I and the U.S. Embassy on opposite sides, exacerbating the divide that had opened
between the two with the arrival of Hill in 2009. By late summer, with Iranian and American policymakers ironically aligning against the candidacy of Allawi, Maliki remained
in his position as caretaker Prime Minister, standing athwart the constitutional government formation process so that it could not proceed without him. Instead of a functioning government, for the foreseeable future Iraq would have a bitter Sunni-Shi’a divide
that threatened to rekindle the embers of sectarianism. This political crisis overshadowed
USF-I’s evisceration of AQI and cast doubt on the U.S. ability to cement the gains of
2007-2009.
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CHAPTER 14
FROM NEW DAWN TO ZERO, AUGUST 2010-DECEMBER 2011
In June 2010, just weeks after Iraqi President Jalal Talabani led government formation
talks among Iraq’s Shi’a political parties in Tehran, the U.S. Senate confirmed General
Lloyd Austin as the next commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) and General Raymond
Odierno as the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. The handover between the two was
scheduled for the end of August, coinciding with President Barack Obama’s directed
change of mission for USF-I and the departure of the last U.S. combat brigades. After
Austin’s assumption of command, the U.S. operation in Iraq would be renamed from
“IRAQI FREEDOM” to “NEW DAWN” to signal the shift to a noncombat mission.
Odierno used his final month in Iraq to begin determining what forces and resources
the United States would need after December 2011 when the U.S.-Iraq security agreement
expired. As his staff analyzed what might be accomplished with a residual force of various sizes and capabilities, Odierno concluded that it would take at least 25,000 troops to
sustain a strategic partnership with Iraq.1
Back in the United States, Austin had begun work on the residual force question as
well. Before taking command, he oversaw wargames based on the possible scenarios
facing the United States as the U.S.-Iraq security agreement expired in late 2011, including
the chance the United States would be forced to “go to zero.” The wargames highlighted
that without a residual U.S. force, USF-I would find it difficult to hand off hundreds of
military activities to the U.S. Embassy, wind down support for provincial reconstruction
teams, and deactivate the existing command and control structures. The United States
would also be hard pressed to maintain stability along the Kurdish-Arab Green Line or
help the Iraqis prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State.2

Vice President Biden (left) General Odierno (right) and Ambassador Jeffery (center).
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Roger Dey (Released).

Vice President Joseph R. Biden Meets General Raymond Odierno and Ambassador
James Jeffery in Baghdad.3
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On August 31, Obama announced an end to “the American combat mission in Iraq,”
a step he had first promised as a Presidential candidate more than 4 years earlier. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had concluded, Obama declared, and Iraqis now had taken the
lead for their own security, though USF-I would remain on hand until the end of 2011 to
advise and assist them. The President added that the promise of American partnership
was contingent on the Iraqis moving forward “with a sense of urgency to form an inclusive government that is just, representative, and accountable to the Iraqi people.”4 At the
same time, Obama said that U.S. involvement in Iraq had to be balanced against other
pressing issues such as Afghanistan and the need to restore America’s economic strength
at home.5
The day after the President’s remarks, September 1, 2010, Austin took command from Odierno in a formal ceremony in Baghdad. Odierno’s departure as
USF-I commander coincided with the replacement of Ambassador Christopher Hill,
whose relationship with Odierno and his command had grown more tense as the
Iraqi election impasse deepened. Instead of Hill, Austin would partner with U.S.
Ambassador James Jeffrey, a veteran Arabist who had served as an Army officer in
Vietnam and, unlike Hill, arrived at the Embassy with extensive Iraq experience.
Together, Austin and Jeffrey set out to repair the civilian-military relationship that had
deteriorated during Hill’s tenure, bringing their staffs together for combined planning
and team building.6

Behind Austin are (left to right) Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Gates, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, and U.S. Central Command Commander General Mattis. Source: DoD
photo by Sergeant 1st Class Roger Dey (Released).

General Lloyd Austin During His Assumption of Command of USF-I from
General Raymond Odierno.7
THE INTERREGNUM
Austin and Jeffrey took up their duties in a nation that had been trying to form a government for almost 6 months. In early 2006, the Iraqi political parties’ inability to reach
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an agreement while the country slipped into civil war had hamstrung General George
Casey, Jr., and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). In 2010, with the country far less violent than in 2006, the Iraqis were even more deeply deadlocked, as Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki worked to prevent Ayad Allawi from forming a new government in the hope
of eventually forcing all of the parties to agree that only he could be Prime Minister.8 To
prevent Allawi’s Sunni-majority Iraqiyah coalition, which had won a plurality of Parliamentary seats, from being shut out of power, Vice President Joseph Biden suggested in
late summer that Maliki return as Prime Minister but share power with a new strategic
policy council to be headed by Allawi. In Biden’s concept, Allawi’s council would determine policy and strategy for the Iraqi security forces (ISF), the Iraqi defense budget, and
the particulars of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship. The idea, while politically creative,
was flawed. Iraq’s Maliki-friendly courts were sure to challenge the council’s constitutionality. Without firm constitutional justification, the proposed compromise amounted
to a gentlemen’s agreement that would rest on the goodwill and good faith of the major
parties—a risky venture, considering Maliki made it clear he did not intend to dilute his
power as commander in chief.
The prolonged negotiations over the formation of the government came at the same
time U.S. officials expected to coordinate with their ISF counterparts to transfer many
military and diplomatic activities. The uncertainty of the political situation made Iraqi
officials reluctant to make decisions. Reconciliation initiatives stalled as well, as USF-I
had difficulty getting officials of Maliki’s caretaker government to demonstrate continued support for the Sons of Iraq, which continued to face attacks and intimidation from
Sunni insurgents.9 As the months passed, U.S. commanders also found their ISF counterparts and caretaker government officials unwilling to act against militant groups as
intensely as they had in 2008 and 2009, especially Shi’a militants.10 After Shi’a militants
rocketed the U.S. Embassy on September 23, U.S. officials noted the perpetrators had
little fear that the ISF would pursue them. By mid–October, a full month had passed since
USF-I or the ISF had attacked the top-tier militant networks in a meaningful way. Some
U.S. officials suspected the Iraqi militants were testing the new commander, Austin, to
gauge his reaction.11
Like the United States, the Iranian regime had become impatient with the pace of
Iraq’s government formation as the stalemate dragged on through the summer. By September, Iranian leaders had decided to support Maliki and had begun to pressure Iraq’s
Kurdish and Shi’a leaders to back Maliki as well. In Tehran, General Qassem Soleimani,
head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, reportedly reminded
Iraqi leaders that U.S. forces would soon leave Iraq, but Iran would always be their powerful neighbor. Soleimani’s terms to the Iraqis were simple: Maliki would remain Prime
Minister, Talibani would remain President, and the U.S. military would be forced to leave
Iraq by the end of 2011 as the U.S.-Iraq security agreement required. Iraqi leaders who
cooperated would benefit from Iranian political assistance and cash payments, while
those who defied Iran would suffer “dire consequences.”12 With both the United States
and Iran backing Maliki’s return, all that remained was for Iraq’s other major parties to
negotiate for as much power as possible in a second Maliki government.
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OPERATION NEW DAWN AND THE “RESPONSIBLE DRAWDOWN OF
FORCES”
The Advise and Assist Mission
In Operation NEW DAWN, Austin and his command continued to work with ISF even
as they withdrew. Austin saw three components to his mission.13 First, U.S. forces would
advise, train, assist, and equip the ISF “so that they are capable of COIN [counterinsurgency] operations, maintaining internal security, and have developed the foundation for
external defense.” Second, U.S. forces would conduct combined operations to neutralize
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other violent extremist networks. Third, U.S. forces would
help increase the capacity of the Iraqi ministries and other institutions.14 Additional key
tasks included helping to reduce Kurd-Arab tensions and balancing Iranian influence.15
To accomplish these missions, Austin had an initial force of 50,000 troops, with 7
Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) spread across the three remaining U.S. divisions. In
his initial guidance, Austin warned that USF-I could not afford to be surprised since the
diminished U.S. troop level in the country left the command little flexibility and depth.
To maintain their situational awareness and force protection, the AABs needed closer
relationships with the ISF.16 Austin noted that USF-I would have to rely on Iraqi units to
secure the American lines of communication during the final withdrawal if it came.17
The AABs were a departure from the Army’s preference to train its combat units
mainly for high intensity conflict while treating stability operations as a secondary focus.
Instead, the AABs were designed expressly for the new post-combat mission in Iraq,
with their organization and training modified to better assist Iraqi units—army, police,
and border forces. Some AAB commanders saw this new role as analogous to that of the
observer-controllers at the Army’s combat training centers, mentoring and conducting
operations simultaneously.18 In addition, the AABs provided their Iraqi partners with
intelligence and targeting assistance, air and logistics support, planning, and command
and control. The AABs’ mission also included helping improve Iraqi governance, especially by providing security for the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) still operating
across Iraq. Some AAB commanders even saw supporting the PRTs as their primary
mission.19
Each AAB contained a civil affairs company, psychological operations teams, combat
camera teams, and additional contracting officers and lawyers. Each brigade also had
a human terrain team comprised of civilian social scientists—anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists—to analyze local Iraqi political and economic dynamics.
The brigades also had five Stability Transition Teams (STTs), which were essentially the
military transition teams (MiTTs), special police transition teams (SPTTs), and border
transition teams (BTTs), renamed. Each STT had 14 senior officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) who worked with ISF counterparts until the expiration of the security
agreement at the end of 2011.20 Unlike their predecessors, the STTs were organic to the
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Map 23. Disposition of U.S. Forces, USF-I Operation NEW DAWN, September 2010.
brigades, reflecting lessons learned from the 2005-era transition teams that suffered from
unity of command challenges and lacked support when operating independently inside
a brigade’s battlespace.21 Making the STTs part of the brigade’s structure also made them
more flexible. If certain Iraqi units needed more mentoring than others, an AAB commander could shift STT members from more capable units to advise less capable ones.22
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The earlier transition teams had focused on the battalion level of the Iraqi Army, but
the STTs paired with brigades and divisions instead. Partnering at the higher level freed
transition teams to assist the Iraqi border forces, an element of the ISF that had a reputation for looking the other way as Iranian weapons and agents were smuggled into Iraq.23
In one instance highlighting the border guards’ ineffectiveness, during the 36th Infantry Division’s 8-month deployment to Iraq’s nine southern provinces in 2011, the Iraqi
Border Police did not seize a single contraband weapon.24
Along with their nontraditional organization, the AABs underwent very different
pre-deployment training than COIN-oriented brigade combat teams. NCOs and junior
officers attended an abridged civil affairs course at Fort Bragg, NC, to develop governance and reconstruction skills and add capabilities and depth to the few PRTs assigned
to each brigade. Almost every Soldier attended Arabic language classes, and key leaders
received additional training, often at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute.
Many units were trained in city management and civic administration. Some AABs sent
leaders to train with the U.S. Border Patrol; others worked with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Reflecting hard lessons from the early phases of the MiTT program, the STTs
were assigned to their AABs early enough to attend pre-mission training with the rest of
the brigade. Even the PRTs, usually including their assigned State Department personnel,
attended pre-mission training.25
In contrast to USF-I’s drawdown and changed missions, special operations forces
(SOF) in Iraq prepared for a long-term presence, believing they would remain for counterterrorism and security force assistance missions long after conventional forces left.
Envisioning an enduring mission similar to those in the 1990s in Kuwait and Colombia,
special operations elements altered their command structure and rotational policies. To
sustain the unity of effort, SOF leaders created a new headquarters, Joint Forces Special
Operations Component Command-Iraq (JFSOCC-I), headed by a Special Forces general
officer who would command Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian
Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) and all other special operations elements in Iraq. To promote
unity of effort further, SOF leaders ended the 7-year-old policy of rotating 5th and 10th
Special Forces groups as the CJSOTF-AP headquarters every 7 months. The 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) received permanent responsibility for the CJSOTF-AP headquarters, freeing the 10th Special Forces Group to refocus on Europe. This new arrangement, prompted by years of frustration due to the differing approaches between the two
groups, matched a 2004 proposal that SOF leaders had rejected in favor of the rotational
policy.
Below the SOF headquarters level, there would be no drawdown in forces, with the
USF-I commander insisting that the CJSOTF maintain its full complement of three battalion-sized task forces that would be the last units to leave Iraq in the event of a full withdrawal. Those task forces increased the length of their deployments from 7 to 9 months
to avoid rotating units and headquarters at the same time and to match more closely the
conventional units’ deployment schedule. Maintaining a large special operations footprint as U.S. conventional forces drew down was challenging. Much of the success of
special operations forces in previous years came from their symbiotic relationship with
conventional forces that provided base security, logistics support, medical evacuation,
and quick reaction capabilities. As conventional forces receded across Iraq, many special
operations elements had to be repositioned to maintain their support.26
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Among the AABs, the declared end of combat operations and the constraints of the
security agreement created an entirely new operational rhythm, making their experience
fundamentally different from the COIN-oriented brigades that had come before them. As
the number of brigades in USF-I shrank, the amount of territory each AAB covered grew,
which paradoxically forced some AABs to increase the number of bases they occupied in
order to maintain contact with the Iraqis they advised.27 The larger areas of responsibility
created logistical and medical evacuation challenges, with each AAB commander forced
to weigh carefully where to position Soldiers safely so that any casualties could be evacuated to medical facilities within the “golden hour.”
The pace of security operations slowed significantly as Iraqis assumed the lead, in part
due to the security agreement’s requirement for U.S. units to obtain evidence-based warrants from Iraqi judges before offensive operations. Local reconstruction projects slowed
as well once the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) took the lead in U.S. development efforts. Projects based on military necessity
that were commonplace during earlier years, such as hiring unemployed Iraqis to pick up
garbage to eliminate improvised explosive device (IED) hiding spots, no longer passed
muster. Reflecting the transition to Iraqi civil authority, the PRTs and AABs coached Iraqi
officials to nominate their own reconstruction projects, approving only those that could
be sustained after the United States departed.28
To a certain degree, Operation NEW DAWN represented a return to Casey’s transition plan from 2005 to 2006, but under more favorable circumstances. Many U.S. officers
cited the same rationale for the diminished American role that MNF-I had used 4 years
earlier, arguing that an American drawdown would push the Iraqis to improve their own
capabilities and avoid the dependency trap. For example, Major Jason Bullock, a battery
commander in 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, echoed the same concerns that Casey and
General John Abizad had had with Iraqi dependency and praised the security agreement
as a way to overcome those concerns:
The U.S. military is still full of [Soldiers] who would much rather do everything unilaterally, but
good leaders know that’s a road to nowhere, except more time in Iraq. The security agreement was
a forcing function not only for U.S. troops to embrace partnership and try to develop the ISF, but
also a wakeup call for the ISF that we are not going to be here forever and they are on the clock to
get to the level they need to get to before we leave.29

The Battle of the Palm Grove
The first significant test of the idea that USF-I’s units should coach from the sidelines
as the ISF took responsibility for security within Iraq’s borders came shortly after Austin
took command. On September 11, 2010, in Diyala Province where politicized Iraqi Army
leaders had kept USF-I advisors at arm’s length, a large Iraqi force became bogged down
in an engagement against a much smaller Sunni insurgent force in an agricultural area
about 50 miles from Baghdad.30 When locals reported to a nearby Iraqi Army unit that
a group of AQI fighters had gathered in a palm grove to construct bombs, an initial ISF
attack against the insurgents collapsed on contact. After the first assault failed, at least
seven different Iraqi units responded to the scene, each unable to mount a coordinated
attack against an AQI force that may have been as small as a squad. A number of senior
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Iraqi officials descended on the area, including the commander of Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, General Ali Ghaidan, and watched ISF units mount a series of unsuccessful
assaults in column formation. The situation did not improve until U.S. Soldiers from 2d
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the local AAB, arrived with rotary wing reconnaissance,
close-air support from attack helicopters, and indirect fire. On September 12, U.S. F–16s
dropped two 500-pound bombs on the AQI position—the first such airstrike since June
2009—after which Iraqi troops maneuvered into the palm grove to find the AQI fighters
gone. The Iraqi troops had failed to establish a cordon around the area as U.S. firepower
dislodged the insurgents, apparently allowing the AQI men to escape.31

Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Brandon Bolick (Released).

Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers Maneuver During the Battle of the Palm Grove.32
This incident provided several lessons for the USF-I command team. The Iraqis had
made contact with the enemy before notifying the nearest U.S. unit that they might need
assistance, so that the AABs and their subordinate formations had been forced to deal
with the action as it unfolded.33 As they had been trained to do, the local U.S. troops
under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Molinari had refrained from taking over the battle from
the Iraqis. In Molinari’s words, he had taken “an appetite suppressant” when it had come
to letting his more capable U.S. Soldiers take the lead and instead focused on providing
as much assistance as the ISF leaders were willing to accept.34 Similarly, Lieutenant General Robert Cone, USF-I’s deputy commander for operations, had monitored the situation
and instructed USF-I’s subordinate commanders to wait for the Iraqis to ask for assistance rather than offer it unsolicited. In Cone’s view, since the Iraqis would soon have to
conduct such engagements without U.S. operational support, they had to stop relying on
immediate U.S. assistance.35
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The Battle of the Palm Grove showed that Iraqis’ capacity for independent action
was limited. In its aftermath, Cone concluded that USF-I’s top priority for ISF development should be training the Iraqis in combined operations at the platoon and company
level, where they had failed at the Palm Grove. Cone also reviewed the Iraqis’ problems
with command and control, another shortfall during the fighting. In his opinion, the Iraqi
regional commands that had proliferated during 2007-2009—including the Diyala Operations Command, which technically had been responsible for the battle—had received
a great deal of attention but did not serve the longer-term interests of the Iraqi Army.
Cone believed the Iraqis needed an operational organization that looked beyond immediate tactical problems in specific locations, a function that the disparate operations commands could not fulfill. Accordingly, Cone avoided direct dealings with Iraqi division
commanders and instead used General Ghaidan, commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command (IGFC), as his primary interlocutor, in hopes of developing the IGFC into
a senior-level headquarters focused on the welfare of the Iraqi Army as an institution,
capable of maintaining and training fielded forces and capable of thinking beyond the
next crisis.36
Back in Diyala, the AAB’s battalion-level after-action review revealed that the Iraqi
troops not only had struggled with basic conventional tactics, but had also mistreated
local citizens and detainees, a counterproductive factor in a COIN campaign.37 In the
aftermath of the September 11-12 fiasco, Molinari found the 5th Iraqi Army division far
more willing to seek the AAB’s help, which eventually resulted in collective training and
battalion-level live fire exercises.38 In the larger sense, the Battle of the Palm Grove left
U.S. commanders with the unsettling sense that years of training and billions of dollars
of expenditure might have accomplished little.
COIN Capabilities vs. Modernization
The debacle in Diyala illustrated how far the Iraqi forces were from the capability the
U.S. military thought that they needed. In 2009, Prime Minister Maliki had believed his
security forces capable of maintaining domestic order in Iraq, and U.S. leaders generally
had agreed. The Iraqi Army that the U.S.-led coalition helped create was proficient at
internal security tasks such as staffing checkpoints and conducting light patrols. However, Iraqi leaders had been overconfident in the ISF’s broader abilities to operate without
U.S. assistance. Although Iraqi leaders decided to purchase M1A1 tanks, M113 armored
personnel carriers, attack helicopters, and M198 howitzers, Iraqi units in 2010 could neither execute combined-arms operations at any level nor defend and control their own airspace. In 2009, MNSTC-I estimated Iraq needed another 12 years to become self-sufficient
in defense matters, a decade beyond the term of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, but the
same assessment also had optimistically assumed no serious threat from another regional
state, a diminishing level of sectarian conflict, and a waning insurgency.39
In the aftermath of the Diyala incident, Austin and his command conducted a thorough assessment of the state of the Iraqi Army in October 2010, with sobering results.
Many Iraqi commanders were absent, and in some cases driven by political allegiance
rather than professional responsibilities. The Iraqi Army and Iraqi police did not cooperate. The Iraqi Army’s logistics and unit staffing systems were abysmal. Across the army,

527

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

ammunition remained in short supply. In some units, soldiers “hot bedded” in bunks
due to a shortage of barracks space.40

Lieutenant General Cone (second from left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Daniel Yarnall
(Released).

Lieutenant General Robert Cone, USF-I Deputy CG for Operations, With General Ali
Ghaidan, Commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command.41
Another major problem was that constant operations against AQI and other militant
groups wore their combat units down. Iraqi leaders rarely pulled units from the front
lines to refit and train, often leaving them in the fight until they became combat ineffective. But even if Iraqi units could have rotated through training, the army as a whole
lacked a training management system, a fact that Austin labeled his “number one gap
and concern for ISF” in November 2010. Without it, the United States could not be confident the Iraqi Army could maintain its proficiency following USF-I’s departure.42
Fixing these problems was difficult. Iraq’s inability to form a government hindered
USF-I’s efforts to help Bagdad plan and modernize its forces. Iraqi defense budget shortfalls further complicated matters.43 As the Iraqis’ newly purchased U.S.-built military
hardware began to arrive, the government struggled to pay for and maintain it. By the
end of 2010, the Iraqis had received 3 Bell helicopters and 51 of the projected 140 M1A1
tanks, but the government only budgeted a third of the estimated $1.5 billion needed to
maintain the new equipment. The shortfall created the risk that the ISF’s expensive new
systems might quickly fall into disrepair.44
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Source: DoD photo by Technical Sergeant Randy Redman (Released).

An M1A1 Abrams Tank From the Iraqi 9th Mechanized Division.45
The Interior Ministry was just as problematic as the Defense Ministry. Austin had
hoped the Iraqi police could assume a larger security role, freeing Iraqi Army units to
refit and train. However, as U.S. commanders took stock in late 2010, they concluded that
the Iraqi police were not ready to take over the internal security role from the Iraqi Army,
and that USF-I’s efforts and resources supporting the police would be better directed to
the army.46 Terminating assistance to Iraq’s police forces was a significant shift. Since
2005, the U.S. command in Baghdad had viewed “police primacy” in Iraq’s security affairs
as a critical component of the U.S. campaign based on an assumption that a successful
counterinsurgency required effective civil policing. Though the security situation had
improved greatly since the dark days of 2006 and 2007, there had been no commensurate
growth in the capability of the Iraqi police—provincial or federal—that would enable
them to relieve the army of its internal security role. The federal police also resisted cooperation with the Iraqi Army, and often avoided cooperation with local police.47
Elsewhere among the Interior Ministry’s forces, Iraq’s border forces remained undermanned and poorly equipped despite several years of effort to improve them. The forces
at the ports of entry on the Iranian border near Basrah required special attention, in Austin’s judgment. In the west, USF-I had no visibility on the operations at the three border
crossing points in Anbar. North of Anbar there was concern that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had infiltrated some of the police formations.48 USF-I recognized a few
encouraging signs, notably the CJSOTF-advised Emergency Response Brigade, which
had a reputation for a willingness to “hit anyone,” fuse intelligence, conduct network targeting and crime scene exploitation, and carry out professional development and leader
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training. Austin remarked that units like this would be important for force protection as
USF-I departed.49 Unfortunately, they were rare.
The End of U.S. Detention Operations
The 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement also required USF-I to transfer detention operations to the Iraqis. In summer 2010, USF-I completed a 19-month process of releasing or
relinquishing custody of more than 22,000 detainees and closing the U.S. theater internment facilities, finally fulfilling former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld’s 2004 goal of getting the United States “out of the Iraqi prison business.”
Under the terms of the security agreement, all detainees held by the coalition had
either to be released or transferred to Iraqi correctional facilities with an arrest warrant
or detention order approved by Iraqi officials. This task fell principally to Task Force
134 commander Major General David E. Quantock, a military police officer who had
been previously assigned to fix the failed detention operations at Abu Ghraib in 2004. As
USF-I’s lead for detention operations from late 2008 to spring 2010, Quantock had to sort
through the detainee population and determine those too dangerous to release. Working
with the military police, criminal investigation division (CID) agents, intelligence personnel, and 56 lawyers, the task force ultimately released over 12,000 detainees and transferred another 8,000 to Iraqi custody.50 A further 400 foreign fighters from 22 countries
were repatriated through the International Committee of the Red Cross.51
The task force found sorting dangerous detainees from benign ones difficult, despite
having continually segregated its detainee population based on threat level. To issue
the arrest warrants or detention orders that USF-I needed to transfer internees to Iraqi
authorities, Iraqi courts required either confessions or two eyewitness statements. Given
the potential for retribution, eyewitness testimony was rare, and the original coalition
arrest packets often could not be shared with the Iraqi courts because they contained
classified information. The coalition’s modern forensic techniques, such as identifying
fingerprints on an IED, explosive residue detection, videotapes or photographs of a criminal act, or DNA evidence, appeared too many Iraqi judges almost like “witchcraft,”
Quantock observed.52 After a series of education programs for judges and negotiations
with Iraqi officials, local courts slowly accepted some of these techniques as evidence,
but corruption among the Iraqi judges remained a problem. In the restive city of Mosul,
for example, judges often released inmates within 24 to 48 hours of transfer from USF-I.
Sectarianism also played its part, Quantock noted, with the Maliki government “almost
exclusively asking for Shia releases,” often in the face of substantial evidence against the
detainees.53
Even physically transferring detainees to Iraqi control was not simple. U.S. officials
and international human rights organizations worried that Iraqi prisoners would be
subject to torture and abuse after being transferred from the well-regulated coalition
detention facilities to the less-regulated Iraqi prisons. To guard against this, Task Force
(TF) 134 transferred detainees only to facilities that met United Nations (UN) standards.
The task force also initiated several programs to improve the Iraqi corrections system to
those levels, including constructing a $28 million facility aimed at logisticians, mid-level
supervisors, and wardens, and organizing several academies that could train 700 Iraqi
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prison guards at a time.54 As Iraqi corrections officers completed their training, they partnered with U.S. guards for additional mentorship, assuming responsibility compound by
compound within each detention facility.55 Corrections Assistance Transition Teams, the
detention equivalent of MiTTs, comprised of military police, engineers, medical officers,
and lawyers, crisscrossed Iraq weekly to inspect Iraqi prison facilities and certify them
according to international standards.56

Source: U.S. Army photo by Private 1st Class Candace Mundt (Released).

Major General David Quantock With Iraqi Ministry of Justice
Official Dara Nour al-Deen.57
As inmates were transferred to Iraqi control, TF 134’s footprint shrank quickly. By the
end of 2009, the task force oversaw one military police brigade in a mainly advisory role,
down from two military police brigades in 2008. In September 2009, TF 134 shut down
the sprawling Camp Bucca, with facilities capable of holding over 30,000 detainees, and
shifted Bucca’s remaining inmates to the Camp Taji theater internment facility, which
itself reverted to Iraqi control in March 2010. When USF-I consolidated its operational
subordinate commands in early 2010, TF 134 furled its colors, becoming a directorate
within USF-I, with Quantock at its head as a deputy USF-I commander for detention
operations.
In July 2010, Quantock’s successor in that post, Major General Jerry Cannon, completed the handover of the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice (MoJ), with the exception of 225 high-value detainees that the United States
continued to hold until the end of 2011.58 The handover of Camp Cropper to the Iraqi Government was inauspicious. Within days, the camp ran out of potable water and sewage
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overflowed in the detainees’ living areas, prompting the Iraqis to request the return of
American assistance and advisors. To make matters worse, as these problems arose, the
prison warden disappeared and four top Islamic State leaders escaped.59
Throughout 2011, USF-I’s detention directorate helped the Iraqi Justice Ministry consolidate control of detention operations which were fragmented across several ministries.
This effort suffered, however, from the fact that like other ministries, the Ministry of
Justice was without a minister during the interregnum period, and few mid-level bureaucrats were willing to make important decisions on their own.60
At the same time, USF-I worked to resolve the future of the 60 remaining detainees,
with the Lebanese Hizballah commander Musa Daqduq among them. U.S. officials aimed
to establish a degree of confidence that the final detainees could be handed over to the
Iraqi Government and held in a maximum security facility without risk that they could
escape and return to the battlefield. Unfortunately, many released detainees had already
returned to the fight. Scores released in the final months and days of the Iraq campaign
eventually assumed leadership roles in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), prompting a senior Special Forces officer to quip to Army historians in 2015, “I really hope we
kept the biometric information from all the detainees we took.”61
IRAQ’S POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION
The Erbil Agreement
By late November 2010, Iranian pressure on Maliki’s behalf forced the Iraqi Shi’a parties to accept his return as Prime Minister. Even the Sadrists dropped their objections,
though Maliki reportedly agreed to hand over some of his party’s southern governorships to Sadrists as part of the deal. With the Shi’a bloc unified at last—however begrudgingly—the major Iraqi factions met in Erbil to hammer out the conditions of Maliki’s
return.62 The specific terms of the Erbil Agreement of December 10, 2010, remained secret,
but the public learned that Maliki agreed to a power-sharing arrangement including an
expanded presidency council of Maliki, Talabani, Barzani, and Iraq’s two Vice Presidents to decide major policy questions. In addition, Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyah would have
the right to select a Defense Minister with the provision that the choice would not be a
politician, nor would the new Interior Minister and Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INIS) director. To secure the Kurdish parties’ backing, Maliki reportedly agreed to their
demands for greater control over their region’s oil reserves and revenues.63 Maliki ultimately honored none of these pledges, but making them allowed him to hold onto the
premiership. Iraq had been without an elected government for 278 days, the longest such
period any modern parliamentary democracy had experienced at that point.
The Shi’a Militant Problem
U.S. and Western leaders hailed the Erbil Agreement and looked forward to a return
to political stability in Iraq. For USF-I, however, the aftermath of the Erbil Agreement
brought the return of old enemies. In the first days of January 2011, Kata’ib Hizballah
(KH), the Iraqi Shi’a militant group most closely controlled by Iran’s Quds Force and
General Qassem Soleimani, attacked both the Camp Victory base complex and Forward
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Operating Base (FOB) Kalsu, 50 miles south of Baghdad near the town of Iskandariyah.
At Camp Victory, KH fired nine 107 mm rockets and one 240 mm rocket from fixed sites
close to the camp’s perimeter, indicating the group had sufficient time to prepare its
firing positions and coordinate its attack. At FOB Kalsu, the main base of the 3d Armored
Cavalry Regiment, KH attacked with six 240 mm rockets and nine large 333 mm improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs). The use of so many IRAMs, a signature Quds
Force weapon, led Austin to conclude that both the Iraqi Shi’a militants and their Iranian
sponsors had decided to pressure the United States to leave Iraq in 2011.64

Source: DoD photo by Airman 1st Class Brian Ferguson (Released).

Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions.65
Captured IRAM launchers
Amid these attacks, Moqtada Sadr made an unexpected return to Iraq on January 5,
following 4 years in Iran. In his initial public appearances, Sadr told his followers to support the ISF and signaled his approval of the U.S. troop withdrawal timeline, but he once
again called for resistance against U.S. troops. USF-I analysts concluded correctly that his
return would create trouble for USF-I in the year to come.66 By late March, Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade restarted its operations against U.S. troops, hitting the Green Zone with
4 rockets in an attack that would have been more damaging had a U.S.-Iraqi quick-reaction force not raided the firing point and found 16 more rockets on improvised rails
attached to timers.67
These attacks were part of a trend of increasing Shi’a militant activity across Iraq. On
March 20, Shi’a militants conducted seven assassination attempts over a 5-hour period
in Baghdad. USF-I concluded that Qais Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) was responsible for the attacks, one of which severely wounded the commander of the 6th Iraqi
Army Division.68 Fifteen months after his release from U.S. detention as part of the Force
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Strategic Engagement Cell’s (FSEC) attempt to reconcile with the Shi’a militants, Khazali
once again was waging war against the United States and its Iraqi partners.
The Day of Rage and the Return of Political Violence
The resurgence of Shi’a militant attacks accompanied an unexpected political challenge to Maliki’s government. The wave of Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa
and Syria in early 2011 swept into Iraq as well. As the Mubarak regime crumbled in
Egypt during February 2011, large demonstrations against the Maliki government broke
out in Baghdad and other major cities such as Basrah and Nasiriyah. The protesters
initially demanded political reforms, a crackdown on government corruption, and the
improvement of electricity and other public services. Unlike in Egypt, where protesters demanded both the ouster of the Mubarak regime and a change in the system of
government, in Iraq, protesters were content with their democratic form of government
but demanded a leadership change. By mid-February, an ad hoc grouping of disaffected
youths, Sunni activists, Sadrists, Iraqi communists, and other small anti-Maliki factions
brought tens of thousands of Iraqis into the streets to demand that Maliki step down. A
smaller but similar movement arose in Kurdistan, where young activists demonstrated
against corruption within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).69
On February 25, 1 month after the massive Cairo, Egypt, protests, activists in Baghdad, Sulaimaniyah, and 10 other Iraqi cities organized a “Day of Rage” against Iraq’s
ruling parties. The results were ugly. Maliki attempted in advance to dissuade Iraqis
from participating, warning that AQI or Ba’athist militants might use the gathering to
incite violence.70 The protests went forward anyway, and Iraqi and Kurdish security
forces fired into the crowds in some cities, killing at least 29 protesters. In Baghdad, Iraqi
troops quelled a large demonstration in Tahrir Square by firing at protesters. In Basrah,
where Iraqi units refrained from such measures, the crowds forced the provincial governor, a Da’wa Party member, to resign.
The Day of Rage passed with 43-recorded protests across the country, though, to the
surprise of many, no terrorists launched attacks against the large crowds. Responding to
the popular pressure, Maliki announced he would limit himself to two terms as Prime
Minister and reduce the salaries of senior officials. In the days following the Day of Rage,
Iraqi Government officials reportedly offered cash, car loans, or land to Iraqi journalists
to change the tone of their coverage.71
But Da’wa Party loyalists and security officers also began a wide-ranging crackdown,
arresting hundreds of protest organizers. “The intelligence services are collecting information about activists and after the demonstrations they have been making arrests and
detaining people,” one organizer told reporters in early March.72 The measures dampened popular enthusiasm for the anti-Maliki demonstrations, leading U.S. officials in
Baghdad to report, “We anticipate PM [Prime Minister] Maliki will conclude that he has
been strengthened by the relative[ly] small scale of the protests and the ISF’s success in
ensuring security.”73
The protests’ anti-Maliki energy dissipated partly because of other political dynamics that distracted from the demonstrators’ original purpose. In northern Iraq, Kurdish
leaders used the Day of Rage demonstrations as a pretext to deploy a division-sized
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peshmerga force to Kirkuk and to disputed areas of the Diyala valley, only withdrawing
after a month of negotiations with the government. The peshmerga incursion heightened
Arab-Kurdish tensions and gave Maliki an issue with which to appeal to Arab anti-Kurdish sentiment just when the protests against him were most intense. In Mosul, thousands
of Sunni Arabs, including Ninewa governor Atheel Nujaifi, protested against KRG President Massoud Barzani and demanded that the U.S. military not remain in Iraq beyond
December 2011.74 Some U.S. observers interpreted Barzani’s deployment of Kurdish
troops to Kirkuk and Diyala as efforts to convince the United States that it was still needed
as a guarantor of peace along the Green Line.75 Whatever the case, U.S. Division-North
(USD-N) commander Major General David Perkins, whose 1st Armored Division had
succeeded Major General Anthony Cuccolo’s 3d Infantry Division as USD-N, declined to
have his troops drawn into the standoff between Kurdish and Iraqi Army units, insisting
to both sides they would have to resolve the crisis on their own.76
In another distraction from the anti-Maliki movement, Iraq’s Shi’a parties staged
large protests in March and April against Bahrain’s Sunni minority regime, which had
cracked down on Bahraini Shi’a protestors and invited Saudi troops to help restore order
in the country.77 The Iraqi Parliament suspended its work in protest, and Maliki and other
Iraqi leaders warned that the Bahrain crisis could expand into a regional sectarian war.
Large rallies led by Moqtada Sadr in particular became not just a domestic Iraqi political
issue, but also a serious concern for the United States. Highlighting the presence of the
U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, Sadr and other Iraqi Shi’a leaders accused the United States of
supporting the crackdown on Bahrain’s Shi’a and used that accusation to denounce the
U.S.-Iraqi status of forces agreement being negotiated by the Obama administration and
the Maliki government.78 This illustrated that gaining popular or Parliamentary support
for keeping U.S. troops in the country beyond 2011 would be difficult for Maliki and his
allies.
In contrast to the uprisings that eventually toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
and Yemen and caused a civil war in Syria, the protest movement against Maliki fizzled
out for reasons specific to Iraq. Other than Moqtada Sadr, none of Iraq’s major political
figures joined the protests. The protesters also found organizing via social media difficult
because of Iraq’s frequent electricity shortages—which, ironically, were one of the causes
of the protests in the first place. The Iraqi protests also did not draw the same attention in
the west that those in other countries had, though there was some criticism of the methods Maliki loyalists used against activists. In June 2011, Human Rights Watch reported
that the ISF in Baghdad had stood by while Maliki supporters attacked protesters or
had participated in the violence against protesters. At protests on June 10, “instead of
protecting peaceful demonstrators, Iraqi soldiers appeared to be working hand in hand
with the thugs attacking them,” a Human Rights Watch report related, adding that the
Ministry of Defense had deployed more than 150 plainclothes security officers to infiltrate the protests and intimidate or attack the demonstrators.79 The intimidation of activists continued outside the protests, culminating in the September assassination of Hadi
al-Mahdi, a popular radio talk show host who had been an important protest organizer.
Four hours before being murdered at his Baghdad home, Mahdi posted on Facebook that
Da’wa Party loyalists had issued death threats and were on their way to intercept him.80
The assassination marked the seventh such killing of an Iraqi journalist in 2011.
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These killings were just one sign that the political violence that had plagued Iraq
from 2004 to 2006 was reappearing. The vacant Ministry of Defense and Interior positions
remained problematic for the Iraqi and U.S. Governments as the status of forces agreement (SOFA) negotiations progressed, but when Maliki named nominees for the posts,
Ali Faisal al Lami, the de-Ba’athification committee chairman who had disrupted the 2010
elections, blocked the appointments on grounds that the candidates had Ba’athist ties.
Lami’s maneuver had a violent outcome.81 On May 26, 2011, professional-style gunmen
shot him in his car near Sadr City.82 It was just one of many attacks on Iraqi Government
officials that spring. As Iraq scholar Michael Knights noted, a wave of killings of Iraqi
officials meant that by June 2011, “senior Iraqi politicians and bureaucrats were attending
multiple funerals per week.”83 Chalabi blamed Lami’s murder on Ba’athists, but U.S. analysts concluded that Lami’s former allies in AAH, which had grown increasingly friendly
with Maliki in 2011, were behind the attack. When Austin brought up Lami’s death with
Maliki, the Prime Minister unsympathetically noted that Lami “had a lot of blood on his
hands.”84
The Return of AQI and End of the Sons of Iraq
As the Shi’a militant groups reemerged in early 2011, AQI demonstrated that it had
begun to recover from the attacks of the previous year. The resurgence began with the
scramble among AQI members to form a new leadership cadre in April-May 2010, a process that resulted in the takeover of the organization by figures connected to the former
regime of Saddam Hussein.
In contrast to the orderly succession of Abu Ayyub al-Masri as AQI leader after Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, there is no evidence that AQI anticipated or
planned for the catastrophic leadership losses of spring 2010. According to internal documents from al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Atiyah Abd ar-Rahman contacted AQI on April 22 to
authorize the group to appoint interim leaders on its own until al-Qaeda’s central leaders
could reestablish reliable communications.85 AQI publicly acknowledged the deaths of
its leaders on April 25, but waited until mid-May to announce its new leaders officially,
who emerged after much infighting.86 Despite its heavy losses, the group still had a small
number of surviving leaders qualified to take over.
According to former AQI ally Mullah Nadhim al-Juburi, those familiar with AQI’s
internal structure expected a new emir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to come from
AQI members with jihadi pedigrees and extremist religious credentials, such as Shaykh
Yunis al-Mashhadani, engineer Abd al-Rahim al-Ani, or Abdallah al-Mufti.87 Instead, the
weeks following the deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi witnessed a takeover of AQI by militants who tended to have Ba’athist as well as religious
backgrounds.
According to AQI insider accounts, Samir Abd Muhammed al-Khlifawi, known more
commonly as Hajji Bakr, a former Ba’athist colonel and AQI’s newly appointed operations chief, moved quickly to seize control of the organization. Lacking the requisite
religious credentials to serve as emir himself and hobbled by past ties to senior Ba’athists
such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Hajji Bakr aimed to install as ISI’s new emir his own
protégé, Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i (known to other jihadists as “Abu Du’a” or, later,
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as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Caliph Ibrahim), a little-known cleric elevated to the AQI shura council
less than 3 months before the deaths of Masri and
Abu Umar al-Baghdadi.88 Like many of ISI’s senior
leaders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been a detainee
at Camp Bucca, released after 11 months in 2004
as a low-threat detainee. Some AQI members later
claimed that amid the dispersal of AQI leaders
during April–May 2010, Hajji Bakr used his control
over the organization’s courier network to create
the appearance of consensus support for Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi and to rig a shura council vote in his
favor.89 One AQI member later claimed that a majority of AQI’s imprisoned leaders opposed Baghdadi’s
appointment, but they were unable to influence the
process.
To appease al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Hajji
Source: ISIS propaganda image.
Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appointed Nu’man
Salman Mansur al-Zaydi, a Moroccan trained in
Samir Abd Muhammad
Afghanistan by bin Laden’s lieutenants, to succeed
al-Khlifawi, Known More
Abu Ayyub al-Masri as war minister of the ISI. Zaydi
Commonly as Hajji Bakr.90
had traveled to Iraq in 2006 and 2007 and displayed
an anti-Shi’a sectarian ideology reminiscent of that
of Zarqawi. Following his appointment as “war minister,” he announced a new offensive
to avenge Abu Ayyub al-Masri.91 In contrast to Masri, however, Zaydi played little role
in AQI’s internal politics, content to let Hajji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi oversee
matters so long as they did not interfere with his ability to wage jihad.
Once in control of the entirety of AQI, Hajji Bakr reorganized the movement in ways
that resembled the Ba’ath, forming a new secret police (mukhabarat) cadre under a commander named Abu Safwan Rifai to prevent further leadership losses.92 In short order,
the AQI mukhabarat grew to 100 members who worked to purge internal dissent and
had wide-ranging authority above that of the provincial walis. From the ranks of these
mukhabarat, ISIS leaders later would draw the commanders of the paramilitary forces of
the “Islamic Caliphate” across Syria and Iraq.93 Hajji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also
formed a new shura council that included jihadists with Ba’athist ties.94 In addition to
Hajji Bakr and Abu Safwan Rifai, other key members of the new shura council included
the former Iraqi Army colonel Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hayali (aka Abu Muslim
al-Turkmani or Hajji Mu’tazz), Abd al Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka Abu Ali al-Anbari
or Abu Alaa al-Afiri), and former Iraqi Army captain Adnan Ismail Najm al-Bilawi (aka
Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Bilawi).95 Bilawi would later become the top intelligence official
within ISIS, while Hayali and Qaduli, both Turkomans from Tel Afar, would become
ISIS’s key operational commanders.
These new ISI leaders concentrated in their early months on replenishing the organization’s empty coffers rather than stepping up attacks against coalition forces or the Iraqi
Government.96 By the beginning of 2011, they had recovered enough to restart large-scale
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terrorist activities. In mid-January, they launched six suicide attacks over a span of 4 days
that killed 8 Iraqi soldiers and 38 civilians, and wounded more than 250 more Iraqis.
The worst attacks occurred on January 20, when a pair of suicide car bombers killed
or wounded 147 Arba’een pilgrims in Karbala.97 The ISF had planned ample security
measures for the pilgrimage, but Austin observed after the attack that “with six million
pilgrims on the road, it’s hard to protect them all.”98 On January 27, a suicide car bomber
killed or wounded more than 100 people in a funeral procession in central Baghdad,
showing that AQI, now calling itself the ISI almost exclusively, had regained its ability to
breach the capital and cause mayhem.99
Alongside these mass-casualty attacks, ISI focused on targeting Iraqi Government and
ISF officials, and began to do damage on a scale that Iraq had not seen for more than a
year.100 On January 17-19, ISI suicide bombers carried out large attacks in Ramadi, Tikrit,
and Baqubah, the first of which attempted—for the third time—to assassinate the Anbar
provincial governor but managed to kill the deputy governor instead. The attacks continued in February, with a three-car-bomb assault near the KDP headquarters in Kirkuk
and multiple attacks against ISF and Shi’a pilgrims in Samarra that caused hundreds of
casualties.101
The rejuvenated ISI benefited from the Maliki government’s rejection of the Sons of
Iraq, the group that had had a decisive, crushing impact on AQI in 2007-2008. Throughout
most of 2010 and 2011, the Maliki government stopped finding government jobs for Sons
of Iraq members. As of July 2010, only 41,000 of an estimated 94,000 Awakening members
had been hired and integrated into the government, with only 9,000 in security jobs.102
At the same time, the Interior Ministry began stripping Awakening movement security forces of their rank and salary, effectively leaving many unemployed.103 The Maliki
government blamed the problems on budget shortages, but many Sunnis perceived the
freeze as evidence of the government’s reluctance to integrate them into the state. Former
Awakening Council leader Nathem al-Jabouri opined in late 2010 that Sahwah members
had only two options: “Stay with the government, which would be a threat to their lives,
or help al-Qaeda by being a double agent.”104
Events seemed to support Sunni frustration, such as the Interior Ministry’s decision to
bypass the Sons of Iraq when hiring large numbers of new police for Ninewa Province in
early 2011. USF-I leaders pressed the Iraqi police commands to hire former Sons of Iraq
temporarily as contractors until government jobs became available, but the Interior Ministry rebuffed the idea of a mixed force of contractors and government employees on legal
grounds. USF-I reports identified “Shia dominance within the MoI,” as the real reason.105
In the meantime, USF-I looked for other ways to find the Sons of Iraq useful, paid work
and prevent them from returning to their former lives as insurgents. USF-I tried assigning
some of the Sons of Iraq to pursue human intelligence on the Syrian border and in Sunni
provinces but this was unsuccessful. A program to offer $4,000 small-business grants in
lieu of government jobs met with no more success. Another proposal involved retraining
Sons of Iraq members to be farmers, tractor repairmen, or gas station attendants, but the
Maliki government had little interest.106
The strongest evidence that ISI had begun to regain its strength came on March 29
when its militants carried out one of the deadliest strikes of the war against provincial
leaders. A group of about 10 insurgents disguised as Iraqi police attacked the Salahadin
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provincial council building in Tikrit with a car bomb, small arms fire, and suicide vests.
Once inside the government center, the militants took hostages and then systematically
slaughtered them during a protracted gun battle with the ISF. The ISF assaulted the
building twice, finally securing it 5 hours later. Five Iraqi soldiers died in the fighting
while 53 Iraqi civilians were killed, including 3 provincial council members and 2 journalists. Nearly 100 others were wounded. U.S. troops did not participate in the assault but
responded to Iraqi requests for ISR and close-air support.107 The attack sent shockwaves
through the Sunni communities of northern Iraq, which had presumed after spring 2010
that ISI had been neutralized. The provincial reconstruction team for Salahadin reported
that the province’s population was “stunned” by the violence and that the general sense
of security that had grown in the previous months had all but vanished after the attack.108
The apparent resurgence of ISI, coupled with Iraq’s growing political instability and
questions about the ISF’s effectiveness led Austin to request that 4th AAB, 1st Armored
Division deploy to Iraq in May to replace 4th AAB, 1st Cavalry Division in USD-N. The
Joint Staff and Defense Department had hoped that the brigade in Iraq could return home
without a replacement, but Austin believed the removal of an AAB from northern Iraq
would be too risky given the deterioration in security and political conditions. The deployment of the additional AAB was unpopular within the Pentagon, since it would slow the
drawdown and complicate USF-I’s withdrawal, but the additional brigade would give
Austin a fresh reserve force for the remainder of the mission.109
Austin’s decision proved prescient, as on August 15, ISI hit 17 cities nearly simultaneously with a series of bombings, killing 74 and injuring over 300. The attacks produced
the most casualties Iraq had experienced in a single day for over a year.110 Shi’a and
Christian neighborhoods in Kut, Baghdad, Baqubah, Karbala, and Najaf bore the brunt.
Less than 2 weeks later, ISI hit the massive Sunni Umm al Qura Mosque in West Baghdad
with a suicide-bomber, wounding 30 and killing 28, including a Member of Parliament.111
To many analysts, the strikes, launched during the month of Ramadan, appeared to be
an attempt by ISI to reignite the sectarian civil war that had been nearly extinguished but
was being given new life by Maliki’s partisan moves. ISI’s spokesman appeared to confirm as much, promising, “Do not worry, the days of Zarqawi are going to return soon,”
in the wake of the bombings.112
The ISI, which had been on life support for most of 2010, was back in force. Hajji
Bakr had managed to transform what had been the largely symbolic leadership of the
ISI into a supreme authority for the organization, with himself as the power behind Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. His restructuring of the group’s leadership cadre had recast former
Ba’athist officers as leaders of the global jihad, and their military expertise soon would
make the organization more effective than its earlier incarnations under Zarqawi and
Abu Ayyub al-Masri. These developments set the group down the path that would lead
to the Islamic State’s conquest of large swaths of northern and western Iraq.
The Mujahedin e Khalq Problem, Continued
The quandary of what to do with the UN-protected but terror-listed MeK, which had
bedeviled U.S. commanders and diplomats since 2003, came to the fore again when a debacle at the MeK camp in Diyala gave U.S. officials a preview of how the Iraqi Government
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intended to treat the group once the U.S. military left. The Iraqi Army had assumed control of external security at Camp Ashraf, the MeK’s base, in June 2010, after which the
MeK and Iraqi troops had confronted each other in clashes that U.S. forces could not
sort out due to ambiguous rules of engagement and force protection guidelines. As Colonel Malcolm Frost and his 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the local AAB in Diyala,
worked to advise and assist their ISF counterparts, Frost concluded that Camp Ashraf
and the MeK would have to be handled carefully to prevent violence. If not restrained,
Frost judged, the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government would settle old scores with the
MeK and fulfill Iran’s wish of forcing the organization to leave Iraq.113

Major General Perkins (center), Colonel Frost (right).
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Brandon Bolick (Released).

Major General David G. Perkins, Commander of MND-N, With Colonel Malcolm
Frost, Commander, 2d BCT, 25th Infantry Division, and Iraqi Officers.114
Frost’s predictions came true in early April. After the drawdown of U.S. observers
from the direct vicinity of Camp Ashraf, Frost discovered that the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command had ordered the Diyala Operation Center to attack the MeK compound. Frost
persuaded Diyala Operations Commander Lieutenant General Tariq Abd Al-Wahb Jasim
Mahdi al-Assawi to refuse the order, but Assawi was quickly relieved of his command
and replaced by his deputy, who followed the IGFC order. On April 8, while IGFC commander General Ali Ghaidan looked on, the 5th Iraqi Army division moved into Camp
Ashraf and immediately clashed with the MeK there. As the Iraqi and MeK casualties
mounted, Frost led his own headquarters and medics back to Camp Ashraf, ignoring ISF demands to remain outside the camp’s perimeter, and set up an aid station for
the hundreds wounded inside the compound.115 UN officials on the scene reported 34
people killed and more than 300 wounded in the fighting, the vast majority of them MeK
members.
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The crisis at Camp Ashraf led to tense confrontations between U.S. officials and the
Maliki government. Commenting on the situation to CENTCOM and the Pentagon,
Austin reported that senior Iraqi officials had been “consistently deceitful” when questioned about what was happening.116 Ambassador Jeffrey and the U.S. Embassy continued to work with the UN to try to resolve the fate of the MeK, but the Iraqi Government
appeared determined to remove the group forcibly from Camp Ashraf even if it required
violence.117
THE PATH TO ZERO
Operation NEW DAWN, which debuted in August 2010, was intended as a stability
operation as U.S. troops left Iraq, but after 9 months, the country was less stable than
when the operation began. Transferring security affairs to Iraqi control had ground to
a near halt during the long political stalemate after the March 2010 elections. The Shi’a
militant groups and AQI-ISI had both returned to the battlefield, reviving security threats
that once seemed finished. Austin, Cone, and other USF-I leaders realized the ISF were
not ready to handle Iraq’s security on their own.
The ISF’s violence against the protesters and the MeK in spring 2011 put U.S. commanders in an awkward position: USF-I’s mission was to empower the ISF, but if ISF
leaders reverted to Saddamist-type practices and functioned as a political tool for Prime
Minister Maliki, they would call U.S. security assistance into question. In the 8 months
remaining in USF-I’s mission, whether the United States and Iraq reached an agreement
on a residual force or not, U.S. troops would have further to go than anyone had anticipated to support the goal of leaving behind a stable, self-sufficient Iraqi state.
Planning for Post-2011: A Residual Force
On January 25, 2011, Austin met with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Michael W. Mullen and General James N. Mattis, the CENTCOM commander, to discuss
the requirement for a new status of forces agreement that would leave a residual force
in Iraq. Mullen and Mattis proposed a 24,000-strong force built around three advise-andassist brigades and some “boutique” items like special operations forces and aviation
support that could be drawn down easily if necessary.118 Mattis noted that keeping at
least one brigade in northern Iraq would mitigate Arab-Kurd tensions along the Green
Line and that any force could be drawn down as conditions improved.119 Austin reported
that both Prime Minister Maliki and Ayad Allawi supported the idea, at least privately.
Mattis believed Maliki would agree to a force of up to 25,000 U.S. troops as long as they
were only in a training role.
In February, Austin and his USF-I staff analyzed the pros and cons of residual forces
ranging from 10,000 to 24,000 and concluded that the risk of mission failure grew as the
force level dropped, and that the residual force should not be smaller than a full strength
division.120 The Iraqi security forces, though improving, would be hard-pressed to assume
responsibility for Iraq’s internal and external security by the end of the year. The Iraqis
would have a continued need for security assistance and capacity-building after 2011,
but Austin believed it would not be possible for U.S. forces to provide it from outside
Iraq. Austin also worried about the potential for the Iranian regime to fill the void left by
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the departing U.S. military presence and the danger to U.S. troops if the withdrawal proceeded too quickly.121 To hedge against future instability, USF-I hoped, in addition to the
residual force, to preposition enough equipment at different locations in Iraq to enable
the United States quickly to deploy a force of three BCTs to the country.122
In Austin’s and Cone’s view, strategic risk and security should shape U.S. decisions.
A robust residual force would not only benefit Iraq but also provide security assurances
for Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and Israel.123 However, Austin also believed it would be difficult to steer deliberations in Washington away from troop numbers and costs.124 Cone
worried that discussions about residual force would focus solely on trainers and would
shortchange force-protection requirements.125
These military recommendations for a residual force ran counter to the preferences
of the Obama administration. In late 2010, administration officials suggested to reporters
that the United States could get by with between 5,000 and 10,000 troops in Iraq. Reports
were that the President himself was considering a force that small. By April, Obama
confirmed these reports, making clear to senior U.S. officials that maintaining more than
10,000 troops was no longer an option, a constraint that frustrated SECDEF Robert Gates
as well as the U.S. military leadership in Iraq.126
Inauspicious Start for SOFA Negotiations
Negotiations with the Maliki government about a new SOFA and a residual force
intensified in spring 2011, with the expiration of the existing agreement only 8 months
away. With time growing short, negotiators on both sides tacitly agreed U.S. troops could
remain past the deadline without a finalized SOFA if the Iraqi Government formally
requested them.127 On April 16, Maliki told visiting Congressman John Boehner, speaker
of the House of Representatives, that while he felt Iraqi forces could secure the country
after 2011, he would welcome American training and equipment.128 On May 8, Maliki had
a similar meeting with Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, Austin, and Jeffrey,
but when the visiting congressmen pressed him about the need for agreement on a residual force, the Iraqi leader countered that the U.S. Government had not yet told him what
kind of force it wished to leave in Iraq after 2011. Without a specific proposal, the Prime
Minister had had nothing to present to the Parliament, so the issue had languished.129 The
senators later wrote that Austin and Jeffrey told them after the meeting that U.S. leaders
in Washington had not yet decided how many troops to propose.
Maliki’s shaky political standing hampered the negotiations as well. Some polls indicated that less than 20 percent of Iraqis wanted U.S. troops to remain, but at the same time
Iraqis were worried about the security vacuum following an American withdrawal.130
Sadrist resistance to the negotiations put Maliki in a political bind, given his dependence
on the Sadrist Parliamentary bloc for his position as Prime Minister.131 In late May, Sadr
led a large protest against the SOFA and threatened to reconstitute the Jaysh al Mahdi
militia if the U.S. military remained.132
Maliki created additional unrest himself. During a Parliamentary recess in May, Maliki
violated the Erbil Agreement by naming his allies Faleh al-Fayadh and former Minister
of Defense Abdel Qader to ministerial-level national security posts, but maintained the
Ministries of Defense and Interior portfolios himself.133 These moves deepened the public
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battle between Maliki and Ayad Allawi, who remained in a position to threaten Maliki’s
shaky governing coalition. Maliki feared that if he committed publicly to a new SOFA
and residual force, Allawi would attack his policy on nationalist grounds and rob him of
his thin margin of support.134 Maliki himself was at times ambivalent toward the SOFA,
as a continued U.S. presence would likely be an obstacle to his consolidation of power.
Meanwhile, Obama had set August 1 as an unpublicized deadline for the Iraqis formally
to request a residual force. During a videoconference with Obama in June, Maliki asked
for additional time to shore up political support for the agreement and cited Allawi’s
opposition as an obstacle.135 In July, President Talabani convened a meeting of the major
political blocs in hopes of reaching a unified position in favor of U.S. military support,
but Allawi’s bloc refused to agree to a residual force until the 2010 Erbil Agreement was
implemented and the vacant security minister posts filled.136
Despite the political turmoil, many Iraqi military leaders considered some American
military presence necessary. Abdel Qader, now Maliki’s chief advisor on defense matters,
had consistently acknowledged that the ISF would require continued training through
2018.137 In July, Major General Fadhel Barwari, the ISOF commander, told The New York
Times, “The Americans need to stay because we don’t have control over our borders.”138
The next month, Iraqi chief of defense General Babakir Zebari told reporters, “Iraqi soldiers and officers would like the American forces to stay in Iraq until they’re capable of
doing the job 100 percent. . . . If I were asked about the withdrawal, I would say to politicians, ‘The U.S. Army must stay until the Iraqi Army is fully ready in 2020. . . . If America
withdraws its forces and one of the neighboring countries causes problems, then we’re
going to have a problem’.”139
The Spike in Shi’a Militant Attacks
As the SOFA negotiations intensified, the Iranian regime’s Shi’a proxies escalated
attacks against U.S. troops. In southern Iraq, violence steadily rose from May onward,
but since the Shi’a militants spared the ISF, most ISF units in the south were reluctant
to defend U.S. troops and installations from the militias as the U.S.-Iraq security agreement required them to do. Austin warned his superiors that if the attacks continued,
USF-I would be forced to conduct unilateral operations against the groups, likely with
U.S. casualties.140 The munitions used plus the increasing accuracy of the attacks pointed
toward greater Iranian involvement particularly in the U.S. Division-South (USD-S) area
of responsibility.141 Austin wanted U.S. training teams to partner with Iraqi units to disrupt the smuggling routes for the Shi’a militants’ lethal supplies from Iran, but local governments in southern Iraq resisted the kind of cooperation Austin desired.142 In one case,
the Sadrist Provincial Council in Basrah attempted to outlaw the movement of USF-I
throughout the province. Local courts appeared to operate a “catch-and-release” program for any Shi’a militants detained.
On June 6, Kata’ib Hizballah fired an IRAM from the Iraqi-controlled portion of FOB
Loyalty near Sadr City, killing 7 Americans and wounding 30.143 Further south, by midJune, the Iranian-backed militias continuously harassed USD-S with IRAM and EFP
attacks. To fire the heavy, difficult-to-guide IRAMs, the Shi’a militants used launch points
close to American bases and troop concentrations, sometimes building houses with a
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false roof, such as a plastic tarpaulin, near the base perimeter, and then removing the roof
just before firing the IRAM.144 In late June, a Kata’ib Hizballah IRAM at FOB Shocker, 5
miles from the Iran-Iraq border, killed three Soldiers and wounded seven more just days
before the outpost was due for transfer to the ISF. The attack brought the number of U.S.
Soldiers killed in June to 14, with more than 50 wounded, making it the deadliest month
for U.S. forces in over 2 years. Over April, May, and June, 21 Soldiers were killed and
105 wounded—triple the previous 3 months’ casualties.145 Violence against the civilian
population rose as well. Iraqis suffered 340 killed in June, the most recorded in a year.146
In response, Austin ordered CJSOTF to launch unilateral raids against Shi’a militant
technicians and facilitators across the south.147 Nevertheless, in July the number of attacks
in the country escalated to 13 per day, a 30 percent increase over the average of the previous 6 months.148 On July 10, AAH bombarded FOB Garry Owen with rockets, killing
one American Soldier. On July 12, the group launched more than 40 rockets at the base,
and on July 16, they followed with four IRAMs, though these attacks caused no casualties. The same month, Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction,
declared in a report to Congress that Iraq was less safe than a year before.149
Following AAH’s July 16 attack, Austin bluntly told Maliki that the ISF were not
engaging Shi’a militant groups. The USF-I commander also asked the Iraqi leader to
warn Iran not to confuse USF-I’s restraint with weakness. Maliki replied that he had
sent the same message to Tehran only days before and had dispatched his own national
security advisor to emphasize the warning, but the Prime Minister also told Austin that
USF-I’s unilateral raids against Shi’a targets were a political problem for him and pressed
Austin to return to combined U.S.-Iraqi operations. After almost 2 months of elevated
attacks and ISF failure to counter them, however, Austin received Maliki’s assurances
with skepticism.150
Despite the Prime Minister’s entreaties, USF-I continued unilateral operations and
captured one of the suspects in the late June attack against FOB Shocker. Partnered U.S.ISF operations, meanwhile, rounded up some of the Shi’a militants responsible for IRAM
attacks in Basrah, while ISF-led operations in Maysan Province netted 70 low-level Shi’a
militants in late July and early August. However, USF-I’s efforts to get the Iraqi Government and ISF to pressure the Shi’a militias met little success. Despite the rising Shi’a
militant threat, the ISF continued to generate mostly Sunni targets for partnered counterterrorism operations, and Iraqi judges often refused to issue warrants for individuals
suspected of taking part in attacks.151 U.S. units and advisors also noted that the Shi’a
militant groups regularly infiltrated ISF units, creating a problem that would continue to
plague USF-I’s advisory mission.152
PREPARING FOR EXIT
The “Waterfall” and Withdrawal From the Green Line
As it became clearer to USF-I and U.S. Embassy negotiators that the residual U.S.
force in Iraq would be much smaller than the 24,000 troops they initially recommended,
Austin gradually began to decrease the U.S. military presence. First, he withdrew U.S.
troops from the 22 combined security checkpoints along the Green Line in Major General
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David Perkins’s USD-N, placing them into an overwatch role. As USD-N receded from
the checkpoints, U.S. commanders hoped they could convince Arab and Kurdish units to
continue cooperation along the Green Line, but this proved difficult.153 USD-N initially
withdrew forces from the combined security checkpoints in Diyala and Ninawa, but had
difficulty extricating themselves from the bilateral checkpoints manned by Iraqi police in
Kirkuk. Eventually, USD-N and the Iraqis agreed the “Golden Lions,” the Iraqi unit consisting of Iraqi Army, Iraqi police, and members of the peshmerga militia, would assume
responsibility for the Kirkuk checkpoints as the last of the U.S. forces moved into overwatch positions on July 22.154
Next, Austin consolidated the three U.S. division headquarters. Since its arrival in
January, attacks on the 36th Infantry Division USD-S by Shi’a militants had increased,
with local ISF in the south doing little to stop them.155 Concerned that the 36th Division
headquarters devoted much of its effort to force protection, Austin redeployed the division headquarters early and merged the remaining units in U.S. Division-Center (USD-C)
and USD-S into a single division under Major General Bernard Champoux’s 25th Infantry
Division headquarters. After the 36th Infantry Division’s departure, Champoux and his
command served as the main command-and-control element for USF-I’s final maneuvers
out of Iraq. This move allowed Austin to continue to staff the Arab-Kurd fault line in the
north and Baghdad, but rendered southern Iraq an economy-of-force mission.156
The End of the Special Operations Mission
The realization that U.S. troop strength—including special operations forces—might
drop to zero by the end of 2011 caught the CJSOTF off guard. Most special operations
leaders had anticipated continued counterterrorism and advisory missions after conventional forces left, believing that a full withdrawal was a “throw-away course of action
. . . that’s never going to happen.”157 Yet the U.S. special operations mission already had
undergone dramatic changes since 2008. By 2011 the ISOF, CJSOTF’s principal Iraqi partner, had become a capable organization, described by several CJSOTF commanders as
the best special operations unit in the Middle East. The unit had expanded from one to
two brigades, one with two national-level counterterrorism battalions, and the second
with regional commando battalions in Basrah, Mosul, Diyala, and Anbar.158 These Iraqi
units conducted nighttime helicopter assaults in Mi–17 helicopters flown by Iraqi pilots
as a matter of routine. They had developed their own human intelligence networks, and
even had their own ISR aircraft and joint terminal attack controllers for close air support.
But the sectarianism that seeped into the organization since its 2007 transfer to the control of Prime Minister Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief degraded the CJSOTF’s
ability to conduct operations with ISOF elements. The Prime Minister had used the ISOF
to intimidate Sunni politicians and other political opponents in addition to targeting
terrorists, and the CJSOTF slowly had distanced itself from the ISOF as the Iraqi force
became politicized. In December 2008, the ISOF had arrested 35 politicians only weeks
before Iraq’s provincial elections.159 In May 2009, the brigade arrested four of the nine
newly elected provincial council members in Diyala.160 In May 2010, the brigade again
arrested a politician in Diyala who had openly criticized the ISOF’s politicized role.161
When these raids occurred, the CJSOTF declined to participate and raised objections with
their Iraqi counterparts in the Counter Terrorism Service headquarters.
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While partnered operations with the ISOF against AQI continued, missions against
Shi’a targets rarely were approved.162 In one instance, Cone submitted 10 potential targets, all of them involving rocket attacks. Counterterrorism director General Talib Kenani
approved two Sunni targets immediately, but disapproved the remaining eight Shi’a targets because they did not have “the right intelligence.”163 In a further display of sectarian
tone deafness, Counter Terrorism Service leaders chose to have the ISOF brigade’s elite
Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force change uniforms. The uniform of Iraq’s national Army
was replaced with jet black coveralls, which matched the all black clothing worn by the
Mahdi Militia during the dark days of Iraq’s civil war—a similarity immediately recognized by Sunni leaders across Iraq.
Because of these trends, the CJSOTF shifted its focus from the ISOF to a partnership
with the Emergency Response Brigade (ERB), an Interior Ministry unit modeled upon the
FBI hostage rescue and special weapons and tactics teams. The CJSOTF had formed the
ERB as a police counterpart to the ISOF brigade, and some of the brigade’s elements, such
as the Hillah special weapons and tactics (SWAT) battalion, had been paired with Special
Forces advisors since 2003.164 The ERB commander, Brigadier General Noman Dakhil
Jawad, was a Shi’a officer unafraid of arresting fellow Shi’a Iraqis who were accused of
sectarian crimes or targeting American forces. This independence caused at least one
CJSOTF commander to warn Jawad to lower his profile or risk drawing Prime Minister
Maliki’s attention.165 It was a prescient warning. In March 2011, Maliki loyalists in the
federal police tried to arrest Jawad on charges of corruption, but when the policemen
arrived, his troops drove them off. Nevertheless, after Jawad’s subsequent arrest, a Saddam-era officer whom USF-I linked to Kata’ib Hizballah took his place and abruptly ended
the ERB’s partnered operations against Shi’a targets.166 The CJSOTF noted that the new
commander exclusively targeted Sunnis, including Sunni political leaders, often without
warrants. In July, after the ERB’s Hillah SWAT battalion and CJSOTF advisors conducted
a series of operations against Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, several of the Hillah battalion’s leaders were arrested and jailed.167 By August, the CJSOTF had collected enough
evidence to persuade Austin to sever ties with the ERB. Breaking the news was difficult
for the brigade’s Special Forces advisors, with some of the Green Berets and the ERB
constables they had fought alongside nearly brought to tears when they learned of the
decision.168
The Race to Build ISF Capacity
Building capacity within the Iraqi security forces always had been a crucial component of the transition plan. As debate continued over the residual force question, Cone,
who had once overseen the U.S. Army’s National Training Center, pressed Iraqi Army
leaders to develop basic combined-arms capabilities through collective training.169 As he
did so, the USF-I advisory brigades urged their Iraqi Army counterparts to pull units out
of day-to-day operations to train, with mixed results. In April, the Iraqi military commenced Exercise Lion’s Leap, in which Iraqi units simulated hostage rescues; cordon
and search operations; air assaults; and reconnaissance operations with a combination
of air, land, and naval forces.170 In addition, the 8th, 9th, and 14th Iraqi Army divisions
all conducted major training exercises in 2011, but the Iraqis’ capacity to undertake more
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sophisticated training as the number of American military trainers diminished remained
in question.171

Source: DoD photo by Captain Chad Ashe (Released).

Soldiers From the Iraqi Army’s 12th Division Take Part in Exercise Lion’s Leap.172
The effort to modernize the Iraqi Army created some additional challenges. As American-made equipment made its way to Iraqi units,173 the Iraqis required two separate
logistics systems, one for the newer American-made systems and the other for the Soviet
bloc equipment the Iraqis had fielded from 2003 to 2009. Many units ended up with a mix
of Soviet and American equipment and encountered shortages of nearly every category
of supply. The communications systems in the American tanks were not compatible with
those in the eastern bloc legacy vehicles, so that many units had to rely on hand and arm
signals or cell phones for tactical communications.174
Meanwhile, the United States continued to work with the Iraqi Government to purchase F–16 fighter aircraft, which U.S. officials believed would tie the Iraqi military
closer to the United States and serve as a counterbalance to Iran’s rising influence in the
region.175 Iraq would pay for the F–16s from oil revenues, with an expected cost of $4.2
billion, including parts and related weapons.176 However, the air force had a difficult
time recruiting personnel, training its pilots, and maintaining its planes, leaving Austin
concerned that the Iraqis might not be able to sustain an F-16 force over the long term
without U.S. mentorship.177
USF-I found it difficult to work with Iraqi defense officials to solve these and many
other similar problems. With Maliki serving as both Minister of Defense and Minister
of Interior in addition to his responsibilities as Prime Minister, obtaining the necessary
administrative approval for crucial ministerial functions was slow. USF-I officials noted
that in the uncertain political environment, Iraqi bureaucrats feared making decisions
that could have political implications, with the result that Iraq’s national-level defense
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systems were incapable of planning more than 6 to 8 weeks in advance. As Cone described
it, the national security ministries in 2011 were in “a general state of paralysis.”178
The “paralysis” had come in part from an unprecedented consolidation of power
within the ISF, as Prime Minister Maliki purged professional officers in key leadership
positions across the ISF and replaced them with his supporters. In 2011, Maliki replaced
5 of the 14 division commanders, substituting Shi’a Da’wa party loyalists for proven
Sunni and Kurdish commanders.179 The Kurds, who felt the reassignments most acutely,
made their frustrations public, with General Babakir Zebari, Iraq’s Chief of Defense and
commander of the Joint Headquarters, providing President Talibani a report that alleged
General Mohan Freiji, who had become a senior advisor to the Minister of Defense after
being removed as the Basra Operations Commander, had “spearheaded a campaign to
rid all Kurdish influence and destroy Kurdish roles within the MoD.”180 Zebari’s report
alleged that Prime Minister Maliki had orchestrated a slow takeover of Iraq’s security
apparatus, a process that began with the creation of the Office of the Commander in
Chief (OCINC), which Zebari described as “a shadow headquarters” that “diluted” and
“stole” the power of the Joint Headquarters. Following the creation of the OCINC, Maliki
quietly took control of Iraq’s special operations forces and its intelligence services, along
with their substantial and secret budgets. With the most effective elements of the Iraqi
security forces under Maliki’s control, OCINC and other Da’wa officers in key positions
began a campaign “assigning officers with sectarian ties to various units and divisions in
the Army.” Zebari asserted that in 2009 Kurdish loyalists intercepted a secret letter from
General Freiji to other Shi’a conspirators in the Ministry of Defense describing methods to accomplish these objectives. These included forcing Kurdish and Sunni officers to
retire, flooding unqualified Shi’a militia members into the senior ranks of the Army, and
“finding charges” that could be levied against senior officers unwilling to support Maliki’s sectarian consolidation.181
By 2010, Maliki’s labors had borne fruit, and in addition to the changes that left only
two Kurds and two Sunnis in command of the 14 divisions in the Iraqi Army, Shi’a officers had taken control of all of the department and directorate level positions in the Ministry of Defense. Shi’a generals held three of the four service commands, with Sunnis
completely excluded, and the Baghdad Operations Command was ordered to report
directly to Maliki, bypassing the Joint Headquarters.182 Zebari’s report argued that as
USF-I rushed to prepare the Iraqi security forces for the unanticipated complete withdrawal of American forces, a slow cancer was overtaking the organization from within.
THE RETROGRADE
The Collapse of SOFA Negotiations
The new U.S. defense secretary, Leon Panetta, arrived in Baghdad on July 11, 2011, for
talks with President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki on the long-term U.S. presence
in Iraq. Panetta emphasized the need for U.S. force protection and for the Iraqi Government to appoint defense and interior ministers. Maliki expressed confidence that the
Iraqis could take care of Iraq’s internal security with limited U.S. assistance in intelligence, logistics, border control, air space control, and collective training. Panetta replied
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that if the Iraqis wanted U.S. assistance, they should formally request it sooner rather
than later.183 Speaking to U.S. troops after his meetings, a frustrated Panetta said, “I’d
like things to move a lot faster here, frankly, in terms of the decision-making process. I’d
like them to make a decision, you know: Do they want us to stay? Don’t they want us to
stay? . . . Damn it, make a decision.”184

Source: DoD photo by Technical Sergeant Jacob N. Bailey (Released).

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta Meets With U.S. Troops Following Negotiations
With Iraqi Leaders About an Extension of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement.185
In late July, Jeffrey and Austin made their rounds of the Iraqi political leaders to stress
the importance of arriving at a decision on the SOFA quickly, but when the political blocs
met on August 2, ostensibly to decide Iraq’s policy on the SOFA, they adjourned for the
30-day Ramadan holiday instead.186 In the meantime, Maliki’s acting Minister of Defense,
Sadun al Dulaymi, agreed with Austin that there was an urgent need for a continued
U.S. military mission, but declined to formalize arrangements without Parliamentary
approval.187
On the eve of Obama’s August 1 deadline for a formal Iraqi request for a residual U.S.
force, Ambassador Jeffrey and Brett McGurk reported that Maliki could meet all the U.S.
administration’s requirements with two exceptions. He did not yet have Parliamentary
approval for the extension of troops and, because of pressure from the Sadrist bloc, he
could not guarantee U.S. troops immunity from prosecution in the Iraqi judicial system.
Both points crossed redlines for the U.S. negotiators and leaders, although Panetta advocated continuing the negotiations to maintain a 10,000-man residual force in Iraq.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, named director of the Office of Security Cooperation that would succeed USF-I at the end of 2011, met with senior U.S.
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officials in Washington as he prepared to deploy to Baghdad in August. In one meeting, a senior White House official warned Caslen to be prepared not to have any troops
under his command after 2011, because the President intended not to maintain a residual
force in Iraq. Instead, the official said, the President would insist that the Iraqi Parliament
approve the SOFA—a demand that would be a poison pill, since Maliki would not risk a
no-confidence vote on his premiership. “We know it is not going to happen . . . and it will
look like the Iraqis were the ones that made it happen,” the official told Caslen.188 Arriving in Baghdad shortly after the meeting, Caslen met with Austin and Jeffrey and relayed
the warning, but the general and ambassador assured Caslen that U.S. leaders remained
committed to leaving a residual force in the country.189
Back in Washington, the administration was reducing the size of the projected residual force. On August 13, Obama informed the National Security Council (NSC) principals
that he had revised his earlier position and would now only authorize a maximum of
3,500 U.S. troops to remain in Iraq, supported by an additional 1,500 troops that would
periodically rotate in and out of the country as contingencies arose. The smaller force and
rotational posture were ideas that General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had suggested to White House officials without the knowledge of
Panetta or Mullen. In Iraq, the revised numbers caught McGurk and Jeffrey off guard and
unable to explain the change, as hours before they had been negotiating with the Iraqis
for a residual force of 10,000. The smaller force would still require Iraqi Parliamentary
approval and immunity from Iraqi law but would provide much less capability to help
defend Iraq.
Assessing the costs and benefits of the SOFA and unnerved by the change in the size
of the residual force, many Iraqi politicians concluded that they would expend far too
much political capital and incur too much risk in exchange for a small force with limited
capabilities. Thus, when the Iraqi Parliament returned from its Ramadan holiday in early
September, the negotiating teams made no progress resolving these issues. As September
passed without an agreement, Austin declared October 15 as the deadline for a decision,
since beyond that point “the laws of physics,” as he put it, would make it impossible for
USF-I to withdraw by the end of the year.190
As that deadline approached, Austin and USF-I began to realize that an agreement
was unlikely. On October 1, Austin reported to Panetta that Maliki simply could not find
a way to balance the need for a continued U.S. troop presence with the political fallout he
anticipated if he pushed the Iraqi Parliament to a public vote on the matter.191 For a brief
time, Austin considered “freezing” 5,000 troops in place to force the Parliament to vote
on the SOFA.192 He also proposed signaling U.S. commitment to stay by accelerating the
arrival of the 3d Infantry Division headquarters, which was scheduled to deploy to Iraq
as a subordinate unit under OSC-I, and reflagging it as the United States Training Mission-Iraq by the beginning of December as USF-I redeployed.193
However, by October 7, Austin accepted that he would be unable to retain either the
advise-and-assist brigades or aircraft within Iraq’s borders after 2011. He ordered USF-I
to begin planning to augment Caslen’s OSC-I, which would have to assume responsibility for the entirety of the U.S. military mission by the end of the year.194 The official word
came on October 21, when Obama spoke with Prime Minister Maliki via video teleconference for the first time since June and informed the Iraqi leader that the United States
would indeed reduce its forces in Iraq to zero by the end of 2011.
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Maliki’s Crackdown
Political turbulence followed in the weeks after the announcement that U.S. troops
would withdraw. KRG President Massoud Barzani leveled the public charge that Maliki
and his allies had submitted to pressure from Iran not to sign the SOFA. Acting Minister
of Defense Sadun Dulaymi, considered a Maliki ally, charged that Maliki had violated
the Iraqi constitution in an attempt to seize power.195 Meanwhile, the Prime Minister took
steps to solidify control of an Iraqi military that would no longer be partnered with U.S.
military units. In the Iraqi general officer ranks, Maliki removed several senior military
leaders who had been closely associated with the United States, including General Nasier
Abadi, an experienced air force officer who had been Iraq’s vice chief of defense. Maliki
ordered Abadi’s retirement just days after finalizing the agreement to buy American
F–16s, even though Abadi had overseen Iraq’s F–16 program for several years.196
With U.S. troops set to depart, U.S. officials saw signs that Maliki feared the prospects
for a coup against him once his government no longer had the backing of American
military units. Caslen observed that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s brutal murder
by rebels on October 20, 2011, the day before Obama’s Iraq withdrawal announcement,
panicked the Prime Minister. Recalling a meeting with Austin and Maliki shortly after
Gaddafi’s death, Caslen said, “All Maliki could talk about was ‘that better not happen to
me . . . there better not be a coup, or I will be dragged through the streets’.”197
Maliki’s fears probably drove what happened next. Three days after Obama
announced the U.S. withdrawal, the Maliki government arrested 600 people across the
country, mostly Sunnis, to quash what Maliki said was a Ba’athist coup plot revealed to
him by the new Libyan Government. However, the government’s list of supposed plotters made the allegations seem implausible, since it included people who had long since
left the Ba’ath Party and others who were already dead.198 USF-I reported that the arrests
aroused “the ire of Sunni officials and tribal sheikhs.”199 In Salahadin, the Sunni-majority
provincial council responded to the crackdown by voting on October 27 for a federal,
semi-autonomous region modeled upon the KRG—an arrangement they believed might
insulate the province from what they viewed as Maliki’s authoritarian consolidation of
power in Baghdad.200 Within days, the Sunni-led provincial councils in Ninewa, Diyala,
and Anbar followed suit, fully reversing their provinces’ 2005 rejection of the federalism
provisions in the Iraqi constitution.201 Maliki declared these moves unconstitutional and
dispatched troops to Salahadin to suppress Sunni protests and to Baqubah to arrest the
Diyala provincial governor.202
Similar trouble appeared on the Arab-Kurd front as U.S. troops began to leave. Even
before it was decided there would not be a residual force, peshmerga forces had moved
into the combined security areas in northern Iraq as U.S. troops departed. In November,
when USF-I transferred FOB Warrior in Kirkuk to Iraqi Army control, Kurdish police
attempted to block Iraqi Army units from entering the base. With only weeks before
the departure of U.S. forces, Austin found himself making a final attempt to prevent
Kurd-Arab tensions from escalating into war. One senior Kurdish politician visiting
Washington summed up the situation shortly after Maliki’s crackdown and the Kirkuk
confrontation. “Many Americans seem to think this [the U.S. military withdrawal] means
the end of the power struggle in Iraq . . . it does not. Now that the Americans are going,
we will see the real start of the struggle for power in Iraq, not the end.”203
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The Final Convoys
USF-I’s final withdrawal from Iraq over a 7-week period in 2011 was an extraordinary
logistical feat for a U.S. force that had maintained large bases in the country for more
than 8 years and for U.S. commanders who, until the last moment, had not expected to
have to leave completely. The scale of the final retrograde movement out of Iraq—the
“waterfall” that USF-I had planned for—was a sizable and rare effort. Austin’s decision
to keep as many troops as possible working with the ISF until late 2011 meant that when
it was announced on October 21 that U.S. forces would withdraw fully, USF-I had fewer
than 60 days to redeploy 40,000 Soldiers and about 36,000 contractors. Those personnel
would have to dispose of the vast amount of equipment that had accumulated since 2003,
including 45,000 pieces of rolling stock and 13,000 shipping containers. Although a small
portion of that equipment would be transferred to the ISF, most would have to be driven
to ports in Kuwait or Jordan or flown from Baghdad. USF-I’s personnel would exit by
convoying to Kuwait or flying out of Baghdad.204

Source: USF-I briefing slide (Released).

Chart 1. U.S. Military Base Closures (December 2010-December 2011).205
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Source: USF-I briefing slides (Released).

Chart 2. Troop Drawdown and Contractor Drawdown.206
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Source: USF-I briefing slide (Released).

Chart 3. Transportation Sustainment Spine in Iraq for Operation NEW DAWN.207
To manage the exit, Austin relocated USF-I’s command nodes to Al Asad airbase and
to Kuwait and prepared to hand the enormous Victory base complex over to the Iraqis.208
A CENTCOM contracting fusion cell helped manage the contractor drawdown, since
USF-I had no mechanism to verify the whereabouts of individual contractors.209 A few
U.S. military elements continued their operations in Iraq up to the last days of the USF-I
presence. USF-I had asked the Iraqi Government to take custody of USF-I’s remaining
detainees before the end of the year, but Prime Minister Maliki declined the request,
forcing American detention operations elements to continue their work until the end of
December.210

554

FROM NEW DAWN TO ZERO AUGUST 2010-DECEMBER 2011

Likewise, the remaining special operators of the CJSOTF continued daily operations
up to the unit’s final day in Iraq, with many of the operations meant to protect the large
American convoys leaving Iraq. With three battalion-sized task forces still in Iraq, the
CJSOTF would have to manage a rapid drawdown at the same time Austin expected
them to serve as a covering force as U.S. troops withdrew. As Colonel Scott Brower,
the CJSOTF commander at the time, described it, the CJSOTF would be “screening for
USF-I, literally doctrinally screening, as the conventional forces were withdrawing down
route Tampa heading for Kuwait.”211 To keep the Shi’a militias off-balance and deter
their attacks, Austin authorized the CJSOTF to launch preemptive strikes.212 At times,
the CJSOTF operated unilaterally, but usually it conducted partnered operations—sometimes with its Soldiers wearing Iraqi uniforms and in vehicles painted to match the ISF as
a way to lower their signature.213

Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Cecilio Ricardo (Released).

Airmen of the 407th Air Expeditionary Group Prepare to Depart Iraq in a C-17
Globemaster III Cargo Aircraft.214
By the beginning of December 2011, USF-I had only 5 bases in Iraq, and between 500
and 800 U.S. Soldiers were leaving the country each day.215 Austin had long worried
about the vulnerability of U.S. troops as they convoyed through southern Iraqi territory
where the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant groups had a heavy presence. His concerns
had deepened in September after reports that IRGC Quds Force affiliates were occasionally interfering with U.S. convoys, raising the prospect that attacks against USF-I’s
last convoys might yield propaganda images of burning U.S. vehicles on the Iraqi highways.216 As the retrograde movement unfolded, however, the U.S. convoys and their ISF
escorts made their way to Kuwait unharrassed, indicating that the Iranian regime and its
proxies decided ultimately not to impede USF-I’s exit.
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Caleb Barrieau (Released).

General Lloyd Austin Cases the USF-I Colors at Camp Victory on
December 15, 2011.217
By early December, Camp Victory, where more than 50,000 Americans had once been
based, resembled a ghost town. A small air operations center remained at the Baghdad
Airport to support the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I, but on December 1, USF-I handed its
Iraqi counterparts possession of the empty Faw Palace, the former seat of American military power. On December 15, Panetta and Austin presided over a final ceremony at
Camp Victory to case USF-I’s colors. It was an event attended by Iraq’s senior military
officers, but Prime Minister Maliki chose not to join them, and the front-row seat that
USF-I reserved for him remained empty. “No words, no ceremony, can provide full tribute to the sacrifices that have brought this day to pass,” Panetta told the crowd, adding
that though the cost had been high for the United States and the Iraqi people, “Those
lives were not lost in vain. They gave birth to an independent, free and sovereign Iraq.”218
Following the ceremony, Austin boarded an aircraft and departed Iraq, taking JFSOCC-I
commander Brigadier General Darsie Rogers and the last USF-I elements in Baghdad
with him.
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***
Three days after the ceremony at Camp Victory, the final U.S. convoy assembled at
Contingency Operating Base (COB) Adder near Nasiriyah in the early morning hours
of December 18. To throw off any final symbolic enemy attack, the troops had spread
disinformation to local officials the day before that they would be remaining in place for
the time being. However, at 2:30 am, more than 500 Soldiers loaded into 110 vehicles and
began their trek in the dark, arriving at the Kuwaiti border shortly before dawn.

Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Cecilio Ricardo (Released).

The Final USF-I Convoy Reaches the Kuwaiti Border as the Sun Rises
on December 18, 2011.219
Among the troops in the last convoy was an American Soldier who had arrived in the
United States as an Iraqi immigrant in 2009 and had enlisted in the U.S. Army the following year. As the convoy waited in the night to depart COB Adder, the Soldier spoke
to a New York Times reporter, but declined to give his name out of fear for the safety of
his family that remained in Iraq. Asked for his thoughts on the withdrawal, he observed,
“The Iraqis are going to wake up in the morning, and nobody will be there.”220
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CHAPTER 15
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION
AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
In December 2011, the decision not to leave a residual U.S. force in Iraq left Lieutenant
General Robert Caslen and the 150 personnel of the new Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) unexpectedly in charge of the large-scale security assistance mission
that a theater headquarters and more than 40,000 U.S. troops had been performing just
weeks before. U.S. leaders made the change from a large U.S. military command to a
small embassy-based cooperation office against the backdrop of what many U.S. observers believed was an increasingly stable Iraq, a strengthening Iraqi state and Iraqi security
forces (ISF), and a manageable set of security threats. Over the ensuing 2½ years, the
experiment of using a stripped-down OSC-I to consolidate the U.S. campaign gains fell
fall short of the mark. From 2012 to 2014, Iraq slipped back into civil war, and the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI) regenerated fully into the new Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL/ISIS), with the U.S. military powerless to stop either event.
AFTER U.S. FORCES-IRAQ (USF-I): CRACKDOWNS AND DISARRAY
Maliki’s Purges
On December 12, 2011, as the few remaining U.S. troops in Iraq prepared to leave,
President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki met in Washington, DC, to
mark the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Early in the day, the two leaders visited Arlington National Cemetery to lay wreaths at the graves of troops killed in the Iraq
War. Later, in a joint press conference at the White House, they emphasized that their
two countries would have a different relationship moving forward. Welcoming Maliki as
“the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant, and democratic Iraq,” Obama noted that
levels of violence in Iraq remained low despite the U.S. troop withdrawal and declared,
“what we have now achieved is an Iraq that is self-governing, that is inclusive, and that
has enormous potential.” As the President saw it, Iraq could be “a model for others that
are aspiring to create democracy in the region.” Both Obama and Maliki acknowledged
that their governments were at odds over the question of whether Syrian leader Bashar
al-Assad should leave power, but in general, the two leaders hailed the future strategic
partnership between their countries.1
Three days later, on the same day that General Lloyd Austin and Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Leon Panetta cased U.S. Forces-Iraq’s (USF-I) colors in a ceremony at Camp
Victory, Iraqi politics began to descend into chaos. Prime Minister Maliki’s seat would be
empty during the December 15 ceremony ending the U.S. military mission in Iraq, as he
had to tend to other matters. Maliki, back in Baghdad after his brief visit to Washington,
instead used the day to call for the Iraqi Parliament to sack his own deputy Prime Minister, Sunni politician Saleh Mutlaq. Mutlaq had given television interviews denouncing
Maliki as a dictator and criticizing the United States for leaving Iraq in an authoritarian state. “Maliki is worse than Saddam Hussein,” Mutlaq told an Iraqi TV channel on
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December 13, “because at least Saddam was a builder, but Maliki has done absolutely
nothing.” Mutlaq told CNN the same day that he had been “shocked” to hear Obama
welcome Maliki as a “democratic” leader, considering that Maliki had arrested hundreds
of people and deployed troops against some of Iraq’s provincial governments in the preceding weeks. Mutlaq told CNN that:
America left Iraq with almost no infrastructure. The political process is going in a very wrong
direction, going toward a dictatorship. . . . People are not going to accept that, and most likely they
are going to ask for the division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster. Dividing the
country isn’t going to be smooth, because dividing the country is going to be a war before that and
a war after that. . . . There will be a day whereby the Americans will realize that they were deceived
by al-Maliki . . . and they will regret that.2

On the same day that Maliki announced his initiative to impeach Mutlaq, the Prime
Minister’s security forces deployed across the Green Zone, surrounding the homes of
several senior Sunni politicians, rendering them virtually under house arrest. Over the
following days, Maliki government officials revealed that they had arrested several of
Vice President Tariq Hashimi’s bodyguards and that the men had confessed that Hashimi
had allegedly ordered them to bomb Maliki’s convoy as it passed through the Green
Zone on November 28. On December 18, Iraqi state television broadcast the bodyguards’
videotaped confessions implicating the Vice President in terrorism, while elsewhere
Iraqi judicial officials prepared to issue an arrest warrant for Hashimi. By that evening
Hashimi, Iraq’s most senior Sunni politician, was a fugitive, having fled Baghdad on an
Iraqi airways flight to Erbil to be sheltered by Kurdistan Republican Guard (KRG) President Massoud Barzani. From Kurdistan, Hashimi and his representatives made statements declaring his innocence and claimed the bodyguards had confessed falsely under
torture. Their claims would later be strengthened by the fact that one of the bodyguards
who confessed on television died in the custody of Maliki’s security forces, with evidence
indicating he was beaten to death.3

=

Hashimi (left), Tawfiq (center). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Patrick Lair (Released).

Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi With Ninawa Operations
Commander Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq in 2008.4
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On the same day that the Maliki government moved against Hashimi and Mutlaq,
it also moved to consolidate power in the ethnic powder keg of Diyala Province. In
response to the Diyala provincial council having passed a resolution that would begin
the process to transform the province into an autonomous region similar to the Kurdish
provinces, Maliki charged the Sunni governor with holding an illegal vote and ordered
Iraqi security forces, aided by Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and Badr militiamen, to take control
of the provincial government center. The governor, who like Hashimi was a member of
the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Kurdistan along with a majority of the provincial council.5
Back in the Green Zone, as these events were unfolding in the immediate aftermath
of USF-I’s departure, the Iraqiyah bloc to which Hashimi belonged suspended its participation in Maliki’s cabinet and called for U.S. intervention to force Maliki to give up
sole control of Iraq’s security forces and to implement the December 2010 power-sharing
agreement. Throughout 2011, the Prime Minister had failed to fulfill his pledge to appoint
new security ministers selected by the other parties. Instead, he had named himself as
acting head of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and also retained control
of the Iraqi intelligence community, signaling that he intended to consolidate personal
control of the most potent arms of the Iraqi Government. Only with the pressure of the
August bombings, did Maliki appoint one of his allies as acting Minister of Defense, itself
a violation of the Erbil Agreement. After Hashimi’s removal, the Prime Minister paused
his pressure against Mutlaq and other senior Sunni leaders, but the December crackdown
still left the Iraqi political class in a state of shock. Maliki had shown by his actions that he
was willing to use his security apparatus against any rival, with even the country’s most
senior political leaders not protected. “Welcome to the post-occupation Iraq,” one senior
Iraqi official in the Green Zone told his American counterparts.6
OSC-I’s Rocky Start
The jarring purge of Iraq’s top Sunni leader occurred as the U.S. military in Baghdad
was going through a jarring period of its own. The U.S. decision to withdraw USF-I fully
from Iraq without a residual force meant that as of December 18, 2011, Lieutenant General Robert Caslen’s OSC-I was the only U.S. military organization in the country. The
U.S. Government had long planned to transition the military mission in Iraq from USF-I
to OSC-I at the end of 2011, but Caslen and virtually all the planners involved in that process had assumed that as OSC-I director, Caslen would still be a de facto operational commander with thousands of troops at his disposal. Until very late in the decision-making
process, U.S. military leaders had believed that Caslen would have a large OSC-I staff to
inherit the functions of the USF-I headquarters and would have the 3d Infantry Division
headquarters available to carry out a large training mission with thousands of military
advisors and trainers. Instead, after the final ceremony marking the deactivation of USF-I
in Baghdad on December 15, Caslen and the 157 personnel of OSC-I found themselves in
charge of a military mission that had required the combined efforts of 40,000 U.S. troops
just a few weeks before.
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Caslen (right), Perkins (left). Source: DoD photo by Specialist Brandon Bednarek (Released).

Lieutenant General Robert Caslen With U.S. Division-North (USD-N)
Commander Major General David G. Perkins.7
The OSC-I mission almost collapsed before it could begin. The rapid withdrawal of
USF-I’s 40,000 troops and more than 30,000 contractors in the space of 2 months in late
2011 was a marvel of logistical planning and execution, but in that intense drawdown
period the U.S. Government failed to resolve significant problems that endangered OSCI’s ability to function. With USF-I’s departure, OSC-I would be operating in the country
as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, covered by the Vienna Convention and given diplomatic immunities and privileges by the Iraqi Government. But as the end of December
2011 approached, Caslen and U.S. Embassy officials had difficulty getting the Maliki government to issue visas for the U.S. military personnel who would be arriving in Baghdad
or staying behind from USF-I to make up the OSC-I staff. They had even more trouble
getting the Iraqis to issue visas for the several thousand contractors who were meant
to provide the bulk of OSC-I’s transportation, logistical, and security support, but who
lacked legal protections under the Vienna Convention. Within the Iraqi Government,
Maliki required that his own office approve U.S. military and contractor visas, greatly
slowing the process.8 Most of OSC-I’s contractors had entered Iraq on a U.S. Government
identification card, not a passport or visa, and thus as the end of December approached,
more than half of them had to leave while they could still do so. Caslen also discovered
in December that the U.S. Government had not yet acquired land-use agreements from
the Iraqi Government for the training sites that OSC-I was supposed to continue operating. With just 2 days left before the end of the year and many U.S. Government offices
in Washington shut down for the holidays, a desperate Caslen finally managed to enlist
the aid of Undersecretary of Defense Ashton Carter to strike a last-minute ministerial
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agreement with Iraqi Minister of Defense Sadoun Dulaimi that would allow OSC-I to
continue to operate.9
Carter’s timely intervention saved Caslen’s mission, though many of OSC-I’s missing
contractors would still have to spend several months working through a friction-filled
visa process before returning to work inside Iraq.10 However, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) aspect of the U.S. security assistance mission did not survive the
transition from USF-I to OSC-I. U.S. officials had assumed that the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), which had been present in Iraq since the early days of the war and had
come to play a central role in the Iraqi Army’s officer education system, would continue
beyond 2011 under a new agreement with the Iraqi Government. However, in the final
weeks of 2011, NATO’s continued participation became unlikely. NATO officials were
reluctant to leave their training mission in place without the substantial U.S. military protection that disappeared when USF-I withdrew from the country. They were also unwilling to leave NATO personnel in Iraq without guarantees of immunity from Iraqi law that
the Maliki government seemed unwilling to give, and in any case, Iraqi officials were
just as slow to extend visas to NATO officials as to U.S. officials and contractors. Though
Caslen traveled to Brussels ahead of the end of year deadline to lobby NATO officials to
stay in Iraq, he and other U.S. officials were unable to convince NATO leaders to continue
the training mission. As a result, NTM-I ceased work as the year ended.11
Despite the loss of a residual force and the departure of the NATO contingent, Caslen
still considered OSC-I an operational component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
with a mission to preserve the security gains already achieved in Iraq.12 There were several tasks Caslen considered essential to this goal. Having served as the commander
of Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) at the end of the surge and seen firsthand
the damage that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other extremist organizations could do, he
believed it was OSC-I’s responsibility to assist the ISF in ensuring that these groups did
not regain a foothold in the country. He also had to manage intra-Iraqi tensions along
the Green Line in 2008-2009 and believed OSC-I had a role to play in preventing conflict
between Arabs and Kurds in the north. In central Iraq and the south, he believed OSCI’s security assistance effort should mitigate Iran’s malign influence so that Iraqis could
chart their own future without external manipulation. In a related area, he hoped OSC-I
could help the Iraqi Government build security cooperation relationships with other Arab
states in the region to counterbalance Iran’s influence. Finally, he believed OSC-I had an
important role to play in restraining Prime Minister Maliki’s authoritarian tendencies,
especially since he judged that security threats to the Iraqi Government tended to bring
out the worst in the Prime Minister.13
These would prove to be ambitious tasks for a military organization with no combat
power and few personnel, and they were made more complicated by a newly assertive
Iraqi bureaucracy. As December 2011 waned, Caslen and his small staff were consumed
in dealing with Iraqi Government requirements and processes not faced by previous U.S.
military organizations in Baghdad. Senior Iraqi officials later admitted that the Maliki
government purposely made things difficult for U.S. counterparts as USF-I departed as
a way of signaling that there would be a new way of conducting business.14 Without the
authorities that had come with being a named operation such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) or Operation NEW DAWN, OSC-I’s every move was subject to Iraqi law and
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oversight by the Iraqi Government bureaucracy. In one example, USF-I left behind 1,200
vehicles in Iraq for OSC-I’s use, but because they had been brought into the country before
2012, Iraqi officials declared that they could not be registered with the Iraqi Government,
leaving anyone driving them subject to arrest. Any new vehicles OSC-I brought into the
country could be registered, Iraqi officials ruled, but that process might take as long as 9
months.15 In other instances, Iraqi officials often delayed the movement of U.S. Embassy
supply convoys until the proper paperwork could be produced, at one point forcing the
Embassy to issue Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to its personnel for a short period.16
There were also difficulties fitting OSC-I into the U.S. diplomatic mission. U.S. interagency planners in Washington had envisioned that the U.S. security assistance mission
in Iraq could continue with little disruption by simply transferring USF-I’s training, advisory, and foreign military sales (FMS) functions—and the personnel and equipment to
execute them—to the U.S. Embassy’s control. The budgets to fund those activities would
be transferred from the Department of Defense (DoD) to the State Department. However,
this plan went astray from the start. With a large-scale security assistance mission and
OSC-I grafted onto it, the U.S. Embassy that Ambassador James Jeffrey oversaw at the
beginning of 2012 was the largest in the world, with more than 16,000 diplomats and
contractors, its own fleet of helicopters, mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), three hospitals, and large quick reaction forces.
Despite its size, the Embassy simply was not postured to continue the vast array of tasks
that had fallen to USF-I as a warfighting organization. Jeffrey believed that U.S. officials
in Washington never understood that his and Caslen’s organizations were not simply
“USF-I Lite” and had little capacity to conduct the security, governance, and rule of law
activities that the U.S. military had carried out before 2012, or to continue to broker Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd outreach. Jeffrey remarked in early 2012, “I don’t have the people
to follow up. It’s all gone.”17
What military assets did remain behind did not necessarily mesh well with the
Embassy. The expanded U.S. Embassy structure came with huge financial and administrative costs that forced Jeffrey and other senior diplomats to spend a great deal of their
time trying to get the hybrid organization to operate effectively. USF-I and DoD planners
had worked hard to bequeath the Embassy a range of military capabilities that the American diplomatic staff in Baghdad was unused to managing, and considered unnecessary
for a diplomatic mission in any case. For example, the Embassy never used the MRAPs
USF-I had left it and quickly abandoned the UAVs and helicopters as well.18
The presence of an unusually large military contingent inside the Embassy also created friction. OSC-I worked under the umbrella of the U.S. Mission in Iraq (USM-I), but
was not like any other security cooperation office in the world. Unlike the other division
heads working in the Embassy, Caslen had been nominated for his position by the President and confirmed by the Senate, which made him and OSC-I an awkward fit within the
Embassy’s hierarchy.19 Asked by Army researchers to describe the relationship between
the Embassy’s other divisions and OSC-I after USF-I’s departure, one embassy official
observed that the two sides “are going in the same direction, but we are still in different
boats.”20 In a few instances, embassy officials bristled at some of OSC-I’s military trappings. Many OSC-I service members continued to wear their uniforms, a practice that
the Embassy’s regional security office (RSO) viewed as problematic for force protection.
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In the RSO’s view, the sight of uniformed Americans could lead Iraqis to think the U.S.
military occupation had resumed and to respond violently.21 When Caslen created a J-2
intelligence cell within his staff, senior embassy security officers opposed the move, arguing that OSC-I had no need of an independent intelligence capability. Caslen and his J-2
saw it differently, arguing that the increased level of militant attacks in Baghdad in 2012
created a risk that OSC-I needed to monitor. With U.S. military officials embedded in
key Iraqi Government offices, OSC-I was in a better position to gather information about
what Iraqi leaders were thinking and planning than were many other U.S. agencies.22
OSC-I’s greatest bureaucratic difficulties lay in its authorities and funding. As an
organization that was neither a military command nor a mere security cooperation cell
within a standard embassy, OSC-I was caught between the models under which DoD
and State Department organizations normally operated and received funding. Like other
military organizations inside U.S. Embassies that oversaw security assistance, OSC-I was
responsible for managing foreign military sales and foreign military financing to the Iraqi
Government under Title XXII of the U.S. legal code—the section of U.S. law that governed State Department activities. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act limited Title XXII military security cooperation cells to no more than six people—very different from OSC-I’s
157. At the same time, U.S. officials in Washington appeared to expect OSC-I to continue
some of USF-I’s military activities, but without being a U.S. military command that had
authorities under Title X of the U.S. code—the section of U.S. law that governed DoD.
This awkward arrangement made it difficult for OSC-I to work with the DoD agencies
that had previously worked with USF-I. Despite the fact that both Caslen and CENTCOM
commander General James Mattis considered Caslen to be one of Mattis’s subordinate
commanders and behaved accordingly, the two men’s respective organizations did not
follow suit. Since OSC-I was not a Title X DoD organization, the CENTCOM bureaucracy
was not technically OSC-I’s higher headquarters and was not bound to use its Title X
operational funds to support the military organization in Baghdad.
In case after case, CENTCOM and the DoD bureaucracy behaved as though the State
Department were responsible for reimbursing CENTCOM for any military costs to support OSC-I, and the State Department reciprocated. One example dealt with the C-130
ring route that the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) flew in support of OSC-I
personnel in Baghdad, Taji, and Tikrit. For years, AFCENT had funded the flights out of
its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation NEW DAWN contingency budgets, but
with the end of those named operations, the source for continued funding was unclear.
Since OSC-I was technically a division of the U.S. Embassy, CENTCOM sought to shift the
cost for the flights to the State Department, but for their part, State Department officials
considered the flights Title X activities being carried out by uniformed military personnel. Since the ring route flights were a vital lifeline that OSC-I could not operate without,
the planes continued to fly amid the bureaucratic dispute, leaving Caslen and his staff
caught in the middle trying to figure out who would fund the operations. The result was
one DoD organization billing another DoD organization for the cost of supporting its own
mission.23 An even thornier problem arose when ARCENT ruled that without a named
military operation, it would not provide OSC-I with postal or finance service or even
to deploy an Army veterinarian into Iraq to conduct the required inspections for MREs
stored for emergencies. As far as U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) leaders were concerned,
575

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

the Iraqi Theater of Operations had closed and was no longer their responsibility.24 With
ARCENT declining to support military activities inside Iraq, the U.S. Embassy passed
their bills—such as the costs required to fly their fleet of military helicopters—directly to
Caslen’s OSC-I, which had no way of paying for them.25
Working out these and many other such bureaucratic problems dominated OSC-I’s
first several months of operation after USF-I’s departure. Caslen and other U.S. military
officials in Baghdad found themselves expending the bulk of their energy in simply figuring out how to secure the authorities and resources necessary to remain in Iraq, rather
than in keeping up the momentum of USF-I’s relationships with and assistance to the ISF.
Within weeks after USF-I’s departure, it was becoming painfully clear that OSC-I would
not be able to perform all of the essential elements of the security assistance mission by
itself without the personnel management, logistics, and signal support that would have
come with a residual force.26
THE UNRAVELING OF IRAQI POLITICS
The wave of arrests in the Iraqi provinces carried out by Prime Minister Maliki’s officials from October onward and the crackdown on Sunni political leaders in the Green
Zone had a significant political effect in 2012. After the broad Sunni rejection of the
U.S.-sponsored political process in 2004-2006, the Awakening and the surge campaign
had helped turn the vast majority of Iraqi Sunnis back to participation in the political process. The elections of 2009 and 2010 had signified that Sunnis generally perceived their
interests could be better secured through politics than through violence, and through
mainstream Sunni political parties rather than through militant groups. The events of
late 2011 and early 2012 showed that the Sunni community’s mainstream political center,
represented by the Awakening and the Iraqiyah coalition, was weakening. As had been
the case since 2009, local Awakening leaders in central Iraq were under constant pressure
from ISI and other militant groups and faced harassment and pressure from Maliki’s
government. Attacks against members of the Sons of Iraq were common, as were assassinations of Awakening leaders. In one high-profile instance in January 2012, Mullah
Nathem Jabouri, the Sunni cleric from Dhuluiyah who had been a founding member of
the Mujahedin Shura Council but had later become a vocal anti-AQI Awakening leader,
was shot to death in west Baghdad by suspected ISI assassins shortly after criticizing the
group in a television interview. Jabouri had arrived in Baghdad only a short time before
to assist Maliki’s office with outreach to Sunni groups who were willing to oppose ISI,
but his killing sent a clear message that the government could not protect people like him
from Sunni extremist groups.27
Vice President Hashimi’s case had a similar impact on mainstream Sunni politics.
Hashimi was an abrasive politician whom many U.S. officials did not particularly care
for, but he had received almost a quarter of a million votes in the 2010 election and thus
represented a large Sunni constituency, especially in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah district. If
mainstream Sunni politicians like him or Saleh Mutlaq were to be purged, then hundreds
of thousands of Sunnis might drift toward more radical political options. As if on cue, just
weeks after the purging of Hashimi, Saddam’s former Ba’athist deputy Izzat ad-Douri
broke almost 9 years of silence by releasing a videotaped speech on April 7, 2012, in
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which he called for Iraqis to unite with “the heroic Iraqi resistance” against “the Persian
Safavid enemy,” claiming they had come to dominate the Iraqi Government in Baghdad.28 The appearance of Douri, who in addition to leading a wing of the Ba’ath Party in
exile was also the de facto leader of the Naqshbandi Army, indicated that the Ba’athist
leader recognized there might be an opportunity to reoccupy some of the political space
that Iraqiyah and the Awakening had dominated since 2006.
A final element in the weakening of the Sunni political center came as Maliki took a
page from Saddam’s political playbook. Before 2003, Saddam had often kept Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’a communities under control by selecting politicians from those communities
who were willing to work with his regime and then letting the largesse of the Ba’athist
state flow through them to the Shi’a- and Kurdish-majority provinces. The politicians
who volunteered to assist the Ba’athist dictator had no natural political following, but
became powerful in their home communities because they were a gateway to the state’s
resources. In 2012, Maliki adopted a similar approach toward Iraq’s Sunnis. Rejecting
cooperation with the Iraqiyah politicians whom Iraqi Sunnis had elected to represent
them, Maliki instead looked for Sunni political partners who had no grassroots following
but could be counted upon to act as channels for state resources to the Sunni community
that might buy some popular allegiance to Maliki’s rule. One such partner that Maliki
chose was the former insurgent financier Mishaan Jabouri, the former ally of Uday Hussein who had tried to take power in Mosul in 2003 and had had to flee the country to
evade arrest on corruption charges in 2005. Once outside Iraq, he had become a militant
ally of the Syrian regime and Muammar Gaddhafi and had also run a satellite TV station
dedicated to broadcasting terrorist propaganda videos, including of attacks against U.S.
troops. He had been charged in absentia with promoting terrorism, but in March 2012,
Maliki and his allies invited Mishaan to return to Baghdad, cleared him of the terrorism
charges, and encouraged him to form a political bloc to compete against Iraqiyah in Iraq’s
northern provinces.29
The Reemergence of Ahl al-Haqq (AAH)
Maliki was taking a similar divide-and-rule approach to Shi’a politics, where he was
attempting to sponsor a competitor to Moqtada Sadr’s political bloc in Baghdad and the
south. Since late 2006, when Maliki and his allies had decided that Moqtada Sadr was too
great a political threat to the Da’wa Party, the Prime Minister had been seeking a political
pact with Qais al-Khazali’s militant group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH). Maliki had long
believed that Khazali, as a former disciple of Moqtada Sadr’s father, could potentially
draw grassroots support away from Sadr and shore up Maliki’s political coalition. In the
last week of December 2011, Maliki brought 5 years of negotiations with Khazali and
AAH to fruition, reaching an agreement under which all criminal charges against AAH
would be dropped and the group would be allowed to operate in the open as a political
party. By December 26, Khazali was back in Najaf after more than a year of exile in Iran.
On January 1, with Maliki’s permission, Khazali held a large “victory” rally in west Baghdad’s Tahrir Square to celebrate the departure of U.S. troops.30 As the Prime Minister and
his Da’wa allies had hoped, the rift between AAH and the Sadrists was immediate―and
violent. Within hours of the AAH victory rally, Khazali’s men were fighting gun battles

577

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

against Sadr’s followers in Sadr City and other parts of Baghdad, prompting Moqtada
Sadr to accuse Khazali and AAH of being power-hungry “killers without a religion.”31
Maliki’s validation of AAH’s activities offered the group a way to advance its longterm objective of developing an influential political-religious network in major Iraqi cities
while maintaining a militant wing in a manner modeled upon Lebanese Hizballah. AAH
was rebranding itself as a nationalist Islamic resistance organization that participated in
local politics, but it also would continue to operate a large militia and take an active part
in the regional “Axis of Resistance” led by the Iranian regime.32 By the end of January,
AAH had opened political offices in Baghdad and Basra and was laying the groundwork
to begin political activities as affiliates of Maliki’s State of Law coalition. They had also
opened a think tank in Beirut affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah. As 2012 progressed, the
group would open political offices in Hillah, Najaf, Khalis, and Tal Afar as well, expanding the presence of their militia along with their new political deployment.33
Meanwhile, as the turf war heated up between AAH and the Sadrists, a reign of terror
descended upon neighborhoods where Shi’a resistance groups had a significant presence.
In several cities, Shi’a militants regularly attacked Iraqis whose behavior they considered
sinful, killing dozens of owners of liquor stores and other establishments the militiamen
deemed to be un-Islamic. In the first few weeks of 2012, Shi’a militants who were most
likely AAH or Promised Day Brigade members also murdered or abducted hundreds
of Iraqi youths who participated in the Western-style “Emo” trend of clothing and hairstyles, a lifestyle the Shi’a militiamen believed involved homosexuality. The militiamen
usually carried out the killings by stoning their victims to death. The wave of murders
began after the Ministry of Interior itself pledged to stamp out what it considered the
“Satanic” Emo subculture, showing that the ministry was on the side of the murderers
rather than the victims.34 The Maliki government apparently had normalized AAH as a
political organization without requiring that the group stop its extremist activities.
In late February, as part of a prisoner exchange with the Maliki government, the newly
normalized AAH handed over to Iraqi officials a wooden casket containing the remains
of U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Ahmed al-Taie. The Iraqi-born Taie, the last American Soldier
missing in Iraq, had been abducted by Shi’a militiamen as he made an ill-advised visit
to family members in south Baghdad on October 23, 2006, and had quickly wound up
in AAH’s hands. AAH had sent Taie’s family ransom demands and proof of life videos
in 2006 and 2007, but he died in the militia’s custody at some point after that, probably
while in captivity in Iran. Under the exchange agreement with the Maliki government,
AAH faced no criminal prosecution or legal measures for the American sergeant’s kidnapping and murder.35
The Quest for a No-Confidence Vote
Meanwhile, in the weeks after the purging of Vice President Tariq Hashimi, Prime
Minister Maliki continued his effort to consolidate power in Baghdad. For months, Maliki
had gradually asserted control over the Iraqi Government’s independent institutions that
had been created in the 2005 constitution as a check on just such a consolidation of power.
By early 2012, the Iraqi judiciary, government auditors, and inspectors general were
largely under the Prime Minister’s control. In mid-April 2012, Maliki arrested the head of
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Iraq’s election commission, the official whom Maliki had accused of conspiring with the
United States and United Nations (UN) to deny the Prime Minister his fraudulent victory
in the Parliamentary elections of 2010. When the election chief was released after a few
days in jail, the man fled to Kurdistan, leaving Iraq’s electoral body in disarray.36
Other Iraqi leaders watched these developments with growing concern. On April 28,
just days after the purge of the election commission chief, KRG President Massoud Barzani, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujayfi, Ayad Allawi,
and Moqtada Sadr met in Erbil and produced a written demand that Maliki accept a twoterm limit as Prime Minister and reverse his consolidation of control over agencies of the
government.37 Maliki responded by declaring in a televised interview that he had become
the target of a foreign-inspired coup attempt.38
Maliki’s opponents reached their breaking point by the summer of 2012. In June, Iraqiyya, the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Barzani joined forces to
present to President Talabani a list of 173 Parliamentarians who had pledged to support a
no-confidence vote that would end Maliki’s premiership. Unfortunately for the Parliamentary factions,
the list immediately found its way from Talabani to
Maliki, who began pressuring individual Members
of Parliament into recanting and quickly killed the
initiative. The Iranian regime helped Maliki in this
fracturing of the opposition bloc by making it clear
to senior Iraqi politicians that the Iranians did not
intend to allow Maliki to be unseated.39 By mid-2012,
the Iraqi Prime Minister’s support for the embattled
Bashar al-Assad in Syria had made Maliki indispensable in Iranian leaders’ eyes, and the Iranian
regime used its political advantage to help break
up the opposition coalition. In the days following
the opposition leaders’ joint call for a no-confidence
measure, Iranian regime officials succeeded in pressuring both Moqtada Sadr and Jalal Talabani to
abandon their support for an immediate vote, and Source: UN photo by Eskinder Debebe.
the danger to Maliki dissipated for the time being.40
THE SPILLOVER OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki.41

Iraq’s domestic political dysfunction in 2012 was
related to the deepening Syrian civil war. The Iraqi factions that had faced each other in
a civil war of their own from 2005 to 2008 now found themselves on opposite sides of
the brutal conflict.42 By the end of 2011, the Maliki government was in effect intervening in the Syrian war on the side of Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite regime. Although
Maliki and other Iraqi Shi’a leaders had long considered Assad an enemy because of
the Syrian dictator’s support for AQI and other terrorist groups in Iraq and although
Maliki had actually demanded a UN tribunal against Assad in late 2009, by mid-2011
Iraqi Government policy had reversed itself. As popular uprisings spread and regional
pressure mounted on the Syrian regime, the Maliki government came to its defense,
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extending political, economic, and security support to
its one-time enemy. The change in the Iraqi Government’s stance was partly induced by Iran, but Iraqi
Shi’a leaders also feared that the fall of Assad’s Shi’a
Alawite regime would lead to a Sunni Islamist regime
in Damascus that would sponsor a renewed jihad
against the Iraqi state.43
It was not an unfounded fear. Most of the Sunni
opposition to Assad in 2011 and 2012 came from
anti-regime activists and from the newly forming Free
Syrian Army, but from the early stages of the Syrian
war, ISI played a significant role as well, as did its
network of Salafi allies inside Syria. Since 2003, AQI
and other Salafi militant groups in Iraq had used Syria
as their strategic depth, supported by a vast network
Source: Photo courtesy of Kremlin.ru.
of Syrian-based Salafi mosques, clerics, and militants
that enabled AQI and others to conduct insurgent
Syrian President Bashar
and terrorist operations inside Iraq. In 2011-2012, this
al-Assad.44
arrangement began to reverse itself, as Iraqi militant
networks became a logistical base that enabled militants to carry out operations inside Syria.
Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership also recognized the potential of expanding their global
jihad into Syria. Assad’s regime had been weakened by months of internal strife, and
the terrorist group already had a network of agents and support cells in place from the
years of sanctuary that Assad had provided. As such, in August 2011, al-Qaeda’s senior
leadership and ISI agreed to send a cadre of experienced Syrian and Iraqi jihadists back
into Syria with the objective of creating an Islamic state there that would become part of
a larger regional caliphate. The new group, named Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al Sham (The
Support Front for the People of the Levant) quickly became one of the most effective
insurgent groups fighting against Assad’s government due to its discipline and military
training.45
Support for the Syrian insurgency went far beyond militant networks, however. Iraqi
Sunnis tended to sympathize with Syrian Sunnis, whom they viewed as fighting a Shi’a
minority government backed by the Iranian regime—a situation many Sunnis believed
analogous to their own position inside Iraq.46 After 8 years in which Iraq’s Shi’a Islamist
parties had been in the ascendency, Iraqi Sunnis began to envision the establishment of a
Sunni state in Syria to reverse their own fortunes. If Syria were to become a Sunni power,
Iraqi Sunnis reasoned, then Iraq’s Sunnis might use the support of Syrian Sunnis to regain
control of Baghdad or at least to renegotiate a greater share of power.47 As a result, from
an early stage in the Syrian conflict, Iraq’s Sunni tribes provided material support for the
Syrian opposition, particularly in eastern Syria, where large tribes such as the Shammar,
Obeid, and Dulaim spanned the porous Iraq-Syria border. The tribes offered the same
safe haven to Syrian insurgents that had once been offered to Iraqi insurgents, reversing
the flow of weapons and militants that had in earlier years gone from Syria into Iraq.
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In addition to the Iraqi Sunni tribes, ISI saw the Syrian civil war as a godsend, providing the organization with a much-need territorial refuge inside Syria where it could
regroup, recruit new fighters, and then eventually resume operations in Iraq. Throughout
2012, Syrian border towns such as Deir ez-Zor and Albu Kamal were flooded with Iraqi
fighters, many belonging to ISI. For ISI and its allies, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria had
merged into a single theater of jihad, with militant operations aimed both west toward
Damascus and Aleppo, and east toward the Tigris River Valley and Baghdad.
Just as Iraq’s Sunni jihadis were becoming heavily involved in Syria, Iraq’s Shi’a militant groups were likewise deciding that they had a role to play in supporting their fellow
Shi’a confessionals in the Syrian civil war. By mid-2012, Iraqi Shi’a militants were flowing
into Syria from groups such as AAH, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Corps. The Iraqi
Shi’a fighters’ deployment into Syria was part of the Iranian regime’s effort to reinforce
Assad’s Alawite forces that could not match the rebel manpower in a country where
Sunnis outnumbered Alawites by 15 to 2. As the Assad regime faced escalating military
pressure from the rebels in 2012, Iran channeled Iraqi Shi’a fighters to Damascus and other
Syrian cities, often routing them via Iran to be trained and equipped before joining Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard Corps or Lebanese Hizballah. This flow of Shi’a militants increased
once AAH leader Qais al-Khazali and KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis returned to
Baghdad following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in late 2011.48 At first, the Shi’a militant groups kept their role in the Syrian fighting quiet, but signs of AAH’s involvement
became unmistakable when funerals of AAH members killed in Syria began to take place
with rising frequency.49
By fall 2012, the Shi’a militant groups’ involvement was overt and escalating. Several
Iraqi Shi’a militant groups and Lebanese Hizballah teamed up to contribute fighters to
the newly formed Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, an Iranian-sponsored militant conglomerate that operated as an auxiliary force for Assad.50 Throughout 2012, these Iraqi Shi’a
militias circulated internet videos of themselves fighting in the streets of Damascus to
defend the Shi’a shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab, the daughter of Imam Ali. Located southeast
of Damascus, the Zeinab shrine was not just a symbolic location, but was also key terrain
that the Assad regime needed to keep the Damascus Airport open.51 Back in Iraq, the Shi’a
militant groups used the defense of the Zeinab Shrine as a recruiting tool and a pretext for
providing auxiliaries to the Assad regime. The majority of the Iraqi Shi’a fighters in Syria
traveled through the Baghdad International Airport, where they enjoyed tacit Iraqi Government support as they moved openly—and armed—through the facility. Iraqi officials
also did little to stop Iranian overflights through Iraqi airspace to deliver military aid to
Assad, despite entreaties by the Obama administration and other Western powers.52
The Syrian war had a profound effect on Iraqi Kurdistan as well. By late 2012, Syrian
Kurdish militias were taking control of the Kurdish-majority areas of northern Syria
where the regime’s power had receded. There they began setting up a new autonomous
region they called West Kurdistan, or Rojava, that bordered on some Kurdish-held territories of Iraq. In the autonomous zone, a Syrian branch of the PKK that called itself the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) was dominant, and it fielded a militia called the People’s
Protection Units (YPG) to hold its newly gained territory. As an offshoot of the PKK that
had posed a serious danger to Turkey, the PYD was a rival of the Turkish-allied KDP of
Massoud Barzani and was also affiliated with Kurdish separatists who would likely view
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a new autonomous Syrian Kurdistan as a base from which to launch a renewed insurgency inside Turkey. The PYD would soon become a new force with significant implications for the stability of the KRG.
RETURN OF THE SUNNI INSURGENCY
The Issawi Crackdown and Sunni Protest Movement
Almost exactly a year after authorizing the December 2011 ISF raid against Iraq’s most
senior Sunni politician, Vice President Tariq Hashimi, Prime Minister Maliki repeated the
act, this time against the most senior Sunni minister in his own cabinet, Finance Minister Rafe al-Issawi. Well-regarded by the international community and fellow Iraqis as a
non-sectarian, pragmatic technocrat, Issawi had been a tangential target in the Hashimi
raids. Both he and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq
had seemed to escape the purge by making peace with
Maliki in early 2012 despite their vehement criticism of
the Prime Minister before that. By late 2012, relations
between Maliki and Issawi had soured, and the Finance
Minister had become Maliki’s biggest political target. On
December 19 and 20, Iraqi special operations forces surrounded Issawi’s home and offices in the Green Zone as
Iraqi Government spokesmen announced the Finance
Minister was being sought on the charge of supporting
terrorism through his alleged connections to the Sunni
militant group Hamas al-Iraq. Issawi took refuge in the
home of Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, where
he reported in a news conference that 150 of his guards,
staff, and family members had been arrested.53
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Petty
The accusation that Issawi was a material supporter Officer 1st Class Mario A. Quiroga
of Hamas al-Iraq was a familiar one to U.S. officials,
(Released).
since Maliki had previously leveled it in 2010. At that
time, then-USF-I commander Odierno had given the
Iraqi Sunni Leader Rafe
Prime Minister a report from USF-I analysts concluding
al-Issawi.54
that the charge was false, and Odierno’s opposition to
the charge had helped Issawi survive a potential purge.
In December 2012, however, it seemed clear that Maliki intended to use the allegation to
sideline yet another senior Sunni leader. U.S. officials had regarded Issawi as a moderate
Sunni with whom Maliki could cooperate in 2011, but the push for his removal from the
government in 2012 indicated that deeper purges would come.
One reason for Maliki’s lack of restraint against top Sunni leaders was that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who had often played a mediating role between Iraq’s Sunni and
Shi’a parties and had helped defuse tensions between Maliki and Iraqiyah the year before,
had suffered a debilitating stroke and had become incapacitated. With Vice President
Hashimi already purged but no new Sunni Vice President nominated in his place, Talabani’s absence meant that the Iraqi presidency council was not present to help restrain
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Maliki’s targeting of his political opponents. For his part, Issawi described the attack
against him as a larger “pre-election blow” intended to weaken Iraqiyah prior to the
spring 2013 provincial elections.55 Within days of the raids, Issawi fled Baghdad to the
relative safety of Ramadi, becoming a fugitive from his own government as Hashimi had
been.
The Sunni community’s reaction to the purging of Issawi was not as calm as its reaction to Hashimi’s arrest a year before. Unlike Hashimi, Issawi was a senior leader of a
major Iraqi tribe, the Albu Issa of eastern Anbar, and he was also a popular civic leader
who had worked as a surgeon in the Fallujah hospital in 2004. His arrest sparked immediate outrage among both his tribe and the Sunni communities of Anbar and the north. Able
to take refuge in his tribe’s territory rather than flee the country, Issawi defied the Maliki
government’s arrest warrant and spoke publicly throughout Anbar condemning Maliki’s
treatment of Iraqi Sunnis and labeling the Prime Minister a dictator. The public demonstrations of support for Issawi quickly grew into anti-government protests throughout
Iraq’s Sunni territories, where youth unemployment reached 40 percent and accusations of unlawful detention of Sunnis by the Maliki government had provoked anger for
months.56 Within days of the arrests in the Green Zone, the country had a full-fledged
Sunni protest movement on its hands, with crowds numbering in the tens of thousands in
Sunni cities such as Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, and Hawijah, and even in Baghdad’s
Sunni-majority district of Adhamiyah. The protests were supported by powerful Sunni
leaders inside and outside of Iraq, such as Khamis al Khanjar, a wealthy Sunni businessman with Ba’athist ties living in Jordan, who helped fund supportive media broadcasts
and the construction of camps for Anbari protestors.57 By mid-January, virtually every
significant Sunni city had a large protest camp at its center, with near-continuous political rallies and televised speeches by Sunni leaders airing their angry grievances against
the Maliki government, including many Sunnis who had been leaders of the Awakening
and Sons of Iraq.
In response, Maliki deployed Iraqi security forces to surround the Sunni protest camps
nearest to Baghdad, especially Fallujah and Ramadi. In those cities and a few others, the
government’s mostly Shi’a police and soldiers established a perimeter of checkpoints
and outposts and kept a tense watch on the protest camps. Young Sunni protesters reciprocated, keeping watch on the government troops just dozens of yards away. With the
armed soldiers and angry protestors in such close proximity, it was merely a matter of
time before the situation became explosive. Maliki dispatched Sunni deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq to Anbar in hopes of calming the protesters, but the move backfired
when thousands of Fallujah protesters attacked Mutlaq with stones. The Deputy Prime
Minister and his entourage barely escaped with their lives.58 Embarrassingly for Mutlaq,
who had moved from being Maliki’s chief Sunni opponent to his chief Sunni ally in the
space of a year, the assault was caught on video and televised throughout Iraq.
The situation soon deteriorated further. On January 25, demonstrators headed to a
rally in Fallujah clashed with Iraqi soldiers at a checkpoint. When the protesters pelted
the soldiers with rocks, the troops fired into the crowd, killing 9 demonstrators and
wounding about 60 more. Hours later, Sunni gunmen retaliated by attacking an army
checkpoint in northern Fallujah and killing two soldiers. These incidents signaled that
Anbar was slipping into open rebellion, with tribal leaders who had once partnered with
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U.S. troops joining in the militant opposition to the Maliki government. Speaking on
behalf of other tribal leaders, Awakening council chairman Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha
gave the government 1 week to deliver the soldiers responsible for the protesters’ deaths,
after which, he warned, “if the government has not heeded our demand, we will launch
jihad against army units and posts in Anbar.”59
The weeks following the Fallujah violence brought an escalation of violence across
Iraq, including a return of the kind of bombings that had once been common in Shi’a
neighborhoods in Baghdad. On January 27, for example, a bomb near a Shi’a funeral
procession in Baghdad’s Zafraniyah neighborhood killed 31 people, including 8 police
officers.60 Some of the violence took on overtones of the Syrian war. The large demonstrations in Sunni cities often included flags and banners of the Free Syrian Army, indicating
that the Syrian civil war was continuing to spill over into internal Iraqi matters, with Iraqi
Sunnis on the rebel side of the Syrian conflict and the Maliki government on the Assad
regime’s side. Eventually these dynamics came to a head in Iraq’s western desert. When a
force of dozens of Syrian soldiers came under rebel attack at a border crossing point near
Ninewa Province, the Syrian troops fled into Iraq, where government forces gave them
shelter. The Iraqi troops then attempted to transport the Syrians to a safer part of Syria by
busing them through Anbar Province, but on March 4, 2013, in western Anbar, the entire
Iraqi-Syrian force of about 50 troops was ambushed and massacred by Sunni gunmen.
A week later, ISI claimed responsibility for the killings in a statement that declared—not
inaccurately—that the incident was proof of collusion between the Maliki government
and Bashar al-Assad.61
With the situation in Anbar and Ninewa provinces growing worse by the week, Maliki
decided in March that the provincial elections scheduled for the following month would
not be held in those two provinces.62 Meanwhile, as sporadic clashes between Sunni protesters and the Iraqi security forces continued, observers noted in March that the black
flags of the ISI had appeared for the first time at rallies in Ramadi, an omen of what was
to come.63
The Hawijah Massacre
The confrontation between Maliki’s government and the Sunni protest movement
exploded into large-scale violence in April, just days after the country held its provincial
elections. The flashpoint came in Hawijah, the restive Sunni town near Kirkuk that had
long been a stronghold for Ba’athist insurgents loyal to Izzat ad-Douri and the Naqshbandi Army, and by April 2013 home to a large protest camp. The provincial elections on
April 20 took place largely without incident across the country, but on the following day,
gunmen attacked an ISF checkpoint in Hawijah and killed an Iraqi soldier. Suspecting
that the killers had blended in with the protesters, ISF commanders issued a deadline for
the protesters to turn over the perpetrators. It passed without result.64 In response, during
the early hours of April 23, 2013, Iraqi troops under the direction of Iraqi Ground Forces
commander General Ali Ghaidan moved in to break up the camp and arrest suspects. The
facts of what followed are in dispute, but what is clear is that gunfire quickly broke out
between the two sides and left scores of casualties. According to an investigation by the
Iraqi Parliament, when the shooting finally stopped, more than 40 civilians and 3 Iraqi
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soldiers were dead, and more than 100 civilians were wounded.65 Other sources claimed
more than 100 civilians had been killed; though the Ministry of Defense claimed only 3
soldiers and 23 “militants who were using the demonstration as a safe haven” had died.66
The massacre in Hawijjah touched off the most intense fighting Iraq had seen since
2008, most of it in sensitive areas along the Green Line. Hours after the Hawijah incident,
Sunni militants who were likely affiliated with the Naqshbandi Army (JRTN) overran
government troops in towns south of Kirkuk and cut the main Kirkuk-Baghdad highway, leading to several days of battles with government troops before the insurgents
withdrew. On April 25, the clashes spread to Mosul, where large-scale gunfights left as
many as 40 people dead. The violence expanded the following day to Baghdad, where
several Sunni mosques were bombed. On April 27, Sunni gunmen in Fallujah pulled five
plainclothes government security men out of a car and executed them, perhaps in an
attempt to prevent the ISF men from reconnoitering for a Hawijah-like assault on the Fallujah protest camp. The Maliki government suspected that Ahmed Abu Risha’s nephew
was among those who executed the five government men, indicating the extent to which
members of the Awakening in Anbar might have turned against the government. Four
bombings in Shi’a towns south of Baghdad at the end of the weekend brought the death
toll for April to more than 700, making it the deadliest month for Iraqis since 2008.67
The fighting led to a further breakdown in political dialogue and an intense escalation
in sectarian tensions. When the violence reached the mixed-sect towns near Kirkuk, KRG
President Massoud Barzani deployed peshmerga to the city to occupy positions beyond
the normal Green Line. Parliament Speaker Osama Nujaifi blamed Maliki for the violence
and called for the Prime Minister to resign and a new government to be formed.
Meanwhile, in a nationally televised speech amid the fighting, Maliki had warned that
continued “sedition” against his government would lead to full-scale civil war. “What
happened in Hawija . . . and other places, is a point in which we should stop and think
because it might lead to sectarian strife,” the Prime Minister said. “Everyone would lose.
Whether he is in the north, the south, east or west of Iraq, if the fire of sectarianism starts,
everyone’s fingers will be burned by it.”68 The Prime Minister’s prediction—or threat—
would come true within months.
THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
The “Breaking the Walls” Campaign
The events of late 2012 and early 2013 were a godsend for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and
his ISI, which since July 2012 had been engaged in a campaign aimed at reigniting Iraq’s
civil war and unifying the wars in Syria and Iraq. For the 9 months preceding the Hawijah
massacre, Baghdadi and his organization had carried out attacks that both exacerbated
and exploited Iraq’s worsening political conflict. On July 21, 2012, Baghdadi announced
the Islamic State’s “Breaking the Walls” campaign, an initiative that took many pages from
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 2004-2006 playbook for provoking a large-scale Sunni-Shi’a civil
war. Central to the strategy was the reliance on car bombs: 24 separate waves of AQI’s
signature weapon aimed at fomenting sectarian strife through spectacular attacks that
would garner disproportionate media attention. The waves were spread out over four
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phases and demonstrated ISI’s technical capabilities, tactical skills, and ability to conduct
an operational level campaign that adapted as the situation changed.
The first phase of “Breaking the Walls” from July through October 2012 consisted of
137 car bombs that hit cities ranging from Basrah to Mosul and varied widely in targets
and density. Government, military, and civilian targets were hit in patterns that made
it difficult to discern a broader objective, but ISI’s ability to mass up to 30 car bombs on
a single day indicated that they had fully regenerated AQI’s car bombing capabilities.
While ISI replicated one of AQI’s most effective tactic by incorporating car bombings in
its Breaking the Walls campaign, it added new elements such as attacking the Iraqi state’s
detention facilities in order to free hardened fighters and return them to battle. The first
such attack in September 2012 only freed 100 prisoners, including 47 death row inmates,
but the operations would quickly grow to be more frequent and effective, eventually hitting a total of eight prisons.69
Phase II, covering the next 4 months, saw a total of 112 car bombs that hit the Shi’a
enclave of Sadr City, as well as the Green Line separating the Kurdish provinces and the
remainder of Iraq. The Green Line attacks in particular indicated operational level flexibility and tried to exacerbate Kurdish/Shi’a tensions caused by Maliki’s executive order
creating the Tigris Operational Command that would inject non-Kurdish Iraqi Army
units into Kurdish provinces. Phase III, with 137 car bombs, principally targeted Baghdad
from February to May, with large waves of 20 or more hitting the capital about every 30
days. Analysts suspected that the surge and pause periods indicated ISI needed time to
construct the complex weapons, and that the car bomb factories were again located in the
Baghdad belts—the same location as AQI’s brutal 2005-2007 campaigns. Also mirroring
AQI’s earlier campaigns, a majority of the bombers themselves appeared to foreign fighters who flowed into Iraq through Syria and down the same infiltration routes tracing the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. A majority of the attacks targeted Baghdad’s Shi’a community and were portrayed by ISI as reactions to the Maliki government’s excesses against
Sunni protesters in Fallujah, Hawijah, and other parts of Anbar Province.70
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Split From Zawahiri and al-Qaeda
Amid its spring 2013 attacks on the Iraqi Shi’a and the Maliki government, ISI suddenly precipitated a rift within the wider Salafi jihad that had far-reaching consequences.
On April 8, 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced that ISI had merged with Jabhat
al-Nusra and formed the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), attempting to highlight
the unity of jihadist forces and that fighting in Syria and Iraq effectively erased the postWorld War I interstate border. Baghdadi’s announcement was imprudent and premature. The next day, Abu Mohammed al Jolani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, rejected the
claim, insisting that he had not been consulted prior to the media announcement. For a
time, Zawahiri attempted to mediate between the two groups, publicly intervening and
ordering each operational level commander to wage war only in their respective theaters:
Iraq for Bagdadi and Syria for Jolani.71 In the aftermath of this series of announcements,
which also included promises from Jolani that his group would remain loyal to al-Qaeda,
Jabhat al Nusra fractured, with a number of its followers leaving to join Baghdadi and
ISIS. Less than a month later, open fighting broke out between the two groups.
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Much of the break between ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra had been long brewing and
echoed some of the same disputes that had existed between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
leader of AQI, and his senior leadership in Pakistan, namely Ayman al-Zawahiri. Jabhat
al Nusrah and al-Qaeda’s senior leaders had become uncomfortable with the brutal tactics of ISI and the implementation of Sharia law in areas where it lacked popular support first. The mass executions—particularly of Shi’a Muslims―beheadings, and horrific
online videos designed to inspire fear and terror as a prelude to civil war were seen by
al-Qaeda and Jabhat al Nusra as dangerous moves that could ultimately damage public
support and turn the population against the group in a replay of the 2007-2008 Sahwah.
Instead of such tactics, Jabhat al Nusrah followed policies that aimed, more or less, to
win “hearts and minds” through economic assistance and social services while avoiding
overt demonstrations of radicalism and extremism that would antagonize local communities.72 With neither group willing to compromise on what they believed was the most
effective strategy, splintering and conflict were inevitable.
To some degree, the rift between ISIS and al-Qaeda’s senior leadership also represented an attempt by the Iraqi franchise of al-Qaeda to challenge the organization’s leaders in Pakistan. In claiming to lead the jihad in both Iraq and Syria and to have authority
over Jabhat al-Nusrah, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was actually asserting authority over the
entire jihadist enterprise in the northern Arab world and mounting a direct challenge to
Zawahiri’s leadership. The relationship between Baghdadi and Zawahiri would deteriorate as the civil war in Iraq deepened and eventually fracture in February 2014 when
Zawahiri formally disavowed any relationship with ISIS as an al-Qaeda affiliate.73
The Abu Ghraib Prison Break
The final 3 months, or Phase IV, of Breaking the Walls, from May to July 2013, were
the temporal and operational culmination of the campaign for the newly renamed ISIS.
The attacks were timed to magnify the effects of the Hawijah massacre and Maliki’s brutal
reaction to the Sunni protests. ISIS car bombs surged with nearly half of the attacks of the
entire campaign occurring in the 3-month period after the Hawijah incident. Statistically
the change was breathtaking: during all of 2010 and 2011, there were between 5 and 10
car bombs per month, but for the last 3 months of Breaking the Walls, this number shot
up to 80 to 90 attacks per month.74 These attacks would help make 2013 become Iraq’s
most deadly year since 2007, with a total of 7,818 civilian fatalities.75
The last phase of Breaking the Walls also saw the culmination of ISIS’s attacks on Iraqi
prisons. On July 21, 2013, exactly a year after Baghdadi had announced the campaign,
ISIS breached Abu Ghraib, the most heavily defended prison within the Iraqi detention system, in a highly sophisticated attack that was synchronized with a simultaneous
attempted prison break in Taji. While their suicide bombers hit key guard posts, ISIS
struck the prison’s security force with sustained mortar fire from multiple directions.
Those attacks were followed closely by suicide car bombs that breached the prison gates
to make way for a ground assault force that went cell to cell freeing somewhere between
500 and 1,000 prisoners, including ISIS “minister of war” Abdul Rahman al Bilawi and
several other ISIS leaders who were awaiting execution on death row.76
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ISIS’s operations expanded the group’s ranks with hardened fighters freed from the
Iraqi prisons and prompted a return of the Shi’a militias in the Baghdad region. By May
2013, checkpoints manned by Shi’a militiamen sprouted across Baghdad as they had
done in 2006. Likewise, incidents of unidentified assailants wearing Iraqi police uniforms
seizing Sunnis out of their beds in the middle of the night crept back into news reports,
as well as the accompanying occurrence of the mejhool, or unidentified bodies, discovered dumped in empty lots or floating in the Tigris.77 The Iraqi Government’s reaction
to the renewed car bombing campaign—a policy of mass arrests of military age Sunni
males—only served to worsen the situation and exacerbate tensions.78 ISIS exploited the
militia and government reactions in its media messaging, connecting them with the government’s abuses in Fallujah, Hawijah, and other locations and creating an impression
that Sunnis faced genocide and extinction. As in the dark days of the Iraqi civil war, many
Iraqi Sunnis again had to choose between a government they considered a sectarian and
authoritarian enemy or a brutal religious extremist group that at least offered them protection in exchange for submission. Typical of the Sunnis caught in this dilemma was one
leader who told a former U.S. official in Baghdad, “I was never sectarian before . . . I love
my country. I’m a nationalist. But I’ve become sectarian now because there’s nowhere
else for a moderate or secularist to be. We’re losers. I’ve become as sectarian as the people
I used to hate.”79
THE DETERIORATION OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, 2012-2014
As ISIS and other Sunni militant groups grew stronger during 2013, the Iraqi security forces were not up to the challenge. ISIS’s July 2013 Abu Ghraib attack was a tactical tour-de force that displayed exactly the kind of combined-arms capability that USF-I
had struggled to build in the Iraqi Army, while the terrorist bombing offensives of 2013
showed that the ISF was struggling to protect Iraq’s vulnerable cities and population
from attacks by the resurrected Sunni insurgency. By virtually any measure, the ISF in
2013 were less capable than they had been in 2010 and were growing weaker in both
capability and confidence, mostly because the worrisome trends that Austin and Cone
observed in 2010-2011 had accelerated. As they had foreseen, the Iraqi Army’s training
program dissipated as U.S. troops left the country, so that many Iraq divisions stopped
sending units to collective training and commanders often diverted their training budgets to other purposes or to corrupt practices. As Austin had predicted, the Iraqi Army’s
maintenance practices continued to deteriorate without U.S. assistance. Iraqi officers who
bought into the U.S.-inspired model of training and skills development watched with
dismay as the Ministry of Defense and major units abandoned it.
After USF-I’s departure, the politicization of officer appointments that had begun
the previous year accelerated, with appointments typically issued through Prime Minister Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief. Changes first occurred at the regional
headquarters outside of the traditional chain of command which had been effective
at coordinated operations because they commanded all security forces in their area of
responsibility—police, army, border security, infrastructure security, and others. During
2012, 4 of the 10 commanders in these headquarters were replaced, and 1 new Operational Command created, with Maliki appointing the new commander himself. The new
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command enflamed Arab-Kurd tensions as its area of responsibility included disputed
areas in Kirkuk and parts of Salahadin province. Disagreements over the move’s implementation boiled over into open Kurd-Arab conflict in December 2012 when peshmerga
forces briefly exchanged fire with Iraqi Federal Police in Tuz Khurmato.80
Similar sectarian consolidation occurred at the division level, with Maliki replacing 6 of 14 commanders in 2012, capping the replacements of 5 other commanders in
2011. All together, these changes left a massive ethnic imbalance, with 11 divisions led
by Shi’a officers, including the 1st Division in Sunni dominated Anbar and the 2d Division in Eastern Ninewa/Mosul. Only two Sunni commanders and one Kurdish commander remained, and one of the Sunni commanders was known as a long-term Maliki
loyalist who had been implicated in sectarian violence against Sunnis. In making his
appointments, Maliki had bypassed Iraq’s constitution, refusing to submit his nominees
for Parliamentary approval as required.81 Many of the newly appointed officers had little
military experience and few qualifications other than personal loyalty to the Prime Minister. Politicization also occurred in the junior officer ranks as candidates for entry into the
Iraqi military academy tended to be connected to Iraq’s political factions.82 These were
bad omens for future performance of the Iraqi Army as inexperienced officers replaced
veteran commanders.
Within the Iraqi military’s general staff, decision-making authority increasingly
resided in the senior generals most closely associated with Maliki: OCINC director Faruq
al-Araji, MOD chief of operations Abud Qanbar, counterterrorism director Talib Kenani,
and IGFC commander Ali Ghaidan. These four, all Shi’a, effectively ran the ministry and
its ground forces, even though the ministry was nominally under the direction of Defense
Minister Sadoun Dulaimi and Chief of Defense Staff General Babakir Zebari. In reality,
neither Dulaimi nor Zebari had any real authority.83
Under the direction of the four Maliki-loyalist generals, the Ministry of Defense made
some consequential changes after 2011. Perhaps the most significant was the creation of
a new command in spring 2012 to oversee operations in the Jazeera-Badiyah region, the
vast desert area of western Iraq that spanned the country’s long border with Syria. Concerned that ISI and other Sunni militant groups were once again establishing a cross-border sanctuary from which to attack Iraqi (and Syrian) cities, Maliki’s OCINC directed the
Ministry of Defense to establish the new command not by raising new combat units, but
by reassigning each Iraqi division’s existing commando battalion—generally the most
experienced and best trained soldiers—to the control of the new headquarters. It was a
disastrous move whose negative effects soon rippled across the Iraqi Army. By mid-2012,
many of the Iraqi divisions had already lost the heightened manpower levels that Petraeus, Dubik, and Odierno had convinced the Iraqi Government to give them during the
surge period. As a result, most of the Iraqi divisions and brigades of 2012 operated at an
effective strength of about 70 percent, a steep drop from the 120 percent (or more) staffing
levels of the surge period. When the order came to give up their commando battalions to
the Jazeera-Badiyah command, many of the remaining divisions suddenly found themselves with an effective strength of less than 60 percent of what they were authorized.84
The problem was made worse by the fact that the prevalence of “ghost soldiers” in the
Iraqi Army’s ranks—soldiers who received a salary from corrupt commanders but who
were not actually present in the force--had increased sharply in 2012. One former Iraqi
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division commander estimated that some Iraqi divisions might have 60 to 70 percent of
their authorized troops on the rolls, but that once ghost soldiers were factored out, their
effective strength would be little more than 40 percent.85
These trends were clear to many of the U.S. military officials assigned to the U.S.
Embassy, such as U.S. defense attaché Colonel Charles “Tony” Pfaff, an experienced U.S.
Army foreign affairs officer who had served in assignments throughout the Middle East.
In an after action report written in early 2014, Pfaff documented the impressions he had
formed after arriving in Baghdad in fall 2012. The Iraqi security forces had “good leaders,
brave soldiers and police, as well as effective weapons and equipment,” he noted, but institutional issues such as “overlapping chains of command, poor administration, continued
sectarian influences, and limited logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities” resulted in “poor performance in the field.” On paper, the Iraqi security forces had
expanded significantly from 2010 to 2013. The Ministry of Defense’s forces had ostensibly
grown from 245,000 in 2010 to 271,400 in 2013, and the Ground Forces Command by 2013
supposedly fielded more than 193,000 troops in 14 divisions and independent brigades.
Across Iraq, these forces were augmented by the Interior Ministry’s 531,000 police—up
from 413,613 in 2010. In addition to its local police, facilities guards, border guards, and
oil police, the Interior Ministry had more than 30 SWAT teams as well as 44,000 Federal
Police deployed in 4 divisions. Despite their notional strength, the forces that numbered
more than 800,000 soldiers and police suffered a string of battlefield defeats from 2013
onward. Pfaff concluded these factors were the culmination of “corrupt legacy practices
that diverted resources away from the fight and created poor conditions for soldiers and
police as funds for food, housing, fuel, and maintenance were siphoned off.” Commanders who often purchased their positions of authority—sometimes reportedly paying as
much as half a million dollars for division or brigade commands—recouped their investment by diverting equipment and supplies or by striking bargains with “ghost soldiers”
to remain home in exchange for splitting their salaries with their commanders. The soldiers who remained at their posts had to shoulder heavier burdens of combat under
austere conditions, and from late 2012 onward Iraqi units fighting against ISIS tended to
experience mass desertions in combat.86
As the Iraqi security forces were hollowed out in this manner, ISF units entered into
what Pfaff described as “a vicious circle where risk aversion stemming from poor conditions drove indiscriminate practices that alienated the population and empowered its
adversaries. This, in turn, encouraged greater risk aversion, as not only was there little
incentive to take risks on behalf of leaders responsible for these conditions, but also little
reason to take risks on behalf of a population that resented them.” Pfaff listed a few significant turning points in 2013 when the relationship between the Iraqi security forces
and the country’s Sunni community broke down. The April 2013 incident in Hawijah,
when General Ali Ghaidan’s troops had fired on a Sunni protest camp and had killed
more than 40 people, had inflamed tensions and made “protesters elsewhere . . . afraid
that the ISF would conduct similar attacks against them.” The situation worsened after
the Hawijjah killings when ISF troops “reportedly under orders from Maliki, attempted
to arrest Dulaymi tribal shaykh Ali Hatem al Sulaiman, killing three bodyguards [and]
again setting the ISF against the Sunnis in Anbar,” Pfaff recounted. Finally, in late September 2013, hundreds of ISIS fighters entered the western Anbar towns of Rawa and
Anah to attack government facilities and blow up bridges over the Euphrates River to
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prevent the Jazeera-Badiyah command from sending reinforcements to the area. The
attack against the two towns had foreshadowed the fall of Fallujah to ISIS 3 months later,
Pfaff believed.87
OSC-I director Lieutenant General Robert Caslen reached many of the same conclusions as Pfaff. Under Prime Minister Maliki’s leadership, the upper ranks of the Iraqi
military became riven by sectarianism, Caslen observed. “The Iraqis preserved ethnic
and sectarian diversity in the military’s upper ranks, as instructed by the Americans,”
Caslen said in 2013. “But the nation’s divisions permeated even that arrangement. Officers routinely bypassed the chain of command to deal with soldiers from similar backgrounds,” reflecting the deep distrust among military leaders of different sects.88 Caslen
believed much of Maliki’s behavior, which appeared sectarian and authoritarian to outside observers, was the result of the Prime Minister’s insecurity in his position. Shortly
after assuming his position as OSC-I director at the end of 2011, the American general
had been surprised to realize that Maliki had considered it part of USF-I’s role inside
Iraq to secure the Maliki government against major attacks or coup attempts. Meeting
with Caslen to discuss OSC-I’s role, Maliki had made it clear that he assumed Caslen and
OSC-I would somehow continue to provide that kind of security after USF-I’s departure
and the expiration of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement. Caslen believed that when Maliki
realized that OSC-I had no means to keep him in power and the U.S. Government no
inclination to do so, the Iraqi leader decided to govern differently, greatly expanding his
use of the ISF against political rivals to secure his own position.89
Like Pfaff, Caslen saw the Iraqi military deteriorate as it became more politicized.
When tensions between the Maliki government and Massoud Barzani’s KRG flared in
early 2013, Caslen believed that in the event of a clash between the Iraqi Army and the
Kurdish peshmerga along the Green Line, the Army would find itself at a serious disadvantage. Maliki had attempted to intimidate Barzani and the Kurdish forces by deploying Iraqi units to the Kirkuk region in 2012. However, the Prime Minister’s troops could
not match the peshmerga’s capabilities and coordination, Caslen believed, meaning that
Baghdad would be unlikely to win in a military confrontation with the Erbil government. As if to illustrate Caslen’s point, in May 2013 the Kurdish commander of an Iraqi
brigade in the 4th Division refused orders to leave a disputed territory on the Green Line
and instead defected to the peshmerga along with all of his Kurdish soldiers and their
equipment.90
As fighting between the ISF and ISIS intensified in 2013, Pfaff noted some serious
tactical and operational shortcomings within the Iraqi units. They had a good communications infrastructure but during the country’s frequent power outages, it was useless,
and Iraqi commanders were often forced to rely upon unsecure cell phones or landlines
to communicate. Meanwhile, in combat the ISF “often rely on large formations when
engaging terrorist targets and facilities, which are easily spotted by ISIL . . . as a result,
ISIL fighters often have sufficient time to depart the target area before the ISF troops
arrive.”91 Iraqi logisticians were good at stockpiling supplies and ammunition on bases,
Pfaff observed, but extremely poor at supplying units on the move, meaning that “when
they do move, ISF often find themselves outgunned with limited ammunition when confronted by ISIL fighters.” Overall, Pfaff noted, the ISF was a force that often lacked adequate situational awareness in combat and had commanders who were afraid to take
decisive action in a deteriorating security situation.92 Within months, the factors that Pfaff
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observed would spell disaster for the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi Government they
were meant to defend.
THE ASCENDANCY OF ISIS
The Fall of Fallujah
The weakness of the Iraqi security forces and the gathering strength of the Sunni
militant groups that opposed them was on full display in Anbar in the last days of 2013
and first days of 2014. For the third December in a row, Prime Minister Maliki ordered
government security forces to arrest one of Iraq’s top Sunni leaders, this time targeting Ahmed Alwani, a Member of Parliament who was also a leader of the Albu Alwan
tribe in eastern Anbar. On December 28, Iraqi troops raided Alwani’s home near Ramadi,
arresting the Parliamentarian and killing his brother in the melee. The raid was the culmination of months of tensions between the Maliki government and Anbaris. By late
2013, Maliki and his security advisors concluded that western Anbar had become a safe
haven for ISIS from which the group was staging its attacks against the government and
against Baghdad’s population. They were particularly concerned with Wadi Horan, a
remote but strategic area connecting Iraq to Jordan and Saudi Arabia that had long been
studied by Iraqi staff colleges because of its frequent use by smugglers and insurgents.
The staff college students were correct, and during 2012-2013, ISIS fighters established
bases in Wadi Horan and used them to train recruits and mount attacks against Iraqi population centers. On December 21, ISIS fighters emerged from Wadi Horan to attack the
7th Iraqi Division in Rutbah, killing 17 senior officers including the division commander
and wounding scores more. The boldness of the attack shocked the Iraqi Army defenders
throughout the province and buckled their morale.93
By then, the protest camps in Fallujah and Ramadi had become the epicenter of Sunni
opposition to Maliki, and the Prime Minister believed ISIS and other terrorist groups
were using the protesters as cover while they set up “headquarters” in both cities. Maliki
said as much in a national speech on December 25 in which he announced his intention
to raze the protest sites, and 3 days later, the same day as the Alwani raid, Iraqi security
forces began dismantling the camps.94 The raid and the razing of the camps prompted 40
Sunni Members of Parliament to resign in protest, while a prominent Sunni cleric called
for Sunni ISF members to defect and defend the protest camps against the government.
On January 2, just 2 days after the camps were leveled, Sunni rebels attacked. In
Ramadi, the rebels made only modest headway, but in Fallujah, the government forces
quickly collapsed. On January 3, ISIS fighters seized Fallujah’s main mosque and declared
the city an Islamic emirate. By January 4, most of Fallujah was in rebel hands, with various armed Sunni groups—some tribal, some associated with the Ba’ath Party, some
ISIS—holding different parts of the city while the ISF retreated to areas outside it. Within
days of the initial rebel attack, the insurgent cleric Abdullah Janabi, who had led Fallujah’s rebels in 2004, had returned to the city and called for a general insurrection.95
The Maliki government had a larger problem than just ISIS. The rebels were a broad
front that included ISIS, other longstanding insurgent groups, and some parts of the Sunni
Awakening. One example was the rebel militia created by Dulaimi sheikh Ali Hatem
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Suleiman, who formerly had been one of the leaders of the Ramadi Awakening council
and had allied with Maliki in the 2009 and 2010 Iraqi elections.96 Nevertheless, as its predecessor organization AQI had done in Fallujah in 2004, ISIS quickly seized leadership of
the rebellion through its superior organization and resources, even though most rebels
considered themselves to be fighting to topple Maliki rather than establish a caliphate.
By mid-January, the Sunni rebels and the government forces had settled into a violent
standoff throughout eastern Anbar, with each side launching near-daily local attacks and
casualties mounting on both sides.
With a major city 30 miles from Baghdad in insurgent hands, Iraq held Parliamentary
elections on April 30. The question of whether Nuri al-Maliki would return for another
term as Prime Minister dominated the voting, despite the broad opposition to his premiership from the political parties outside his State of Law coalition. Unlike 2010, Iraq’s
Sunni and secular parties did not join in an electoral bloc as they had done under Ayad
Allawi’s Iraqiyah. As a result, Maliki’s State of Law finished far ahead in the voting,
taking 92 seats while the nearest second-place finisher, Muqtada Sadr, finished with just
34. Maliki himself garnered more than 720,000 popular votes, almost half a million more
than the next most popular candidate, Ayad Allawi. The Prime Minister had paused
the military operations around Fallujah while the voting took place, but on May 9, he
directed a force led by the Iraqi special operations forces to resume an offensive against
the city. Though it stalled after a few days, the election result and Maliki’s control of the
security forces made him seemed poised in late May to dominate the process of forming
a government yet again.
The Fall of Mosul
Neither Maliki nor any other Iraqi leader knew it, but the country was about to be
plunged into a deep crisis that would threaten the Iraqi state’s very existence. As Maliki
and the other political parties prepared to negotiate a new government in early June 2014,
Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul fell into enemy hands. Though control of Mosul had
always been tenuous, the Iraqi Government’s grip on the city and its 2-million-strong
population had weakened after the U.S. withdrawal, largely due to the worsening relationship between the population and government security forces. In 2013, Maliki had
appointed Lieutenant General Mehdi Gharrawi of the Federal Police to command Mosul’s
security forces, despite Gharrawi’s notorious history as a National Police commander in
west Baghdad. In 2006, Gharrawi’s troops had terrorized the Sunni population of west
Baghdad, and Gharrawi himself had narrowly escaped prosecution on charges of murder
and torture.97 He had been relegated to unimportant positions for a few years but had
been dispatched to Ninewa by the Prime Minister as the security situation deteriorated
there after USF-I’s withdrawal. Gharrawi’s checkered history made him a poor choice to
take over a force that already suffered from poor training, low staffing, and tense relations with Moslawis. The weakness of Gharrawi’s troops led them to rely on checkpoints
to screen for insurgent fighters, but the checkpoints also served to harass the local Sunni
population.98 Ambassador James Jeffrey later noted that the security forces in Mosul “had
lost the support of the people because they had a sectarian policy, and I saw it with my
own eyes.”99
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The war against ISIS and other insurgents in Anbar also made Mosul vulnerable. By
June 2014, the local brigades of the Iraqi Army had been stripped of significant manpower, equipment, and heavy weapons to support operations in Anbar. The resulting
shortfalls within the 2d and 3d Iraqi Army divisions in Ninewa were compounded by
the rampant problem of ghost soldiers in their ranks, with thousands of soldiers splitting
their salaries with their commanders in order to be excused from reporting for duty. The
6th Brigade of the 3d Iraqi Division, for example, had only about 500 troops on hand in
early June, significantly fewer than the 2,500 being reported to higher headquarters.100
Similar manning issues afflicted the rest of Ninewa’s security forces. Local authorities
later estimated that of the 25,000 soldiers and police who were supposed to be securing
Mosul in June 2014, fewer than 10,000 were actually present.101
The thinness of the ISF ranks in Mosul was exposed in spectacular fashion in early
June 2014. Before dawn on June 6, a force of perhaps 300 ISIS fighters assaulted the northwest portion of the city.102 In Musherfa, a key entry point into Mosul, only about 40 Iraqi
soldiers were on duty to oppose the ISIS attack.103 In nearby Tamoz 17 district, an ISIS
column of 15 pickup trucks and two captured HMMWVs easily routed an Iraqi police battalion owing to the ISIS fighters’ superior firepower.104 “In my entire battalion we ha[d]
one machine gun,” recalled Colonel Dhiyab Ahmed al-Assi al-Obeidi, the police battalion
commander, while “In each pickup, [ISIS] had one.”105 Over the next several days, ISIS
flooded the city with hundreds of trucks carrying heavy weapons and fighters.106 By June
9, approximately 2,000 ISIS fighters had entered the city, and assaulted the main force of
ISF defenders at the Mosul Hotel. Attacking the hotel with a military water tanker loaded
with explosives, the ISIS men set off an explosion large enough to be felt throughout city,
shaking the confidence of the remaining government troops west of the Tigris.107

Source: ISIS propaganda image.

A Convoy of ISIS Fighters Moves Through Mosul Shortly After Capturing the City.108
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An ISF exodus from Mosul followed. ISF morale crumbled when the two senior Iraqi
Army officers on the scene, General Abud Qanbar and General Ali Ghaidan, took their
security details and left west Mosul on the evening of June 9. As word spread that the
senior commanders had fled the battlefield, most of the remaining soldiers and police
followed suit, abandoning thousands of vehicles and heavy weapons and leaving the
city’s main military bases and airport undefended, shortly to fall into ISIS’s possession.109
As the ISF fled, ISIS fighters also captured Mosul’s branch of the Iraqi Central Bank and
seized what may have been more than $400 million in currency, instantly making them
the wealthiest terrorist group in the world.110
The people of Mosul were dumbstruck by the sudden disappearance of the government’s troops seemingly without a fight. As one businessman who witnessed the battle
put it, “The city fell like a plane without an engine . . . [ISIS] were firing their weapons
into the air, but no one was shooting at them.”111
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The Camp Speicher Massacre
The collapse of the ISF in Mosul opened the road down the Tigris River Valley. Taking
advantage of the ISF retreat, ISIS pressed its offensive south toward Baiji, Tikrit, and
Samarra. By midday on June 11, ISIS fighters in 30 unarmored trucks rolled into Tikrit,
taking control of the city center without firing a shot. The Tikriti police force had already
melted away the previous day as word of the disaster in Mosul spread.112 When ISIS
seized downtown Tikrit on June 11, the thousands of Iraqi Army and Air Force troops
based outside the city at Camp Speicher were thrown into confusion as they assumed that
the ISIS juggernaut would soon swamp the base. Many troops at Camp Speicher were
unarmed trainees at the base’s air force school, and among these trainees panic spread,
especially after some found the base’s armory empty.113 Many trainees, spurred by phone
calls from their families in Baghdad and the south, took the ill-advised decision to flee the
base. On June 12, thousands of them shed their uniforms and forced their way through
the main gate of Camp Speicher unarmed and in civilian clothes. The exact details of the
flight from the base are unclear owing to conflicting accounts and the subsequent killing
of most of those who fled. Lieutenant General Ali Freiji, who in 2006-2008 had partnered
with U.S. troops to pacify the Triangle of Death south of Baghdad, was now the commander of Camp Speicher, and though he raced to the gate with his security detail to
stop the flood of deserters, more than 3,000 troops poured out of the camp.114 Many of the
deserters walked down the highway in an orderly file toward waiting trucks that local
Tikritis had apparently promised would escort them south to safety. Instead, those who
boarded the trucks found themselves captured by ISIS fighters. After sorting the captives
by sect, the ISIS men executed about 1,700 Shi’a troops, dumping their bodies into mass
graves or the Tigris River Valley and posting photos on the internet.115
The mass murder shocked the country and threw the Shi’a population of Baghdad
and the south into a panic. Blame for the incident was unclear. Many of the surviving
soldiers claimed they had received orders from officers to abandon Camp Speicher.116
Some said their instructions had come from Ali Freiji himself, and initial accounts of the
massacre repeated that rumor, but military and Parliamentary investigations later in 2014
cleared the general and assessed that he had done his best to stop the disaster.117 It was
a dark moment for Freiji, who had worked effectively with U.S. troops during the surge
and who former Minister of Defense Abdel Qader rated as the top officer in the Iraqi
Army.
The Popular Mobilization
By the end of June, as the holy month of Ramadan approached, ISIS was in control of
three major Iraqi cities (Mosul, Fallujah, and Tikrit) and a large swath of the upper Tigris
River Valley. ISIS fighters were pressing against Sinjar, Tel Afar, Kirkuk, and the Shi’a
shrine city of Samarra, with the ISF and the Kurdish peshmerga seemingly powerless to
stop them. Having won an equally stunning military victory against the ISF, ISIS followed
up with a stunning political and religious coup. On June 29, the group declared that it had
reinstituted the worldwide Caliphate and that its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, would
henceforth rule as Caliph Ibrahim. On July 4, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publicly
for the first time to give a sermon in the Nur al-Din Mosque in Mosul on the first Friday
of Ramadan. He preached to a congregation of thousands of terrified Moslawis who
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had been searched by armed ISIS fighters at the entrances,
directed where to sit, and told only that the day’s sermon
would be delivered by “the commander of the faithful.”118 In
a 21-minute sermon, Baghdadi echoed the words of Islam’s
first caliph, his namesake Abu Bakr, demanding Muslims’
obedience, asking for support for his caliphate, and emphasizing the theme of jihad.119 ISIS media specialists produced a
professional-grade video of Baghdadi’s sermon and quickly
broadcast it on the internet.
Baghdadi’s sermon was a masterstroke, demonstrating
that he and his organization were more strongly positioned
than the al-Qaeda leaders in hiding in Pakistan. By appearing
in the open in a major city in the Arab heartland, Baghdadi Source: Department of State
had accomplished something Osama bin Laden and Ayman
photo (Released).
al-Zawahiri had never managed, a fact that vaulted him
to a position of authority in the global jihadist movement.
ISIS Leader Abu Bakr
The Mosul appearance was useful as recruiting propaganda
al-Baghdadi.120
among jihadists across the globe, proving that ISIS’s caliphate was a reality. Baghdadi’s declaration of re-establishing
the caliphate, an issue that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri had hotly
debated, had considerable religious significance. According to some religious figures, the
reestablishment of the caliphate obligated Muslims to come to its defense, although such
an interpretation was not uniform and many prominent scholars asserted Baghdadi had
insufficient prominence to make such a declaration.
ISIS spokesmen declared that the group intended to attack Samarra, Baghdad, and
Karbala. Baghdadi’s sermon and takeover of much of northern Iraq convinced the population of the capital that the threat was real.121 The fall of Mosul and Tikrit shattered
Iraqi confidence in their Army and led many to conclude that ISIS was capable of defeating the roughly 60,000 Iraqi soldiers and police who defended the capital. On June 12,
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling for volunteers to defend Baghdad,
secure the country’s Shi’a shrines, and support Iraq’s Sunnis and other minorities against
ISIS attack.122 Though Sistani may have intended his fatwa as a call to reinforce the Iraqi
security forces, it spurred a vast expansion of the country’s Shi’a militias. Within days,
Moqtada Sadr, AAH, the Badr Corps, and Kata’ib Hizballah had all formed new groups
to accept tens of thousands of volunteers who were coming forward to respond to Sistani’s call.123
On June 15, the Iraqi Parliament codified Sistani’s fatwa by declaring the volunteers
official auxiliaries of the Iraqi military known as the Population Mobilization Forces
(PMF). Overall command of the PMF fell to Iraqi national security advisor Falah Fayadh,
with the Iranian-sponsored former Badr Corps operative Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis as the
PMF’s deputy commander.124 Virtually every Shi’a political faction and leader formed
their own popular mobilization units under the auspices of the PMF, while Prime Minister Maliki pledged a large government budget for their equipment and salaries, a move
that incensed Sunnis as it laid bare the government’s motives for abandoning the Sons of
Iraq. Within weeks, more than 90,000 volunteers had swelled the PMF ranks and drifted
toward the front lines, where the remnants of the Iraqi security forces had established
positions to slow ISIS’s advance.125
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Iraq’s Shi’a parties and most Baghdadis considered the PMF necessary to prevent
Baghdad from falling, even though by mid-July ISIS, with its lines of communications
overextended, showed little intention of trying to attack the city. Instead of continuing
toward Baghdad in large numbers, ISIS had turned toward smaller objectives such as
the dams near Haditha and Mosul, isolated ISF garrisons in Salahadin and Kirkuk Provinces, and areas north of Baqubah in the Diyala River Valley.126 Nevertheless, the Iranian
regime’s Quds Force and its commander Qassem Soleimani launched a high-profile advisory effort, rushing IRGC Quds Force advisors to the PMF in areas contested by ISIS, such
as the Diyala valley. It was an excellent opportunity for Iranian strategists. For decades,
Soleimani and other IRGC commanders who had lived through the Iran-Iraq War as
their formative experience had considered the Iraqi Army a potential threat to the Iranian
regime. With the collapse of several Iraqi Army divisions and the appearance of the PMF,
Soleimani and his peers had an unexpected chance to promote a parallel security structure to compete with the Iraqi Army for legitimacy, under the overwhelming influence of
the Quds Force and its militia proxies.
The fall of Mosul ended Maliki’s chance for a third term as Prime Minister. He had
staked his reputation on his ability to provide security, but the swift collapse of the security structure he had overseen and failure of the senior military leaders he had appointed
created a political backlash he could not survive. Even as Maliki attempted to regain
political legitimacy by pledging government funding for the PMF, the other political parties began to organize against him in a way they had not done in 2010. On July 9, Grand
Ayatollah Sistani tipped the balance against Maliki by writing privately to Da’wa Party
leaders that Iraqi leaders needed “to speed up the selection of a new Prime Minister who
has wide national acceptance” and a “new vision” in order to address the country’s “critical circumstances.”127 With top cover from Sistani, the Da’wa leaders and other parties
moved to form a new government without Maliki. On July 15, the Parliament elected
Diyala native Salim Jabouri, a Sunni, as speaker, following on July 24 by electing senior
PUK official Fuad Masum as Iraq’s new President in place of Jalal Talabani. On August
11, Masum nominated Da’wa Party Parliamentarian Haider Abadi, a British-educated
engineer, as Iraq’s new Prime Minister.

Source: DoD photo by D. Myles Cullen (Released).

Prime Minister Haider Abadi.128
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THE START OF OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
The United States restricted its military support to the Iraqis while Maliki still served
as Prime Minister. A small task force from U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) under the command of Major General Dana Pittard had arrived in Baghdad on June 15 to assess the military situation and begin coordination with the Iraqi Army, but U.S. leaders had refrained
from providing more direct support in the weeks after the fall of Mosul. U.S. officials
believed Maliki needed to step aside in order for the campaign to halt ISIS to succeed,
and they conditioned security assistance on his replacement by a new Iraqi premier. This
policy stance created resentment among many Iraqis, especially Shi’a, who concluded
that the United States had been willing to let ISIS threaten Baghdad in order to gain leverage to remove Maliki. The Iranian regime and its Iraqi allies highlighted the difference
between the U.S. and Iranian responses to the crisis, and even some long-time U.S. partners voiced their frustration. Mowaffak Rubaie summed up this attitude when he told
journalists, “Who arrived here to save us three days after Mosul fell? Not the Americans.
They only sent abysmal airstrikes 3 months later when their citizens were beheaded. The
speed of the Iranian response to Baghdad and Erbil was the next day.”129
With Abadi in place, U.S. military involvement steadily increased and, in fact, direct
U.S. activity against ISIS had already begun the week before Abadi’s appointment. From
August 1-4, ISIS attacked outposts in Sinjar and near the Mosul Dam, sending the peshmerga reeling and forcing tens of thousands of Kurds, Yezidis, Christians, and other
minorities to flee. At Jebel Sinjar, ISIS fighters massacred hundreds of Yezidis and pursued Yezidi civilians who fled onto the bare mountain and became stranded there. At
Mosul Dam, ISIS members came close enough to the dilapidated structure to worry Iraqi
and U.S. officials that they could seize the dam’s controls and flood the Tigris River Valley
from Mosul to Samarra. On August 6, ISIS attacked east from the Tigris River Valley and
overran the Christian towns of eastern Ninewa, killing non-Sunni men and enslaving
women and children. Within hours, the ISIS fighters were less than 20 miles from Erbil,
with peshmerga defenses appearing to collapse and open the road to the Kurdish capital.
In response to the threat, on August 8, U.S. aircraft began bombing ISIS positions west of
Erbil, while U.S. special operations forces provided advisors to peshmerga units. The airstrikes reversed the ISIS momentum immediately, halting the terrorist group’s advance
and enabling peshmerga units to stabilize a defensive line.
On the same day, CENTCOM named ARCENT commander Lieutenant General James
Terry as commander of the counter-ISIS campaign, and Terry began to organize a task
force headquarters at ARCENT’s main base in Kuwait. Terry and a small staff—limited
in size by a troop cap set by U.S. officials in Washington—joined Pittard’s organization in
Baghdad and set up a Combined Joint Operations Center with Iraqi Army counterparts
at forward operating base (FOB) Union III, across the street from the U.S. Embassy in
the Green Zone. Terry’s task force also organized a small operations center in Erbil from
which to coordinate with peshmerga counterparts. By August 18, under the cover of U.S.
airstrikes, peshmerga troops had halted ISIS’s advance along the Green Line and had
begun to push the group’s fighters slowly back toward the Tigris River.

599

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR

Carter (center), Jones (left), Terry (right). Source: DoD photo by U.S. Army Sergeant
1st Class Clydell Kinchen (Released).

SECDEF Ashton Carter With U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones and ARCENT
Commander Lieutenant General James Terry.130
Significant changes in the military organization on both the Iraqi and American sides
soon followed. On September 23, Prime Minister Abadi dissolved the Office of the Commander in Chief, the organization Maliki and General Faruq al Araji had used to exert
control over the Ministry of Defense, and ordered the immediate retirement of General
Abud Qanbar and General Ali Ghaidan, the two senior officers whose flight from Mosul
had demoralized the city’s defenders.131 The following day, SECDEF Carter ordered the
Army’s 1st Infantry Division headquarters to deploy 500 Soldiers to Baghdad, Erbil, and
Kuwait to take over for Pittard’s task force as a new Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq. The division would do so as part of the newly named Operation
INHERENT RESOLVE, the name given to the campaign against ISIS in both Syria and
Iraq under Terry’s command. Though the number of troops deployed inside Iraq as part
of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE remained limited by the U.S. Government’s self-imposed cap, the operation included a large NATO contingent to train Iraqi units.
By the end of October, Major General Paul Funk and his 1st Infantry Division headquarters reached Baghdad and Erbil to begin their mission as Combined Joint Forces
Land Component Command-Iraq, meant to repair the broken Iraqi Army and coordinate
close air support for the Iraqi and peshmerga troops in contact with ISIS. Just shy of 3
years after the last U.S. units had left Baghdad, the U.S. Army had returned.
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CHAPTER 16
CONCLUSION: FROM SURGE TO WITHDRAWAL
The post-surge period was marked by dramatic changes in the character of the Iraq
conflict and in the U.S. approach to it. By the end of 2008, the security situation had
improved to a degree that had seemed unthinkable in early 2007, when U.S. casualties
and incidents of violence had risen to their highest levels of the war. Where insurgent
attacks inside Iraq had once averaged over 140 per day, by the end of 2008 the coalition
routinely experienced days with no attacks at all throughout the entire country. The provincial elections of January 2009, in which Iraqi voters in almost every Arab province
elected parties running on a nationalist law and order platform boded well for political
stability as well. General Raymond Odierno and Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF-I) recognized the profound change in the character of the conflict, and as a result MNF-I and
its units began to shift their focus from counterinsurgency to stability operations—the
activities necessary to sustain the military victory won during the surge.
At the same time, however, interest in the United States was waning. By early 2009,
the “Washington clock” that General Peter Petraeus had spoken about in 2007-2008 had
run out. After the financial crisis of 2008, U.S. Government officials and American foreign policy experts began to argue that counterinsurgency was too costly during a time
of shrinking resources. As a result, the Iraq strategy and plans put in place in early 2009
reflected limits on U.S. military activity rather than the idea that the surge had created
opportunities that could be exploited.
After its signing, the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement and its provision that U.S.
troops would withdraw fully from Iraq by the end of 2011 loomed over every aspect of
the U.S. military campaign. The agreement forced MNF-I to adjust its operations and
plans in significant ways, such as the stipulation that U.S. troops would withdraw from
Iraqi cities in June 2009, as well as new requirements for almost all U.S. units to coordinate their operations through their Iraqi military and police counterparts. The movement of U.S. troops out of the cities created vulnerabilities that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
exploited in the massive autumn bombings of August-December 2009, which discredited
the Maliki government to such an extent that it nearly collapsed.
As the date for withdrawal from the cities approached, civil-military cooperation suffered and the relationship between MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy devolved into a level
of dysfunctionality equal to that between Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) and the
Coalition Provisional Authority. Still, MNF-I and its civilian counterparts were able to
cooperate closely enough to implement Odierno’s vision of a “combined security mechanism,” a de facto peacekeeping mission along the Green Line under which U.S., Iraqi, and
Kurdish security forces operated and coordinated together to prevent the very real threat
of an Arab-Kurdish war in the north.
While the Combined Security Mechanism was helping to stabilize northern Iraq, several factors were undermining Iraq’s stability elsewhere. In 2010, the Sons of Iraq movement that had helped turn the tables in 2007-2008 began to wilt under pressure from AQI
on one hand and the Maliki government on the other. The Iranian regime’s Quds Force
intensified its campaign to try to force the United States out of Iraq using militant proxies
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such as Kata’ib Hizballah and other Shi’a militias, while the Syrian regime of Bashar al
Assad continued its involvement with AQI and other Sunni insurgents despite U.S. outreach to the Assad regime. Nevertheless, the Syrian regime could not save AQI from the
most successful series of security operations of the entire war, which came in early 2010
and nearly destroyed the terrorist organization. The Iraqi political deadlock that ensued
after the country’s parliamentary elections of March 2010 undermined these successes
by once again polarizing Iraqi politics along sectarian lines and setting Prime Minister
Maliki against the Sunni political bloc associated with the Awakening. When the Arab
Spring movement swept across the Middle East in 2011, the unpopular Maliki government found itself the target of popular disaffection because of the government’s failure to
improve governance and public services.
Against this backdrop, U.S. commanders raced against the clock in 2010-2011 to prepare the Iraqi security forces (ISF) to defend the country by themselves after the departure of U.S. troops, and the U.S. Army’s specially designed Advise and Assist Brigades
began to rotate to Iraq for that purpose. After United States Forces-Iraq’s (USF-I) August
2010 change of mission from combat operations to advise and assist operations, however,
USF-I leaders had fewer and fewer means with which to counter the Shi’a militants and
other adversaries. By late 2010, USF-I leaders had to work hard to prevent retrograde
operations from becoming the U.S. command’s main effort. At the same time, commanders had to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Advise and Assist
Brigades that operated “by, with, and through” Iraqi forces. USF-I commander General
Lloyd Austin and his headquarters also had to conduct continual planning to push the
“waterfall” (of the ultimate U.S. troop withdrawal) as far to the right as possible, thereby
leaving the greatest number of forces in place and preserving options to the last possible
moment in 2011 as the United States formulated its policy on troop strength in Iraq.
As U.S. troops prepared to depart the country, clear signs emerged that USF-I’s main
enemies were reemerging. Under new leadership and reinvigorated by the onset of the
Syrian civil war, AQI rebounded during 2011 and began forming itself into what would
eventually become the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Shi’a militant groups, meanwhile, stepped up their attacks against U.S. troops in mid-2011 in an attempt to position
themselves to gain credit for driving USF-I out of Iraq, as Lebanese Hizballah had done
before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The Iranian-backed militias also conducted these attacks partly to better position themselves for political power in the postU.S. period.
Even before 2011, USF-I leaders were seeing early signs of the deep problems within
the ISF that would later cause that force to unravel in the face of ISIS in 2014. Austin
noted in particular the difficulty within the ISF of maintaining complex weapons systems
and performing logistics functions. At the same time, signs of Prime Minister Maliki’s
politicization of ISF leadership and establishment of regime protection forces—such as
the Iraqi special operations forces—were unmistakable, pointing to the difficulty of completing a security assistance mission within a “sovereignty trap” in which a host nation
government’s aims diverge increasingly from our own, but that host nation remains the
means by which we intend to secure our interests. Falling oil prices also led the Iraqi Government to cut the ISF’s budget, making it impossible for USF-I and the ISF to remain on
track with ISF development plans such as the generation of the new Iraqi Air Force. The
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Iraqi Government also cut payments to the Sons of Iraq, partly due to its budget deficits
and partly for sectarian reasons aimed at preventing a Sunni resurgence.
Most importantly for the completion of the USF-I mission, however, the effort to leave
a residual force in place after 2011 failed. U.S. military plans did not anticipate the fall
2011 decision to withdraw all troops. These plans were based on mistaken assumptions
that the State Department would have the capacity and the will to sustain USF-I’s many
military missions upon assuming control of the security assistance mission. The shift in
security assistance and ISF development from military units to contractors failed after
2010, and at the same time, “soft power” did not fill the vacuum as U.S. military planners
had assumed and officials in Washington had asserted.
As a result, at the end of 2011 the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq—the organization created to assume the security assistance mission after USF-I’s closure—was left in
a situation similar to that of CJTF-7 in 2003: under-resourced and lacking the authorities
and tools necessary to preserve U.S. interests. This mismatch of ends and means was
more serious than U.S. Government leaders understood in 2011-2012, partly because of
the U.S. misinterpretation of low reported levels of violence and the difficulty of maintaining situational awareness as U.S. forces drew down.
The unfortunate aftermath of the U.S. military withdrawal is now well known: in
2013, after a series of political moves by Maliki that alienated much of Iraq’s Sunni community, the country began to return to a state of civil war. By the first week of 2014, Fallujah was back in insurgent hands, soon to become an ISIS stronghold. Five months later, in
June 2014, Mosul fell to ISIS and the four Iraqi Army divisions in Ninewa and Salahadin
Provinces evaporated. In the ensuing chaos, ISIS fighters advanced all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad and to the hinterland of Erbil, prompting a massive expansion by Iraq’s
Shi’a militia organizations to defend the country’s capital. By the end of summer 2014,
U.S. forces had begun to return to Iraq to stiffen the ISF and to conduct a new campaign
against ISIS, but without the benefit of the military infrastructure the United States had
shut down in 2011. The war that had begun in 2003 was far from over.
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CHAPTER 17
CONCLUSION: LESSONS OF THE IRAQ WAR
In a way, it would be reassuring to believe that the mistakes the United States made in
the Iraq War were the result of unintelligent leaders making poor decisions. If that were
so, then the United States could be assured of avoiding similar mistakes in the future
simply by selecting better, more intelligent leaders. However, this is not the case. The
overwhelming majority of decisions in the Iraq War were made by highly intelligent,
highly experienced leaders whose choices, often in consensus, seemed reasonable at the
time they were made, but nonetheless added up over time to a failure to achieve our
strategic objectives. Examining the reasoning behind these decisions and the systemic
failures that produced them should be the first task in analyzing the Iraq War’s lessons.
What follow are examinations of some of those key decisions, and in some cases their
unintended consequences, as well as their implications for future wars.
SELECTED STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WARS
State Collapse
The operation to change the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein escalated into the
unintentional collapse of the Iraqi state, an outcome that went beyond U.S. objectives and
for which the U.S. military was not prepared. Part of the Iraqi state was bound to collapse
because of the U.S.-led invasion, but coalition provisional authority (CPA) orders 1 and
2 led to a far more sweeping implosion than U.S. leaders intended. A large part of the
instability that followed between 2003 and 2011 was the predictable consequence of this
implosion, after which factions of all kinds, including extremist militants, rushed to fill
the void.
The invasion of Iraq showed that even an operation designed as a limited regime
decapitation can precipitate state collapse in centralized, authoritarian political systems,
after which must follow either martial law imposed by a large military presence or civilian authority prepared to step in and immediately assume responsibility for governance―
itself a massive undertaking. If this does not happen, the void will at least partly be filled
by malignant actors. In Iraq, coalition leaders made a conscious decision not to impose
martial law in Iraq in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam’s regime, but they also had not
prepared an interim authority ready to do more than manage a humanitarian crisis that
did not materialize. The resulting power vacuum and governance gap have never been
fully filled by the post-Saddam Iraqi state.
Technology Does Not Always Offset Numbers
The Iraq War demonstrated that technological advancements only go so far in
enabling reduction of our military end strength and our forces on the ground. Stability
and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, and in general, are troop-intensive
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activities. In addition, irregular warfare by its nature is a political-military endeavor in
which every operation has political implications, which is why establishing relationships
with local Iraqis and developing an understanding of local socio-cultural dynamics was
so important. That task requires human interaction more than it requires the application
of technology. Against this backdrop, the de facto cap on U.S. troop strength in Iraq and
the reduction of ground troops in the Army’s transformed brigade combat teams (BCTs)
combined to create an absolute shortage of ground forces for the prosecution of stability
and COIN operations in Iraq. In future wars, the United States must guard against its
historical American predilection to assume technology or qualitative warfighting superiority can be a substitute for troop numbers.
The Iraq War also highlighted the mistaken assumptions that influenced the pre-2003
debate over whether the U.S. military would—or should—be capable in the future of
fighting two major regional conflicts simultaneously. In the pre-2003 period, U.S. military leaders and planners accepted that the United States need only maintain the combat
power and forces required to win in one theater of war while holding in another, after
which U.S. forces would be able to pivot to the second theater of war and win there as
well—a concept nicknamed “win-hold-win.” In the simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan—neither of which reflected the nature of a major regional conflict in defense
planning—the U.S. military was not able to “win-hold-win.” Instead, long-term stability
operations severely taxed ground forces optimized for decisive conflict such as Operation
DESERT STORM and created a shortage of ground forces. Strategic defeat was almost
assured by artificial constraints on combat power in either theater and by this overall
shortage of ground forces. This fact holds implications for potential future contingencies
around the world. It is not clear, after the Iraq War, that the U.S. military has retained
sufficient ground forces to fight successfully in more than one major regional conflict at a
time. Furthermore, the inability of ground forces to accomplish the objectives of the winhold-win concept indicate that the basic strategic premise itself is inadequate.
Coalition Warfare
The multinational coalition’s political and diplomatic value for the United States was
not matched by its operational effectiveness inside the Iraq theater. Coalition warfare was
largely unsuccessful for several reasons. Following the model established in the Balkans,
the U.S. military allocated independent division battlespace to the coalition partners in
Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) and Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE), but in doing so uncoupled most of southern Iraq from the broader U.S.
military campaign. The Polish-led MND-CS operated under strict national caveats that
restricted its units in restive, Shi’a-militant-influenced areas of the country. In the British case, MND-SE became increasingly disconnected from Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s
(MNC-I) planning and operations, with both the U.S. command in Baghdad and the British command in Basra operating as though events in central Iraq and far southern Iraq
were unrelated. As Iranian malignant influence mounted in 2006 and after, U.S. commanders pressed the British contingent in southern Iraq to disrupt the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Shi’a militant proxies, a step that Whitehall prevented.
When the United States adopted the surge strategy in 2007, the differences between the
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new U.S. approach in central Iraq and the British transition strategy in southern Iraq
could not be reconciled.
These differences illustrated problems that stemmed from assuming the coalition’s
contributing nations held a common understanding of and commitment to the strategic objective. They did not. The success of any coalition depends on the establishment
and maintenance of such a common understanding and commitment. Without these
elements, the predictable result is coalition partners who operate with caveats that can
become self-defeating.
The United Kingdom’s (UK) operations in Iraq are a case in point. By 2006, the British
Government had decided to withdraw its forces gradually from Iraq in order to increase
significantly its troop presence in Afghanistan. This decision made deployments in Iraq
and Afghanistan a zero-sum matter, a fact whose implications British policymakers
apparently never discussed with their U.S. counterparts. The need to pull forces from
Iraq to send to Afghanistan became even more critical after the 2003 strategic restructuring and defense cuts that dramatically reduced the size of the British Army began to take
effect.1 As a result, MND-SE was forced to reduce forces on a strict timetable, giving the
command almost no flexibility as conditions changed. Resolving this strategic dilemma,
as U.S. commanders in Baghdad wished to do, would have required discussions and an
agreement between U.S. and British national leaders that did not take place.
Despite the disconnect between the operational commands in Baghdad and MNDSE, the British contribution in Baghdad was significant. Until mid-2009, when the British national contingent departed Iraq, British special operators played a crucial role in
the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). British and Australian officers played key roles
in Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), MNC-I,
and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) as well as MNSTCI’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) element, NATO Training Mission-Iraq
(NTM-I). Senior British officers often led MNF-I’s planning, reconciliation, and governance efforts, exerting outsized influence on the conduct of the coalition campaign.
Over the course of this 6-year interaction, the working relationship between U.S. and
British officers grew increasingly close and eventually shifted to Afghanistan. From 2002
onward, a generation of U.S. Soldiers learned to assume that in any major operation they
would be serving alongside British counterparts, especially at the operational level. From
the British perspective, however, it is not clear that the same is true. Given the British
Government and public’s deeply negative view of the Iraq War, participation of British
forces in future U.S.-led campaigns cannot be taken for granted.
The Iraq War also showed that the under-resourcing of defense forces by almost all
our allies, including the United Kingdom, would require a new approach to the integration of allies into future campaigns. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. military assumed that
any large-scale U.S. operation would include major allies. In the future, we can no longer
assume our allies will be willing to participate, at least on the terms we require; nor can
we assume they will retain the military capabilities to add value to operations when they
do. If countries with limited capabilities and overly restrictive national caveats participate in future conflicts as allies, the challenge of integrating them can be mitigated somewhat by diffusing coalition contingents across U.S. headquarters rather than giving allied
contingents their own independent battlespace as was done in MND-SE and MND-CS.
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Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform
U.S. national interests probably will require the military to conduct large-scale security force assistance in the future, either in conflict or outside of conflict, so the Army must
sustain institutional capabilities for missions of this kind. Building indigenous foreign
forces on a scale of the Iraq War requires a specialized force structure and training base
within the conventional Army, not just special operations forces. The U.S. military may
be called upon to stand up MNSTC-I or Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan type organizations in the future, and thus the Army should have the doctrine
and force structure capable of doing so quickly. In Iraq, the Army waited 6 years before
creating the Advise and Assist Brigades. In future conflicts, this should be done more
rapidly, or it would be even better if the capability were retained in the peacetime Army.
In the future, security assistance and security sector reform must go hand in hand.
Both are necessary; neither is sufficient by itself. In Iraq, the United States had to build
military forces, self-sufficient administrative systems within the military and the Ministry of Defense, and law enforcement organizations. Building combat power through the
construction of tactical units alone, as was done in the first 3 years of the Iraq War, was
a short-term solution that squandered precious time and created an illusion of progress.
Institutional development of combat support, combat service support, and ministerial
functions must occur in parallel with the creation of tactical units.
Holistic security assistance means that the United States must also build law enforcement institutions. This includes police, a confinement system, and an adjudication
system, yet in Iraq, the United States did not have an integrated approach. U.S. leaders
assigned responsibility for the police function to MNSTC-I and provided congressionally
approved Iraqi security force (ISF) funds, but they assigned the other two functions to
the U.S. Embassy’s Rule of Law Task Force, which could not access ISF funds. The result
was a massive operational police force but an inadequate confinement and adjudication
capability.
The effort to build an effective ISF also faced unity of effort challenges, with responsibility for local police, paramilitary police, and military forces assigned at various times to
different departments within the U.S. Government. After 3 years, this problem was finally
resolved when authority, responsibility, and funding for all security forces, to include the
police, were assigned to the Department of Defense (DoD). In the future, such an arrangement should be the model. If regulatory or statutory change is not possible to attain unity
of effort, organizations responsible for building non-military security forces—such as the
police—must be appropriately organized and funded. They currently are not.
Building capable and independent security forces requires years, potentially decades,
of interagency efforts. The insistence of senior military leaders, nearly consistently across
the span of the Iraq War, that Iraqi forces would be able to stand on their own after “just”
another year or two was counterproductive. If the United States is to undertake such
projects in the future, senior military officers should caution their political leaders from
the onset that their path will be long, slow, and frustrating. While such a commitment
is costly, it does pay dividends. Maintaining involvement and presence not only helps
protect the investment in training host nation security forces, but it also provides some
degree of influence with local political leaders.
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Democratization and the Sovereignty Dilemma
Since the early 20th century, the United States has assumed that democratization brings
greater stability. However, as the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), wars have shown, elections are not always stabilizing events. U.S. commanders long believed the emergence
of an elected Iraqi Government would have a calming effect, but the elections of 2005
exacerbated ethno-sectarian conflict and contributed to the civil war that followed. The
haste with which the Coalition carried out that process―holding two parliamentary elections, drafting a constitution, and hosting a referendum on that constitution―heightened
tensions by raising the stakes of each event and provided insufficient time for reconciliation. Iraq went from the removal of the Ba’ath regime to an approved constitution in
roughly 30 months. By comparison, the fledgling United States―a nation with a tradition
of democracy and a robust civil society―spent 12 years navigating a similar path. Iraq’s
2010 parliamentary elections were similarly destabilizing, providing Prime Minister
Maliki a pathway to consummate his authoritarian and sectarian tendencies.
The Iraqi political process demonstrated one of the enduring problems with the American approach to COIN. Once a partner government feels that its survival is assured, the
U.S. ability to influence it declines. This often means that the partner government will
arrest reform and reconciliation programs before they are complete―especially programs
that would threaten the political or economic elite. As a result, often the root causes of
insurgency will remain intact and ready to flare back up under the right conditions. U.S.
leaders will continue to confront these dynamics in the future as the United States works
through host nation governments to advance its national interests. Overcoming such
a deep challenge will require a counterintuitive application of U.S. national power. As
security improves, the United States will likely have to increase its commitment of key
elements of national power—especially within the economic and diplomatic realms—in
order to maintain sufficient influence so as to build a lasting peace.
U.S. misperceptions regarding democratization and sovereignty were linked directly
to another key strategic error. The United States equated the end of fighting with the end
of the war, but war involves more than fighting. By focusing heavily on metrics involving
violent incidents, U.S. leaders assumed that Iraq was more stable than it actually was. As
a result, they deluded themselves about the length of commitment required and gave
away tactical and operational successes only to achieve strategic failure. Strategic success
would have required an acceptably stable state that Iraqis considered legitimately representative of majority and minority groups, but U.S. leaders struggled to define how to
accomplish that objective and focused on comfortable tactical and operational tasks that
were necessary but not sufficient.
The Role of External Actors
COIN and counterterrorism are exponentially more difficult if enemy groups enjoy
sanctuaries, especially in neighboring countries. The United States must develop a
whole-of-government approach for neutralizing such sanctuaries, which have posed a
problem for the United States since the end of World War II. From an early stage in the
war, Syria and Iran played a highly destabilizing role in Iraq. Both sought to bog the
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U.S.-led coalition down to gain advantage in the regional political struggle and deter the
United States from seeking regime change in their countries. They also opposed the creation of a new U.S.-allied Iraqi Government. They gave sanctuary and strategic assistance
to the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies, respectively, and contributed materially to the killing
and wounding of tens of thousands of Iraqis and hundreds, if not thousands, of coalition troops. U.S. military and civilian leaders recognized this problem early in the war
but never formulated an effective strategy for ending or even neutralizing it. U.S. leaders refrained from direct measures against those regimes, and instead left the matter to
MNF-I, a U.S. theater command that could only operate against Syrian and Iranian operatives and proxies inside Iraq itself—with very rare exceptions. As a result, the Syrian and
Iranian regimes became more and more emboldened. In particular, the Iranian regime
produced sophisticated and lethal technology for their Iraqi proxies to use against U.S.
troops, and U.S. forces had difficulty keeping up with the evolution of Iranian weapons such as explosively formed penetrators and improvised rocket-assisted munitions
(IRAMs). These weapons killed and wounded scores of U.S. troops, but the United States
responded to them only at the tactical and operational levels, not the strategic. By imposing artificial geographic boundaries on the conflict, the United States limited the war in a
way that made it difficult to reach its desired end states.
The United States also never formulated a successful strategy for addressing the destabilizing influence of other regional states, including some U.S. allies. Turkey, Jordan, and
the Gulf states all played roles of varying significance in Iraq, not all of them positive.
The United States had difficulty persuading the Gulf States to crack down on terrorist
facilitators who supported AQI and other Sunni militant groups in Iraq. The Jordanian
Government was reluctant to crack down on facilitators and sympathizers for the Sunni
insurgency based in Jordan. The Turkish Government came close to war with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on several occasions. The Turkish air and ground operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) inside Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007-2008
nearly collapsed the Iraqi governing coalition in Baghdad at a time when the United
States was trying to parlay the security gains of the surge into political reconciliation.
The United States also failed to persuade the Gulf States to fully embrace the new Iraqi
Government and encourage its reintegration into the Arab world in political, economic,
and security terms.
In any conflict with major regional implications, the United States must expect all of
the countries in a region to respond to U.S. actions. From the initiation of hostilities, the
motives and potential actions of regional players must be taken into account and an interagency response developed. In the Iraq War, U.S. leaders seemed to believe that other
regional nations would not react. When they did, U.S. leaders rejected strategic action
and instead chose operational or tactical responses. Although the United States should
always be wary of expanding a conflict to other nations, U.S. leaders should consider the
option of escalation—including with military power—when neighboring states become
de facto combatants. In Iraq, the U.S. inability to find an effective response to Syrian
and Iranian proxies made accomplishing our political and military objectives almost
impossible.
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Military Leadership and Strategic Implementation
Innovative commanders emerged during the war and were empirically successful,
but the process of encouraging and institutionalizing innovations was uneven. It is also
not clear that the Army rewarded their performance through the promotions process or
by supporting the replication of their successful innovations. With only a few exceptions,
it does not appear that the Army examined how the tactical leaders who innovated in
Iraq became innovators in the first place. Most often, it appears they learned what was
required through peer-to-peer interaction on the battlefield, not in institutional venues
back home. Indeed, it seems that the most successful innovators were actually inverting
policy rather than operating within policy, most notably in the case of the brigade and
battalion-level COIN approaches of 2005-2006, which took place during a time of the
transition strategy. This is a fact the Army has not really confronted, and it seems possible that the Army in the Iraq War actually tended to penalize successful leaders who
challenged their commanders.
Some of these issues clearly extended to strategic leadership as well. Theater and operational commanders were continually forced to deal with problems that could only truly
be resolved at the policy level, by higher authorities in Washington or in allied capitals.
The two most significant examples were that Iraq theater commanders often operated
without the benefit of a coherent regional strategy, and that Iraq theater commanders
were forced to mitigate the national caveats and policies of coalition partners. In addition to these examples, at several points of the war—the surge most prominently—military leaders found themselves in the awkward role of defending strategy in the political
realm. As a result, the line between military and political roles at times became blurred.
A better concept for the role of military leaders in war might be that of shared responsibilities of senior political and military leaders.2 The belief in a hard line between the
civil and military spheres is a mistaken one, and the experience of the post-9/11 wars
has shown that, while civil leaders unequivocally retain final decision authority, military
leaders should share the responsibility for ensuring the quality of important decisions.
Specifically, military and civil leaders who embark upon war have a shared responsibility to ensure that war aims are achievable and that strategies, policies, and campaigns are
tied to those aims and have a reasonable probability of success. It is also incumbent upon
them to ensure, together, the integrity of the decision-making process and the fidelity
of the information used in that process; the organizational capacity to execute in a sufficiently coherent way, then adapt quickly enough as change happens; and the sustained
legitimacy of the war.
There is an organizational dimension to the implementation of these strategic factors.
Future conflicts will require the integration of different elements of national power, but
the U.S. interagency often lacks the capability of managing this integration. The current
methodology of making policy via the National Security Council is sufficient for setting
policy parameters, but it is insufficient for implementing and adapting. As Robert Komer
noted in “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,” the U.S. system was too slow to adapt to the
changing character and demands of the Vietnam war, and more than 3 decades later in
Iraq, it remained too slow.
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OPERATIONAL LESSONS
The Operational Impact of Key Policy Decisions
The Short-war Assumption. U.S. leaders and planners operated under the constant
assumption that the war would be short. At no point in the war, even during the surge,
did U.S. leaders believe the campaign was more than 18 or 24 months from the point
when U.S. troops could be withdrawn and responsibility for security handed over to the
Iraqis.
The short-war assumption drove DoD’s planning, and the “patch chart” of units scheduled to deploy often drove operational planning in the theater. The same assumption,
at times, drove procurement and modernization decisions, with the Army and Marine
Corps often deciding to fund future capabilities ahead of the operational needs of the
Iraq theater. Such a decision was wholly logical, given the assessment from the theater
headquarters that the war would wind down within the next year or so. Some leaders,
such as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates, were able to overcome institutional
inertia temporarily and champion procurement projects that met the immediate operational needs of the conflict, but in general, the bureaucracy still “did its thing.”
The fact that U.S. leaders retained the short-war assumption for as long as they did
created some long-term negative consequences within the U.S. military. One such consequence was the creation of a de facto “away team” and “home team” within the U.S.
officer corps, wherein a population of officers in certain career fields, services, and units
deployed much more frequently than the rest. This phenomenon, in turn, created a division in worldview among military leaders.
Constant Constraint on Force Levels. Throughout the war, the commands in Iraq had
too few troops to accomplish their military missions. As a matter of policy, DoD leaders
and strategic-level commanders enforced a de facto cap on U.S. troop strength in the
Iraq theater and effectively discouraged lower-level commanders from requesting more
troops. DoD and military leaders did this for a variety of reasons, including the belief
that the U.S. ground services were too large, outdated and unwieldy, and therefore sending more troops to Iraq would hinder building more agile forces against future threats.
Another reason for the force cap was the assessment that additional forces could be counterproductive by creating “antibodies” among the Iraqi public as well as a “dependency
cycle” that could prevent the Iraqi Government and its security forces from taking full
responsibility for their nation’s security. Institutional concerns also loomed large, with
Washington worrying that extended and back-to-back deployments would burn out and
even cripple the all-volunteer force. Requirements from other theaters, namely Afghanistan, competed for limited resources in what became a zero-sum game. At other points in
the war, the cap was driven by domestic political considerations.
The consequence of the troop cap was that at no point during the war, even during
the surge period, did the in-country commanders meet their troop-to-task ratios or
have enough troops to defeat both the Sunni insurgency (including AQI) and the Iranian regime-backed Shi’a militants simultaneously. The campaign to stabilize Iraq most
likely required far more time than it would otherwise have needed as a result, time that
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ultimately would not politically be available. The dearth of U.S. troops in late 2003 and
early 2004 gave room to the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies to gather strength. As U.S.
troops withdrew later in the war, it meant that their departure left the United States with
little influence over the behavior, effectiveness, and development of the ISF, which were
rendered far less capable and far more politicized as U.S. combat support waned.
The question of force levels was not just an operational one. Senior civilian and military leaders did not always make accurate assessments of the force levels required to
perform the missions they assigned, nor put in place personnel policies that would make
those force levels available. The problem was further exacerbated by a reluctance to
increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps because of concerns that such an expansion would come at the cost of procurement and research and development.
Several steps should be taken to avoid these sorts of problems in future conflicts.
First, strategy should be driven by the traditional method of balancing of ends, ways, and
means rather than by force levels. This should be done in conjunction with civilian leadership as a part of the national security decision-making process. That process should
include discussions on what is actually feasible at different force constraints, and should
incorporate a continuous discussion about risk that matches the changing operational
situation. Second, the assumption that U.S. Soldiers, by their mere presence, create ill
effects must be banished from our strategic thought. While Iraqis chafed at the continued
presence of U.S. Soldiers, many Iraqis also considered it essential for Americans to stay
until their country was truly stabilized and self-sufficient. American military personnel
consistently served as the most effective brake to sectarian conflict, with U.S. forces often
acting as the only honest broker trusted by a majority of Iraqis.
Another important step to address potential future force constraint challenges would
be for senior military leaders to consider increasing the size of the force, especially the
Army and Marine Corps, as soon as the United States is committed to a major conflict.
Repeatedly, the military has downsized after a major conflict to the degree that it does
not have enough forces to fight the next war. This historical reality, when paired with
the time required to obtain funding and authority for expansion, as well as the interval
needed to recruit and train those new forces, makes early action essential. If the decision
is not made early enough to increase the size of the force sufficiently, it is possible or even
likely that, by the time that additional forces become available, they will arrive too late
to have an operational effect. Senior military leaders should be extremely skeptical of
assessments that a conflict will be over too quickly to benefit from such a growth. It is far
easier to cancel such growth than to deal with the operational and strategic consequences
of having insufficient forces.
Ad Hoc Organizations. After the invasion of April-May 2003, which was executed
at the operational level by standing headquarters (U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM],
Third Army, and V Corps), the war was fought by ad hoc organizations. Rather than
use standing headquarters and commands, the Army and DoD chose instead to create
new organizations to perform the functions of the theater command and its subordinate headquarters that handled the development of the ISF and detention operations.
Almost all of the most important operational commands in Iraq, such as CJTF-7, MNF-I,
MNSTC-I, and Task Force 134, were established mainly by joint manning documents and
staffed by individual augmentees provided by the services. Only MNC-I did not fall into
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this category, since it was based upon the standing U.S. Army corps headquarters that
rotated into theater on a yearly basis. The ad hoc commands all suffered greatly from low
staffing at the outset, though MNF-I eventually grew far larger than its original design.
DoD leaders chose to use ad hoc organizations partly because they believed the Iraq
War would be short and therefore large standing headquarters would be costly and
unnecessary, and partly because they wished to keep the standing commands—such
as CENTCOM and other army-level commands—available for other operations. The
large, capable Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), for example, sat
under-utilized in Kuwait for the duration of the war, waiting to be used in a contingency
that never came. The consequence of using an ad hoc manning process was that the U.S.
operational commands in Iraq were mainly headquarters that did not train together,
lacked cohesion, and suffered from high personnel turnover, all of which hampered their
effectiveness. While the tactical units that fought the war avoided the pitfalls of the Vietnam war’s year-long individual replacement program, the headquarters that planned
and managed the conflict were saddled with exactly that burden.
Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, the trend toward ad hoc headquarters has accelerated as a number of standing headquarters have been eliminated or
reduced as cost savings measures. V Corps, the headquarters that planned the invasion
of Iraq, is no more; and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), which could
form the basis for a future CFLCC, have had their personnel authorizations cut nearly in
half. In 2014, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) had sufficient manpower to assume the mission immediately as a CJTF for operations in Iraq in addition to its ASCC duties. Today
such a shift would not be possible. Given the concrete value that standing headquarters
demonstrated repeatedly during the Iraq War, it would be wise to arrest, if not reverse,
the near free fall reduction in their strength.
Army Transformation and the War. The Army’s 2003-2004 decision to continue with
transformation while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan had severe operational implications. Army leaders decided that the transformation process would eventually produce
a larger number of more capable BCTs for the Iraq theater and other contingencies, but
by continuing with transformation in a time of conflict, they rendered some brigades
unavailable for deployment as they were reorganized and refitted. The most serious consequence of this decision was the Army’s need in 2005 to operationalize the strategic
reserve, the Army National Guard, and deploy large portions of it to Iraq.
As a result, about half of the brigades deployed to Iraq during the 2005 rotation were
National Guard units taking part in the first large-scale operational deployment of the
National Guard since the Korean war. Though most of these units and individuals performed admirably, their deployment meant that for the make-or-break year of Iraqi elections, which President George W. Bush considered the critical period for his Iraq strategy,
half of the Army brigades in theater were reserve units rather than more experienced and
trained active component units.
The deployment of transformed brigades had other unintended consequences. The
tactical improvements gained through transformation generally were offset by losses in
troop strength in each brigade, a factor of critical importance in COIN operations. The
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons, in particular,
often proved unequal to their assigned tasks; and it would be hard to imagine a RSTA
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squadron conducting a movement to contact as 3-7 Cavalry did while it fought its way
to Baghdad in 2003. Breaking up division resources and decentralizing them into the
transformed brigades also had other consequences. The demise of the Division Support
Command and Division Artillery undoubtedly would make made it more challenging
for a division commander to weight the main effort, and repeating the tactical success of
the invasion could be more difficult. At times during the invasion, for example, all of the
3d Infantry Division’s assigned and attached artillery battalions were firing in support of
one brigade—a seemingly unrealistic scenario now that each brigade commander owns
his own artillery battalion. While some of these division resources are making a fragile
comeback, it is difficult to see how the partial reversals will have a decisive impact. When
evaluated in the context of the Iraq War, transformation at best produced few concrete
gains; at worst, it produced a net negative result.
Overly Optimistic Planning. Throughout the war, planners in DoD and in the theater
assumed that the security situation in Iraq would improve over time, and that the theater
would require fewer U.S. troops in the future. At no point other than in late 2006 and early
2007 did strategic thinking reflect the idea that the security situation could worsen and
require more U.S. troops. U.S. military plans generally were aligned with General John P.
Abizaid and General George W. Casey, Jr.’s assumption that the new Iraqi Government
would be seen as legitimate and dampen militant resistance. The opposite proved to be
true. U.S. military leaders stuck with the campaign plan of 2004-2005 even though several
studies done in 2005—including the ones completed by MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Red
Team in Baghdad—concluded that it was not succeeding. The planning of large operations such as IRAQI FREEDOM is a shared civil-military responsibility, and both military
and civil leaders failed to reassess the appropriateness of the 2004-2005 campaign plan
despite evidence that it needed to change. Senior military leaders and their staffs must
be able to better identify strategic inflection points and alter their plans when such transitions occur.
The Understanding of the Environment Across the Force
Throughout the war, U.S. units suffered from a limited understanding of the operating environment in Iraq. In the prewar planning and the execution of the invasion, U.S.
units did not understand the inner workings of the Ba’athist regime or the Iraqi security
sector, and assigned too much importance to the formal structures of the government.
Intelligence reports underestimated the impact of decades of international sanctions
and their effects on Iraq’s infrastructure and Iraqi society. The United States also did
not understand the relationships and rivalries among the various Iraqi factions, political
parties, communities, and tribes. As a result, U.S. units found it difficult to discern the
enemy’s strategic and operational intent throughout the war—and to discern the motivations of the factions and individuals that comprised the post-Saddam Iraqi Government
and security forces. As a result, U.S. units’ actions sometimes exacerbated preexisting
conflicts among Iraqis, especially in cases in which Coalition forces inadvertently sided
with one party against another in a long-standing local struggle. These struggles often
appeared to be a matter of the Iraqi Government versus the insurgency (in which the
Coalition naturally aligned with the representatives of the government) when in fact the
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disputes often long predated the 2003 invasion. Too often U.S. units were manipulated
into taking part in local conflicts that were not necessarily germane to the broader fight
against our enemies.
U.S. units also had difficulty understanding the relationships among the various
enemy groups, so that early in the war they failed to detect, among an array of insurgent groups that appeared loose and disparate, the existence of an insurgency that could
coordinate and synchronize its activities at the operational level across the country. In
the mid-years of the war, U.S. forces also failed to detect deep fissures among insurgent
groups—on both the Sunni and Shi’a sides—that might have been exploited to fracture
the insurgency well before the Sunni Awakening. U.S. units also did not appreciate the
degree to which the former regime elements in the Sunni insurgency were linked to AQI
and other Islamist extremist groups, so that the Ba’athist role inside AQI was opaque to
the United States when it evolved into an Iraqi-led organization in 2009-2010.
Because U.S. forces often did not understand the dynamics that drove local political
conflict, they did not grasp the linkages between local conflicts and national politics. The
dictum that “all politics is local” was truer in Iraq than we generally understood: virtually every powerful faction in the central Iraqi state owed its national-level strength to
a local constituency. As a result, Iraqi political figures often became directly involved
in local matters to preserve or advance their national-level power, to either the benefit
or detriment of the coalition. Though the coalition often had limited leverage over Iraqi
factions at the national level, our units had virtually unlimited power at the local level,
where they could issue contracts to whomever they pleased, arrest whomever it was necessary to arrest, or partner with whomever it suited them to partner. Because U.S. leaders
often did not understand the relationship between local politics and national politics,
they rarely turned their ability to make or break any local Iraqi faction into advantage
over national-level Iraqi factions or leaders.
Operational Art Considerations
The Army has not yet captured the operational art lessons of the Iraq War and incorporated them into doctrine or military education. At the time of this writing, Lieutenant
General (Ret.) James M. Dubik’s monograph, Operational Art in Counterinsurgency, remains
one of just a few works on this topic. What follow are a series of lessons that the Army
should incorporate into its doctrine on operational art.3
The Absence of an Operational Reserve. The constraint on U.S. force levels throughout the war meant that, aside from brief periods, the United States fought the Iraq War
without an operational reserve inside the theater. At almost every stage of the war, U.S.
forces inside Iraq were fully committed, meaning that U.S. commanders accepted more
risk than U.S. doctrine would normally dictate. In several cases, U.S. commanders found
it difficult to respond to operational-level surprises, such as the fall of Mosul in November 2004, the Samarra Mosque bombing in 2006, and the Basra and Sadr City battles of
spring 2008.
In future conflicts, senior Army leaders should do everything possible to ensure that
they have sufficient troops in theater to be able to maintain a capable reserve. In the case
of Iraq, the reserve should have been at least two battalions in size and should have
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been a mechanized or Stryker force. If strategic constraints prevent leaders from having
enough aggregate forces to task unassigned units to the mission, it is better to maintain
a reserve and accept risk in some locations rather than go without. Assigning a unit that
already has battlespace to be an “on call” reserve, as was the case in 2004, is not a viable
option and has the potential to create catastrophic results for both the location requiring
a reserve force and the location from which the “on call” reserve is inevitably pulled.
Economies of Force. The dearth of U.S. troops also meant that operational commanders were forced to employ risky economies of force throughout the war, often under-resourcing areas that were important to Iraqi stability or to the enemy. The need to employ
economies of force meant that U.S. commanders faced a constant tradeoff between the
need to disrupt the Sunni insurgency’s use of the Syrian border zone as a strategic base
(and the Shi’a insurgency’s similar use of the Iranian border zone) and the need to employ
enough troops in central Iraq to secure and stabilize the Baghdad region. In the most
costly instance of this tradeoff, MNF-I shifted significant combat power from central Iraq
to the Syrian border zone in 2005, dealing the Sunni insurgency tactical defeats in its
border sanctuaries but leaving the Baghdad region open to sectarian violence that almost
tore the country apart. At no point in the war, even during the surge, did U.S. commanders have enough forces at their disposal—either U.S. or Iraqi—to operate at an adequate
level in both central Iraq and the border zones.
While nearly every military commander throughout history probably has wished
for more forces, in Iraq, some of the causes of the malady of insufficient forces were
self-induced. Particularly during the 2005-2006 timeframe, senior commanders sought to
“starve” U.S. forces of manpower in order to force them to turn over more responsibility
to Iraqis. This was thought to be a method that would empower and prepare the Iraqis
more quickly to take responsibility for their own security, thereby attaining the theater
end state more quickly. In reality, it had the opposite effect, creating considerable gaps
in the coalition’s situational awareness and propelling the country more quickly toward
civil war. Future operational leaders should recognize the ill effect of purposely creating
risky economies of force and determine better methods of transitioning responsibility to
host nation forces quickly.
Boundaries. Too often, coalition unit boundaries did not take local political, social,
or tribal dynamics into account, thereby hampering a unit’s effectiveness and creating
seams that our enemies could exploit. The U.S. units that occupied Iraq in 2003 made
boundary choices that reflected U.S. military doctrine but sometimes made little sense in
the Iraqi context. The most significant early example was the inclusion of Diyala in MNDNorth Central’s (MND-NC) area of operations. Diyala was separated from much of the
rest of the MND-NC area of operations by the Hamrin Mountains and was more linked to
Baghdad than to the Tigris River Valley. This decision also artificially cut the upper Tigris
River Valley, an insurgent hotbed, into two separate division areas of operation. Not until
late 2005 were Mosul and Tikrit finally included in the same division area of operations,
and even then, the Diyala Valley remained part of MND-North’s (MND-N) battlespace.
Similarly, the unfortunate arrangement of MND-CS’s battlespace made first Karbala
and Najaf, and later Diwaniyah, artificially separate from the other major cities of central
southern Iraq, creating many seams that the Sadrist insurgency and the IRGC Quds Force
could exploit. Finally, at various times the vast Jazeera area north of the Euphrates—the
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Ba’athist regime’s main smuggling area during the 1991-2003 sanctions period—was a
seam between MNF-West (MNF-W) and MND-N which the Sunni insurgency heavily
exploited.
To address these issues, boundaries must be constantly reevaluated, perhaps to the
point of creating a doctrinal mandate to review unit boundaries quarterly or at least semiannually during sustained conflicts. In Iraq, with a few notable exceptions, shifting unit
boundaries usually only occurred because of the surge or withdrawal of coalition forces.
Even in those cases, often little thought was given as to how to restructure boundaries.
In the future, boundaries must be reviewed on a recurrent basis to assess whether they
adequately reflect the changing human terrain and enemy situation.
Key Terrain. The coalition’s arrangement of battlespace also failed in some cases to
emphasize properly Iraq’s key terrain. The most significant example of this was that from
2003 through 2006, the coalition’s operational commands did not recognize the importance of the “belts” around Baghdad and their critical role in securing the city. Only in late
2006 did MNC-I realize what most Iraqis knew: that Iraqi Governments had for decades
used the belts to secure the approaches to Baghdad and that the belts had been the basis
of Saddam’s plans to defend the capital in 2003. From an early stage, AQI considered the
belts vital to control Baghdad. Later the IRGC Quds Force and Badr Corps intended to
use them to cleanse the Baghdad region of Sunnis. Nevertheless, not until the arrival of III
Corps in late 2006 did the coalition formulate a comprehensive plan to control the belts.
It has become almost a cliché for operational level planners to assess a nebulous “will
of the people” or “public support” as the center of gravity in a conflict against insurgents.
While these issues are critical, they are more appropriately strategic centers of gravity
and reflect tasks that do not fall wholly within the military’s purview. At the operational
level—even in fights against insurgents and other irregulars—key terrain is still important and ignoring this fact is perilous. The U.S. military should reemphasize the doctrinal
importance of terrain in insurgencies, noting that guerrillas need logistics bases, training
areas, sanctuaries, and areas from which to launch large-scale attacks. Human terrain
matters, but so does geographic terrain.
Decentralized Assets for a Decentralized Fight. The U.S. force that invaded Iraq in
2003 was trained to maneuver and fight in divisions, meaning that scarce assets such
as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and fire support were managed
at division or corps level. As the war proceeded, U.S. operations became increasingly
decentralized to the brigade and battalion level, and over time enabler resources such as
ISR were pushed to lower and lower levels. By 2009, some battalion commanders controlled more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and intelligence assets than the V Corps
commander had in the 2003 invasion.
In institutional terms, the Army needs to further integrate operational decentralization in its organizational structures (tables of organization and equipment [TOEs]), rather
than having units returning from a combat zone turn in the equipment and assets useful
to them in war and recreate their prewar TOEs.

628

CONCLUSION: LESSONS OF THE IRAQ WAR

Transitions
The decision to rotate units into the theater on an annual basis had significant implications for operations, as many units that rotated into the theater tended to only formulate plans that extended to the end of their 1-year rotation. Those plans often sought to
conduct a successful 1-year campaign based on new approaches rather than sustaining
whatever the units that preceded them had been doing. As a result, U.S. units tended to
emphasize quick but sometimes short-lived effects rather than longer-term stability. In
one example early in the war, U.S. leaders rejected as too slow Brigadier General David
Perkins’s suggestion to build a new electrical infrastructure that would meet Baghdad’s
full demand within 3 years. Perkins then returned to the theater 3 years later to find that
no major upgrades to the Iraqi electrical grid had taken place, and Baghdad’s demand
still far outpaced supply.
The turbulent unit transitions that took place at least once a year also hampered relationships between coalition units and local Iraqis. U.S. units came and went so frequently
that productive relationships were forgotten. Often the extensive knowledge about the
local operating environment that units developed was not fully transmitted to incoming
units. This was made worse by the frequent changes that accompanied the drawdown of
U.S. troops.
A potential solution could have been to align brigades and divisions permanently to
one theater and one specific area of operations until the cessation of hostilities or the withdrawal of forces. Under such a model, if a brigade operated in west Baghdad on its first
deployment, it would expect to be deployed to that same area―even to the same forward
operating bases (FOBs) and joint security stations (JSSs) if possible―for the remainder of
the conflict. When that brigade redeployed to its home station, it would remain in virtual
contact with the unit that replaced it, even reading its classified daily reports and conversing with the deployed unit’s leadership. Such a pattern, used by special operations
units for the majority of the war, could have created long-term buy in and commitment
for coalition forces and Iraqis alike as the unit would know that their actions had longterm relevance. It might not be possible to assign units always back to their same area of
operations given the turbulence associated with Army transformation and the ebb and
flow of overall force structure. However, it would have been better than the haphazard
assignment of forces that often saw brigades switched not only across different provinces
in Iraq, but also between the Iraqi and Afghan theaters.
A second potential solution would be to deviate from the normal command rotational
schedule, keeping commanders in key positions such as brigades, divisions, and corps
headquarters deployed for multiple years or even the duration of the conflict. While such
a solution would undoubtedly be an incredible personal and family burden, it would
almost certainly have alleviated the dilemma of repeated annual transitions. Nor would
such a solution be without historical precedent. In the Civil War and World War II, senior
leaders knew that they were committed for the duration of the conflict, itself a considerable motivating factor to achieve success. Similarly, during the post-9/11 conflicts, some
senior special operations commanders remained deployed for years at a time, and Casey
commanded MNF-I for 2½ years.
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Metrics
Throughout the Iraq War, U.S. operational commands found it difficult to determine
whether their plans were succeeding or failing, especially as conditions in the theater
changed. U.S. commanders and their staffs never came to a consensus on what they
ought to be measuring to know whether their units were effective. For most of the war,
units and civilian agencies tended to measure their activities or inputs rather than the
outcome of those activities: money spent, Iraqis trained, insurgents killed or captured,
or other such measures. Until 2006, the coalition essentially measured success by the
holding of Iraq’s three elections, the generation of ISF, and the drawdown of coalition
troops. During the surge, the United States emphasized the completion of “benchmarks”
to gauge strategic progress. But for both the pre-2007 measures of success and the 2007
benchmarks, it would have been possible to show progress in every specified metric but
still fail in the overall mission—exactly the situation in which the coalition found itself in
late 2006. For future operations, the Army must reexamine its measures of effectiveness,
and U.S. units must have better ways of determining whether they are succeeding in their
missions.
At a different level, the Army should consider reassessing trends that emphasize the
use of metrics at the expense of difficult to measure professional judgment. In some ways,
Army leaders have become too enamored with the “fetishization” of statistics and metrics.4 At times in Iraq, metrics and statistics were seen as hard truths or facts, when they
often only provided a snapshot in time of a portion of the situation. Examples of this phenomenon include the transition readiness assessment, the size of the Iraqi security forces,
and the calculation of whether U.S. brigades could be withdrawn in 2006. While our
Army relishes quoting Carl von Clausewitz, in practice we have come to rely excessively
on the Jominian theory of war and its emphasis on scientific method, an imbalance that
requires adjustment. As a force, we should re-emphasize the traditional German military
concept of “Fingerspitzengefuhl,” which loosely can be considered a commander’s sense
and intuition of the battlefield in making decisions.
Iraqi Security Force Development
The years-long effort to create a self-reliant and effective ISF failed for a variety of
reasons, highlighting the extreme difficulty and complexity inherent in building another
nation’s institutions. Though the development of the ISF was often named as the U.S.
operational commands’ main effort, it was never the top priority in terms of resources or
manpower. The main vehicles for developing the ISF (MNSTC-I and the transition teams)
were under-resourced for most of the war. The 2005 decision to have specialized units
and transition teams rather than regular brigades and divisions lead ISF development
meant that the mission never received the full attention of DoD or the theater command.
For better or worse, the development of the ISF was effectively a secondary mission for
most U.S. units until the arrival of the Advise and Assist Brigades in 2010.
The development of the ISF also suffered from disunity of effort for the first 2½ years
of the war when the theater command did not have unified responsibility for the security
ministries and their forces. Even after MNF-I gathered all ISF development functions
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under MNSTC-I at the end of 2005, MNC-I and MNSTC-I did not unify their campaign
plans until mid-2007 when Dubik and Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno synchronized the generation of Iraqi forces with MNC-I’s campaign plan so that the ISF’s force
generation and replenishment directly supported MNC-I’s counteroffensive.
Dubik and Odierno modeled their relationships with the ISF on the one within the
U.S. Army between the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM). Dubik and MNSTC-I, as the ISF’s de facto TRADOC, took
responsibility for the ISF’s initial training, retraining, and brigade-level combat training
center. Odierno and MNC-I, as the ISF’s de facto FORSCOM, used embedded transition
teams and unit partnership to continue training in the field. When the operational commands adopted this approach in 2007, it helped achieve a greater unity of effort for ISF
development.
The most significant problem in building the ISF was failing to account for the political
pressure upon and corruption within the Iraqi forces. Too often, the coalition generated
Iraqi military or police units or assisted offices of the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of
Interior without fully understanding the ways in which political networks extended into
the security forces and security ministries. Rarely did the coalition’s intelligence-gathering apparatus invest as much effort in understanding the ISF and the Iraqi Government
as it did analyzing the enemy. Iraqi commanders often operated under political pressures
their coalition counterparts could not discern or answered to familial or political connections that were opaque, all of which made their behavior and decision making seem at
times inexplicable and made full partnership between coalition and Iraqi units difficult
to achieve.
Addressing this problem, likely one of the most vexing of the entire war, is not easy.
Its roots return to the U.S. decision to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004—an
action that was originally intended to occur years later. Once sovereignty is returned
to a defeated or collapsed power, a large degree of control over the construction of that
state’s institutions is lost. As difficult as it would be, given the host nation’s political push
to return sovereignty as soon as possible, every effort must be made to delay the transfer
of power to allow institutions to incubate under the umbrella of international protection
from corruption. The longer institutions are able to grow without the threat of corruption
and political pressure, the more likely those institutions will be able to resist them on
their own. Furthermore, in Iraq, U.S. leaders usually acted as if the issue of sovereignty
was black and white—once sovereignty had been granted, the United States should completely acquiesce to the will of the newly sovereign nation. While respecting sovereignty
has usually been a bedrock of U.S. values and foreign policy, it does not mean that the
United States should not apply the appropriate levers in order to convince host nation
leaders to make the best decisions. As one U.S. general remarked to Army historians,
the United States had the money and guns to try to influence Iraqi policy—including the
selection of security force leaders—but often gave both away without caveat or condition.5
The Iraq War was the scene of a long debate between using standing units to develop
host nation security forces through partnership and using specialized, ad hoc transition
teams. Transition teams often faced challenges that inhibited their performance, including poor cohesion, insufficient size, lack of unity of command, and haphazard staffing.
As a result, their efforts to prepare ISF were inconsistent. By contrast, standing units
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partnered with Iraqi forces experienced few of the problems that beset transition teams.
While such a solution still had considerable challenges inherent to the monumental task
of rebuilding a nation’s security forces and infrastructure, it appears that using standing
units is the best approach to developing foreign indigenous forces. Constructing the ISF
was also hindered by a series of decisions that inhibited their effectiveness from the tactical to the institutional level. Formal partnership between U.S. advisors and Iraqi units
often focused on staff functions and rarely occurred below the battalion level, preventing
growth at the squad, platoon, and company level: the basic building blocks of tactical
formations. Logistics functions were not built in parallel with tactical units, crippling the
long-term ability of the Iraqis to sustain themselves and creating additional opportunities for corruption. Similarly, armor and artillery formations, as well as engineers, were
neglected initially, delaying the possibility of developing true combined arms capabilities. Combined together, these decisions enfeebled ISF development and delayed transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.
Detainees
Throughout the war, U.S. forces struggled with the question of what to do with the
enemy captured on the battlefield. Having decided at the outset not to treat them as prisoners of war who may be detained legally until the cessation of hostilities, the United
States never found a workable solution to the problem of handling “security detainees”
or “enemy combatants” within a sovereign nation. The improvised systems for reviewing whether detainees were a security risk were so imperfect as to allow large numbers of
Sunni insurgents in particular to return to the battlefield. So pervasive was this phenomenon that most of the senior Iraqi leaders of AQI and later ISIS were at one time in U.S. custody but let go, including ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The political dynamics that
dominated the Iraqi Government, meanwhile, created a similar result among captured
Shi’a insurgents, a large number of whom were released back onto the battlefield because
of pressure from Baghdad or by the terms of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement.
The phenomenon of insurgents reappearing on the battlefield repeatedly after U.S.
troops captured them created a deep level of distrust between the tactical units who fought
and captured the militants and the higher echelon commands that designed policies that
released them. The perception that the operational commands were following a “catch
and release” policy became widespread among U.S. units, so much so that the detainee
policies created perverse incentives among U.S. troops, especially on operations against
militants who had been previously captured and released. The repeated reappearance of
militants on the battlefield also undermined the Iraqi population’s confidence in the coalition and gave life to conspiracy theories that the United States was releasing dangerous
fighters back into the war in order to perpetuate sectarian conflict.
The likelihood that U.S. forces will continue to operate against militias or insurgents in
the future means that the detention conundrum that began in Afghanistan and Iraq will
recur. The Army must relook its doctrine, training, and organization for detention operations and ensure that it is as appropriate for the handling of security detainees as it is for
the handling of enemy prisoners of war. At the national level, the United States should
lead an effort to revisit and potentially update portions of the Geneva Conventions and
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international law to reflect the current environment of nonstate actors and multinational
terrorist organizations who exploit loopholes within current detention protocols.
At the same time, military leaders should press for a revision of U.S. policies that led
to detainee problems in Iraq. If, in future conflicts, the United States again chooses to
regard its captured enemies as something other than enemy prisoners of war, then U.S.
leaders can expect once again to see the enemy released back onto the battlefield repeatedly through imperfect security review procedures, to see detainee abuse cases emerge,
and to see our troops forced into debilitating moral dilemmas.
Multinational and Interagency Campaign Planning
Iraq showed that the United States needs better doctrine for strategic campaign planning. The United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq without the detailed civil-military plans necessary to stabilize the country after regime change. Over time, the theater
command and the U.S. Embassy developed sophisticated plans for meeting coalition
objectives in Iraq, but they did so in an ad hoc fashion, by trial and error. General David
H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker refined multinational and interagency
planning in the Joint Strategic Assessment Team and Joint Campaign Plan of 2007, which
Odierno and Austin later carried forward, but these processes have not been captured in
U.S. doctrine.
At no point during the war was the joint campaign planning that took place in Baghdad matched by similar interagency planning or synchronization in Washington. Future
conflicts will require the integration of many different elements of national power, but
the Iraq War showed that the United States currently lacks the capability of managing this integration. The United States should actively support regulatory or statutory
changes such as a “Goldwater-Nichols” for interagency reform. At a minimum, such
reform should include interagency assignments as a requirement for General Officer or
Senior Executive Service level promotions; increased funding for civilians to attend military schooling at all levels (basic course, advanced course, command and general staff
college, as well as senior staff college); mandatory civilian participation at combat training centers (CTCs), battle command training programs (BCTPs), and other training; and
creation of a civilian quick reaction corps with short notice deployments included in their
recruitment contracts.
Conventional-SOF Integration
At the outset of the Iraq War, U.S. conventional and special operations forces were
unaccustomed to operating together in the same area. U.S. military doctrine at that time
encouraged a segregation of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) into
different areas of operation, and this was the way U.S. forces conducted the invasion of
2003. As the coalition settled into largely static geographic areas of operation after the
invasion, conventional and SOF units found it necessary to share battlespace. For at least
the first 2 years of the war, this arrangement was often awkward, as conventional commanders often found SOF raids disruptive and uncoordinated, while SOF commanders
sometimes found conventional units constraining to the SOF mission. As early as fall 2003,
however, conventional and SOF commanders found ways to integrate their operations,
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and by 2005 Casey and MNF-I sought to institutionalize these methods at the theater
level. By the time of the surge, most SOF and conventional units in Iraq had become
highly adept at synchronizing their operations, able to generate intelligence, coordinate
targeting, and execute operations together with astonishing speed―a factor that created
heavy pressure on AQI in particular and nearly resulted in that organization’s defeat in
2010. A generation of tactical commanders in both conventional and SOF units learned
how to operate together between 2003 and 2011, to devastating effect. As with the war’s
other innovations, the integration of special and conventional operations is a perishable
skill that will atrophy over time if it is not captured in U.S. military doctrine, training, and
organization. As one U.S. general officer observed after 2011, “everyone will be inclined
to return to their own corners now.”6
Some Army leaders have also noted the role reversal between SOF and conventional
units: before the 9/11 attacks, foreign internal defense (FID) had been nearly exclusively
the role of special operations forces, specifically the Army Special Forces regiment. Special Forces groups were oriented regionally and considerable effort and expenditure was
put into training their personnel to speak foreign languages and understand different cultures. The doctrinal mission of direct action, while still one of the regiment’s core tasks,
was not of equal importance to FID. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army Special Forces groups increasingly focused on direct action, leaving large-scale FID missions
to conventional forces—as is the case, at the time of this writing, in much of Operation
INHERENT RESOLVE. It appears, for example, that the doctrinal guideline that a Special
Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) should train a host nation battalion was
ignored during certain periods of both conflicts. While this report recognizes U.S. special
operations forces will never be of sufficient size to rebuild an entire country’s security
forces, its leaders should revisit the current imbalance between FID and direct action, and
shift the focus of Special Forces groups back toward their more traditional role in FID.
The Role of the Reserve Component
At an individual level, reserve component troops made significant contributions to
the war. The operational commands could not have been staffed without them, especially
as changes in the operating environment required the creation of new organizations to
deal with specific problems, such as Task Force 134.
At the unit level, the Army’s 2004 decision to operationalize the nation’s strategic
reserve, the Army National Guard, had important implications inside the Iraq theater.
This was especially true during the pivotal election year of 2005, when the National
Guard provided 8 of the 16 Army brigades in the theater. The majority of National Guard
units and commanders performed well, especially at the platoon and company level. But
the difficult experiences of the 48th BCT in the Triangle of Death, 1-184 Infantry Regiment in Baghdad, 2-28 BCT in Ramadi, and 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in
Kirkuk―all in 2004-2006―left senior U.S. commanders with the impression that assigning battlespace to National Guard brigades carried significantly more risk than assigning battlespace to active brigades. As a result, MNF-I did not assign brigade or division
battlespace to National Guard units again until 2009. The increased title 10 burden the
National Guard will have in a shrinking Army requires significant reforms. Additional
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funding is required to ensure Guard units are equipped on par with active forces, personnel rules should ensure deployable units are fully staffed, and policies should increase
the number of mandatory annual training days.7
The Role of Contractors
The U.S. military’s reliance on contractors to provide services and other support in
theaters of war, a development that followed the drawdown of uniformed U.S. troops in
the 1990s, gave them a critical role throughout the Iraq War. This trend accelerated when
senior military and civilian leaders substituted force management levels or troop limitations for traditional strategic reviews. As a result, contractors performed military support
tasks that the units in Iraq could not do themselves, such as some logistics functions, part
of the training of the ISF, and even the securing of large coalition bases. At some points
in the war, the coalition had more contractors inside the theater than uniformed troops.
Contractors came with their own challenges, however. Before the surge period, the
operational commands did not have reliable systems for tracking the activities and
locations of contractors, meaning that they occasionally disrupted military operations
or strayed into dangerous situations without the awareness of battlespace owners. In
addition, the Iraqi population mostly did not distinguish between the actions of coalition military units and Western contractors and often held the coalition responsible for
contractors’ negative activities. The most significant case was the Blackwater contractors’
killing of 17 Iraqis in Nisour Square in Baghdad in September 2007, an incident that had
strategic implications for the remainder of the war because it made the Iraqi Government
deeply reluctant to accept the presence of U.S. and coalition contractors without legal
restrictions on their activities.
MNSTC-I faced two contractor-related issues. First, the requirements in theater
changed faster than the contracting system could accommodate. The late summer 2007
decision by coalition commanders that the police development contract should be
changed to the advising of provincial chiefs of police took 8 months to implement, far too
long for the operational needs of the campaign. Second, contracts in which contractors
phase themselves out of work—a necessary part of “phasing in” host nation security
forces to do the job themselves―are hard to write and provide incentives for contractors
to underperform. In one case, coalition commanders realized in 2007 that the MNSTC-I
contract to train the Iraqi National Police had failed—in 3 years—to produce a single
policeman capable of training his fellow Iraqis. When the contract was passed to the
Italian Carabinieri, the paramilitary force produced an Iraqi training cadre capable of
instructing students in just 6 months.
The Importance of Headquarters
U.S. senior commanders learned over the course of the war to value tactical and operational headquarters. Stabilization and COIN operations generated a myriad of nonstandard tasks that often required the hands-on involvement of leaders, such as engagements
with political, ISF, or tribal leaders. Many of these tasks endured even as U.S. units gave
up responsibility for tactical security so division, brigade, and battalion headquarters
continued to play central roles in the campaign even as their companies and battalions
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drew down. In some cases, missions required a full headquarters structure but few troops,
such as the Combined Security Mechanism, the peacekeeping-style mission created by
Odierno to prevent Arab-Kurd conflict along the disputed boundaries in northern Iraq.
U.S. commanders also learned the consequences of using ad hoc, joint manning document headquarters rather than standing headquarters. Time after time, when creating
new organizations in Iraq, DoD and CENTCOM relied on ad hoc headquarters rather
than standing army, corps, or division headquarters, only to see the new organizations
suffer from a lack of cohesion, inadequate training and proficiency, and low staffing.
Senior leaders such as Petraeus concluded from their experience in Iraq that a standing
headquarters of any kind will always outperform an ad hoc, individual augmentee-filled
organization. Yet DoD favored ad hoc joint headquarters for a variety of reasons: to ensure
all the services contributed to the headquarters; to leave standing commands intact for
other contingencies and war plans; and because U.S. leaders assumed the missions for
which the ad hoc organizations had been created would be short and need not disrupt
future plans and operations. Iraq showed the pitfalls of such an approach.
The Role of the Division
The 2003 invasion was fought by divisions maneuvering through battlespace and
synchronizing the operations of their brigades and other assets. Once the coalition divisions took up largely static areas of operation after the invasion, the proper role of the
division in the broader campaign was not entirely clear. Over time, the management
of the Iraq campaign was decentralized to the brigade level. As the modular brigades
became severed from their organic division headquarters, frequently operating under
the control of divisions with whom they had little familiarity, divisions sometimes had
difficulty finding an appropriate role in synchronizing tactical activities. In some extreme
cases, divisions acted as the equivalent of area support groups for diverse and sometimes
only loosely coordinated brigade operations, especially divisions with vast battlespace
and diverse operating environments. In other cases, divisions found a productive role in
maintaining an operational-level enemy picture and coordinating brigade and battalion
operations to overcome seams that insurgents might exploit.
In either case, the Iraq War did not yield a clear picture of the future operational role of
the division. Some divisions took on a level of responsibility, management of assets, and
control of territory equivalent to that of a traditional corps headquarters. At the height of
the surge, for example, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) controlled five U.S.
brigades, but also exercised de facto control, or at least controlling influence, over four
Iraqi divisions, tens of thousands of Iraqi police, and more than 50,000 Sons of Iraq. Similarly, in some cases U.S. brigades took on a level of responsibility equivalent to or even
exceeding that of a traditional U.S. division. In 2007, Colonel Ricky Gibbs’s 4th Brigade,
1st Infantry Division controlled no fewer than nine U.S. battalions and exercised de facto
control of thousands more Iraqi troops. In the same year, Colonel Michael Kershaw’s 2d
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had slightly over 5,000 U.S. troops in the “Triangle of
Death” south of Baghdad, but also exercised de facto control over more than 20,000 Iraqi
troops and Sons of Iraq, giving 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, more manpower and
a span of control greater than that of a standard U.S. division.
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Stability Operations
Stability operations are a crucial part of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. However, large-scale stability operations require specialized skills and troop-to-task ratios. A
stability operation on the scale of Iraq is likely to require more specialized expertise and
combat support than the Army currently retains in its inventory. If—or when—tasked
again to undertake a large-scale stability operation, the Army must be better prepared
to deploy quickly combat support capabilities and specialized personnel. To do so, the
Army should both maintain the civil affairs growth that occurred over the last decade
and continue to balance stability training with combined arms maneuver training. At
the same time, certain capabilities could be effectively “warehoused” within TRADOC
to be able to be reactivated on short notice. Such capabilities would include military governance, economic reconstruction, agricultural development, human assessment teams,
and military assistance and advisory teams, at a minimum.
Strategic Communications
The coalition was never able to keep pace with the enemy’s strategic communications. Its process was reactive, bureaucratically slow and centralized, and not considered
a critical mission. Commanders often remarked that strategic communications required
approval at corps and force level―or often higher. One commander in south Baghdad
noted that he could not obtain corps approval to display a billboard or distribute leaflets featuring a wanted insurgent, but that he incongruously had the authority to drop
joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) on insurgent positions or buildings. The coalition’s
inability to influence the informational battlespace in a timely manner or to provide the
necessary authorities to commanders who were engaged in a decentralized and local
conflict was a symptom of the U.S. military culture that did not place a high priority on
strategic communications or information operations and a U.S. Government averse to
the risks associated with fighting a war of ideas. As the world becomes more reliant on
digital information, this challenge will become more acute, as most Army tactical capabilities are still primarily flyer, leaflet, and loudspeaker platforms. Engaging in the digital
conflict of ideas in real time or near real time, as our adversaries already do, will require
structural, doctrinal, and legislative change across the joint and interagency spectrum.
TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INNOVATIONS
The tone of this study of the Iraq War often has been critical, highlighting the significant errors from which the United States and the Army must learn, but this is not meant to
overshadow the Army’s significant tactical and operational adaptations and innovations.
The units deployed to Iraq made strides in COIN warfare, stabilization operations, counterterrorism, security assistance, and many other areas that would have been unthinkable
in 2003. This flexibility and adaptability will be important for generations of future leaders who may face similar tactical and operational problems. What follows is a selection of
some of the more significant innovations and adaptations.
The initial adaptation to COIN from 2003 to 2006. Well before the publication of a
COIN manual in December 2006, U.S. units had made great progress in applying such an
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approach in their areas of operation. Many units demonstrated surprising flexibility in
rediscovering and applying COIN tactics―albeit unevenly—often without any support
from their institutional and educational systems. The campaign histories of 2003-2006 are
replete with such examples of units and commanders who taught themselves to fight in
a way they had not been instructed to do.
Agility from 2006 onward in reconciliation at the local level. Agile, flexible, and
open-minded commanders and units made the Awakening possible. Later, U.S. units
displayed great creativity in synchronizing bottom-up and top-down political accommodation, so that by the time of the surge, battalion and brigade commanders had invented
the concept of “maneuvering to reconciliation”—i.e., planning security operations with
a view to opening up new reconciliation initiatives. In 2007, the operational commands
created an entire infrastructure to manage and enable the Sons of Iraq, while creating the
Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to parlay local cease fires into political progress
wherever possible. These innovations had little to guide them in existing doctrine.
The use of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Army commanders and units developed the capacity and knowledge to use money as a COIN and
stabilization tool, so much so that by 2007 most leaders acknowledged that money for
projects had become as important as ammunition on the battlefield. By then, the pre-2003
practice of centralized control of small funds by contracting officers and field ordering
officers had given way to spending billions of dollars by U.S. units across a spectrum
ranging from microeconomic projects to much larger-scale initiatives such as paying of
the Sons of Iraq. While considerable debate exists on the long-term efficacy of such efforts,
there is little question that Army commanders’ adroit use of the funds helped tamp down
many of the underlying causes of instability for the short term, thereby buying time to
re-establish security and rebuild the ISF. A more detailed review of this topic is warranted, given the uneven long-term effects and the concern that such “expeditionary economics” caused more harm than good.
The operational synchronization of military and civil activities. The U.S. units
who fought after 2005 had learned to integrate their operations with civil activities and
non-military organizations in ways the Army of 2003 could not have envisioned. The
creation of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to pursue stabilization objectives; the
integration of MNF-I (and USF-I) with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, both organizationally and
in planning; and the specific revision of MNF-I campaign plans by the civil-military Joint
Strategic Assessment Team in 2007 (and by its successors in later years) are the most
significant cases in point. In many instances, U.S. military leaders and units learned to
connect their military operations explicitly to the achievement of a sustainable political
outcome in their areas of operation, though this was not accomplished, ultimately, at the
strategic level.
A series of intelligence innovations. During the war, a combination of organizational
changes and technological improvements gave tactical level units, sometimes down to
the brigade and even battalion level, access to national level intelligence from all of the
three major intelligence collection disciplines. These made it possible for U.S. forces to
identify enemy networks and target them for either disruption or political reconciliation. They also enabled an unprecedented increase in counterterrorism operations tempo
(OPTEMPO). These changes coincided with an extraordinary forward deployment of
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the defense intelligence community that made defense intelligence more responsive to
operational demands and equipped commanders with better knowledge and capabilities than could have been dreamt of in 2003. These deployments, coupled with the ability to reach back to national capabilities, enabled commanders to understand better the
various threats the coalition faced and at times to get within the decision cycle of those
adversaries.
Establishing an effective medical evacuation system. During the span of the war,
the U.S. Army’s medical community constructed the most effective medical evacuation
system in the history of warfare. At the point of injury, individual Soldiers were issued
medical kits with tourniquets and advanced bandages with coagulant material. Frontline medics were provided additional training and new trauma equipment that greatly
increased a casualty’s chance of survival. In order to preserve the “golden hour,” casualties were swiftly evacuated to forward-based surgical teams and then sent on to a
regionally located combat support hospital where they received further treatment and
stabilization. Those facilities pioneered many new trauma techniques, such as whole
blood transfusions and massive blood loss protocols, which were later passed on to civilian trauma specialists. If necessary, casualties were sent to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany where they were further stabilized before being sent on to the
national military hospitals in the Washington, DC, area. Hundreds, if not thousands, of
grievously wounded casualties lived because of these innovations, leading to unprecedented survival rates.
The creation of the Combined Security Mechanism. This initiative to prevent conflict
along the disputed internal boundary (the “Green Line”) helped avert an Arab-Kurd war
that had seemed inevitable in 2007-2008. For a critical period of 2 years, it kept the peace
between the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the KRG in Erbil until it was dismantled
during the U.S. military withdrawal of 2011. It should serve as a model for peacekeeping
and peace enforcement within the U.S. military.
***
The Iraq War has the potential to be one of the most consequential conflicts in American history. It shattered a long-standing political tradition against preemptive wars. John
Quincy Adams’s presumption that America should not go “abroad searching for monsters to destroy” was erased, at least temporarily.8 In the conflict’s immediate aftermath,
the pendulum of American politics swung to the opposite pole with deep skepticism
about foreign interventions.
In terms of geostrategic consequences, the war produced profound consequences.
At the time of this project’s completion in 2018, an emboldened and expansionist Iran
appears to be the only victor. Iraq, the traditional regional counterbalance for Iran, is at
best emasculated, and at worst has key elements of its government acting as proxies for
Iranian interests. With Iraq no longer a threat, Iran’s destabilizing influence has quickly
spread to Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, as well as other locations. As the conflict expanded
beyond its original boundaries, the colonial creation that was the Iraqi-Syrian border was
effectively erased. Bashar al-Assad, having misjudged his ability to control the Salafist
foreign fighters that he gave safe haven for the better part of a decade, found himself
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threatened by the very forces that he had exploited to avert an American invasion―an
invasion that in actuality was never forthcoming. Syria was plunged into a vicious civil
war that devolved into a brutality only seen in the worst conflicts of the 20th century,
resulting in a death toll that has topped half of a million, repeated use of chemical weapons, and the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Kurdistan evolved from a proto-state
into a de-facto nation, a development that has created deep tensions with Turkey. The
danger of a Sunni-Shi’a regional conflict, with potentially globally destabilizing effects, is
now greater than at any time since the original schism. Zarqawi’s goal appears to be on
the cusp of becoming reality.
The human and material cost of the conflict was staggering. Nearly 4,500 American
military personnel lost their lives in the fighting, and another 32,000 were wounded―
many of them grievously. More than 300 soldiers from other coalition nations also perished. Estimates on Iraqi casualties vary wildly, ranging from roughly 200,000 killed to
more than a million. Monetary costs, for the United States only, are similarly hard to
approximate due to the challenge in estimating future costs for veterans’ care and the
interest on loans taken out to finance the war. There is no question that the war has been
expensive, ranging even among the lower estimates from a cost of over 800 billion to
nearly 2 trillion dollars.
At the same time, there are those who argue that the Iraq War, as well as the conflict in Afghanistan, represent historical aberrations with few germane lessons. Supporters of this position posit that conflicts involving COIN and nation-building sit far from
the World War II style of “traditional war” for which the Army typically has been held
responsible. Such potentially existential conflicts are so much harder to prepare for, they
argue, that investing time on COIN related tasks would be counterproductive, if not irresponsible. Adherents of the position that the Army should return to its “traditional” warfighting role also suggest that it is relatively easy to train “down” from high intensity
conflict against other armies.
The authors of this study conclude that such positions are intellectually specious. Ironically, many of the same arguments were made before the invasion of Iraq and during the
first few years of the war. As a result, precious lives and time were lost before the Army
adapted to the character of the conflict and was able to regain the initiative. It is one of
this study’s core premises that there are additional complexities in COIN that often do not
exist in more conventional conflicts. Translating national political guidance into battles
and campaigns that blend both traditional maneuver and deft political efforts that target
the drivers of conflict is a complicated art. Leaders at all levels in COIN have to be able
to integrate the fields of political science, culture, and regional history simultaneously
with military strategy to achieve success. Long-term security force assistance, a staple of
COIN, is difficult, dangerous, and frustrating. Peacebuilding, the process of nurturing
reconciliation, building durable and tolerant institutions, and carrying out political and
economic transformation are intensely challenging tasks. U.S. efforts toward this end in
Iraq were inefficient, disjointed, and ultimately unsuccessful.
Given the consequences and the cost of the Iraq War, it is essential that the Army
studies what went wrong and why. The Army must also capture the innovations and
adaptations that produced tactical and operational successes. Above all, the United States
must not repeat the errors of previous wars in assuming that the conflict was an anomaly
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with few useful lessons. This project was commissioned by the Army’s senior leadership
in part because they believed the Army had spent the first few years of the Iraq War
relearning the lessons of the Vietnam conflict. Hopefully, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War
will help prevent that error from being repeated.
While the next war that the United States fights may be different from the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be risky to assume that it will be so different as to render
the lessons of those conflicts moot. The character of warfare is changing, but even if we
face peer or near-peer competitors in future conflicts, they are likely to employ a blend
of conventional and irregular warfare—what is often called “hybrid warfare” or “operations in the gray zone.” The United States may not have the luxury of choosing the next
war it fights. Our enemies are aware of the challenges we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan
and will incorporate lessons that they have derived from these conflicts against us.
The failure of the United States to attain its strategic objectives in Iraq was not inevitable. It came as a byproduct of a long series of decisions—acts of commission and
omission—made by well-trained and intelligent leaders making what seemed to be reasonable decisions. At one point, in the waning days of the Surge, the change of strategy
and the sacrifices of many thousands of Americans and Iraqis had finally tipped the scales
enough to put the military campaign on a path towards a measure of success. However,
it was not to be, as the compounding effect of earlier mistakes, combined with a series of
decisions focused on war termination, ultimately doomed the fragile venture.
It is for the efforts and immeasurable sacrifices of our Soldiers that this work is dedicated. Above all, this history is meant to be a permanent record of their accomplishments
and their willingness to give the last full measure of devotion for their own country and
for the people of Iraq.
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8. John Quincy Adams, speech to U.S. House of Representatives on Independence Day, July 4, 1821,
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AFTERWORD
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) was honored to support the effort for this
study and to publish these volumes. Since our vision is to develop strategic leaders and
ideas invaluable to the Army, the Joint Force, and the Nation, the publication of these volumes is emblematic of this study’s purpose. In fact, this study represents what Secretary
of War Elihu Root envisioned when he established the USAWC in 1901. He directed its
students to consider three important strategic issues: national defense, military science,
and responsible command—aspects which are relevant to this study.
It is our hope these volumes will prompt and enable further studies on other levels
and aspects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to hundreds of hours of
interviews, as a byproduct of this work, over 30,000 pages of documents were declassified, and will be made available online. Over time, all of these primary sources will be
reviewed and reassessed by others, including the Staff College and USAWC students,
as a way to continue to improve as a profession. To further assist with studying these
volumes, we are publishing them in a searchable digital format, negating the need for a
lengthy index. Additionally, while this is an extensive study, it is by no means complete.
Many areas fell outside the scope of this study and will require further in-depth research,
areas such as logistics, humanitarian assistance, special operations, and conventional
mutual efforts, along with U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) decisions and wider
U.S. and international partner decisions, which impacted the strategic and operational
direction and resources in Iraq itself.
This study reinforces the importance of what we do at the USAWC as part of professional military education and the need to continue to innovate and improve our efforts.
The central problems in Iraq and Afghanistan typically started at the strategic level. We
rightfully need to address the many operational and tactical issues highlighted throughout this study. However, that is not sufficient to solve the overall challenges we will face
in the foreseeable future. We have to get the strategy right and be prepared for the inevitable natural tendency toward strategic drift and strategic depreciation. The U.S. Army
has traditionally had an almost overwhelming faith in technology and doctrine, on the
changing character of war, which is often reflected in this study. We can and will analyze
and learn from it. At the same time, we cannot overcommit to the lessons from this war.
As Dr. Mike Neiberg, our USAWC Chair of War Studies, recently reinforced to me, “The
next war we fight will be quite different and will render many of the operational and tactical suggestions here overcome by events.” The question is which ones? At the USAWC,
we are committed and will further reinforce the importance of the study of strategy, the
nature of war, and the essence of leadership and decision-making at the strategic level,
and at the sometimes “Gordian Knot” nexus of strategy and operations.
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On this the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, I am mindful that this study
is part of a longstanding tradition within our Army to critically assess past strategies,
operations, and decisions to inform decisions and actions in the future. This commitment
to self-evaluation, study, and adaptation serves not only to ensure the future readiness
of our Army, but honors those who likewise committed themselves to the security and
defense of our Nation during this conflict.
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Center for Army Lessons Learned
U.S. Central Command
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
Coalition Forces
Coalition Forces Land Component Command
Commanding General
Central Intelligence Agency
Criminal Investigation Division
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula
Combined Joint Task Force
Combined Joint Task Force-7
Concerned Local Citizens
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Contingency Operating Base
Counter-IED Operations and Integration Center
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COIN
COL
CPA
CRS
CSA
CSI
CSIS
DCSINT
DIA
DoD
EFP
EOD
EPRT
ERB
ERU
FBI
FID
FIFA
FMS
FMV
FOB
FORSCOM
FPS
FRAGO
FSEC
GAT
GMLRS
GOI
HMMWV
I MEF
IA
IED
IFCNR
IGFC
IIP
INIS
IO
IP

counterinsurgency
colonel
Coalition Provisional Authority
Congressional Research Service
Chief of Staff of the Army
Combat Studies Institute
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
explosively formed penetrator
explosive ordnance disposal
embedded provincial reconstruction teams
Emergency Response Brigade
Emergency Response Unit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
foreign internal defense
Federation Internationale de Football Association
foreign military sales
full-motion video
forward operating base
U.S. Army Forces Command
Facilities Protection Service
fragmentary order
Force Strategic Engagement Cell
Governance Assessment Team
guided multiple-launch rocket systems
Government of Iraq
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (aka “Humvee”)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Iraqi Army
improvised explosive device
Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation
Iraqi Ground Forces Command
Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi National Intelligence Service
Information Operations
Iraqi Police
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IRAM
IRGC
ISCI
ISF
ISG
ISI
ISIL
ISIS
ISOF
ISR
ITFC
JAM
JCPAT
JCS
JDAM
JFSOCC-I
JIEDDO
JRTN
JSAT
JSS
KDP
KH
KRG
LNO
LTC
MEF
MeK
MEU
MHI
MiTT
MNC-I
MND
MND-B
MND-C
MND-CS
MND-N
MND-NC
MND-NE

improvised rocket-assisted munition
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
Iraqi security forces
Iraq Study Group
Islamic State of Iraq
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
Iraqi special operations forces
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Iraq Threat Finance Cell
Jaysh al-Mahdi (aka Mahdi Army)
Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Direct Attack Munition
Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi
Joint Strategic Assessment Team
joint security stations
Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kata’ib Hizballah
Kurdistan Regional Government
liaison officer
lieutenant colonel
Marine Expeditionary Force
Mujahedin e Khalq
Marine Expeditionary Unit
Military History Institute
Military Transition Team
Multi-National Corps–Iraq
Multinational Division
Multi-National Division–Baghdad
Multi-National Division-Center
Multi-National Division–Central South
Multi-National Division–North
Multi-National Division–North Central
Multi-National Division–Northeast
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MND-SE
MNF-I
MNF-W
MNSTC-I
MOD
MRAP
NATO
NCO
NDU
NDU-CISA
NPR
NSA
NSC
NTM-I
OCINC
ODA
ODIN
OIF
OMC
OPDAN
OPORD
OPTEMPO
OSC-I
OSD
PIC
PJCC
PKK
PM
PMF
POTUS
PRT
PSC
PUK
PYD
RCT
ROE
RPG
RSO

Multi-National Division–Southeast
Multi-National Force–Iraq
Multi-National Force–West
Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq
Ministry of Defense
mine resistant ambush protected
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
noncommissioned officer
National Defense University
National Defense University-College of International Security Affairs
National Public Radio
National Security Agency
National Security Council
NATO Training Mission–Iraq
Office of the Commander in Chief
Operational Detachment Alpha
Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Office of Military Cooperation
Operation DEFEAT AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH
operation order
operations tempo
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Provincial Iraqi Control
Provincial Joint Coordination Center
Kurdistan Workers Party
Prime Minister
Population Mobilization Forces
President of the United States
provincial reconstruction team
private security contractor
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Democratic Union Party
regimental combat team
rules of engagement
rocket-propelled grenade
regional security office
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RSTA
SCIRI
SDE TIR
SEAL
SECDEF
SFA
SG
SGS
SIGACT
SOCCENT
SOCOM
SOF
SOFA
SPTT
SSI
STT
STU
SVEST
SWAT
TF
TFBSO
TOE
TRADOC
UAV
UK
UN
UNSCR
USAHEC
USAID
USAWC
USD-C
USD-N
USD-S
USF-I
USIP
USMC
VBIED
VP

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
Strategic Debriefing Element Tactical Interrogation Report
Sea, Air, and Land Teams
Secretary of Defense
strategic framework agreement
Special Groups
secretary to the general staff
significant activity
Special Operations Command Central
Special Operations Command
special operations forces
status of forces agreement
Special Police Transition Team
Strategic Studies Institute
Stability Transition Team
Special Tactics Unit
suicide vest
Special Weapons and Tactics
Task Force
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
table of organization and equipment
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
unmanned aerial vehicle
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAWC’s Army Heritage and Education Center
United States Agency for International Development
U.S. Army War College
U.S. Division-Center
U.S. Division-North
U.S. Division-South
United States Forces-Iraq
U.S. Institute of Peace
U.S. Marine Corps
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
Vice-President
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VTC
WMD
YPG

Video Teleconference
weapons of mass destruction
People’s Protection Units
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MAP SYMBOLS
Armor
Cavalry
Cavalry (Armored)
Field Artillery (Self-Propelled)
Infantry
Infantry (Airborne)
Infantry (Air Assault)
Infantry (Mechanized)
Infantry (Stryker)
Battery, Company, or Cavalry Troop
Battalion or Cavalry Squadron
Regiment or Group
Brigade
Division
Corps
I Corps
II Marine Expeditionary Force
Multi-National Division–Baghdad
1st Armored Cavalry Division
82d Airborne Division
2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
6th Brigade, 2d National Police Division (Iraqi)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker)
2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery
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